Ex- CHAP. against the renewed incursions of the French arms. perience had proved that if they once got the command of the passes of the Alps and the harbour of Genoa, the whole plain of Lombardy would be at their feet; and again, as in 1796, the conquest of Europe might begin with that of the plains watered by the Po. Aware of the paramount necessity of averting such a catastrophe, Lord Castlereagh, as already mentioned, had carefully enjoined Lord William Bentinck to avoid anything in his proclamations or conduct which might lead the Genoese to infer that their separate nationality was to be restored; and the same orders were reiterated on a subsequent occasion.* The disregard of these injunctions by the English commander occasioned no small embarrassment to the British Government; but Lord Castlereagh did all in his power to soften the blow to the Genoese by stipulating the retention of their ancient laws and customs when transferred to the Sardinian crown.t XIV. 1814. 61. The restoration of Ferdinand VII. to the throne of Spain had already been accomplished via facto, and the Lord CasCongress of Vienna had little to do, excepting what re- views on lated to the suppression of the slave trade, with his "With respect to the arrangement your Lordship has made for the provisional government of Genoa, it is material that it should not be considered as prejudging the future system which it may be expedient to apply to that part of Europe. Your Lordship will adopt such measures as may conciliate the feelings of the people; but you will avoid referring to the ancient form of government, in terms which may excite disappointment, should considerations arising out of the general interests induce the adoption of a different arrangement."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK, May 6, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 15. "The messenger who carries this letter to your Lordship is also the bearer of my order to General Sir John Dalrymple to transfer, as far as depends on him, the provisional government of Genoa to the King of Sardinia, and to act with the troops under his command as an auxiliary corps in his Majesty's service till further orders. I hope your Lordship will be satisfied that, if we have felt it not possible to preserve to Genoa her separate existence, we have acted up to the spirit of the assurances of protection which you gave the people. I trust you will approve the safeguards obtained for the rights and interests of the Genoese, and that you will employ your personal influence to bring them and their future sovereign together under the most conciliatory auspices." - LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK Vienna, December 18, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 221. tlereagh's the Spanish Govern ment. 154 CHAP. Government. But Lord Castlereagh had already, immediately after he set foot in his ancient dominions, given him the strongest counsels as to the principles of his future government, which, if followed out, would have in all probability prevented the disastrous revolution and sanguinary civil war which afterwards bathed the Peninsula in blood. It remains a striking monument of the combined attachment to order, resistance to oppression, whether monarchical or democratic, and love of real freedom, which formed the leading features of that statesman's character.* A more serious subject connected with the Italian peninsula, which was every day attracting more attention, Although the conduct of the Cortes and Regency has latterly been marked by a firm adherence to the principles of the alliance, so far as the mere existence of the constitution is at stake, it is impossible to conceive that any change tranquilly effected can well be for the worse. We are entitled to pronounce now, upon a certain extent of experience, that, in practice as in theory, it is amongst the worst of the modern productions of that nature. “I am glad to hear that the King is not disposed, in looking to a change, to aim at the restoration of the ancient order of things. I am confident there is not vigour and ability enough amongst his adherents to sustain such a system against the temper of the times, and the party which exists in Spain favourable to a form of government more or less free. If his Majesty announces to the nation his determination to give effect to the main principles of a constitutional regime, I think it is probable he may extinguish the existing arrangement with impunity and re-establish one more consistent with the efficiency of the executive power, and which may restore the great landed proprietors and the clergy to a due share of authority; but to succeed in establishing a permanent system, he must speak to the nation, and not give it the character of a military resolution; in doing which, the language of Louis XVIII. may afford him some useful hints. "I hope, if we are to encounter the hazards of a new constitutional experiment in Spain, in addition to the many others now in progress in Europe, that the persons charged with the work will not again fall into the inconceivable absurdity of banishing from the legislature the ministers of the Crown; to which error, more perhaps than to any other, may be attributed the incapacity which has distinguished the march of every one of these systems which has placed the main authorities of the constitution in hostility, instead of alliance, with each other. I have every confidence in the discretion with which you will act in the impending crisis. You will not hesitate to afford your counsel and support, where you may be of opinion that the just influence of the British Government can promote the happiness of our ally; but, where you cannot see your way clear as to the probable result, I should wish you to abstain rather than commit your Government by any systematic, precipitate, or too ostensible interference in the internal affairs of Spain."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to Sir H. WELLESLEY, Paris, May 10, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 25, 26. XIV. 1814. 62. Affairs of was that of Murat and the kingdom of Naples. That CHAP. sovereign continued with a powerful army of 50,000 men on the Po, and it was difficult to say against which side it would be directed. In truth he did not know himself. His whole object was to retain his crown whichever side Naples. proved uppermost, and that could only be done by preserving a dubious neutrality till fortune had declared decidedly for one party or the other. He was no stranger to the designs of Napoleon in the island of Elba to regain, by a sudden descent upon its coasts, the crown of France, and he was naturally inclined to support him in the attempt; but he had no intention of doing so unless there was a reasonable prospect of success. He was waiting, therefore, for Napoleon to strike the first blow. On the other hand, the Allied Powers felt a reluctance to approach the subject, from the well-known and honourable feelings of the Emperor regarding it, and his determination at all hazards to keep his word, pledged to Buonaparte by the treaty of 11th April at Fontainebleau. The most alarming reports, however, were received from Paris of the impending danger, which was represented as much increased by the known treachery of Murat and the residence of Napoleon, subject to no control, within a few days' sail of the coast of France.