X. proper use of it, by confining himself to one offensive at CHAP. a time, and by an undue dispersion of his force when the contest commenced. 1813. 56. support So set was Napoleon upon prosecuting his attack on Berlin, that his first idea, even after all the disasters which he Napoleon's had sustained, was to reinforce his army there by his Guards march to and reserves, and march in person at their head against Macdonald. that hated capital. Nothing diverted him from this design but the advices he received of the extent of the losses sustained by Macdonald on the Katzbach, which proved to be so serious that he felt himself compelled, much against his will, to direct his steps with the reserves towards Bautzen and the banks of the Bober. Contenting himself, therefore, with reinforcing the Army of the North, and putting it under the command of Ney, whose instructions were to push on and occupy the Prussian capital at all hazards, he himself set out with his Guards and cuirassiers, to whom were added Poniatowski's corps, which was brought up from Zittau for that purpose. The united force formed a mass of 60,000 fresh troops, all in the finest order, and little weakened by the fatigues of the campaign, and raised Macdonald's army to 110,000 men. At the same time, Marmont's corps was withdrawn from the pursuit of the Allied Grand Army, which had retired into Bohemia, and was not in a condition for some time to renew operations, and stationed at Hoyerswerda, midway between the armies of Ney and Macdonald, to keep up the interior communications of the Grand Army. This was the more necessary that a body of Cossacks, detached from Berna-Napoleon dotte's force, had pushed forward and captured a considerable convoy of ammunition between Bautzen and Bischofswerda, in the very centre of the French position. thousand men, under St Cyr, Victor, Lobau, and Murat, were xvi. 402left in observation of the Allied Grand Army of Bohemia, and 60,000 under Ney, directed against Berlin.' Thus, 3, 1813; notwithstanding all the losses and fatigues of the campaign, 232, 233. and after providing for all the garrisons, the three armies Sixty Sept. 2. to St Cyr, Sept. 3, 1813; St Cyr, iv. 395; Fain, ii. 325, 326, Thier 407; Napoleon to Mar mont, Sept. Marm. v. CHAP. X. 1813. 57. Blucher falls back, leon returns which combated in a circle round Dresden still presented The better to keep Blucher ignorant of the formidable attack with which he was menaced, Napoleon took the and Napo- utmost pains to conceal his departure from Dresden, and to Dresden. gave out that his real destination was the Army of the North, with a view to a movement on Berlin. He himself set out at an early hour on the 4th September, and took the road to Bautzen with the greatest secrecy. But although everything was done to elude observation, the real destination of the Emperor could not long be concealed. The Guards and cuirassiers moving towards the Bober, left no doubt of the route which the Emperor had taken. He was in great hopes that Blucher, who was following up his victory with the utmost vigour, would either be in ignorance of his approach, or be so intoxicated with the triumph really gained over Macdonald as to hazard a general battle, in which case he felt assured of a decisive victory. But he found himself mistaken. Faithful to the plan of the campaign agreed to at Trachenberg and the orders he had received, Blucher no sooner heard of the Guards being seen in the enemy's ranks than he gave orders to halt, and fall back at all points. Görlitz was soon abandoned, and reoccupied by the French on the night of the 5th. On the following morning the pursuit was resumed with the utmost vigour. But Blucher still continued to retreat, 269; Bout. and his columns at all points were seen retiring on the 326; Thiers, verge of the horizon. At the same time, alarming adxvi. 510, vices were received from Dresden, against which the Allied Grand Army was again advancing in great strength Marmont, under Schwartzenberg in person. Stunned with these Sept. 6, 1813, Ibid. repeated disasters, the Emperor, after musing long on the probable issue of a campaign in which the Allies gave 1 Odel. i. 79-81 ; Fain, ii. 511; Marm. v. 254; Napoleon to him no opportunity of striking a blow in person, and the arms of his lieutenants at a distance had become uniformly unfortunate, determined to abandon the pursuit, ordered the Guards and cuirassiers to return with himself to Dresden, and left orders with Marmont to remain at Hoyerswerda in a situation which kept up the communications between Ney and Macdonald, and was at hand to lend assistance to whichever might be attacked by superior forces. CHAP. X. 1813. Bernadotte. The return of the Emperor to the Saxon capital was 58. loudly called for by the events which had occurred since Advance of his departure, and ere long affairs towards Berlin assumed Ney against the most alarming aspect. Ney, who had been appointed Sept. 5. to the Army of the North in lieu of Oudinot, after the defeat of Gross Beeren, received on 2d September the most positive instructions from the Emperor to push on to Berlin, while the Grand Army of Bohemia was not in a condition as yet to resume offensive operations.