XIV. 1814. it would be little consolation to find that they were threat- CHAP. ened by the imperial and royal armies of Russia and Poland, not by the single arms of the former alone. Treaties also, stubborn and numerous, opposed themselves to the realisation of this, in appearance generous, in truth ambitious, design. By the treaty of Kalisch, 28th February 1813, of Reichenbach, 15th June 1813, and Töplitz, 9th September 1813, it had been expressly stipulated that the Grand-duchy of Warsaw should be amicably divided between the three partitioning Powers, as nearly as may be in proportion to the several allotments at the last partition; that Prussia should be raised up to ten millions of inhabitants, and Austria restored to the whole of Illyria. It would be impossible to reconcile these stipulations with the pretensions now advanced by Russia, which were sub- xviii. 427stantially that, under pretext of restoring the ancient i. 87; Hard. kingdom of Poland, she should be put in possession of the 458. whole of it.1 1 Thiers, 429; Cap. xii. 456 light, and irritates Sensible of this objection, and aware of the strenuous 22. opposition which the open advancing any such pretension Which is on the part of Russia and Prussia would awaken on the brought to part of Austria and Great Britain, the two Northern Ca- extremely binets were careful to conceal their designs and secret France. understanding until their preparations were so far complete that they could set the other Powers of Europe at defiance. In spite of all their skill, however, the Cabinets of Vienna, London, and Paris, soon got information of what was going on. Before eight days had elapsed after the assembling of the Congress in the end of September, the united action of Russia and Prussia had roused suspicion, and their designs on Saxony and Poland been detected. Great was the indignation of the French Government on its discovery of their plan with regard to the former country. It had not even been asked to concur, as Austria and England had been, in the dethronement of the King of Saxony, and not only was alarmed at so considerable an addition being made to the strength of a rival power, but felt mortified by a step so important and ma CHAP. XIV. 1814. terial to the future balance of power in Europe being undertaken without its concurrence being so much as asked. It was perfectly known that this transference of Saxony was only the first in a series of changes to the advantage of the Northern Powers, and that the annexation of the crown of Poland to that of Russia was equally agreed upon. M. de Talleyrand, accordingly, no sooner heard of these decisive steps than he took the most active measures to counteract them. He strongly represented to Lord Castlereagh and Prince Metternich that Russia had now thrown off the mask; that it would soon be 1 Thiers, brought down to the Oder, its vassal to the Elbe, and then, intrenched in the centre of Germany, the Czar would become the arbiter of Europe.1 xviii. 450, 451. 23. at this. Nothing could exceed the indignation of Alexander, Indignation when he heard of these movements on the part of the of Alexander French representative. That sovereign, usually so courteous and bland-so penetrated, even to a fault, with the generous affections-became suddenly irritable and haughty. He was never tired of inveighing against the ingratitude of men. The Germans for whom he had done so much, the English who had by his aid come victorious out of a mortal strife, the Bourbons whom he had placed on the throne, the French whom he had delivered from a terrible tyranny, were coalescing against him, or silently looking on, when his dearest wishes were on the point of being realised. It was against France and M. de Talleyrand, in particular, that his indignation was directed. He fully expected support in all his projects from that Power, for whom he had done so much, and evinced such generosity; and least of all did he anticipate opposition from a sovereign and cabinet which, in a manner, owed their political existence to his support. In addition to these reasons of state, drawn from public policy, Alexander had private grounds of offence against Louis XVIII. That monarch had evinced little respect for his advice; he had not decorated him with the cordon XIV. 1814. bleu, which he had bestowed on the Prince Regent of CHAP. England; he had said openly, that under God he owed his restoration to the throne of his ancestors to that prince; he had refused his request of a peerage for M. de Caulaincourt, and raised provoking objections against a projected union between the Duke de Berri and the Russian Grand - duchess Anne. Seeing the Czar thus inflamed, and fearful that his anger might lead to serious consequences, especially so far as France was concerned, the wise Nesselrode advised his imperial master to propose a private conference with M. de Talleyrand, which was instantly and joyfully acceded to. It took place accordingly, and the particulars were the same night sent Thiers, to Paris by Talleyrand, and have been recently published 453. in M. Thiers's History.1 xviii. 