* So far did this go, and so menacing were the accounts transmitted of the discontent and incipient treason in the French metropolis, * "Les principales Puissances ne commencerent à raisonner sur la translation de Buonaparte dans une autre hémisphère que lorsque les arrangements majeurs eurent été arrêtés, et que les plaintes des souverains d'Italie, notamment du Grand-duc de Toscane, sur le voisinage de Buonaparte se furent accumulées. C'est alors que le plénipotentiaire Portugais, Palmella, offrit l'une des Azores pour lieu de résidence de Buonaparte, et que l'Angleterre proposa Ste Lucie ou Ste Helène; mais l'aveu de leurs cours et le transport de ce personage dans l'une de ces îles emportaient d'indispensables delais."--Congrès de Vienne ; CAPEFIGUE, i. 84. "Le Prince de Talleyrand avait écrit à Louis XVIII:-' Que d'après l'agitation qui regnait en Italie il conviendrait qu'un corps de 30,000 hommes fut réuni entre Lyon et Chambery pour être prèt à agir, mais que le mouvement devait se faire avec le moins d'éclat possible à fin de ne pas donner d'ombrage à l'Autriche et au Roi de Sardaigne. Le Maréchal Soult reçut au même tems l'ordre formel de se tenir prèt à toutes éventualités.'"-CAPEFIGUE, i. 89. VOL. II. 20 XIV. 1814. * CHAP. that Metternich submitted formal queries to Fouché as to the course which, in the event of Napoleon's reappearing, the army would pursue, and received very unsatisfactory answers, singularly prophetic of the future of France. A general and vague feeling of disquietude accordingly prevailed, both in the Royalist circles at Paris and the Congress of Vienna, on this subject; and so far did matters go, that it was under the consideration of the Allied Cabinets whether Murat should not be forcibly dispossessed of his dominions, and the Duke of Wellington was consulted by Louis XVIII. and Lord Liverpool as to the force which would be required to accomplish the object if Great Britain should be charged with the operation.+ In truth neither party was in good faith in regard to * "Ce n'était pas chose totalement imprevue pour quelques ministres, et principalement pour M. de Metternich, le retour de Napoléon, objet d'effroi pour le plus grand nombre et qui fit passer M. de Talleyrand d'une hauteur insultante à la plus honteuse pusillanimité. Le Prince de Metternich, qui jugea promptement la situation critique des Bourbons, avait précédemment et secrètement adressé à Fouché les questions suivantes: 1. Si Napoléon revenait qu'arriverait-il? 2. Que résulterait de l'apparition du Roi de Rome sur les frontières de la France? 3. Quelle serait la direction d'un mouvement national insurrectionnel? L'ancien Ministre de Police répondait : 1. Si le premier régiment envoyé contre Napoléon passait de son côté, il en serait le même de tout l'armée. 2. Si le Roi de Rome était amené sur nos frontières par un corps Autrichien, tout le monde serait pour lui. 3. Si le mouvement était intérieur on prononcerait pour le Duc d'Orleans.-HARDENBERG, xii. 475, 476." "I concur very much in opinion with the King (Louis XVIII.) that the chances of disturbance, particularly in this country, are very much increased by leaving Murat on the throne of Naples. If he were gone, Buonaparte in Elba would not be an object of great dread. You must be the best judge whether you ought or can come forward on this occasion. If you should determine to do so, what follows will show you the means which are requisite, which are in your power, and my opinion of the probable expense. "If the British Government should undertake this operation, it should be performed by the armies of the Allies of the Peninsula, which might be got in the following proportions-viz., 10,000 infantry from Spain, 12,000 infantry from Portugal, 20,000 of all arms from Great Britain, and 10,000 of all arms from Sicily, with 60 pieces of field artillery and a battering-train from Great Britain; the whole to assemble in Sicily in transports to be found by Great Britain. This force, with 40,000 men, which might be sent from the southern ports of France by sea into the Roman States, would be more than sufficient to insure the object almost without striking a blow. . . . This operation would probably last four months from the time the troops would embark in the Peninsula till their return, and would, calculating their expenses at a dollar aday for each man, cost £1,200,000."-DUKE OF WELLINGTON to LORD LIVERPOOL, December 25, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 226, 227. XIV. 1814. 63. sides in re the treaty of the 11th April, in so far as it regarded CHAP. Napoleon and Murat ; nor perhaps were the circumstances such that good faith was practicable. There is unfortunately more truth than is generally supposed in the common Bad faith adage, that from "the prison to the grave," for a dethroned on both sovereign, "there is but a step." Ostensibly at peace, the two gard to Napoleon contracting parties to this treaty were in reality secretly and Murat. endeavouring to undermine each other. The Cabinet of the Bourbons alleged with truth that Buonaparte had never intended to execute the treaty of Fontainebleau ; that his partisans were everywhere intriguing with the utmost activity, both in France and Italy, to effect his restoration; and that it would be perfect madness to go on making the stipulated payments to him and his family from the resources of France, as they would all be applied to fitting out of armaments, or fomenting insurrections, to effect their destruction. The events which immediately followed proved that these surmises had too much foundation, and that the peace of Europe had never been more endangered than by the intrigues to which they referred. Napoleon and Murat alleged, with equal truth, that the treaty had never been carried out, save by sending him to Elba, by the Allied sovereigns, and that France in partiticular had entirely failed in implementing her pecuniary obligations towards them. They complained that no part of the stipulated annuity of £100,000 a-year had been paid to the ex-Emperor, and that it was notorious that the Allies were only waiting for a decent pretext to break with them altogether, and send Buonaparte to a distant island, 1 Thiers, while they re-established the Bourbons on the throne of 611. Naples.1 1 xviii. 610, really meant The Allied sovereigns, however, had in the first in- 64. stance undoubtedly intended to keep Murat on the throne The Allies of Naples, and to preserve Sicily as a separate monarchy at first to to its ancient sovereign, with such an indemnity as could left be found for the loss of his Continental possessions. They Murat. had even gone so far as to discuss the abandonment of have Naples to |