XIV. 1814. CHAP. futurity, clearly anticipated this danger, and in the arrangements which he projected in 1806, in the event of the Coalition proving successful, one was to bring Prussia up to the Rhine, and over that river to the frontier of old France. It was impossible now, however, to carry that project into execution; for the jealousy of Austria and the other Powers in the Confederacy would have been instantly aroused by such an addition to the power of any state in Germany. All were agreed that Belgium should be annexed to Holland, under the Prince of Orange, who was to be created King of the Netherlands; but it was by no means so apparent how the provinces between it and Mayence, including the important fortress of Luxemburg, should be disposed of. It was indispensable that they should be bestowed on some Power possessed of military force adequate, with the assistance of Great Britain and the Netherlands, to their defence, and actuated by an interest adverse to their absorption by France. It was at one time proposed to give them to Bavaria in return for the loss of the Tyrol and Salzburg, resumed by Austria; but to this it was justly objected that the Cabinet of Munich had a hereditary jealousy of Austria, had often been in alliance with France against that Power, and that, in their hands, the bulwark of Europe against France might become the outpost of France against Europe.* Undoubtedly this encroaching, so extensively in contact with Holland and the Low Countries. But as this is only a secondary danger, we should not sacrifice to it our first object, which is to provide effectually against the systematic views of France to possess herself of the Low Countries and the territories on the left bank of the Rhine-a plan which, however discountenanced by the present French Government, will infallibly revive whenever circumstances shall favour its execution.” -LORD CASTLEREAGH to the DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Vienna, October 1, 1814 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 144, 145. "In Hardenberg's Paris projet, Bavaria was indemnified for the Tyrol, Salzburg, &c., partly on the right bank of the Maine; Prussia being placed behind the Rhine, with a lisière only on the left bank, her flanks supported by Wesel and Mayence. To this arraugement Austria and Bavaria positively refuse their concurrence, as giving to Prussia the entire command of their only great river, in addition to the Rhine, the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula. This resistance has induced Prussia to endeavour to find an expedient, by tempting Bavaria to place herself in the more exposed positions on the left XIV. 1814. project presented many advantages. "It is supported," CHAP. said Lord Castlereagh, "by the obvious inability of the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, by any combination of their own means, permanently to secure themselves against France; the necessity of interesting other Powers in their defence; and the impossibility of doing so effectually, except by giving them a substantive footing beyond the Rhine. To give a decided German character to the politics of Bavaria, now closely united with Austria, she ought to be liberally treated, and have her territorial interests rendered incompatible with the French scheme of extending themselves to the Rhine. If this reasoning is solid, there can be no doubt that the support of so highly military a Power as Bavaria on the left flank, with Prussia in second line to Holland, and Bavaria as proposed in the present plan, presents a Lord Casmuch more imposing front to France than Holland, spread the Duke of out to the Moselle, with Prussia behind the Rhine, and Wellington, the territories between the Moselle and the Rhine mor- 1814; cellés, as mere indemnities, between the Grand-duke of x. 143, 144. Baden and other petty princes.' "1 tlereagh to Oct. 1, Cast. Cor. 58. mately give Luxem Nether On the other hand, the Duke of Wellington supported the annexation of Luxemburg, if possible, to Prussia, It is ultiwith the whole territory on the left bank as far as Huy, agreed to and if that could not be effected, that it should be given burg to the to the King of the Netherlands. His reasoning on this King of the point, mainly founded on the improbability of Bavaria lands. being permanently either willing or able to keep that important barrier fortress from France, appears to be well founded, and it would have been for the advantage of Europe if it had been given effect to, as Prussia is bank of the Rhine. XIV. CHAP. obviously a much more important Power to interest in the independence of the Low Countries than either the 1814. King of Belgium or Bavaria.* Lord Castlereagh was convinced by the Duke's reasoning on this point, which entirely coincided with his own view, of what would be expedient in the abstract if the Powers interested could be prevailed on to carry it into effect. But he soon found that the concession of Luxemburg with so considerable a territory to Prussia was impossible, from the determined resistance opposed by France and Bavaria to any project which gave the former Power the command for any distance of both banks of the Rhine. It became necessary, therefore, to make a choice between the Netherlands and Bavaria to be intrusted with the sovereignty and defence of Luxemburg; and, for the reasons stated by the Duke of Wellington, Lord Castlereagh In reply to Lord Castlereagh's letter of October 1, the Duke of Wellington wrote on October 17, "I agree so far in principle with you, that I think it would be desirable that, if possible, all the territories on the left of the Rhine should belong to one Power only, besides the sovereign of the Netherlands, and that that Power should be Prussia. If all this territory cannot be given to Prussia, it is better that a part should be given to