XIII. 1814. CHAP. military spoil. But when France came under the Bourbon rule the case was entirely changed. The Emperor Alexander, whose generous heart was enamoured of noble actions, was urgent with Lord Castlereagh to allow the fleet to return to France on the principle that it would go far to reconcile the people of the country to their new governors. Without expressing a decided opinion on this point, which was of great importance to the future position of France as a naval power, Lord Castlereagh contented himself with stating the case and referring its decision to the Cabinet at home, expressing, at the same time, an opinion that it might be conceded. On the general terms of peace there was no disagreement. It was unanimously resolved to give to France her old frontier and territory, with a small addition on the side of Savoy and the Palatinate; and that the Allied forces should evacuate the fortresses they had conquered in old France, at the same time that the French troops retired from those they still held beyond the Rhine." * The affairs of Italy at this period wore so unpromising *"As to peace, we have agreed to enter upon its negotiation with Talleyrand under full powers from Monsieur, in order that it may be ready for signature on the King's arrival. With respect to the nature of the arrangement, we shall all be agreed to take our Chatillon projet as the basis; but in the present state of things there is just cause for some modification; and there is disposition in the Emperor of Russia inconveniently to favour a relaxation in our demands. As far as I can judge, we shall be unanimously disposed to strip the arrangement of anything bearing upon it the character of particular distrust. We propose to admit the French ambassador to the general congress; and, having the English restitutions necessarily in hand as a security for the peace, we are disposed, by the convention for the suspension of hostilities, to allow the evacuation of old France by the Allied troops, and of the fortresses beyond those limits by the French troops, to go hand in hand. "In this part of the case I foresee the fleet at Antwerp will make the prac tical difficulty. I see the general feeling will be against our refusing to France liberty, as circumstances now stand, to withdraw those ships. The Emperor of Russia has already expressed to me his hope that this would not be pressed. In the other instances of fortresses to be surrendered, the French garrisons are to be allowed to evacuate as friends, and not as enemies, taking with them their arms and military equipment, leaving only what is considered, in military phrase, les dotations de la place. The reasoning will be-if the army is suffered so to retire, why not the navy? The former keeping their arms, the latter, in parity of reasoning, are entitled to retain and retire with their ships. This is not very correct logic; but the maintenance of the opposite principle will be XIII. 94. Untoward affairs in an aspect, and had become so complicated by the inca- CHAP. pacity of the Austrian commander-in-chief, the treachery and ambiguous conduct of Murat, and the imprudent 1814. and unauthorised proclamation of Lord W. Bentinck, that, had a general peace not been concluded and hostili- aspect of ties resumed, it might have become a very serious cause Italy in the of embarrassment to the Allied Powers. The reason was," end of April. that Murat, having first been a traitor to his country and his benefactor, and openly joined the Allied cause, was determined nevertheless not to commit himself irrevocably by commencing hostilities against the French, till the signature of the Allied sovereigns or their ambassadors was appended to a treaty securing to him his dominions. unpleasant against the temper of the Allies, and the enforcing it by siege now still more so. I wish, therefore, to know your feelings upon this point-whether you are disposed to reserve it as a distinct question for negotiation, meaning to give it up ultimately, if everything else is satisfactorily settled, as a mark of generosity to the nation; or, whether you see any and what modification to the question. "You will recollect we never claimed the ships for ourselves; we considered them as the right of the captors. The engagement I obtained was, that they should follow the fate of the place, and not go to France; but this stipulation was against Buonaparte, not against the Bourbons. I am afraid we cannot now press this point without much odium. The value of the ships is in itself no great object. I understood from the Brabant deputies they were perishing fast, being built of green wood. If you can reconcile feelings to the measure, I myself doubt the expediency of making this point a sine qua non as matters now stand in Europe. "With respect to the future limits of France, I hope