Jan. 3,1815; attacked they should regard themselves as all assailed; CHAP. that if one of the three found itself menaced, the two XIV. others should intervene, and, in case of failure to effect an 1815. amicable adjustment, should succour it, each with an armed Art. 2. force of 150,000 men, of which 120,000 should be infantry Art. 3. and 30,000 cavalry; that his Britannic Majesty should Art. 4. have the option of furnishing the whole or part of his contingent in foreign troops taken into his pay; that in Art. 5. the event of a war, they should concur amicably on the appointment of a general-in-chief, and the operations to be carried on; that in the event of new arrangements or Art. 6. additional contributions of armed forces becoming necessary, they should be entered into and provided without delay; that peace should not be made but by common Art. 7. consent; that this treaty was not to be regarded as annul- Art. 8. ling any previous one between the same parties, but, on the contrary, as ratifying and confirming them in their fullest extent. The preparations of the new Allies kept pace Traité, with their engagements. Everywhere warlike prepara- Cap. i. 95, tions were set on foot, and as a preliminary step 25,000 fresh Austrian troops marched into Gallicia. On their side Russia and Prussia were not idle. The Russians had already concentrated 260,000 men in Poland; Prussia had 173,000 under arms; Austria, 220,000 effectives; and the Anglo-Belgian army was reckoned at 80,000. By a secret article, Bavaria, Hanover, Holland, and Piedmont were invited to accede to the treaty, which they immediately did, and added 100,000 more to the Allied forces. Thus, as the result of a pacific congress, and in the midst of professions of moderation and pacific dispositions on all sides, all Europe was in arms, and on the verge of a universal conflagration, and a million of armed Cap. i. 97 possible au veritable esprit de ce traité; que si, par suite et en haine des propositions qu'elles auraient faites et soutenues d'un commun accord, leurs possessions étaient attaqués, alors et dans ce cas elles s'engageaient pour se tenir pour attaquées tous trois à faire cause commune entre elles et à s'assister mutuellement pour repousser une telle agression avec toutes les forces déjà spécifiés."-Traité, 3 Janvier 1815; Castlereagh Correspondence, MS.; and CAPEFIGUE, i. 96. 96. CHAP. XIV. 1814. 49. men on the two sides only waited a signal from Vienna to commence the work of mutual destruction.* The weighty concerns connected with European diploOrigin of macy at this period were not the only ones which occuwith Ame- pied the attention, and called for the direction of Lord tia at this Castlereagh. A negotiation, hardly inferior in its ulti the contest rica time. mate effects in importance, was at the same time pending with the United States of America. To understand how this came about, it must be premised that at the close of the war on the Continent, the Americans had, for no apparent reason, and at a very suspicious time, declared war against Britain. There was really, at the time when these hostilities were commenced, no cause in dispute between the two Powers. At a previous period of the contest, indeed, when the English and French, each engaged in mortal hostility, were interchanging deadly thrusts at each other, the inhabitants of the United States had just ground of complaint against both the belligerents; for the French had declared all neutral vessels with their cargoes good prize which had touched at any harbour in Great Britain, and the English did the same with any neutral vessel bound for a French harbour, which had not touched at an English port. But this cause of complaint, how just and pressing soever, had passed away. The English Orders in Council, which, with the Berlin and Milan Decrees, had made this violent invasion on neutral rights, had been repealed, so that, on this ground at least, there was no longer any reasonable cause for complaint. But in the course of the negotiations which had long pended on the subject, it had become evident XIV. 1814. that the Orders in Council, though the ostensible, were CHAP. not the real cause of the war. The Americans made no corresponding complaints against the French decrees, though they had commenced this unwonted, and, to neutrals, destructive species of warfare. All their indignation was directed against the British, though their measures, how violent soever, were in retaliation and defence only, and it continued after they were repealed. It was apparent that the Americans, deeming the British armies. and fleets deeply engaged in the European war, deemed the opportunity favourable for throwing their sword into the scale when it was so nearly balanced, and extorting from the distresses of Great Britain a renunciation of the right of searching neutral vessels at sea, and wresting from her her remaining transatlantic possessions. And thus the unseemly spectacle was exhibited of an emancipated colony seeking to aggrandise itself at the expense, in a moment of distress, of the mother-country, and of the greatest republic of the New World combining with the despot of the Old, to root out the last asylum of freedom on the European shores. 50. success America. The success in the war had been so equally balanced that though on the whole it had been decisively on the Balanced side of Great Britain, yet either party might withdraw during the with honour from the contest. On the one hand, the war with Americans could point with pride to the spectacle of three British frigates taken in single combat by so many of theirs of equal nominal rating, though much superior in real strength; a formidable attack on New Orleans had been repulsed with great slaughter; and the British squadron on Lake Champlain annihilated by the vessels of the United States. On the other hand, the British had redeemed, in two glorious encounters at sea, the dimmed lustre of their arms; they had taken Washington, the capital of the United States; repulsed all attempts to invade Canada; and so utterly ruined the commerce of the confederated states that the custom duties, CHAP. XIV. 1814. 