But CHAP. XIV. 1814. the restoration of which you speak is but a dream. if, instead of that restoration, complete and European, you re-establish Poland only in part, and, to deceive the world, call it by the name of the old commonwealth, and render it as large as possible in order to hand it over with its restored name and increased strength to Russia, you will perpetrate an illusion on Europe which will never be submitted to. Consider, Sire, what is due to the loyalty of your own exalted character, the alarms already spreading to such a degree that the Congress is regarded in many places as already dissolved, and permit me to supplicate you, for the repose of the world and Thiers, your own glory, to renounce pretensions which you must 492." feel are inadmissible.”1 1 xviii. 491, Talleyrand quence, to Russia. On the day following, Lord Castlereagh prepared and 31. transmitted to the Czar a long note, in which the same Measures of arguments were ably stated, and every consideration in conse urged which could induce him to recede from his aggres-propitiate sive policy. At the same time he communicated to M. Talleyrand the substance of his interview, who lost no time in transmitting it to his Court, from the archives of which M. Thiers has extracted the important document, which thus comes to us from the best and most unsuspected of all sources, the testimony of an unwilling and sometimes hostile witness. Talleyrand himself was charmed to find the English diplomatist thus decidedly opposed to the Czar, for it divided his two most formidable enemies; and he immediately proceeded to turn it to his own advantage, by insinuating to the Emperor that it was on the preservation of Saxony that the Cabinet of 2 Hard. xii. the Tuileries was chiefly set, and that, if this was con- Thiers,xviii. sented to, no obstacle would be thrown on their part to i. 92. the coveted acquisitions of Russia in Poland.2* * The real views of Lord Castlereagh at this period, and the length he was prepared to have gone in resisting the domination of Russia, are well explained in a secret letter to Mr Vansittart, Chancellor of the Exchequer, on November 11, 1814 : "The progress of our revenue, as contained in your interesting statement, 162; 493; Cap. CHAP. XIV. 32. Russia occu and gives Prussia. On the eve of the formal opening of the Congress on the 1st November, Alexander, in order to determine, if 1914. possible, the indecision of the other Powers by the example of un fait accompli, resolved to withdraw his troops from pies Poland, Saxony into Poland, and to transfer the former country Saxony to into the custody of Prussia. This actually took place on the 8th November 1814. By a proclamation issued on that day by Prince Repnin, the Russian governor of Saxony, in whose hands, since the battle of Leipsic, the administration of the country had been provisionally, and as a matter of necessity placed, it was announced, "That the supreme administration of the kingdom of Saxony, placed, in virtue of an arrangement between Russia and Prussia, and to which Austria and England have adhered, in the hands of his Majesty the King of Prussia, having been solemnly handed over to-day by me to the governor and generals named by his Majesty, the inhabitants of Saxony are required to put the same confidence in, and manifest the same spirit of order and obedience towards them by which they have been distinguished during my administration. The Emperor, my august master, will never cease to feel an interest in the affairs of Saxony; and in surrender is highly satisfactory; but we shall have occasion for all our resources, and you may rely on my desire to economise them as much as possible. The great question in my hands is the Dutch loan, which connects itself, however, with our claim to retain Demarara, Berbice, and Essequibo. "If the Emperor of Russia shall persist in refusing to acknowledge his treaties, or to treat in pursuance of them à l'aimable, I shall have no diffi culty in stopping that demand, provided that I can secure the Low Countries against his arms and his intrigues. But if his Imperial Majesty shall change his tone, and make a reasonable arrangement of frontier on the side of Poland, if he shall allow the other European arrangements to be equitably settled, including those of Holland, and alter his tariff besides, then, my dear Vansittart, I must come upon you for my pound of flesh-or, if I cannot stop his power upon the Vistula, and it breaks loose, and shall carry everything before it to the Meuse, I cannot answer for the consequences: I only beg you will believe I shall do my best to save your purse. The engagements with Holland shall be no obstacle to this, as I had rather give the Prince of Orange something more to defend and fortify the Low Countries, than assist the credit of a Calmuck Prince to overturn Europe."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to RIGHT HON. N. VANSITTART, Vienna, November 11, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 200. Viz., of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Töplitz. XIV. de Vienne, ing the government of the country to a Prince eminently CHAP. noble, virtuous, and generous, he trusts he has done the best in his power for the happiness of provinces shaken by 1814. so many storms, and standing so much in need of tran-1 Congrès quillity." As the die was now cast, the King of Saxony i. 321-323. addressed to the Congress an eloquent and plaintive memorial protesting against the transference of his dominions to another Power, and invoking the principles on which the Coalition had maintained the contest against Napoleon. The proclamation of Prince Repnin affirmed with truth that it was issued by Russia and Prussia, with the consent of Austria and England. The two latter Powers had, as already mentioned, during the course