the Emperor will not be disposed to press any departure from the ancient frontier which, in a military point of view, can be objectionable. The flat part of Savoy not affecting the line of the Alps and Avignon, are the augmentation to which, from the first discussions at Chatillon, it was thought France might be suffered not unreasonably to aspire. I believe, upon similar principles, something in the Palatinate had been thought of; but this must depend upon German arrangements. With respect to the power of France so augmented, I see no present cause for alarm; and there is a strong motive for giving to our peace with the Bourbons somewhat of a more liberal complexion. With respect to our own peace, I consider Malta, the Cape, Mauritius, and Tobago, a sine qua non; also the regulations limiting the French to a commercial occupation of their factories in the East Indies. I should wish, as at present circumstanced, not to press the Saintes. It is not worth swelling the catalogue with a demand of this nature. . . . I am inclined to a liberal line upon subordinate questions, having secured the Continent, the ancient family, and the leading features of our own peace. I still feel great doubts about the acquisition in sovereignty of so many Dutch colonies. I am sure our reputation on the Continent, as a feature of strength, power, and confidence, is of more real moment to us than an acquisition thus made."LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD LIVERPOOL, April 19, 1814; Cast. Cor. ix. 472-475. CHAP. 1814. This they hesitated to give, both because there was no security in coming to an arrangement with such a character, and because it was as yet uncertain what the views of the Allied sovereigns might be in regard to the restitution of the legitimate King of Naples to his territories. Meanwhile Murat, with an army, fine at least in appearance, of 40,000 men, lay inactive on the southern bank of the Po, ready at a moment's warning to take part, with decisive effect, in favour of either of the combatants, but it was as yet uncertain which. Bellegarde, the Austrian commander-in-chief, was at the head of a gallant army 50,000 strong; but Eugene still had 36,000 under his banners, and the Austrian marshal was not a man of the energy requisite to make head against such a combination of difficulties. To add to the embarrassment, Lord William Bentinck, as already mentioned, had taken possession of Genoa, and issued proclamations promising the restoration of the ancient form of government, and was writing despatches portraying the aversion of the people to an annexation to Piedmont.* In these circumstances, there is no saying what might have ensued if matters had not in son's War, the interim taken a decisive turn in Paris, and the affairs of Italy had not been determined by the events of which it had been the theatre.1 1 Sir R. Wil in 1813 and 1814. While the Allied sovereigns and ministers were experiencing there the usual attendants on great and decisive success, Fontainebleau was a scene of the most disgraceful treachery and tergiversation ever perhaps witnessed in "I hope from the course the Viceroy is pursuing, that Italy will wind up well. He is the best of the Buonaparte school, and has played an honourable and able part. If Buonaparte had been enabled to maintain himself in the field in France, between Murat's rascality, Bellegarde's timidity, and Lord William Bentinck's impracticability and Whiggism, which seems to follow him everywhere, we should have been in danger of a serious disappointment in that quarter. As it is, we are masters, I hope, of the question now, in a military sense, and must weigh well the political complications, which are not merely personal to the sovereign claimants, but mixed up with a great deal of internal and extensive jealousy amongst the mass of the Italian population." -LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD LIVERPOOL, April 27, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 509, 510. XIII. 95. Fontaine Blois from peror and the history of the world. Napoleon published an order CHAP. of the day to the army, in which he severely stigmatised the conduct of Marshal Marmont and the Senate; 1814. but in misfortune the example of defection is contagious, Universal and it was only the more readily followed by all around defection at him.