X.

47.

Gus move

ment of

Berlin.

casion was so enormous, and so much at variance with the CHAP. usual ability and foresight of his military operations, that it would be altogether inconceivable were it not explained 1813. by another principle, not less conspicuous than military Simultanetalent in his character, which was an overbearing disposition and self-confidence which led him to brook no delay, Oudinot on and venture upon everything at once. In pursuance of Aug. 20. this strongly-marked and irresistible propensity, not content with the defeat and ruin of the Allied Grand Army, which was in a manner within his power, he resolved on a simultaneous attack on Berlin. He thought a great impression would be produced in Europe, and the prestige of his power effectually restored, if, at the same time that he himself defeated and drove back the Allied Grand Army, one of his lieutenants routed the army of the Crown Prince, and damped the zeal of the Prussians by the capture of their capital in the very outset of the campaign. Impressed with these ideas, he sent the most positive orders to Oudinot, who commanded the army destined to act against Berlin, to commence operations the moment the armistice expired; and it was to clear his right flank from disquietude while this important blow was in course of being struck, that he made the movement in person against

cutting short the fruits of victory, it became the principal cause of Vandamme's defeat."-JOMINI, Vie de Napoléon, iv. 403, 404.

Marshal Marmont says: "Napoléon, après avoir mis en route sa Garde, était resté à Dresde incertain sur ce qu'il ferait. Ayant reçu les nouvelles de l'échec éprouvé par Maréchal Oudinot devant Berlin et des revers du Maréchal Macdonald sur la Katzbach, il resolut de rester, de rappeler sa Garde, et il eut le tort incroyable de ne pas faire prévenir Vandamme. Si la Garde eut suivi Vandamme, Kleist, pris entre St Cyr et la Garde, mettait bas les armes, et Vandamme eut battu le 30 les divers corps qui l'ont attaqué. Mais bien plus si la Garde eut joint Vandamme le 29, pendant qu'il était victorieux, il aurait pu se porter en avant, et se trouver ainsi au milieu de toutes les forces ennemies, qui étaient sans organisation et dans une entière confusion par suite des difficultés de la retraite. Toute l'artillerie marchait isolement, ses troupes descendaient par détachements en suivant tous les sentiers praticable. Il n'y avait pas le 29, 30,000 hommes à mettre regulièrement en bataille dans la plaine. C'était un de ces coups de fortune comme il en arrive en un siècle de guerre. Tout le matériel aurait été pris, et tout se serait dispersé. Des reproches reciproques auraient servi à tout dissoudre à tout désorganiser. La fortune en a ordonné autrement, mais le seul coupable et le veritable auteur de la catastrophe c'est Napoléon."-MARMONT, v. 165, 167.

VOL. II.

D

1813.

CHAP. Blucher, which was interrupted by the Allied advance upon X. Dresden. But in directing this invasion of Prussia, the French Emperor entirely miscalculated the resistance the invading army was likely to experience from the enthusiastic spirit and patriotic devotion of the Prussian people. He reckoned on Bernadotte having only 85,000 men under his orders, including those under Walmoden, watching Davoust in Hamburg, which would have left him not more than 60,000 to cover Berlin. But instead of this, the Crown Prince had 80,000 men under his immediate command, including 20,000 excellent cavalry, independent of the troops observing Hamburg and blockading the fortresses on the Oder. Oudinot had not more than Bernadotte's 70,000 men with him; and although a large part of the Official Re- Allied force was landwehr and new levies, which could hardly be relied on under a heavy fire, yet a large part of the French army was composed of conscripts just as inexperienced, and by no means equally animated by patriotic or enthusiastic feeling.1

1 Thiers, xvi. 380, 581;

port;

Schoell, i

73; Jom. iv. 406; Bout. 52,

53.

48.

Battle of Gross Beeren. Aug. 23.

Bernadotte, who was quite sincere with the Allies up to a certain point-namely, to effect the expulsion of the French from Germany, though with as little interference of the Swedish troops as possible-took his measures with great judgment to resist the enemy and cover the Prussian capital. On the 17th August, in expectation of an immediate attack, he assembled his forces at Ruhlsdorf, in front of Berlin, in a good position, and there awaited the attack of the enemy. The concentration of so large a body of men, however, was the work of time; and before it was completely effected, the French were upon him, and gained considerable successes in the outset. But everything was soon supplied by the ardour and enthusiasm of the Prussians. Oudinot, who directed his march from Baruth by Luckenwalde, attacked on the 23d. Bertrand, with the French right, in vain assailed Blankenfelde, but Reynier with their centre won Gross Beeren. Bulow, however, who had a corps of nearly 30,000 men under

X.

1813.

his orders, without waiting for orders from Bernadotte, CHAP. of whose loyalty he had strong suspicions, countermarched from the left to the centre, and fell on Reynier, whose 18,000 men, at Gross Beeren, were established in the very heart of the Allied line, and totally defeated him, with the loss of 13 guns and 2000 prisoners. The arrival of Oudinot's own corps from the French left alone averted an utter rout. The total loss of the French in this battle exceeded 10,000 men.* After this check, which taught him the quality of the troops with which he had to deal, Oudinot drew back, under the cannon of Wittenberg; and this induced a still Sir Chas. greater disaster, for 10,000 Saxons and Bavarians in his Lord Castlereagh, Sept. army, ill-affected to the French cause, disbanded and fled 10, 1813, to the Elbe, exclaiming "Sauve qui peut." Great part of Thiers, xvi. them never rejoined their colours, but entered the patriot Bernadotte's ranks of Germany; and the whole Saxon prisoners in Berlin, in the enthusiasm excited by this success, enlisted 73. in the same ardent bands.1

Stewart to

MS.;

387-391;

Official Re

port;

Schoell, i.

