X.

1813.

CHAP. for his spring. A heavy rain and thick mist, which continued the whole day, and was as favourable to the Allies here as it was adverse at Dresden, eminently favoured his Aug. 27. designs by entirely shutting out his troops from view. The wished-for opportunity was not long of arriving. A part of Macdonald's men had crossed the Wüthende-Neisse, between Weinberg and Klein Tintz, when Blucher, seeing that it would be long before a sufficient number could pass over in support, gave the signal for attack. Wassilchikoff, with the whole Russian cavalry of Sacken's corps, fell on a large body of Sebastiani's horse, who had crossed and covered Macdonald's left, while the Cossacks stole round unperceived and assailed their rear. Both attacks proved successful. The French cavalry were speedily overthrown, and thrust back into the defile, already choked up with guns, carriages, and men; while the Allied foot, now joining the victorious horse, threw themselves upon the infantry of Macdonald's corps. Charpentier's division was soon hurled down the rocky banks into the roaring Neisse (Wüthende-Neisse). Many were made prisoners, twenty-six guns were taken, and all the ammunition-waggons lost.1

1 Plotho, ii.

89, 90; Sacken's

Official Ac

count; Schoell,

iii. 80, 81;

Kausler, 639, 640; Thiers, xvi. 370-373.

52.

Defeat of

Macdonald with im

mense loss.

Souham, who was marching on the French left towards Liegnitz, hearing the roar of the battle on his right, turned, with the instinct of a brave man, in that direction, and arrived with his leading division at the entrance of the defile of Nieder Crain just as the French horse were overthrown on the plateau opposite. He immediately united his men to the reserve of Sebastiani and entered the defile. This only made matters worse. His infantry, with Sebastiani's reserve cuirassiers, got through the Sacken's ravine, and were mounting the opposite side in tolerable order, when, just as they reached the summit and were 81; Thiers, beginning to deploy, they met the fugitives. In vain they 373; Grosse endeavoured to make openings and let them through; the refluent mass broke down and swept away every attempt at formation.2 Souham's columns, striving to gain

2

Official Ac

count;

Schoell, iii.

xvi. 372,

Chron. i. 482-490.

a passage, were for the most part fairly overwhelmed by the torrent. Such as succeeded in reaching the crest were charged by the Allied cavalry and driven down the steep. Two remaining divisions of his corps, which came up at nine at night, and crossed over lower down the Katzbach, to endeavour to restore the combat, were met by Sacken and forced back across the ford.

CHAP.

X.

1813.

53.

immense

French.

While this disaster was experienced in the French centre and left, an obstinate conflict had been maintained Retreat and on the right, between Lauriston and Langeron, towards losses of the Hennersdorf. The numbers there were about equal; and both sides stood their ground with resolution. Towards evening Macdonald, having learned the extent of the disaster on his left, gave orders to Lauriston to retreat; this was effected in good order, and with comparatively little loss, though it amounted, when he regained the opposite banks of the Katzbach, to twenty-two guns, his whole ammunition-waggons, and 2000 prisoners. A serious disaster, however, befell Puthod's division, detached, as mentioned above, from Lauriston's corps, in the course of the retreat on the following day. On arriv- Nov. 27. ing at the banks of the Bober, he found the whole bridges swept away by the extreme violence of the floods which descended from the Bohemian hills, in consequence of the storm of rain on the preceding day. In vain he tried, by moving down the stream, to find a passage at some practicable point. In this situation he was speedily surrounded by the victorious divisions of the Russians; and after a stout resistance, his soldiers, grown desperate, 1Thiers,xvi. broke, and fled to the banks of the river to endeavour Vaud. i. 148; to save themselves by swimming. Part escaped in this Jom. iv. 19; manner; but 3000 men, two eagles, and twelve guns, with their whole ammunition-waggons, were taken, besides geron's Offi2000 killed or drowned in the attempt to cross the count; river. In the course of the day forty more guns were 83, 84. taken, making, in all, 103 guns and 230 caissons captured

374-377;

Grosse

Chron. i.

503; Lan

cial Ac

Schoell, ii.

CHAP. during the battle and pursuit, besides 18,000 prisoners and 7000 killed and wounded.1 *

X.

1813.

54.

Effect of

these disasters on

Such was the terrible disaster of the Katzbach. This succession of unexpected misfortunes following each other in rapid succession, made the greatest impression on the Napoleon. ardent and impassioned soul of Napoleon. For several days he remained silent, moody, and contemplative, revolving in his capacious mind the chances of the campaign, and weighing the different degrees of culpability which he could impute to his lieutenants. In truth, the disasters incurred were so numerous and irreparable, that it is not surprising he almost despaired of his fortunes. Four great battles had been fought in the short space of a single fortnight, in the first only of which he had been victorious, while in the three last he had been defeated with tremendous loss. In that short time he had lost 80,000 men and 200 guns, while the Allies, on the field at least, at the very utmost, had not been weakened by half the number. Worse still, the prestige of victory had passed over to the other side. The successes of the Allies had been the last in this fearful strife; their gallant bands had returned flushed with victory to Prague and Berlin; all Germany had come to ring with their songs of triumph. Indescribable was the enthusiasm which these circumstances produced in the whole of Europe, but especially in the Fatherland; they at one blow doubled the strength of the Allied armies. Napoleon, as usual, cast all the responsibility on his generals. It was their incapacity and blunders which had done the whole, and converted a commenced triumph into a long series of disasters.† He was in an especial manner incensed, and not without