* He found Oudinot's army not more than 60,000 strong, sheltered under the walls of Wittenberg, in very bad condition, discouraged, and in a great part broken up, having lost altogether its communications with Dresden, and surrounded on all sides by clouds of light horse, which seriously interrupted its supplies. On the 5th he commenced his movement, directing his steps in the first instance towards Baruth, on the Torgau road, from 1 Richter, i. whence he was to advance direct on Berlin. No sooner 437; Vaud. did Bernadotte receive information that the French army Bout. 62; was in motion, than he concentrated his troops, and pre-250, 251; pared to intercept its progress.' Tauenzein, with the 422, 423. advanced-guard, reached DENNEWITZ early on the morn "At Baruth you will be only three days' march from Berlin. The communication with the Emperor will then be completely re-established, and the attack on the Prussian capital may take place on the 9th or 10th inst. All that cloud of Cossacks and rabble of landwehr infantry will fall back on all sides when once your march is decidedly taken. You will perceive the necessity of moving rapidly, in order to take advantage of the present state of inefficiency of the Allied Grand Army in Bohemia, which might otherwise recommence operations the moment they become aware of the instructions of the Emperor."—Instructions to NEY, 2d September 1813; ST CYR, iv. 394. i. 171; Marm. v. Thiers, xvi. X. CHAP. ing of the 6th, and soon beheld the head of the French army, which, in its march towards Baruth, was approach1813. ing his post with an evident intention of making good the passage through to Jüterbock by main force. 59. Battle of Sept. 6. Had Ney been master of his own measures he would not have hazarded an attack on an enemy strongly posted, superior in numbers, and enthusiastic in spirit. But the commands of the Emperor to advance were peremptory, and he was too well aware of his imperious disposition to disobey. Tauenzein's troops barred the way in battle array, and the heavy fire of their artillery soon brought up Bertrand's Italian division, but Morand's French veterans of the same corps re-established the action, and, quickly gaining ground, threatened the Allies with total defeat. Bulow, however, whose corps was following that of Tauenzein, no sooner heard the cannonade, than, without any order from his commander-inchief, he moved up his 20,000 Prussians and attacked the left flank of Bertrand and Morand's men, as they were pushing Tauenzein before them towards Dennewitz. On the other side, Reynier with his Saxons came up on the menaced flank to the assistance of Morand and Bertrand, 421, 422 and a furious conflict ensued between them. At length, 1Thiers,xvi. Vaud. i 172; Jom. iv. 421; however, the Prussians prevailed, Reynier was driven Marm. v. 251, 252. 60. Decisive victory of back, and the French left and left centre driven through Göhlsdorf in the direction of Oehna.1 Ney, however, was not the man to yield the victory while a chance remained. No sooner did he perceive the Allies the ultimate success of Bulow on the Allied right, than he hastened up Oudinot's corps to the assistance of the retiring Saxons. This large reinforcement restored the combat, and it was hard to say to which side victory would ultimately incline, when the Prussian brigade of Borstel, which was marching in the rear, hearing the loud cannonade towards Jüterbock, suddenly appeared on the field, and, on the extreme Allied right, with loud cheers attacked Oudinot and the Saxons in flank. At this CHAP. X. 1813. instant, Thumen's Prussian division having assailed Bertrand's corps, and forced it out of Dennewitz to a considerable distance from the field of battle, Ney had ordered Oudinot to quit the Saxons and hurry to the centre to his (Bertrand's) support, so as to prevent the French wings from being separated from each other. This left the Saxons alone exposed to Borstel's eager rush. They quickly fell into confusion, abandoned Göhlsdorf, whicht hey had retaken, and began to disband over the plain. At this moment, when 45,000 Prussians, alone and unsupported, had hitherto maintained the contest, Bernadotte, with the Swedes and Russians, 25,000 strong, the former in the rear, who had broken up that morning from Eckmannsdorf, reached the field, and, rapidly forming his troops in order of battle, advanced in the finest order to their support. This great reinforcement to the Allies was decisive of the day. Ney, who with difficulty kept his ground when the Prussians alone were in the field, was in no condition to withstand this fresh attack. He was forced to retire, which he did at first in fair order, but gradually the centre, attenuated by Bertrand's eccentric retreat to the right, was thrown into confusion. The disbanded Saxons came rushing into the gap to get behind the shelter of Oudinot's men, and the field was speedily covered with fugitives. Ney did all he could, but it was in vain; the two wings were irrevocably separated and it was only owing to the inexplicable tardiness of Bernadotte's pursuit that he was enabled to reunite them, two days after, beneath the ramparts of Tor-1 Lond. 130; gau. In the battle and retreat, the French lost 18,000 430-432; men, of whom one half were deserters who never again 252, 253; rejoined their colours, with 23 guns and 17 caissons. Be The Allies were weakened by 6000 men, of whom 5000 count; were Prussians—a clear proof with whom the glory of 117; Richthe contest rested.' So disconcerned was Ney with the 446; Vaud. issue of this battle, that he wrote to Napoleon next son, ii. 107. day resigning his command, accompanied by expressions Thiers, xvi. Marm. v. Bernadotte's Schoell, iii. ter, i. 445, i. 173; Wil |