of the negotiation, given what might be construed into a reluctant consent to it, from a sense of the absolute impossibility in any other way of providing in Germany an adequate counterpoise to the power either of France or Russia. Metternich, however, did not disguise his extreme reluc- Oct. 22. tance to consent to the entire dethronement of an ancient sovereign house without an indemnity; and Lord Castle- Oct. 11. reagh said that it "was with the deepest regret that he 459, 460. felt himself compelled to accede to the arrangement.' "2 2 Hard. xii. preparations This surrender of the government of the whole of 33. Saxony by the Russian to the Prussian authorities, was Warlike the result of a secret treaty between these two Powers, ria. which had been concluded without the privity or knowledge of the other Powers. But public acts soon ensued on both sides which put the hostile views of both parties in the clearest light, and proved that the pacific congress was on the verge of a new war possibly as long and bloody as that which had just been concluded. Austria and England protested in the strongest manner against their provisional assent to a matter still under discussion being taken as authority for such an unaccountable proceeding. On the 9th November the Grand-duke Constantine left Vienna, and proceeded to Warsaw, where he took the command, and immediately addressed a proclamation to the Poles, CHAP. XIV. 1814. Dec. 9. 1 Lord Cas tlereagh to Lord Liver pool, Nov. 16, 1810, MS.; Thiers, 507, and 543, 546. 34. the policy in which he said, "The Emperor, your powerful protector, appeals to you. Unite around his standards. Let your hands take up arms for the defence of your country, and for the preservation of your political existence." Nesselrode wrote to the Emperor that "eight millions of Poles were resolved to defend the independence of their country." The agitation in Warsaw was extreme; the lure of restoring the Polish nationality had entirely succeeded. The whole Russian armies retreating through Poland were halted, to the number of 200,000 men, and the fortresses of Thorn and Modlin put in a posture of defence. The Emperor meanwhile abated nothing of his haughty bearing, and frequently repeated his favourite expression in circles where xviii. 493- it was sure to be immediately conveyed to the ministers of France and Austria, "I have three hundred thousand men in Poland; let them come and take it if they please."1 Lord Castlereagh's original view, as already mentioned, Change in was to have directed the whole efforts of the Powers of England opposed to Russia to preserve Poland from its grasp; and to attain that, and create a central Power capable of withstanding either France or Russia, he was content to have strengthened Prussia by the whole of Saxony. But, however wise that policy might be, with a view to the warding off future dangers, there could be no doubt that it would be attended with extreme hardship to the present King, and went to establish a precedent which might come to be of dangerous application to the lesser states of Germany in after times. The project of entirely transferring Saxony to Prussia excited a great sensation in these lesser states, the sovereigns of which were alike jealous of any considerable increase of the power of Austria or Prussia, and averse to the idea of dethroning and annihilating a reigning Prince in the Confederacy. Bavaria took the lead in this combination, and spoke out resolutely on the necessity of hazarding a war rather than submitting to it. They took the most effectual means of attaining their object, by addressing themselves to the Prince Regent of England, who, regarding Saxony. CHAP. XIV. 1814. as King of Hanover, was as much interested as themselves in withstanding the proposal. The Prince embraced their views, and the consequence was a change in the instructions of the British Cabinet to Lord Castlereagh. He was now directed to concur to a certain extent with France, Bavaria, and the lesser German Powers, in opposition to the entire absorption of Saxony by Prussia, and to contend for compromise. To this change the preservation of Dresden Cap. i. 92; and a part of Saxony to its reigning family is mainly to 462. be ascribed.1 1 Thiers, a 496, and xviii. 495, 543-550; Hard. xii. measures of Bavaria. This change, however, by threatening to deprive Prussia 35. of part of the territories of Saxony, which its Cabinet so Warlike eagerly coveted, only augmented the chances of a complete France and rupture between the Powers, and a general war. They immediately took fire at Berlin. Hardenberg declared openly at Vienna, that “Prussia would not restore Saxony. She had won it, and she would keep it. She had neither the inclination nor idea of abandoning it." At the same time, the Prussian armies were all put on the war footing, and large bodies of troops from Berlin marched into Dresden, and occupied all the frontier towns of Saxony. Meanwhile the other Powers were not idle, and Frederick Augustus found himself supported by a larger combination than he could have ventured to hope for. Bavaria had 70,000 men soon on foot, which were moved towards the Saxon frontier, and De Wrede formally offered to Metternich to bring 25,000 into the field for every 100,000 which the Cabinet of Vienna sent forth to support them. Talleyrand wrote to his Government in the most urgent terms, counselling the immediate increase of the French army; and Louis XVIII., though most reluctant to draw the sword, at length agreed to call 70,000 of the old soldiers to their standards, which raised the effective force of France from 130,000 to 200,000 men. So threatening did affairs look, that the Duke of Wellington wrote from Paris that war was inevitable, and that the only use of the Congress of Vienna was to gain time for the preparations |