51. the chief source of the public revenue of the confederacy, had almost entirely disappeared. In these circumstances, and as the liberation of the British army from France by the treaty of 1814 enabled the whole disposable force of the empire to be directed to the American shores, it was clear that all hopes of Canadian conquest were at an end, and that the United States could expect nothing from a continuance of the contest, but the total ruin of their commerce, without any possible success at land to counterbalance these disadvantages. A conviction of these painful truths at length forced itself on the minds of the Americans, and with such force that it is now known that, if the contest had continued six months longer, the whole northern states would have broken off from the union, formed an independent confederacy, and made peace with Great Britain. As England had neither territory nor indemnities to demand from the United States, and her inhabitants were satiated with glory and anxious only for peace, the inclination to come to an accommodation was equally strong on her part. These feelings on both sides led to an interchange of pacific communications, which ended in the appointment of commissioners, who were to meet at Ghent, in the Low Countries, to arrange the terms of a final pacification. Lord Castlereagh's instructions to the British commisLord Castle- sioners—who were Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, Esq., structions to and Dr Adams-were of the most conciliatory description, the British and revealed the anxious desire for the adjustment of all reagh's in commis sioners at Ghent. disputes between the parties on the most equitable footing.* * "You may assure the American commissioners that the British Government, whatever sense it may entertain of the causes of the rupture, is sincerely desirous of a permanent adjustment of all differences, and that this desire is not abated by the successful termination of the war in Europe. With this view you are authorised to meet with frankness and conciliation whatever propositions the American negotiators may be prepared to offer for terminating the war which has been declared by their Government. "So far as the Prince Regent's ministers can anticipate the nature of the ap proaching discussions, they appear to class themselves under the four following heads-1st, the questions mainly affecting our maritime rights and strength, and especially the undoubted right of the sovereign of these realms to claim XIV. 1814. The commissioners were instructed to adhere firmly to the CHAP. right claimed by the British to reclaim their own subjects from the merchant vessels of the United States in time of war, and for this purpose to exercise the right of search, but to receive favourably any proposal for the modification in practice of the abstract theory. A revision of the boundary treaty of 1783, which had been very loosely worded, was recommended, not in the spirit of conquest or aggrandiseand enforce in war the allegiance and service of his subjects; 2dly, the protection which the Indians as allies are entitled to claim at our hands; 3dly, the regulation of the frontier, to prevent hereafter, as far as possible, jealousy or collision; and, 4thly, the question of the Fishery. 1. "With respect to the maritime question, you will endeavour to ascertain whether the American negotiators have any specific measure to propose for obviating hereafter the alleged abuses of which they complain in the practice of impressing British seamen from on board American merchant ships. The enclosed proclamations will demonstrate that the British Government can never recede from the principle of holding their own subjects to their duty of allegiance. You will endeavour to ascertain whether the American Government is disposed prospectively to desist from their extravagant pretensions under this head, in which case something might possibly be devised to relieve their difficulties as to the past, by adopting a reasonable system of indulgence towards individuals who may have actually and bonâ fide entered amongst them under the faith of their acts of naturalisation. This might be effected by stipulation, without bringing the question of right to issue on either side. "The right of search and of withdrawing our seamen from on board American merchant ships can never be given up, even for a time, in exchange for any municipal regulation whatsoever. But if the American negotiators have any regulations to propose tending to check abuse, the British Government will weigh them dispassionately, and with a desire to conciliate. The difficulties, however, of finding a satisfactory expedient may render it desirable to waive this discussion altogether, if other points can be adjusted. To this the British Government will have no objection, considering the question to be practically set at rest by the return of peace. They are equally prepared to leave the rule of war of 1756 to rest upon its own clear and well-established authority. Should the American commissioners abstain from stirring this question, you will remain silent upon it. Should they think fit to advert to it, you will assert the principles upon which the British Government has uniformly maintained the legality as well as the justice of this rule. 2. "Upon the subject of the Indians, you will represent that an adequate arrangement of their interests is considered by your Government as a sine qua non of peace; and that they will, under this head, require not only that a full and express recognition of their limits shall take place: you will also throw out the importance of the two States entering into arrangements which may hereafter place their mutual relations with each other, as well as with the several Indian nations, upon a footing of less jealousy and irritation. This may be best effected by a mutual guarantee of the Indian possessions, as they shall be established upon the peace, against encroachment on the part of either State. Much of the disquietude to both Governments, as connected with Indian affairs, has been produced by that regular and progressive system of encroachment, |