CHAP. XIV. 1814. 1 Cap. i. 88, 89. those who were known to be most obnoxious to them. Eugene Beauharnais had recently arrived at Vienna ; he was immediately met in the most flattering manner by the Emperor, who not only visited him with almost paternal kindness, but publicly walked with him arm-inarm on terms of the most intimate familiarity. He spoke constantly of the necessity of keeping faith, and executing with the most scrupulous fidelity the treaty with Murat; and when Talleyrand alluded to the obvious danger of leaving Buonaparte so near the coast of Italy, and hinted on the necessity of removing him to St Helena or the Canary Islands, he replied, "Right or wrong, I have signed the treaty of Fontainebleau, and I will abide by it. When my word is once given I do not admit of change. So much the worse for France if she does not keep her engagements." So far did the Emperor's irritation against the royal family at Paris go, that he spoke to his confidential friends on the possibility of substituting for them on the throne of France the younger branch of the Bourbons. The name of the Duke of Orleans was mentioned as a suitable person for the throne along with those of Bernadotte, who was again viewed in a favourable light, and Prince Eugene; and so far did these speculations go, that, in a memoir secretly prepared by orders of the Emperor, and which came afterwards into the possession of the Duc de Richelieu, the question was seriously argued whether the continuance of the elder branch on the throne of France afforded any security for the independence of Europe or the repose of France.1* * The Saxon question had been thus ably stated by the French Government:— "La question sur le sort de Saxe et de son souverain peut être envisagée sous le double rapport du droit et de l'utilité. On parle d'un royaume comme d'un pays vacant, du Roi comme d'un criminel qui n'a plus rien à attendre, si ce n'est peut-être de la clemence, "Le Roi n'a point abdiqué; si donc il a perdu ses droits, il faut nécessairement de deux choses l'une; ou que la conquête seule ait pu les lui faire perdre, ou qu'un jugement l'en ait privé. Quand l'oppresseur de l'Europe disposa du Hanovre, qu'il avait conquis, loin de reconnaître qu'il avait pu en disposer, l'Angleterre déclara la guerre à la Puissances qui avait consenti à le recevoir de lui (la Prusse). Quand par représailles celle-ci donna la Guadeloupe à la CHAP. 1814. 45. Austria. Seeing matters so nearly approaching a rupture, and rightly judging that the principal danger to be guarded against in any ulterior arrangements was the augmentation of the already exorbitant power of Russia, Lord Decided Castlereagh lost no time in drawing closer his relations note of with Prince Metternich and Prince Talleyrand. Knowing from the decided language of the Emperor and his public acts, as evinced in the vast concentration of troops in Poland, that he would not be diverted from his designs, and, if necessary, would carry them through by force, these three statesmen considered seriously during the first week of December what measures were best calculated to defeat them. The result of these deliberations was the forwarding of a decided note by Prince Metternich to the Dec. 10. Emperor Alexander, in which it was stated that, "Considering the unanimous opinion of Germany, the definitive Suède le même oppresseur de l'Europe réprouva à son tour la doctrine, que la conquête seule peut oter la souverainté. L'Angleterre et son ennemi ont donc également rejeté cette doctrine : la conquête n'a donc pas pu rendre le royaume de Saxe vacant. "Le Roi de Saxe n'a certainement pas été jugé, car il n'a été ni cité ni entendu. Il est donc tout au plus dans le simple état d'accusé; c'est à dire, dans un état où celui qui s'y trouve ne perd même le droit d'être tenu pour innocent jusqu'à ce qu'il ait été condamné. Si le Roi de Saxe devait être jugé, par qui serait-il? Serait ce par ses accusateurs? Serait ce par ceux qui veulent profiter de ses depouillés? Serait ce par ceux dont la politique a seule créé cette necessité, qui l'absout de toutes les fautes qu'elle aurait pu lui faire commettre. "Admittons pour un moment qu'il puisse l'être et qu'il soit; d'après quel principe de justice la peine portée contre lui serait-elle étendue aux princes de sa ligne? La confiscation, que les nations eclaircis ont banni de leurs codes, serait celle introduite aux dix-neuvième