of the Czar, however, were soothed by his being left in possession of Warsaw and a considerable territory around it, which in some degree seemed to realise his favourite dream of re-establishing the kingdom of Poland as an appanage of the empire of Russia. CHAP. XIV. 1814. reagh's nationality stitution for Lord Castlereagh's efforts were not confined to re- 54. straining the ambition of Russia from swallowing up the Lord Castlewhole of Poland; he laboured also assiduously, and not efforts to without effect, in securing for the inhabitants of the preserve the district which Russia did acquire of it a separate exist- and a conence and constitution, with the Polish laws, uniform, arms, Poland. and nationality. This was a very great matter in the estimation of the Poles, for it kept alive their hopes of a revived separate existence, and the reunion of their scattered provinces under the national standard. In this effort he stood alone on the side of the confederated Powers, for France, as already observed, had withdrawn from the struggle about Poland, reserving her whole strength for that regarding Saxony, and Austria was too much wedded to the old system of government to take any interest in new constitutions. He found, however, a powerful and unexpected ally in the Emperor Alexander, who, imbued from early youth with liberal and enlarged views by the influence of his Swiss preceptor, La Harpe, had become enamoured of them by the halo of glory which had encircled his brows since the capture of Paris, and was determined to apply them in his newly erected kingdom.* This was accordingly done; Poland received a * "The Emperor seems determined about a Polish kingdom and constitution: the projet given him for the latter I have not yet seen, but shall be enabled to let you know something of it in a few days, through my old Polish friends, many of whom are now here."-LORD WALPOLE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, St Petersburg, August 9, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 83. In the same letter is a very curious statement regarding the Emperor Alexander, which several passages in his subsequent life seem too much to confirm. "The intimacy which has so long subsisted between the Emperor and the celebrated Madame Narychkin is about to be broken off, and she will leave this country for some years. I believe her true reason is the fear of what she foresces likely to happen, from the great oddness of the Emperor. This was suspected in very early age, and medical men now here were brought over on that ac CHAP. XIV. 1814. 55. of the Saxon question. constitution, and all the elements of freedom in so far as they can be conferred by mere institutions. Whether the country was really prepared to take advantage of them, and, socially speaking, benefited by their adoption, may remain a doubt. But there can be doubt that its material interests were largely favoured by the change; for Poland in 1831, after fifteen years of the new Government, maintained on terms approaching to equality a contest with four millions of inhabitants against Russia with sixty millions. The arrangement of the Polish question, which was the Settlement grand difficulty at the Congress, and the one which Lord Castlereagh was most intent on settling, removed the chief obstacle that stood in the way of an adjustment of that of Saxony. As Prussia now resumed possession of the greater part of the Grand-duchy of Posen, containing two millions of inhabitants, her claims for a large indemnity on the side of Saxony were of course proportionally abated, and the arguments of Austria, France, and Great Britain for a restoration of part at least of his dominions to the dispossessed sovereign of Saxony, were materially strengthened. So early as 17th December, accordingly, Lord Castlereagh wrote to the Duke of Wellington, that he considered the Polish question as settled, and the Saxon question the only one now of much consequence, but that as soon as it was settled all difficulties would be at an end.* Hardenberg, though obliged to abandon his count. Upon her expressing an intention of settling for some time in France, he earnestly begged her not to make acquaintance with any of the royal family, mais de la fronder autant qu'elle pourroit; but if the Queen of Holland showed her any attention, to cultivate her acquaintance and that of her friends. She excused her resolution to the Emperor, by remarking the strong feeling of affection manifested by the public for the young Empress upon her leaving St Petersburg; her dread of being at some time the victim of that sentiment; and that by going away she would at least show that she was not the obstacle to a reconciliation, which she advised, between them."-LORD WALPOLE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, August 9, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 84. "I consider the Polish question as settled, Prussia never having contended it in earnest, and Austria consequently has yielded. The Saxon question is now the only one that is of much difficulty. The point of Naples being one of principle, and not of detail, cannot lead to delay. I should think, if the 1 tlereagh to demand for the whole of Saxony, fought a stout battle CHAP. for as much of it as he could get, and in the end XIV. bent his whole endeavours to obtain Leipsic. Such, how- 1814. ever, was the resistance opposed to the demand by Lord Lord CasCastlereagh and the other confederates, that he was ulti-Lord Livermately obliged to content himself with Naumburg, Wit- pool, Dec. tenberg, and Torgau on the Saale, and a territory con- MS.; Hard. taining 800,000 inhabitants. The principle of an in-474; Thiers, demnity having been arranged amongst the sovereigns, it 574. was agreed to refer the details to a committee.1 18, 1814, xii. 473, xviii. 572 to who were bers of the Committee. But in arriving at this conclusion a serious difficulty oc- 56. curred, which, when almost within sight of the harbour, Difficulty as had wellnigh made shipwreck of the Congress. Austria to be memhad presented to the Congress a statistical table from which she made it appear that Prussia would by this arrangement have gained more than she had lost by the spoliation of Napoleon, and would be raised up to the stipulated amount of 10,000,000 souls.* This was warmly contested by M. de Hardenberg, and it was to escape from the difficulty that Lord Castlereagh proposed to Prussian possessions were settled, that there would not be much difficulty in * Austria maintained that the gains and just claims of Prussia since the war began, were as follows: 1. Regained in Dantzic, Magdeburg, and Westphalia, 2. Reclaimed from the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, 3. From Anspach and Bareuth, 4. From Hanover, 5. From Saxe-Weimar, Souls. 