CHAP. XIV. 1814. 459-461. nich again, though he felt the necessity of strengthening Prussia, was not inclined to do so beyond a certain point. He had no desire to see the Cabinet of Berlin so powerful as to contest with that of Vienna the supremacy in the confederacy, and he was reluctant to establish so dangerous a precedent as that of entirely stripping an ancient reigning family of their dominions. He desired, therefore, to leave a certain part of his territories to the King of Saxony, including his beautiful capital, but to assign a considerable portion of his dominions to the King of Prussia in return for what he might lose in the Grand1 Hard, xii. duchy of Posen to the advantage of Russia.1 But meanwhile Alexander was resolutely bent on restoring Poland; his armies were all halted there in their homeward march from Germany; the Grand-duke Constantine, who commanded at Warsaw, was unwearied in his attentions to the Polish nobility; and the Russian agents and partisans everywhere spread through the country the reports that the Emperor was bent on restoring the lost nationality of their country-that he would do what Napoleon had left undone and that now was the time, by rallying round the Russian standards, to restore their long-lost native land to its separate existence.* At the same time the Emance des couronnes, les droits de legitimité, l'equilibre de l'Allemagne, les égards dûs à un roi réveré par ses vertus, les liens de parente, et une analogie d'infortune, avaient paru à Louis XVIII. de justes motifs de défendre la cause de Frederic Auguste; il avait même declaré dans son conseil qu'il ne consentirait jamais à la cession entière de la Saxe, et laisserait à ses successeurs la tâche penible de la sanctionner."-CAPEFIgue, i. 81. "The Russian minister, the Comte de Stackelberg, has taken all the Poles here under his protection, and Madame de Stackelberg presented several Polish ladies at the last court. He made no secret, I believe, that he acts by the orders of his Court, and he pays the most marked civilities even to the inhabitants of the old Gallicia. The Poles in general are pleased at the idea of becoming a kingdom attached to Russia, for the present, in the idea that it will lead to their future independence. Some of the more reasonable look upon this as illusory, and flatter themselves that the day will come when Austria will espouse their cause in order to wrest Poland from Russia. But it is remarkable that among all the Poles whom I see (and I see a great many) there is not one individual who is attached either to Russia or to any other Power, but as they think that that Power may ultimately favour their views for the independence of Poland."-HON. F. LAMB to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Vienna, June 25, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 59. XIV. 1814. peror, who was extremely exasperated at Talleyrand and CHAP. the French Government, held out promises of support to Murat in his claims for the throne of Naples, which he knew would touch both Austria and France on the tenderest point. Alarmed at these concurring dangers, which seemed to portend new political combinations, and possibly a renewal of wars at no distant period, Metternich resolved to bring up his last resource to resist the progress of the Russian Emperor. He requested Lord Castlereagh, therefore, to solicit an audience of the Czar; "knowing," says Thiers, "that he could not oppose to him a more redoubtable adversary." It was immediately accorded; but instead of fixing an hour, as requested, in his own hotel, the Czar himself called on the British diplomatist at his dwelling. He could not have given him a more touching proof of esteem, or evinced more clearly how much he had at heart the objects to be discussed at the interview.* 27. 66 reagh's ob Alexander. Lord Castlereagh, much touched by this flattering proceeding, redoubled in his respectful manner towards his Lord Castleillustrious guest; "but he remained," says Thiers, a servations to true Englishman-that is to say, immovable; and, wishing to manage everything, he yielded nothing." He began by referring to the numerous occasions on which England had endeavoured to accommodate itself to his wishes; he reminded him that she had aided him in 1812 to conclude the treaty of Bucharest with the Turks, when hard pressed by Napoleon in Russia, which secured him the possession of Bessarabia; that she had induced Persia to grant him a better frontier towards Georgia; that, in fine, to secure Russia the possession of Finland, she "M. de Metternich, au lieu de retenir Lord Castlereagh, le laissa marcher en avant, certain qu'on ne pouvait pas opposer à Alexandre un plus redoutable adversaire. Indépendamment de son caractère entier, Lord Castlereagh avait l'avantage de représenter la Puissance la plus désintéressée dans les distributions territoriales du Continent, et en outre celle qui payait toutes es autres. Or cette supériorité de celui qui donne sur celui qui reçoit, perçait toujours dans les relations de l'Angleterre avec ses alliés."-THIERS, xviii. 486. CHAP. XIV. 1814. 1 Thiers, xviii. 487, 488. 