XIV. Holland, of the Rhenish to that of Prussia, of the city CHAP. and harbour of Genoa to the kingdom of Piedmont, and the formation of a great defensive confederacy, composed 1814. of the whole states of Germany, were all so many means towards the attainment of this end. They were designed to surround France with a girdle of affiliated monarchies, which should render it impossible for its armies, under revolutionary direction, to cross their own frontier without finding themselves in the territories of a respectable state, supported by others actuated by similar interests, and threatened by the same ambition. 2. tion of the was the But although the establishment of these strong outposts against French ambition added considerably to the The restorasecurity of Europe, and the reduction of France to its Bourbons ancient limits took much from its means of aggression, great secuyet experience had proved that these precautionary rity. measures could not alone be relied on to prevent a repetition of the calamities from which so narrow an escape had been made. It could never be forgotten that France, animated by revolutionary passions, starting from her old frontiers, had carried her arms to Cadiz and the Kremlin. The same thing, if the same passions revived, might be expected to recur. The danger of success in a similar crusade against the independence of nations would be even greater on the second occasion than the first; for not only was France stronger and more warlike at the conclusion of so many conquests than it had been at their commencement, but it was evident that desires and aspirations had been awakened by her successes in other countries, which rendered it more than probable that in some of them, at least, she would find ready and zealous supporters. It was evident to all, that Europe was now divided everywhere into two great partiesthose of progress and conservatism - which presented more attractive war-cries than the old banners of nations. When France hoisted the standard of revolution, and carried her eagles abroad with the words, "War to the 1814. CHAP. palace, and peace to the cottage," she soon found herXIV. self at the head of a powerful confederacy, composed of the Batavian, Cisalpine, Roman, Ligurian, and Parthenopeian republics. It was their accumulated strength which overcame the might of Germany, and hurled the whole military force of Western Europe on the devoted realm of Russia. As long as France was ruled by a revolutionary government she would always be the head of a similar coalition, and when matters came to a crisis its members would all unite their forces to hers. As the revolutionary passions in all the adjoining states were far stronger at the close of the war than they had been at its outset, a second crusade against the independence of other nations might with certainty be looked for at no distant period if a revolutionary government was at the head of that powerful military state. It was for this reason that the Allied Powers resolved to make no peace with "Napoleon or any of his family," and that Lord Castlereagh, albeit to the last degree averse to any interference with the internal affairs of France, was sincerely rejoiced when the choice of the Senate and Legislative Body fell on the Bourbon family. 3. The ancient race and the ancient territory," was Reasons of Lord Castlereagh's beau ideal for the pacification and reagh's settlement of Europe, and he often made use of these that object. expressions when the matter was under discussion at the Lord Castle favouring close of the war. His reason was not any preference in the abstract for the Bourbon family over that of Napoleon, still less any predilection for arbitrary government, or aversion to the growth of real freedom. No man was less wedded to particular families, or less under their influence; none was ever more attached to general liberty. It was from a clear perception of the effect of a successful insurrection, and the establishment of a revolutionary dynasty on the throne of such a state as France, that he desired the restoration of the ancient amily. He saw that the French Revolution had per XIV. 1814. manently severed European society into two great parties, CHAP. whose principles were irreconcilable, forms of government opposite, and hostility eternal. There could be no real peace between these two great divisions of mankind, any more than between the Romans and Carthaginians in ancient, the Christians and Saracens in modern times. Any temporary suspension of hostilities between such Powers could be only an armed truce. The establishment of a revolutionary government on the throne of such a powerful military state as France was more calculated than any other circumstance to increase the strength of the revolutionary league, and encourage similar convulsions in other states, because it was a standing example of the triumph of such a bouleversement, and formed a lasting point d'appui, round which all lesser states, having effected a similar subversion of the ancient authorities, would congregate. Thus, as long as France was under a revolutionary government she would never cease openly or covertly to encourage similar changes in other states, because she hoped to