* "Le 30 on se trouva tous réunis sur la gauche du Bober, mais au nombre de 50,000 hommes au plus, au lieu de 70,000 qu'on était quelques jours auparavant, et après avoir laissé 100 pièces de canon dans les fanges. Macdonald se vit donc sur le Bober, avec 50,000 soldats découragés, et 9000 ou 10,000 trainards suivant l'armée, et alléguant le défaut de fusils pour ne pas revenir au drapeau."-THIERS, xvi. 377.

"Mon cousin,-M. le Duc de Tarente (Macdonald) s'est laissé pousser sur Görlitz. Il sera possible que je sois obligé de marcher sur Bautzen demain

CHAP.

X.

1813.

reason, at Oudinot, for the senseless dispersion of force which had led to the check at Gross Beeren, and the eccentric subsequent retreat to Wittenberg instead of Torgau, which put in hazard the important interior line of communication between the Grand Army and that of the North, and endangered those of Macdonald. If an error was committed by the French marshal on this occasion, it led to no evil results. Bernadotte, whose dark and tortuous policy was now renewed in consequence of the extrication of Berlin from immediate danger, 154.15 was so dilatory in his movements after his victory, that Vaud. i.168; on the 4th September, eleven days after, he had only Jom. iv.408; advanced to Rabenstein, near the Elbe, a distance little mere than fifty miles from the field of battle.1

1

155;

Bout. 57-59;

St Cyr, iv.

of 130.

and late

disasters.

It was already evident, from the turn which events had 55. taken, both that Napoleon had judged wisely in making Causes of his stand on the Elbe, and establishing himself in such early success Napoleon's strength on that river; and that he had, even in so short a time as had since intervened, lost all the advantages with which his position there was attended, and rendered his situation eminently perilous, by his grasping and overbearing disposition having led him to aim at impossibilities, and undertake everything at once. The advantage of the position and wisdom of selecting it as the central point and base of his operations, had been decisively proved by the fact that, by rendering him master of an interior line of communication, and enabling him to fall with a preponderating force upon any one part of the

ou après demain. Occupez donc promptement les positions défensives." -NAPOLEON to ST CYR, 1st September 1813; ST CYR, iv. 391.

"Mon cousin,-Ecrivez au Prince de la Moskwa (Ney). Nous venons de recevoir des nouvelles du Duc de Reggio (Oudinot), qui a jugé convenable de venir se mettre, à deux marches, audessus de Wittenberg. Le résultat de ce mouvement intempestif est, que le corps du Général Tauenzein, et un fort parti des Cosaques, se sont portés du côté de Luckau et de Bautzen, et inquiétent les communications du Duc de Tarente. Il est vraiement difficile d'avoir moins de tête que le Duc de Reggio. Il n'a point su aborder l'ennemi; et il a eu l'art de faire donner un de ses corps séparément. S'il l'eut abordé franchement, il l'aurait partout culbuté."-NAPOLEON to BERTHIER, 2d September 1813; ST CYR, iv. 393; and JOMINI, iv. 417, 418.

X.

CHAP. circle of his enemies, it had given him the victory over their Grand Army and most formidable attack. Nothing was 1813. wanting to complete his success but to follow up the great blow then struck, and, by completing the ruin of the Grand Army, dissolve the Coalition formed against him. Nothing would have been easier than to have done this; all that was required was to have moved the Young Guard, Poniatowski's corps, and Vandamme, forming a mass of 75,000 combatants, upon Culm and Töplitz, to stop the Grand Army in its retreat, while Murat, Victor, St Cyr, and Marmont pressed their retiring columns.* Instead of this, he adopted the fatal resolution, impelled by his towering disposition and overweening ambition, of striking on three sides at once. He enforced a vigorous offensive on Oudinot against Berlin; Macdonald took the same course against Blucher; while he himself was launching his victorious legions on the rear of the Grand Army. But his forces, great as they were, could not suffice for the triple strain, and the consequence was that he thought it necessary to halt the Young Guard at Pirna, in order to be in a situation to support, if required, Oudinot in his advance on Berlin, or Macdonald in his march upon Liegnitz. The result was that his weighty central reserve, perfectly adequate to have turned the scale in any of the three expeditions, remained inactive while they were simultaneously going on, and disaster, great and irreparable, was incurred at once in Bohemia, Prussia, and Silesia, in consequence of its want. There was here a decided deviation from military principles, not in selecting the Elbe as the basis of his defensive warfare, as Sir George Cathcart argues, but in neglecting to make the

* "At Culm," says Wilson, "each party fought with a resolution suitable to the magnitude of its object—the preservation or ruin of the Allied army (ii. 251). The danger seemed imminent, for the whole army still remained fixed in the mountains, unable to move from the breaking down of carriages and other impediments. The distance from Kraupen to their embouchure was but five wersts, and if that pass was gained, ruin was inevitable for above 150,000 men" (ii. 101).