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and France; and for the consideration of the slave trade CHAP. -the maritime Powers.

XIV.

40.

Lord Castle

ceeds in

Prussian

During all this time Lord Castlereagh was indefatiga- 1814. ble in his endeavours to detach Prussia from Russia, and unite it with all the other States of Germany in a defensive reagh sucleague to resist the encroachments of the Czar on the side shaking the of Poland. Upon the King he could produce no impres- Cabinet. sion, for he was a fellow-soldier of Alexander, and like him he felt himself bound by every consideration of gratitude and honour to his benefactor. But upon the Prussian Cabinet, which was not bound by the same irrefragable bonds, and which was second to none in Europe in ability and intelligence, his efforts were attended with much greater success; and both Metternich and Talleyrand now embraced his views and seconded his efforts. He represented to them "that the abandonment of Poland was a misfortune for the whole of Germany, but for the Prussians in particular, so near Russia, a peril of the gravest kind that even the last partition was less dangerous, for it at least left the Vistula with its fortresses as a barrier against Russia; but that it was now proposed to bring them across that river down to the Oder, and into the very heart of Germany: that the project of restoring Poland was a mere delusion; for the Poland which would be restored would not be the ancient warlike and independent republic, but a vanquished and submissive Poland, which could prove nothing in the hands of the Czar but a brave nation of slaves fighting for its masters that if it were permitted to have any will of its own it could only be to resume Gallicia from Austria, and Dantzic, Graudentz, and Thorn from Prussia; and it might be figured what interest the Cabinet of Berlin would have in facilitating such a consummation. The motive which led the great Frederick to accept a portion of Poland on occasion of the first partition in 1772, was to unite by them old Prussia to Silesia, which otherwise would have been completely separated, and

VOL. II.

2 M

CHAP. Would have presented the two sides of a right angle XIV. united only at its apex. But this advantage would be 1814. entirely lost, and the old inconvenience would return in a still more dangerous form, if this portion of the Polish territory were ceded to Russia, and that Power established on the Netze and the Wartha, between Thorn, Posen, and Kalisch. Russia would then only require a single step to cut Prussia in two by a single stroke, and send one army to Berlin and old Prussia and another to Upper Silesia. All that Prussia would acquire on the Elbe from Wittenberg to Dresden could never compensate to her the extreme risk of having the Russians permanently established at Posen, in the very midst of her territories. Her demands for an increase of dominion on the Elbe are universally acknowledged. England, and even Austria, are willing to give her the whole, or at least the greater part, of Saxony, but on the condition that she will frankly and in good faith join the European alliance, and detach herself from the ambitious ally to whom she is unhappily so strongly united. That attachment, however, is not founded upon reasons of State and public policy, but has arisen entirely from the friendship and gratitude of the King for the Czar. The destiny of nations, however, should not be made to depend on the friendship of individuals; and it is the duty of the Prussian ministers to enlighten their sovereign upon the real interests of his people, and if they cannot persuade him to alter his policy, to withdraw from his service." 1

1 Thiers, xviii. 532, 533.

41. Effect it

These arguments of Lord Castlereagh were so obviously well founded, and they spoke so strongly on military the King of grounds to the desire for national independence, naturally Prussia. strong in a state which felt itself surrounded by more

produced on

powerful neighbours, that they produced a strong impression even on Frederick William, and caused him to hesitate in throwing himself, as he had hitherto done, into the arms of Russia. The Prussian ministers, indeed, were too farsighted not to have themselves adopted the same views ;

XIV.

1814.

and it was the influence of the King, arising from his CHAP. personal regard for the Emperor of Russia, which had hitherto prevented effect being given to them.* The Emperor of Russia soon perceived this change, and as all the other Powers were decidedly against him on this point, he was very much affected by it. To neutralise the impression, he asked the King of Prussia to dine with him, tête-à-tête, in order to come to an understanding on the momentous questions at issue, without the intervention of their ministers-a proceeding which, how unusual soever in matters of State, seemed warranted by the dangers they had faced together and the personal intimacy which subsisted between them. The interview was looked forward to with the utmost anxiety by the Czar, Nov. 29. for he well knew how set his subjects were on gaining the xviii. 533, command of their ancient and hereditary enemies, the 534: Lond. Poles; and he himself said to Sir Charles Stewart that Stewart to "it was as much as his crown was worth to return empty- pool, Dec. handed to St Petersburg." It took place on the 29th Ms.

362; Sir C.

Lord Liver

1814,

42.

the Czar

Prussia.