siècle dans le droit général de l'Europe; ou la confiscation d'un royaume serait-elle moins odieuse que celle d'un simple chaumière? Agir comme si la conquête seule donnait la souverainté c'est anéantir le droit de l'Europe et la placer sous l'empire exclusif de l'arbitraire et de la force. A qui la disposition que l'on pretend faire de la Saxe serait-elle utile? A la Prusse? Deux millions de sujets qui d'ici a plus d'un siècle peut-être ne s'affectioneraient point à la dynastie nouvelle. Ou veut fortifier la Prusse; on l'aura réelement affoibli. L'union de l'Autriche et de la Prusse est nécessaire au repos et à la sûreté de l'Allemagne; mais la disposition qu'on pretend de faire de la Saxe serait la chose du monde la plus propre à rallumer une rivalité qui a duré jusqu'aux désastres de la Prusse et que ses désastres ont suspendue mais non pas peut-être eteinté. Ainsi ces dispositions iraient contre le but même qui les aurait fait faire, et d'un premier mal naîtroient une foule de maux. Reconnoissons donc que l'injustice est un mauvais fondement, sur lequel le monde politique ne sauraient bâtir que pour sa ruine."Protestation de la France, 2 Novembre 1814; Congrès de Vienne, i. 276-280. CHAP. XIV. 1814. resolution of England, as expressed in the last instructions to Lord Castlereagh, and the opinion of all the great European Powers, and in particular that of France, and keeping in view the non-implement by Prussia of the conditions imposed in a moment when her desires were yielded to, Austria was now resolved that Saxony should 1 Note by be maintained in its existing state, with the exception of some sacrifices of territory judged necessary for the better rounding of the Prussian territory, and which may be regarded as the just punishment of the faults committed by Frederick Augustus.' Metternich, Dec. 10, 1814; Cast. Cor. MS.; and Thiers, xviii. 553. 46. Warlike preparations Bavaria. It was not without a full appreciation of the dangers with which it was attended that this decided step, so of Austria, different from his usual policy, was taken by Prince MetFrance, and ternich. The ministers of the three coalesced Powers had concerted measures, and were prepared for any eventuality. Austria had 250,000 men in arms in Moravia and Bohemia, and the allied armies of Bavaria, Wirtemberg, Baden, and Saxony raised the entire force to 320,000 men, ready for action in Central Germany. This immense force was to be divided into two armies-one, 200,000 strong, was to advance from Moravia towards the Upper Vistula, while the second, consisting of 120,000 combatants, was to march from Bohemia on the Oder. At the same time a force of 50,000 French was to enter Franconia, so as to cover the flank of the army moving on the Oder, and 50,000 more French to enter the Prussian-Rhenish provinces. By the concentration of these formidable masses, it was hoped Prussia would be com This note of Metternich's bore:- "L'Autriche ne nourrit aucune jalousie contre la Prusse: elle regarde, au contraire, cette puissance comme l'un des poids les plus utiles dans la balance des forces de l'Europe. De toutes ces puissances c'est celle dont la position a le plus de conformité avec celle d'Autriche. Placé également entre les grands empires de l'ouest et de l'est, la Prusse et l'Autriche completent leur système de défense respective. Unies, les deux monarchies forment une barrière impregnable contre les entreprises de tout prince conquerant qui, de nouveau occuperait peut-être un jour le trône de France ou celui de Russie."-Note du PRINCE METTERNICH, 10 Decembre 1814; CAPEFIGUE, i. 80, from METTERNICH's Papers. XIV. 1814. pelled to abandon her pretensions to the whole of Saxony, CHAP. and Russia be driven beyond the Vistula. The projects of the coalesced Powers were not to be carried into execution till March following, and in the mean time they remained the close secret of Austria, England, France, and Bavaria. England, as the best part of her army was engaged in America, was not taken bound to furnish any, Thiers, troops in the first instance, but she was to make up the xviii. 