28. Alexander, had consented, though with very great reluctance, to the annexation of Norway to Sweden. He then quoted the three treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Töplitz in 1813, by all of which it was expressly provided that the Grand-duchy of Warsaw should be divided among the three partitioning Powers, not become the exclusive appanage of one of them. He said, in conclusion, respectfully, but firmly, "I entreat your Majesty to reflect on the disquietude which Russia is causing to Europe, and the trouble which the line it is pursuing has already afforded to the Allies. I do not scruple to tell your Majesty that unless care is taken, the Congress of Vienna, from which it was hoped would date the reign of justice and moderation among civilised nations, will present nothing but a scene of ambition of itself sufficient to make the reign of Napoleon be regretted.”1 Profoundly irritated at these intrepid words, which Answer of sounded strange in the ears of a despotic Eastern potentate, accustomed to see everything yield to his will, Alexander was yet sufficiently master of himself to be capable of answering with moderation and judgment. "The two treaties of Russia with Turkey, and with Persia," said he, "were, it is true, facilitated by Great Britain; but this was done in order that the armies of Russia, disengaged from Eastern wars, might be rendered disposable against Napoleon, the common enemy of both : Norway was promised to Bernadotte, but that was only to detach him from the French alliance, and secure his co-operation against France. I do not, therefore, consider myself as weighed down by the weight of benefits, considering the motives of the benefactor. The treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Töplitz, contain, it is true, the stipulation alluded to, in regard to the Grandduchy of Warsaw; but that was made in reference to a state of things quite different from what has now come to pass. The utmost which was then hoped for, was to succeed in opposing some barrier to the ambition of XIV. 1814. Napoleon, but by no means to force him back to the CHAP. Rhine, and precipitate him from the throne. By the unexpected flow of success which has followed the conclusion of these treaties, the other Powers of Europe have gained immensely; Austria has regained the frontier of the Inn, the Tyrol, Italy; England, Holland and Belgium. It is not just in these circumstances that Russia and Prussia, which, during the conflict, have incurred very different dangers from England, should derive no accession of territory from this unexpected flow of good fortune, by which their less endangered Allies have so largely benefited. As to Saxony, I am pledged to give it to my friend and fellow-soldier, the King of Prussia; as to Poland, to restore it to its lost nationality by engagements to the Poles themselves. 29. "In my eyes the partition of Poland was an offence, the moral consequences of which have never ceased to Concluded. weigh down Europe. It is at once honourable and politic to endeavour to repair them. Russia alone has the means of doing so; for the major part of the Polish provinces fell to her on the partition; and that was not the case either with France, which failed in the attempt to restore Poland, nor with Austria or Prussia, who have never even thought of such a thing. On the other hand, Russia, by abandoning the large part of Poland which she held in her hands, with a small sacrifice from Prussia -a sacrifice the compensation for which was already agreed on-by endowing the restored kingdom with liberal institutions, and impressing moderation in the use made of them, would achieve a work which would be the glory of Europe and of the Congress of Vienna. I propose to myself that noble object; I am on the eve of accomplishing it, and I will not be diverted from it. Besides this, when my armies entered Poland, they made by my authority certain promises to detach the Poles from Napoleon, and I am resolved to keep my word. I am not one of those sovereigns who make promises under the 1814. CHAP. pressure of necessity, and retract them with the same XIV. facility when the danger is past. What I have promised I will perform; and I think the services I have rendered to Europe are such as entitle me, on the other side, to some concession to my wishes, and some regard to my pledged honour.” 1 1 Thiers, xviii. 489, 490. 30. reaghi's reply. It must be admitted that the annexation of Poland to Lord Castle- Russia, which was the real point at issue, could not have been more forcibly and eloquently defended than it was by the Czar on this occasion. Lord Castlereagh, however, preserving always the most respectful demeanour, and using only the most measured and polite expressions, was nowise disconcerted or diverted from his object. "The partition of Poland," said he, "was a crime; and it is not England, which has from the first opposed it, which will ever maintain the contrary. She is prepared, therefore, instantly to accede to the restoration of Poland, and there is nothing she desires more ardently. But to render it effectual for good, it must be complete and entire. If, therefore, Austria will restore what she yet holds of Poland, and Russia and Prussia will do the same, and out of the portions thus restored you will form a kingdom apart, independent of its neighbours, and seat on its throne a Polish king, or, if not Polish, a sovereign independent of the partitioning Powers-if, in addition, you will give the restored kingdom institutions sufficiently monarchical and liberal-England will not only applaud this measure, but contribute to its completion, though it should cost her much to do so. But are the three partitioning Powers prepared in good faith to commence the great work of restitution? If they are, is it possible to find a king capable of undertaking it? Are the Poles capable of living together in harmony, and comporting themselves like men of sense, capable of forming a nation, and bearing the strains of liberal institutions? Grave doubts may be entertained on all these points, and there is too much reason, on the contrary, to believe that |