XIII. 1814. and Ambassador at Vienna; the latter a situation of the CHAP. very highest importance, as that capital had been fixed on as the seat of the approaching congress, where the most important diplomatic affairs ever brought in Europe under discussion were to be determined. This appointment was accompanied by the strongest expressions of the Prince ConservaRegent's entire satisfaction with his whole conduct, both tive Statescivil and military. Bernadotte, much to his credit, had pp. 6, 7 ; some time before conferred upon him the Grand Cross of i. 27-29. the Swedish military Order of the Sword.1 men (Lond.), Cast. Cor. bestowed on reagh, and Parliament on the Lord Castlereagh received shortly after the highest 104. proof of the approbation of his Government and sovereign, Honours by being decorated with the Order of the Garter, a dis- Lord Castletinction rarely, if ever, bestowed, except upon crowned discussion in heads or persons of the very highest rank or celebrity. A testimony to his merit and public services, still more Peace. memorable and flattering, was borne by the House of Commons on occasion of the discussion (for it could not be called a debate) on the treaty of peace on 29th June 1814. The address to the Crown, congratulatory of the treaty, was then agreed to without a division. On that occasion Lord Castlereagh said, "All the imputations, that we had engaged in the war or continued it for purposes of selfish ambition, have been removed. The conduct of Great Britain has been vindicated: it has been proved that she entered into the war from nothing short of an over-ruling necessity; and that she was ready to relinquish everything of which, for her own security, she had been obliged to take possession, as soon as it had become manifest she could make that sacrifice without danger. If the country has for twenty years sustained the most severe burdens, and done so with a noble fortitude, it is at least gratifying for her to find that she has come out of the tremendous conflict in which she has been engaged with the acquisition of that security for which she contended, and with a reputation unstained by reproval. She bravely stood by the Powers of Europe CHAP. XIII. 1814. in circumstances of unprecedented peril; feeling that it was her duty to enter the lists in defence of all those moral and political principles which were endangered, abstaining from too cautious and minute a calculation of the chances of the conflict, and leaving the result to Providence. We have thus, Sir, at length closed the war as conquerors certainly, but enjoying the rare felicity of receiving the benedictions not only of those with whom we fought, but ultimately of those against whom we fought. There is no feeling more powerful in Paris at this moment than respect for the English character. And thus, I trust, that the course we have pursued through the whole of this eventful crisis will prove permanently beneficial to the whole world. I trust that feelings of mutual kindness have come to supplant those of animosity in all ranks of the people of both countries, and that they may long retain the terms of amity and friendship. If no other blessing is derived from all that 1 Parl. Deb. has happened, it will be no trifling one that the spell has been dissolved by which it has been supposed that Britain and France were necessarily enemies." 1 xxviii. 464, 465. 105. Mr Can ning's éloge of the Peace. On this occasion Mr Canning said, in strains, considering what had occurred, of generous eloquence, "The real object of the war was the establishment of our own security and the tranquillity of the world; and with a view to that object it was necessary to resist the principles of that violent convulsive Republic which, having desolated France, sought to shake all the established thrones and governments of Europe. With that view we have resisted the military despotism which grew out of that convulsive system. We contended against the Jacobinism which gave birth to the war in all the shapes and forms which it had assumed to disturb us and the whole civilised world, and we have finally conquered. Yes! we have completely conquered, and in pursuing this glorious conquest, nothing has been more praiseworthy than the signal patience which this nation has manifested. The people XIII. 1814. of this country in truth are entitled to more praise for what they have endured than what they have achieved; more for the manly steadiness with which they have stood at their post than the promptitude with which they have marched out to battle. It had been said that the spurious fire of French liberty, which burned only to consume, would have burned out without our interposition. But we had promoted and witnessed its final extinguishment, and we had the proud satisfaction of seeing that the nation in which it raged had at length come to this country for the pure flame of rational liberty. This is a legitimate and high source of national congratulation. I doubt, indeed, whether that undisputed command of the sea, which has been the conquest of the war, or the splendid achievements of our gallant army and its unrivalled leader, afford so much matter for just congratulation as to find that, after overcoming the wild enthusiastic delusive spirit of liberty which desolated France,—that after having been the saviours, we had become the model of Europe. Let us hope, for the interest of mankind, that that model will be generally adopted, that all nations will endeavour to introduce that vital spirit, that germ of strength, which has enabled so small a country to make1 Parl. Deb. such extraordinary exertions to save itself, and to deal 452. out salvation to the world.” 