Bavaria than that it should be parcelled out among several Powers. It must be observed, however, of Bavaria, that that Power has generally been in the opposite system to ours, and that any distant territory in the hands of so weak a Power as Bavaria must continue to be, is seldom well defended. There will arise the question of Luxemburg. It is essential to the defence of the Netherlands to keep that fortress out of the hands of the French; at the same time, I see the military inconvenience of extending so far the system of the sovereign of the Netherlands. I should rely upon Prussia keeping that fortress, but not upon Bavaria. "There is another view in which the disposal of Luxemburg is important, and that is the standing connection between that duchy and the provinces on the left of the Meuse. The inconvenience of the separation of a few cantons ceded to France has been felt and complained of by the Netherlanders; and I fear they will feel more severely the separation of the provinces on the right of the Meuse, with which they have been so long connected, and in which many of them have properties. This point deserves consideration. Upon the whole, what I should prefer for the Netherlands would be that Prussia should have the territory on the left of the Rhine, to a line drawn from Huy to that river; and that the Prince of Orange should from that line have both banks of the Meuse to the left bank of the Rhine. If this arrangement could be made, Luxemburg would be more secure in the hands of the sovereign of the Netherlands than in those of the King of Bavaria, and should be given to the former."-DUKE OF WELLINGTON to LORD CASTLEREAGH, October 17, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 166, 167. XIV. acquiesced in the annexation of it to the former, with the CHAP. territory of Lernburg; not, however, as part of the kingdom of Netherlands, but as a separate principality, forming part of, and defended by, the German confederacy. 1814. Italy. 59. The affairs of Italy were not so complicated at first sight, but fraught with more material interests in the end Affairs of than either those of Saxony or Flanders. The circumstances of that peninsula were very peculiar, and such that it was extremely difficult to say what course would be the best to adopt regarding it. Two points were perfectly clear, and on them all were agreed. The first was, that Austria must resume her ancient possessions in the Milanese and Venetia as far as the Po and the Ticino, which formed a clear and well-defined boundary. The former of these territories having been her own before they were wrested from her by France in 1796, the latter ceded to her by the treaty with France in 1797, there was no earthly pretext on which their resumption by that Power could be resisted. Add to this that the desire of the Cabinet of Vienna to regain them was so strong, and their influence in the Congress was so great, that they could not have been wrested from her without a general war, and entirely breaking up the concord between Great Britain, France, and Austria-so essential to presenting a barrier against the ambitious projects of Russia on the Vistula. The idea either of forming an Italian confederacy or erecting one single kingdom in the peninsula, so much in vogue in subsequent times, was then felt to be so utterly impracticable that it was never even mooted by any one at the Congress, though suggested by some ardent inexperienced philanthropists in private memorials. Restoration of the old regime and separate govern.ments, was then the universal wish. There were many secret aspirations in Venice, but it was not for a united *The Powers to whom the arrangement of Italian affairs was intrusted by the Congress of Vienna were Austria and Spain, as the two most immediately interested, along with France, Russia, and England, as mediators. XIV. 1814. CHAP. Italy, of which they should form a part, but for the old standard of St Mark and the restoration of the ancient Doges: the Milanese sighed for the days of their independence and the sway of their old Dukes; the Florentines were counting the days till the paternal government of their Grand-dukes was restored; the Romans were hailing in imagination the return of the Pope to the Eternal City; the Neapolitans, distracted between their ancient and their present rulers, were desirous only of having a flourishing nobility and splendid court in their beautiful capital; the Genoese were praying for the restoration of their ancient government, and earnestly deprecating the annexation to Piedmont with which they were threatened. The dream, "della unita Italiana, was then utterly out of the question, for the best of all reasons-that it was inconsistent with existing rights and at variance with the universal wish. 60. annexation The second point upon which the sovereigns were all Reasons for agreed was that, notwithstanding the loudly-expressed disinclination of the inhabitants at the annexation of Piedmont. Genoa with its adjacent territory to Piedmont, it was necessary to carry that annexation into effect. The necessity for this arose from the exposed situation of the latter country, which, of course, would be the first to be assailed if the French Government resumed its ambitious designs on Italy, and the danger which would threaten the whole states of the peninsula, if their armies should gain possession of the magnificent harbour of Genoa. Troops could be landed there in fortyeight hours from Toulon, and in a week more they might be either at Turin, Milan, or Florence.* Genoa, independent, could make no sort of resistance to such an irruption; it was only by interesting the warlike and comparatively powerful state of Piedmont in its defence that any security could be obtained on this side * How entirely was this verified in the beginning of the war between France and Austria in 1858! |