1814.

litical interest, but on the yet stronger bond of personal CHAP. friendship and common danger. Alexander and Frederick 'XIV. William had stood by each other in many a well-debated field; they had "summered it and wintered it together." Together they had stood before the ramparts of Dresden; together they had faced the thunders of Leipsic; together they had shared in the triumphs of Paris. From the very depths of national humiliation and degradation Alexander's powerful arm had raised Prussia to the highest pitch of prosperity and glory. For nearly two years they had lived almost in the same tent, and rode all day side by side. They were nearly of the same age, alike chivalrous in feeling and refined in manner, and during all that time they had never had a wish or a feeling but in common. It was not in human nature that these circumstances should not have produced an extraordinary degree of intimacy and friendship, like that of Pylades and Orestes in ancient Thiers, times, which partook more of the warmth of love than 425. the ordinary attractions of worldly interest.1

xviii. 424,

peror of

Poland.

In addition to this, the material interests of these two 11. sovereigns were in a great measure identical, and led them The Emto pursue the same line of policy. Alexander had to gain Russia on Poland; Frederick William, Saxony. The Czar had magnificent and generous views for the restoration of the fallen Sarmatian nation. In common with all the world, he felt the extreme injustice which had been perpetrated upon it by the partition; but he felt also that he had the means of restitution in his hands, and he regarded himself as the instrument in the hand of Providence for the accomplishment of that great act of national justice. His plan was to restore the whole kingdom of Poland as it stood in 1772, including Lithuania, Gallicia, the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and the Duchy of Posen. Sixteen millions of men would thus regain their lost nationality, and the ancient and illustrious kingdom of Poland, the bulwark of Christendom, would rise from its grave. It is true this would imply a great sacrifice of territory and revenue on

CHAP. the side both of Austria and Prussia; but he proposed XIV. fully to indemnify both of these Powers-Prussia by the 1814. whole of Saxony, besides the Rhenish provinces; and

1 Thiers.

xviii. 425, 425.

Austria, on the side of Italy. Russia would require no indemnity for the cession of the Grand-duchy of Lithuania, containing nine millions of inhabitants, for he proposed that he himself was to be the King of Poland, which was to descend to the same series of heirs as the crown of Russia. The Emperor was so set on the realisation of this project, that all the efforts of the French and English diplomatists were unable to divert him from it; and the Duke of Wellington, proceeding on the information furnished by Talleyrand as to what was going on at Vienna, wrote to Lord Castlereagh that matters were hopeless from the determination of the Czar, and that war was inevitable.* Lord Castlereagh, from the first, made the most strenuous efforts to resist the Emperor's views on this point, and to unite the other Powers in one system against it, but for long he did not meet the support he might have expected, not even from M. de Talleyrand, on the part of France.1 +

• “Lord Castlereagh adressa à l'Empereur Alexandre plusieurs mémoires dans lesquels il s'opposait itérativement et avec force au nom de sa Cour à l'erection d'un royaume de Pologne qui fût uni et qui fit parti de la Couronne Imperiale de Russie; le desir de sa Cour étant de voir une puissance indépendante, plus ou moins considérable en étendue établie en Pologne sous une dynastie distincte, et comme un état intermédiaire entre les trois grandes monarchies." -CAPEFIGUE, Les Cent Jours, i. 87.

"I have this instant had an interview with M. de Blacas. I found him much displeased at the continued obstinacy of the Emperor of Russia respecting Poland, on which he says that he understands his Imperial Majesty declared, before he quitted Vienna to go into Hungary, that he considered all matters settled; that he was to be king of Poland, and the King of Prussia king of Saxony; and that he had given M. de Talleyrand to understand that he would not depart from his plan on either of those countries. M. de Blacas said that the result would be that the King, and most probably the Prince Regent [of England], would withdraw their ministers from the Congress, declaring that they could not acknowledge these arrangements, and that Europe would remain in a feverish state, which sooner or later must end in war.