1,500,000 2,500,000 500,000 300,000 50,000 4,850,000 being somewhat more than she had lost, which was 4,800,000 souls. Now, Russia restored to her 1,000,000 in the Grand-duchy of Posen. She would gain on the left bank of the Rhine, and in the Grand-duchy of Berg, 1,600,000; and she had regained in Dantzic, Magdeburg, and Westphalia, 1,500,000. She maintained, therefore, that good faith with Prussia did not require the sacrifice of more than 750,000 souls on the part of Saxony, which had 2,100,000 inhabitants to restore her to her proper state.-See THIERS, Xviii. 570, 574; and Congrès de Vienne, vi. 176, 177. XIV. 1814. CHAP. refer the refer the question of figures to a committee. But the question immediately occurred, Who should be represented in it? Austria insisted that it should consist of the representatives of the four Allied Powers only, in pursuance of the stipulation in the treaty of 30th May, that the territories wrested from France should be disposed of by them without the intervention of France. M. de Talleyrand immediately took fire at this, and threatened to leave the Congress within twenty-four hours if a representative of France was not admitted to the committee. This was undoubtedly contrary to the provisions of the treaty of Paris, but "les quatre" were not so cordially united now as they had been at that time, and the support of France on the Saxon question was felt to be indispensable. Lord Castlereagh accordingly reassembled the representatives of the old Allies, and represented to them the expedience of reconsidering the matter, and admitting M. de Talleyrand to the committee. This was strongly supported by Metternich, and though opposed by Hardenberg on the part of Prussia, and Nesselrode on that of Russia, Dec. 31. finally agreed to by them all. After this, the Prussian question might be considered as settled, the only point remaining for consideration being the boundaries and statistical figures necessary to be determined on, with a view to give Prussia the 800,000 souls required out of xviii. 573. Saxony. She struggled hard, but in vain, to have the 575; Hard. town of Leipsic included in the ceded districts, but she obtained possession of Magdeburg, Wittenberg, and Torgau, on the line of the Elbe.1 * 1 Thiers, xii. 473, 474. *M. Thiers gives the following graphic account of the colloquy between Sir Charles Stewart (then Lord Stewart) and Talleyrand on this occasion : "Il fut décidé qu'il n'y aurait pas de commissaire Français dans la commission d'évaluation. Lord Castlereagh n'osa pas porter lui-même cette nouvelle à M. de Talleyrand; il en chargea son frère Lord Stewart, ministre d'Angleterre à Berlin, qui se présenta à l'hôtel de l'ambassade avec beaucoup d'excuses et d'explications embarrassées. M. de Talleyrand qui, lorsqu'il s'agissait du rôle de la legation Française à Vienne, n'entendait pas raillerie, demanda sèchement au frère de Lord Castlereagh quels avaient été les opposants à l'admission de la France dans la future commission, et lui dit avec une ironie amère, que c'étaient sans doute les alliés qui n'avaient pas voulu XIV. 57. in forming a barrier in Countries. The keen and threatening question to which the claim CHAP. of Prussia on Saxony gave rise, did not divert Lord Castlereagh's attention for a moment from the grand object, 1814. in so far as the security of Great Britain was concerned, Difficulties of keeping France back from the Rhine, and securing an in adequate barrier against her ambition in the Low Coun- the Low tries. He foresaw distinctly that this was the point where the real danger would one day arise; and that, however strongly and sincerely the present Government of France might disclaim any such project, the time would come under the present or some other dynasty, when these assurances would be forgotten, and the whole force of France, aided by all the allies, revolutionary or otherwise, she could summon to her standard, would be devoted to destroying the kingdom of the Netherlands and regaining the entire frontier of the Rhine for herself.* Mr Pitt, whose far-seeing mind looked deep into d'elle. Lord Stewart ayant assez ingénûment avoué cette influence des alliés, M. de Talleyrand, hors de lui, répondit brusquement au frère de Lord Castlereagh, Puisque vous êtes encore les alliés de Chaumont, restez entre vous. Aujourd'hui même l'ambassade Française quittera Vienne, et tout ce que vous ferez sera nul pour elle, et pour les intérêts sacrifiés. L'Europe sera instruite de ce qui s'est passé, la France connaîtra le rôle qu'on a voulu lui faire jouer, et l'Angleterre saura quelle conduite faible, inconséquente, a tenue son représentant. Elle saura qu'après avoir livré la Saxe et la Pologne, il a repoussé le secours avec lequel il aurait pu les sauver.' Ces paroles menaçantes pour Lord Castlereagh, à qui elles préparaient une situation fort difficile dans le Parlement Britannique, émurent singulièrement Lord Stewart, et il courut avertir son frère de l'orage qui se formait."-THIERS, xviii. 574, 575. * Lord Castlereagh's letter to the Duke of Wellington, of date October 1, 1814, fully explains his views on this subject, and is one of the most striking proofs of his statesmanlike wisdom and prophetic sagacity. He says "The great question for the house of Orange, as well as for us, is to weigh what is the best security for peace, and for keeping the Low Countries out of the hands of France. In this view of the subject, beyond all others the most essential for Great Britain to look to, I doubt the policy of building our system of defence exclusively upon the Prince of Orange's power, enfeebled as it must be for great military exertions by the genius of his people and by the principles of his Government. You will weigh this in deciding on the alternatives into which the question resolves itself. We should both wish to press what was most acceptable to the Prince of Orange; but the point ought to be ruled upon larger principles; and in examining them, I am always led to revert with considerable favour to a policy which Mr Pitt, in the year 1806, had strongly at heart, which was to tempt Prussia to put herself forward on the left bank of the Rhine more in military contact with France. I know there may be objections to this, as placing a Power peculiarly military, and consequently somewhat |