1* On this occasion Mr Whitbread said, in a manly and noble spirit, “I originally opposed the administration of the noble Lord opposite (Castlereagh), but seeing an alteration in the tone of that noble Lord from what I had remarked in his predecessors, and that too at a moment when more than ordinary success might have been supposed to make him less moderate, I came to repose confidence in his moderation, telling him at the same time that I did so, and that I hoped the time would come when I should be able to declare whether or not the confidence had been deserved. That time has now arrived; and I can tell the noble Lord that in every respect, except that article in the treaty regarding the slave trade, to which the noble Lord should never have put his hand, the noble Lord has completely and fully shown that he deserved that confidence which I have reposed in him. I can tell the noble Lord that if there is one part of his history which in my opinion redounds more to his honour than any other, it is that when he went to negotiate, he fairly tried the experiment of doing so with the then ruler of France. Though the papers have not been produced, I am fully convinced that the negotiations at Chatillon broke off only in consequence of the folly, madness, and what not of xxviii. 451, CHAP. 1814. 106. General the fall of Napoleon. Historians and military writers have repeated, even to XIII. satiety, that Napoleon was overthrown because Europe arose as one man to shake off his oppression; and that, in a military point of view, his fall was owing to the obstinacy and infatuation with which he refused all reasonable terms of accommodation when proffered to him, on repeated occasions, by the Allied Powers. The more minute and accurate information, as to the real nature and chances of that conflict, gives strong reason to doubt whether either of their opinions is well-founded. So far from Europe having risen like one man to throw off the oppression of Napoleon, it rose up like one man to support it; the mighty conqueror led the whole forces of Western Europe in his crusade against Russia, he invaded its territory with half a million of men, more than double the number by which it was opposed; he was defeated not by the reaction of civilisation or the resolution of freedom, but the fervour of the desert and the constancy of religion. The serfs of Russia did that which neither the enthusiasm of the Italian, nor the independent spirit of the Teutonic race had been able to effect. Germany, it is true, rose with unanimous fervour in 1813 to complete the overthrow of Napoleon; but they did not do so till after the catastrophe of the Moscow campaign. Then they did not hoist the colours of independence so much as follow the standards of conquest. Had it not been for the resolution of Alexander and the fortitude of the Russians, the perseverance of the English could not have prevented the other states of Europe from willingly forging eternal chains for themselves. Napoleon himself. The noble Lord's firmness, however, was not daunted; he persevered in his resolute course, and by his firmness contributed to keep the Allied Powers together till the business was brought to a glorious conclu sion. I have often recommended ministers to make peace with the ruler of France, if it was practicable; and there was no evidence that it was impracti cable till the noble Lord tried it; and when he did so, and it was found to be impracticable, no man rejoiced more than I did in the restoration of the Bourbons, coupled as it was with the saving of Paris from destruction."-MR WHITBREAD's Words, June 29, 1814; Parliamentary Debates, xxviii. 455. XIII. 1814. 107. Napoleon reasons for conduct, ruined him. There is more reason in the opinion that Napoleon CHAP. brought about his own ruin by his obstinate rejection of all reasonable terms of accommodation made to him, and his immuring half his army in distant fortresses on the frontier, when his empire was perishing for want of troops had good in its heart. There can be no doubt that both of these his latter were great errors, and that the last, especially, was more though it than anything else conducive to his fall. It is remarkable that both mistakes proceeded from the same cause, and that was the excess of moral courage in himself, and an entire distrust in its existence in others. He declined the Allied propositions of peace at Prague and Chatillon, because he had confidence individually in his own star, but he had none in the steadiness of the French if it appeared to be waning; he retained his troops in the distant fortresses, because he knew that his empire was one of opinion, and that if it turned, and men saw any symptoms of decline in it, his prestige was at an end, and he would run the risk of being abandoned by his own subjects. It is for the same reason that the British were constrained to veil the retreat from Affghanistan under a second irruption into that distant region, which, if unsuccessful, would have involved their Indian Empire in ruin. But before we condemn the conduct of Napoleon as irrational, and such as at once occasioned his fall, we must reflect on what chances there were in his favour if he adopted it, and how near he repeatedly was to decisive success by pursuing it. Had he supported the advance of Vandamme towards Culm with the Young Guard, whom he halted at Pirna, after the attack on Dresden in 1813, he would have destroyed the Allied Grand Army; had he erected a few forts detaches around Paris in 1814, so as to enable it to hold out for a few days, till he returned from St Dizier, the whole Allied army would have found in their advance to that capital nothing but ruin. And even with these great mistakes he would have been successful in the war, but for the moral courage |