“I again urged him in the strongest manner to have instructions sent to M. de Talleyrand to lay aside all considerations upon small points, and to unite cordially with you in a great effort to produce the union of all the Powers in Europe against the projected aggrandisement of Russia. M. de Blacas then said that he considered that there were three great objects for arrangement— Poland, Naples, and Saxony-upon which the King felt an almost equal interest,

CHAP.

XIV.

12.

It may readily be believed that Prussia deemed an ample compensation due to her for the proposed relinquishment of her Polish territories, the more especially 1814. that she would, by the cession of Thorn, Modlin, and the views of fortresses on the Vistula to Russia, be entirely denuded of Prussia. her eastern frontier. But the Emperor Alexander entirely reconciled the Cabinet of Berlin to this step, by the proposal that the whole of Saxony should be annexed to Prussia, the crown of which should be permanently placed on the brows of the house of Brandenburg. It was urged in support of this arrangement by Prince Hardenberg, "that the loss of Southern Poland to the advantage of Russia, imperatively called for an indemnity to Prussia: Saxony is the only country which presents such a compensation. To recreate it, and render it powerful, is acknowledged on all hands to be essential to the establishment of a balance of power in Europe, and the great increase of power pro

and that he did not think your Lordship was inclined to act so directly to affect the views which the Government of both countries professed to have, as he had expected, and that he wished that you should receive further instructions on the subject from home. I told him that he was quite mistaken; that I had not the papers to show him, but could assure him that language could not be stronger than that which you had used, both verbally and in writing, to the Emperor of Russia, to dissuade him from his Polish scheme, which was the foundation of all the mischief, and that you were directing all your efforts to connect the ministers of the other Powers of Europe in the same views and measures with you on this point; that you considered other points as comparatively unimportant; and that, moreover, the ultimate decision of them depended more or less on the decision as to the Polish question, which went to whether there should or not be in Europe any system whatever of equilibrium. "I reminded him that I had already apprised him that M. de Talleyrand was running after these small objects, instead of looking to that principal one: and he admitted that he was not himself satisfied with his conduct. He then proposed that Great Britain, France, Spain, and Holland should agree by treaty not to recognise the Polish arrangement; and he pressed the point strongly and repeatedly, as being the best mode of drawing with us Austria and Prussia. I told him that all combinations of this description created jealousy, and that the first and immediate effect of such an arrangement would be to separate us from our old allies. He gave up this idea, and he went away at last, as he said, convinced that the best method to be adopted was all to unite for the object of opposing the Emperor's views on Poland, laying all minor points aside, and promising to endeavour to remove from the King's mind the impression that you were not decided in your measures on this point."DUKE OF WELLINGTON to LORD Castlereagh, November 5, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 183, 184.

XIV.

1 Harden

berg's

Minute,

Oct. 9,

xii. 458.

necessary."1

CHAP. posed to be given to Russia renders it more than ever These ideas met with a cordial response in 1814. Prussia; but it was far otherwise in Saxony, where the national feelings and attachment to their sovereign were universal among the inhabitants; and the people were 1-14, Hard. unanimously opposed to the project of handing them over to their hereditary enemies. A host of pamphlets speedily made their appearance at Dresden, in which the annexation project was vehemently condemned; and to such a pitch did the ferment arise that the governors of Torgau and Wittenberg shut their gates and prepared for resistance to the inhabitants. Meanwhile Hardenberg made a formal demand on England and Austria for the immediate cession of the whole of Saxony; to which Lord Castlereagh, on the part of Great Britain, gave his reluctant adhesion. That of Metternich was more guarded, and pointed to the retention of a part of the Saxon dominions by the ancient family. Talleyrand, on the part of France, openly and unreservedly opposed the annexation, as was done by several of the lesser princes in Germany.*

Oct. 10.

Lord Castlereagh replied to Hardenberg on the 11th October:-"Si l'annexation de la Saxe à la Prusse s'accordait avec le salut de l'Europe, il garan tissait le consentement de l'Angleterre, quoique la ruine d'une aussi ancienne maison le remplit de douleur; mais que si les princes Allemands, après avoir failli, avaient réparé leurs fautes par des services subséquens, il n'en était pas de même du Roi de Saxe; que sa déclaration devait, cependant, être regardée comme nulle dans le cas où la Saxe serait sacrifiée aux prétensions de la Russie et non aux intérêts de l'Europe."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to PRINCE HARDENBERG, October 11, 1814; HARDENBERG, xii. 459, 460; and Castlereagh MS.