49.

of this fatal

Thus terminated Napoleon's boasted march to Berlin, which was to have entirely reinstated his affairs, punished Real cause Bernadotte for his defection, and turned the patriotic dispersion of songs of the Prussians into lamentation and mourning. forces. So set was the French Emperor upon this achievement, that he sacrificed to it the whole fortunes of the campaign. The first question which he asked when he returned to Dresden on the 26th was, "Whether there was any news from Berlin ?" and it was for the same object that he halted the Young Guard at Pirna on the 28th, and returned himself to Berlin, when, by simply moving it on in support of Vandamme, he would have completed the ruin of the Allied Grand Army, and terminated the war by

"Une douzaine de mille hommes étaient les uns morts ou blessés sur le champ de bataille de Gross Beeren, les autres dispersés sur les routes dans un état de complete débandade. C'est tout au plus si les trois corps d'armée, la cavalerie du Duc de Padoue comprise, présentaient en ligne 52,000 bommes, au lieu des 64,000, qu'ils comptaient à la reprise des hostilités."THIERS, xvi. 421, 422.

CHAP.

X.

1813.

50.

against Blucher.

a thunderbolt like Austerlitz or Friedland. His conduct in not doing so, and thus foregoing the greatest opportunity of his life, was a part of the same character which led him to engage simultaneously in the invasion of Andalusia and Portugal in 1810-which made him leave Portugal to attack Valentia when Wellington was threatening Leon in 1812, which occasioned the loss of Spain-and to invade Russia when the devouring cancer of the Peninsular war was still unhealed, which led to the loss of the French empire.

While these important events were in progress in BoAdvances of hemia and Prussia, a disaster of a still more stunning Macdonald character was incurred on the banks of the Katzbach. Napoleon was nowise answerable for this calamity, for the instructions which he had left to Marshal Macdonald, when he left the army to go to Dresden, were of the most sensible description.* The force under the immediate command of Macdonald amounted to 75,000 men, forming the corps of that marshal himself, Ney, and Lauriston, besides 12,000 men under Poniatowski, stationed in communication with him at Zittau, on the Bohemian frontier, to guard the defile by that place into Bohemia, whither Napoleon at that time intended to turn his steps. The Emperor never doubted that with this force he would be able to accomplish the task assigned to him, which was to throw back Blucher beyond the Jauer, and to establish himself in strength on the Bober, between Buntzlau and Lowenberg, in such a manner as to keep the army of Silesia removed from Dresden, and prevent it from making detachments to assail Oudinot in his movement on Berlin. Macdonald seems to have been of the same

They were: "To concentrate his troops and march towards the enemy, so as to be in a situation to afford aid to the Grand Army in its operations against Dresden or Bohemia; but, if attacked by superior forces, to retire behind the Queiss and hold Görlitz; and if hard pressed when the Emperor was far advanced in his attack by Zittau upon Prague, to retire to the intrenched camp around Dresden: keeping in view that his principal object should be to keep up his communication with the Emperor."-NAPOLEON's Instructions to MACDONALD, August 28, 1813; VAUDONCOURT, i. 145.

X.

1813.

opinion as to his strength to throw back the enemy, but CHAP. in so doing he exposed himself unnecessarily to hazard. Instead of obeying his orders, which were to keep his troops as much as possible concentrated, he divided them, for the sake of convenience in marching and getting supplies, into five columns, which advanced on parallel roads over a front twenty-four miles in breadth, stretching from Schönau to Liegnitz. The centre of this straggling army, under Macdonald in person, advanced by the WüthendeNeisse on Weinberg; the right, under Lauriston, moved on Hennersdorf, with Puthod's division, detached by Schönau and the foot of the Bohemian mountains; while the left, led by Souham, in the absence of Ney, who had been taken with him by the Emperor to Dresden, was Thiers, xvi. ordered to move by Liegnitz, pass the KATZBACH there, Vaud. i. and fall on the right of the enemy; and Sebastiani's cavalry iv. 373-416. connected Souham with the centre.

367-369;

146; Jom.

simultane

Blucher, who had 75,000 admirable troops well in 51. hand, and in great part concentrated in front of Jauer, Blucher's was not the man to let so favourable an opportunity of ous advance striking a decisive blow against the enemy escape him, against him. and fortune singularly favoured his designs. No sooner did he receive information that the Guards and cuirassiers had returned towards Dresden, than, rightly judging that the Emperor himself was with them, he resolved, in conformity with the plan of operations concerted at Trachenberg, to resume the offensive at all points. He directed his three corps to halt in their retreat and recross the Katzbach in three columns between Goldberg and Liegnitz,-York and Sacken on his right moving against Liegnitz; Langeron on the left towards Goldberg. On learning the near approach of the French, the veteran Prussian, who, with York and Sacken's corps, was now close to the ravine of the Neisse, arrested their march on his own side of the plateau of Eichholz, behind a low range of swelling heights, which effectually screened them from observation, and there, like a lion in cover, lay crouching