* The baseness of his courtiers and ministers would bleau and seem incredible if not attested by the unexceptionable the Emtestimony of an eyewitness. "Every hour," says Caul- Empress. aincourt, "was marked by fresh voids in the Emperor's household. The universal object was to get first to Paris. All the persons in office quitted their post without either asking or obtaining leave; one after another, they all slipped away, totally forgetting him to whom they owed everything, but had no longer anything to give. The universal complaint was that the formal abdication was so long of appearing. It is high time,' said every one, 'for all this to come to an end; it is absolute childishness to "The Emperor thanks the army for the attachment which it has manifested towards him, and chiefly because it has recognised the great principle that France is to be found in him, and not in the people of the capital. The soldier follows the fortune or misfortune of his general; his honour is his religion. The Duke of Ragusa has not inspired his companions in arms with that sentiment: he has passed over to the Allies. The Emperor cannot approve the condition on which he has taken that step; he cannot accept life and liberty from the mercy of a subject. The Senate has allowed itself to dispose of the government of France; it forgets that it owes to the Emperor the power it has now abused; that it was he who saved a part of its members from the storms of the Revolution, drew it from obscurity, and protected it against the hatred of the nation. The Senate founds on the articles of the constitution to overturn it, without adverting to the fact that, as the first branch in the state, it took part in these very acts. A sign from me was a mandate to the Senate, which was always ready to outstrip my wishes. The Senate speaks of the reproaches the Emperor has addressed to foreign nations: it forgets they were drawn up by itself. As long as fortune was faithful to their sovereign, they were faithful; and not a whisper was heard against any abuse of power. If the Emperor despised them, as they now reproach him with having done, the world will see whether or not he had reasons for his opinion. He held his dignity from God and the nation; they alone were entitled to deprive him of it. He always considered it as a burden; and when he accepted it, it was in the conviction that he alone was able to bear its burden. The happiness of France appeared to be indissolubly wound up with the fortunes of the Emperor; now that fortune has decided against him, the will of the nation can alone induce him to remain upon the throne. If he is really the only obstacle to peace, he willingly gives himself up as a sacrifice for France."-Proclamation of NAPOLEON, 5th April 1814; FAIN, 225-227. 1814. 40, 68, 69. CHAP. remain any longer in the antechambers of Fontainebleau, XIII. when favours are showering down at Paris;' and with that they all set off for the capital. Such was their anxiety to hear of his abdication that they pursued misfortune even into its last asylum; and every time the door of the Emperor's cabinet opened, a crowd of heads were seen peeping in to gain the first hint of the much-wished-for 1 Caul. ii. news." No sooner was the abdication and the treaty with the Allies signed than the desertion was universal. Every person of note around the Emperor, with the honourable exceptions of Maret, Caulaincourt, and Macdonald, abandoned him. The antechambers of the palace were literally deserted. Berthier even left his benefactor without bidding him adieu. "He was born a courtier," said Napoleon, when he heard of his departure; "you will see my vice-constable mendicating employment from the Bourbons. I feel mortified that men who have risen so high in the estimation of Europe should sink so low. There is no Tartar who would not deem himself dishonoured by such baseness. Think of Moscow and its splendid palaces thrown as a holocaust to the country." Marie Louise at Blois was even more deserted. When she got into her carriage to leave that place for Vienna, none remained to hand her in but her own chamberlain. Compare this with the unbought loyalty of La Vendée, the steady fidelity of the Tyrol, the voluntary flames of Moscow, and say whether the national virtues are improved by the march of intellect and triumph of revolutions.** One important event, which belongs more to the private biography of Napoleon than these Memoirs, occurred at this period. Overwhelmed by misfortune, shocked at the baseness and treachery of all around him, and despairing of the future, he resolved to commit suicide. His iron will could not bend, but :0 was brokem Ever since the battle of Malo-Jaroslawitz in Russia, where de hai varros (y escaped being made prisoner by the Cossacks, he had carried about with him a strong peisen, prepared by Dr Ivan, for a similar contingency. Cu the myàs of the 11th April the day on which the preliminaries of peace were signed at Paris, be drew the fatal potion from its place of concealment, and, after mxng it with water, swallowed the whole. He then threw himself on his bed and civsed his eyelids, expecting to open them no more. The possunt, Dowever, from having been so long kept, had lost somewhat of its power, and be bad strength left to call M. de Caulaincourt to give him his |