Prince Metternich did not reply till the 22d October; and then he said:"En faisant abstraction des liens de famille existant entre les maisons d'Autriche et de la Saxe, son souverain ne pouvait approuver l'annexion des Etats Saxons en entier à la couronne Prussienne-source éternelle de méfiance entre les deux Puissances ainsi rapprochée; que si, néanmoins, la force des circonstances l'exigeait, il serait nécessaire qu'on prit des arrangemens sur la fixation des frontières, la fortification des places, et les relations commerciales, ainsi que sur la ligne de défense de l'Allemagne méridionale; que sa Majesté ferait connaître ses vues relativement à la forteresse de Mayence, mais que tout considéré le Roi reconnaitrait qu'il convenait de laisser à l'ancienne maison une partie de son royaume."-PRINCE METTERNICH à PRINCE HARDENBERG, Octobre 22, 1814; HARDENBERG's Mémoires, xii. 460.

Prince Talleyrand answered on the part of France on the 2d November:"Le Roi de Saxe n'avait été ni accusé ni interrogé ; il n'existe aucun tribunal compétent pour le juger; la Saxe demande son retour, l'Allemagne réclame

XIV.

13.

Austria, at this juncture, was, it may well be believed, CHAP. not less disquieted than Great Britain at the projected vast addition to the power of its gigantic neighbour; but its 1814. exposed situation, and the want of any defensible frontiers Views of between them, prevented her from giving expression to its Austria. views with the same resolution. All that Metternich ventured to do was to strive to prevent the incorporation of Gallicia with the restored kingdom of Poland; and on that condition he consented to the Polish frontier being extended to Kalisch, which brought it greatly nearer both to Vienna and Berlin, and would have secured to the Czar a preponderating influence in the Germanic confederacy. He held out strongly for the retention of Cracow and Zamosc, which Alexander was desirous to absorb; as he also was Thorn, the bulwark of Prussian Poland. The Czar supported these demands by the significant hint that he had 400,000 men in Poland, that the whole country, with its strongholds, was already in his possession, and that he was governing it as his own. Metternich felt the force of these considerations; and, as he knew that the chief weight of Russia, in the event of a rupture, would fall on Austria, he deemed it advisable to moderate his

l'intégrité des droits de tous compromis par le sacrifice de la Saxe; que le feu couvait sous la cendre, et que, s'il éclatait, la France ne pourrait en demeurer spectatrice oisive; que si l'annexion demandée s'effectuait, on verrait renaître la rivalité de la Prusse et de l'Autriche, ce qui compromettrait la tranquillité de l'Europe."-PRINCE TALLEYRAND à PRINCE HARDENBERG, Novembre 2, 1814; HARDENBERG, xii. 460.

The King of Saxony, then a prisoner in Friedrichsfeld, protested on the 4th November "contre occupation de la Saxe, déclarant que la position de son pays l'avait seule empêchait de se prononcer contre la France; et que le but de la guerre ayant été le maintien des trônes légitimes, il avait du s'attendre à la restitution de l'héritage de ses ancêtres; en conséquence il protestait contre la prise de possession de ses états, qu'en aucun temps il ne consentirait à céder ou à échanger." In support of this protest, the Duke of Saxe Cobourg wrote to Lord Castlereagh on the 14th November:-" Par la destruction du royaume de Saxe, la Prusse et l'Autriche se trouveraient dans une situation hostile; que la Russie et la Prusse étant intimement liées, la première de ces Puissances appuierait les vues du seconde en Allemagne tandis que la seconde appuierait les vues d'agrandissement de la Russie au côté de la Turquie; et qu'on verrait l'Allemagne détruite, l'empire Ottoman renversé, et la paix de l'Europe ébranlée."-LE PRINCE DE SAXE COBOURG à LORD CASTLEREAGH, Novembre 14, 1814; HARDENBERG, xii. 461.