552, deficiency in subsidies to the other Powers, of which some i. 94, 95. of them, and France in particular, stood much in need.1 553; Cap. 47. begins to Dec. 31. Prussia did not reply to the determined note of Austria till the 20th, when Prince Hardenberg lodged a note, The Czar reiterating the demand of his Court for the whole of yield. Saxony as the only adequate recompense which the nation could receive for the sacrifices she had made; but offering to give up certain of her possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, as an indemnity to Frederick Augustus. On the preceding day, Talleyrand had drawn up a note, which was communicated to Lord Castlereagh on the 24th, in which he stated that he abandoned with regret the cause of Poland, which he could no longer defend against Russia, but that he would support that of Saxony, in the preservation of which the two principles of legitimacy and equilibrium of power were interested. The Czar now somewhat abated his haughty pretensions in regard to Poland. Some rumours of the combination of France, Austria, and England had reached his ears, and the constant communication between the embassies of those three Powers sufficiently proved that something serious was in contemplation. Accordingly, by a note on 31st December, he consented to relinquish one part of the Polish territory to Austria and another to Prussia, to declare Cracow a free city, and to give the restored kingdom of Poland, which might embrace the whole of that country ceded in the three partitions to Russia, such a constitution as might suit the wishes of the inhabitants and be in conformity with CHAP. XIV. the lights of the age. But the two Courts of Berlin and Vienna repudiated this proposal, from the apprehension that if so large a portion of Poland were assigned to 466, 407. Russia, the two lesser portions would ere long follow the same direction.1 1914 48. Secret treaty between England, France, and Jan. 3, 1815. As there was now no prospect of an accommodation, and it had become evident that force alone, or the immediate prospect of its application, could lead to a solution of the difficulty, the representatives of the three Austria. Powers, Austria, France, and Great Britain, at the suggestion of Lord Castlereagh, on 3d January 1815, signed a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, which was the most important diplomatic act of the Congress of Vienna, and portended new political combinations, which have, more or less, ever since governed the diplomacy of Europe. By this treaty, which proceeded on the preamble of the decree of the contracting parties to act in the most disinterested way, so as to carry out the principles of the treaty of Paris, it was provided that if any one was Art. 1. "Le Prince de Hardenberg ayant dit avec chaleur dans le comité de Pologne et Saxe que la Prusse saurait bien défendre ses droits sur la Saxe, Lord Castlereagh, piqué, se détermina aussitôt à proposer aux plénipotentiaires de France et d'Autriche une alliance defensive entre les trois cours: elle fut signée le 3 Janvier 1815."-CAPEfigue, i. 95. The preamble of the treaty bore:-“ Leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, le Roi de France, et le Roi du Royaume de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, convaincus que les puissances qui avaient à completer les dispositions du traité de Paris devaient être maintenues dans un état de sécurité et d'indépendance parfaite pour pouvoir fidèlement et dignement s'acquitter d'un si important devoir, regardent en conséquence comme nécessaire à cause des pretentions récemment manifestées de pouvoir aux moyens de repousser toute agression à laquelle leurs propres possessions ou celles de l'un deux pourraient se trouver exposées en haine des propositions qu'ils auraient cru de leur devoir de faire et de soutenir d'un commun accord par principe de justice et d'equité, et n'ayant pas moins à cœur de completer les dispositions du traité de Paris, de la manière la plus conforme qu'il serait possible à son veritable sens et esprit, à ses fins ont resolu de faire entrer entr'eux une convention solennelle, et de conclure une alliance défensive. En conséquence, les trois souverains sur-nommés de signaient pour leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs le Prince de Metternich, le Prince de Talleyrand, et Lord Castlereagh. Les hautes puissances contractantes s'engagent réciproquement et chacune d'elles envers les autres, à agir de concert avec le plus parfait désintéressement et la plus complete bonne foi pour faire qu'en exécution du traité de Paris, les arrangemens qui devaient en com pleter les dispositions fussent effectués de la manière la plus conforme qu'il serait |