451 24. Talleyrand Sept. 30. The Czar received the veteran diplomatist with a dry and haughty air, very different from the usual studied Interview of courtesy of his manner. Talleyrand, however, was too with Alexconsummate a master of diplomatic address, and had ander. been too long accustomed to the violent sallies of Napoleon's temper, to be disconcerted by this reception. "What is the state of your country?" asked the Czar, abruptly, when the French minister was ushered into the room. "Excellent," replied Talleyrand; "far better than could have been hoped for-as good as your Majesty could desire." "And public opinion?" "It is improving every day." "And the progress of liberal opinion? "Nowhere is the progress more real and satisfactory." "And the press?" "It is free, with the exception of some restrictions indispensable in the first days of a new Government." "And the army?" "Excellent: we have 130,000 men under our standards, which, in a month, may be raised to 300,000." "And the marshals?" "Which of them, Sire ?" "Oudinot?" "He is devoted." "Soult?" "He was in bad humour at first; they have given him the command in Brittany, he is satisfied, and evinces the greatest zeal." "And Ney?" "He suffers XIV. 1814. CHAP. under the loss of his endowments, but he trusts that your Majesty will put a period to his inconveniences." "And your Chambers? I am told they are not at one with the Government." "Who can have told you such a falsehood? There are, as in every commencement, some difficulties; but after twenty-five years of revolutions, it is miraculous that we should have arrived at the tranquillity we enjoy." "And are you satisfied with your position?" "Sire, the confidence and kindness of the King have surpassed my most sanguine hopes." 25. 66 At each of these answers an ironical smile passed over Concluded. the features of the Czar, bespeaking incredulity in the answers of the veteran diplomatist. At length, having exhausted these preliminary and tentative interrogatories, Alexander approached the real objects of the conference. 'Let us now come to our affairs are they to be concluded?" "It depends only on your Majesty to finish them in the most glorious manner, and to the advantage of all Europe." At these words the Czar could scarcely coutain himself, and he broke forth on the ingratitude he had experienced, and especially the resistance to his wishes which had been opposed by France. "I think the Bourbons owe me something; now is the time to evince their sense of it in deeds, and not merely in words." "Without contesting," replied Talleyrand, "the obligations of the august master whom I have the honour to serve towards your Majesty, we cannot forget the rights of Europe, which we must respect, especially after having overturned a man whom we justly accuse of having trampled them all under his feet." "The rights of Europe," replied Alexander, "which you have now conjured up to oppose to me, are such as I do not recognise. Between independent Powers there are no rights, but such as suit every one's convenience: I know of no others." Unhappy Europe! unhappy Europe! rejoined Talleyrand, raising his hands above his head, "what then will become of you?" The Czar, upon this, CHAP. XIV. 1814. said, "Well then, be it so; it is then war! war! I have 200,000 men in Poland; let them come and chase me from it. Besides, I have the consent of all the Powers to what I desire; you alone oppose it and present an obstacle which may break an accord on the point of becoming general." "France," replied Talleyrand, "neither desires nor fears war; but if unfortunately it should become universal, she will at least wage it on this occasion for the maintenance of the rights of all, aided by the universal sympathy and support of many of the Powers ;" for he well knew that the general concurrence of which the Czar boasted had in reality no existence. Mutually irritated, the Emperor and diplomatist now separated. Before M. de Talleyrand withdrew, the natural courtesy Thiers, of Alexander prevailed over his passion, and he held out 455; see also Cap. i. his hand to him. M. de Talleyrand took it, and the 78, 88, and Czar forced a smile, but a convulsive movement of the 46. fingers revealed the secret exasperation of his mind.1 1 xviii. 454, Hard. xii. Metternich come to an Lord Castlereagh, as before explained, was inclined, 26. though with deep regret at the necessity which compelled Lord Castlehim, to adopt the line to support the annexation of rand Saxony to Prussia, deeming that addition to the strength understandof the second German state indispensable to preserve the ing. balance of power in Europe, and in an especial manner called for in order to secure the support, or, at all events, the neutrality, of the Court of Berlin in resisting the encroachments of Russia on the Vistula.* Metter * "Quant à la question de Saxe, je vous déclare, que si l'incorporation de la tolalité de ce pays dans la monarchie Prussienne est nécessaire pour assurer un si grand bien à l'Europe, quelque peine que j'exprime personellement à l'idée de voir une aussi ancienne maison si profondement affligée, je ne saurai nourrir aucune répugnance, morale ou politique, contre la mésure elle-même. Si jamais un souverain s'est placé lui-même dans le cas de devoir être sacrifié à la tranquillité future de l'Europe, je crois que c'est le Roi de Saxe, qui, par ses tergiversations perpetuelles, et parcequ'il a été non seulement le plus dévoué, mais aussi le plus favorisé, des vassaux de Buonaparte, contribua de tout son pouvoir, et avec empressement en sa double qualité de chef des états Allemands et d'état Polonais à pousser l'envahissement jusque dans le cœur de la Russie."-Note de LORD CASTLEREAGH à M. DE HARDENBERG, Octobre 11, 1814; CAPEFIGUE, i. 80; and Castlereagh Correspondence, MS. On the other hand, M. Talleyrand stated at the same time :-"L'indépend- |