November, and was attended with unlooked-for success.1 Alexander, who was extremely excited on this occasion, spoke with the last degree of violence. He began by re- Interview of calling to their recollection the vows they had inter- with the changed in the beginning of 1813 when they met on the King of Oder, and after years of severance and coldness promised to stand or fall together, or save Europe by their united efforts. He reminded him of the fidelity to his oath which he had evinced, when, his councillors having all advised him to halt on the Vistula and make peace with Napoleon, he had resolved to brave all the dangers of war rather than forego the chance of delivering Germany. "But," said he, "for this honourable fidelity to engagements, Germany would still have been enslaved, and Prussia reduced to five millions of inhabitants. It is to the fidelity of Prussia never contended it in The Saxon question is now

* "I consider the Polish question as settled. earnest, and Austria consequently has yielded.

the only one that is of much difficulty."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to DUKE OF WELLINGTON, December 17, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 219.

XIV.

1814.

CHAP. Russia that this change, so fortunate to both, which has since taken place, is entirely to be ascribed. The coalesced Powers are all desirous to profit by this auspicious change of fortune themselves, but they would deprive the Russians, to whom they are indebted for it all, of any share in the remuneration. To leave Russia bounded on the side of Europe by the Vistula is to leave her without any compensation for all the blood she has shed from the banks of the Oder to those of the Seine. After the disaster of Moscow Napoleon offered us peace with the Vistula for a boundary, and we might have returned home with security and honour without exposing ourselves to fresh hazards, or sacrificing the 200,000 soldiers who were lost in Germany in 1813. Now, however, this grand resolution, to which the deliverance of Europe has been owing, to pass the Vistula despite the advice of the wise Kutusoff, is forgotten, and those very Powers, who could only be impelled by violent pressure to hazard anything in the cause, will enjoy the whole fruits of victory. The Austrians, in particular, who have not shed a fourth of the blood poured forth like water during the war, appropriate to themselves the whole gains of conquest, and will not leave Russia a village to compensate to her for Moscow burned. That diplomatists should enter into such cold-blooded calculations can be understood-it is their business to do so; but that sovereigns full of the sentiments of honour, like Alexander and Frederick William, of the same age, and bound together by the perils they have shared in common, by the vicissitudes of their lives, by their common reverses, their common triumphs, should give way to the same selfish views, is inconceivable. We have been always happy and fortunate when we were friends, and never unfortunate except when disunited; we both feel a superstition concerning our union let us remain for ever united for our own happiness and the good of our people."1*

1 Thiers, xviii. 535, 536.

*The particulars of this interesting meeting were communicated the next day to Hardenberg, who forthwith sent them to Talleyrand and Lord Castle

XIV.

1814.

43.

Fresh and

union of

Prussia.

There was much truth in these eloquent words, so far CHAP. as the personal merits of Alexander, and the great services of Russia during the war, were concerned; though, unfortunately, so far as the independence of Europe and the liberties of other States were involved, they were met secure by other considerations not less weighty, and of more Russia and general application. Enforced, however, with the charm of manner which the Czar possessed in so high a degree, and to which his animation and vehemence only lent additional force, they proved irresistible. Frederick William threw himself into the Emperor's arms, and they mutually swore again eternal friendship. Alexander, however, when the first transports were over, reminded Frederick William that it was not enough that they were united, but that the consent of their Cabinets was required to public acts, which should bind their respective Governments. For this purpose another meeting was arranged between the Emperor and Prince Hardenberg, at which the former repeated all the arguments he had addressed to Lord Castlereagh and Prince Talleyrand to induce him to adopt his views. Hardenberg combated them as much as he could, and laid before him the views of Austria and Great Britain on the subject, but without producing the smallest impression on the Czar. The minister was finally obliged to yield; Russia and Prussia remained more closely united than ever; and the conditions of the agreement were, the abandonment to Russia of the whole of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, including 1 Thiers, Warsaw, with 4,200,000 inhabitants, and the annexation 537, 541. to Prussia of the whole of Saxony.1

1

xviii. 536,

44.

alienation

This renewed cordial understanding between Alexander and Frederick William soon made itself felt in many dif- Extreme ferent ways. The Czar and his suite discontinued all of Ale visits, except those of mere ceremony, to the French Embassy, and openly received in the most cordial manner

reagh, by whom they were transmitted to Paris and London, where M. Thiers found them in the Bureau des Affaires Etrangères.-THIERS, Xviii. 536-542.

ander

against the

Bourbons.

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