find in them political and physical support, and those governments would never cease to look to her as their head, and the Power which on a crisis would support them against all attacks from the legitimate sovereigns. And as England had long been the head of the anti-revolutionary party in Europe, and the only Power which had escaped subjugation from France, it might with confidence be expected that the whole hostility of the revolutionary league would, if successful on the Continent, be directed in the end against her power and independence. from Russia. Such a turn of affairs, which presented itself to Lord 4. Castlereagh's mind as not only possible but probable, if Great dana revolutionary dynasty were established on the French ger he ap prehended throne, would inevitably lead to a renewal, on a great scale, of the Continental war, and the growth of a fresh danger in Eastern Europe not less formidable to general freedom and the independence of nations than the tri VOL. II. 2 [ XIV. 1814. CHAP. umph of the revolutionary principle in the west. Distracted as the military strength of Great Britain was, by her empire in India and the defence of her colonial possessions in every quarter of the globe, it was impossible that her armies could appear on the Continent in sufficient strength to combat alone such a league with France at its head; and experience had proved that neither Austria nor Prussia, nor even the two united, could stand against it. Thus the reliance of the conservative league would, in the last extremity, infallibly come to be on Russia; and if she came forth and was a second time victorious in the fight, what security would remain for the independence of the other European Powers, or the general liberty of mankind? "Serpens nisi serpentem comederit non sit draco." Beyond all doubt, in such an event the liberties of Europe, in every age the ark of freedom, would be trampled under foot by the Asiatic cavalry. This peril presented itself in the strongest manner to the mind of Lord Castlereagh, and it will immediately appear what courageous efforts he made to avert it. It was hard to say whether Europe had most to fear from the Red Republicans of Paris, or the swarthy cavaliers of the desert. Napoleon was of the same opinion, and equally with him foresaw the dire alternative. "In half a century," said he, "Europe will be Cossack or Republican." 5. reagh's The restoration of the ancient race in France, without Lord Castle- doubt, afforded a guarantee, in a certain degree, for the principle peace of the world, and the postponing of such a dire was a Ger- collision; but it could not be relied on as a permanent federacy and security against it. The French people, and, above all, man con the restora land, inde Russia tion of Po- the Parisians, have, especially in recent times, been found pendent of to be so fickle, that it can never be predicated for any length of time, under what form of government, or race of sovereigns, they will continue. Add to this, that Russia was as steady as the Parisians were changeable; but its steadiness was all directed, like that of England in India, XIV. to one object, territorial aggrandisement, and the increase CHAP. of political influence. It was absolutely necessary, therefore, for the future peace and independence of Europe, 1814. that some power should be formed which might be capable of resisting either of these antagonists, or even both together, if, from motives of ambition, they should enter into an alliance. Such a power was to be found in Germany, and Germany alone. Locally situated between them, the one could not reach the other but by subjugating and passing over the forces of her confederacy. Strong, warlike, and patriotic, her 40,000,000 of inhabitants, if united, were fully a match for either France or Russia; aided by England, she would be so against both. But the real strength of Germany lay in Austria and Prussia experience in every age had proved that the confederacy, slow to act, and often distracted by mutual jealousies or discordant interests, could not be regarded, but for these Powers, as an efficient barrier either against France or Russia. It was therefore indispensable, in Lord Castlereagh's estimation, to the independence and liberties of Europe, that Austria and Prussia should both be powerful; and this could be done only by restoring to the former of these her whole possessions in Northern Italy, and augmenting the latter by the whole, or the greater part, of Saxony. In so doing, it was no doubt necessary to make a painful sacrifice; the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, that of Genoa to Piedmont, would be stigmatised as acts of spoliation equal to the worst of Napoleon's. But independence was better than nationality; the King of Prussia would become the sovereign of Prussia and Saxony, as the King of England is of England and Scotland; the feelings of country would not be outraged, and an indemnity for the dispossessed royal family might be found in some of the ceded territories on the banks of the Rhine. He still further desired to put a bridle in the mouth of Russia, by restoring, if possible, Poland to the state of an independent kingdom, under an independent sovereign. |