warmly supported this petition, and very much by his exertions the restoration was made complete, and the Apollo Belvidere, the Laocoon, the Fighting Gladiator, the Transfiguration, and Last Communion of St Jerome, were restored to their former seats in the Vatican. For this important service to the arts and to Rome he afterwards received the warmest thanks of the Supreme Pontiff. CHAP. XIV. 1815. The military revolution which immediately followed 91. the return of Napoleon from Elba, and the imminent dan- Removal of Napoleon to ger to which Europe in consequence had been exposed, St Helena. rendered it evident to all that, in the final pacification. which was to be made, it was absolutely necessary to provide effectually both against a repetition of a similar irruption on the part of the ex-Emperor, and against the military force of France remaining so powerful as to afford it, if attempted, a like chance of success. How to do this most effectually was a different question, and gave rise to much division of opinion among the Allies. Lord Castlereagh, as already mentioned, had in 1814 strongly opposed the settlement of Napoleon in Elba, and Sir Charles Stewart had pointed out its dangers with a precision which subsequent events had rendered prophetic. Taught by this example, all were now agreed that he must be removed from the dangerous vicinity of France; but there was not the same unanimity as to where he should now be placed. The Canary Islands were seriously thought of, and Dumbarton Castle, a fortress perched on the summit of a high insulated rock in Scotland, was proposed. Lord Castlereagh strongly supported his removal to St Helena, which was at length agreed to. The instructions which he prepared for his detention there, and which were fully acted upon, were to give him the title of General, not Emperor, to prevent the growth of dangerous illusions in his mind, and to give propre à en relever les beautés, et avec ce repos d'esprit nécessaire pour jouir des arts et des antiquités-but qui ordinairement conduit seul les voyageurs à Rome.". Mémorial des Artistes Etrangers à Rome à LORD CASTLEREAGH, Rome, 15 Juillet 1815, MS., and Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 462, 463. VOL. II. 2 R XIV. 1815. CHAP. him every comfort and accommodation which was consistent with his secure custody. That the latter strictness was not uncalled-for is proved by the fact that, during the six subsequent years that he remained there, several plans were, by the admission of his warmest partisans, formed for his escape, some of which were very near succeeding. And that the former humane principle was fully acted upon is obvious from the facts, admitted by the same authorities, that he was subjected during his residence on the island to no personal restraint or indignity; that he was at liberty to ride when he pleased, attended only at a distance by a mounted guard; that he had saddle-horses and books in profusion, and was accompanied by all the friends, both male and female, who chose to share his exile; that his table was equal to that of any duke in England, and Burgundy and Cham Xxxv. 1158, 1 Parl. Deb. pagne his daily beverages; and that the expense of the establishment kept up for, or on his account, by the British Government was £400,000 a-year.1* 1159. 92. tions for a final peace. But it was not enough to have secured the person and Negotia guarded against the future invasions of the ex-Emperor; it was indispensable also to take such securities from France itself as might prevent a repetition of assaults upon Europe by its revolutionary inhabitants. Different plans were proposed to accomplish this object, which were anxiously considered by Lord Liverpool, Lord Castlereagh, and the Duke of Wellington. One was to dismantle the whole frontier fortresses of France except a few of the strongest, and cede them to the Allies. Another to detach Alsace, Lorraine, and Picardy from it, and restore them to the German Powers to whom they had originally belonged. A third, to occupy the frontier fortresses for a fixed period, either three or five years. The whole of them were * Lord Castlereagh's instructions as to the custody of Napoleon were in these words:"To treat Napoleon with all the respect and consideration due to his rank, but under such precautions as should render his escape a matter of impossibility." The total cost of his table which the English Government paid was £12,000 a-year.-Parliamentary Debates, xxxv. 1158, 1159. XIV. 1815. strongly impressed with the idea that, in Lord Liverpool's CHAP. words, "the continuance of the King's authority and Government, after the evacuation of the country by the Allies, must be very problematical; and if his Government should then be overturned, and be followed by a Jacobin or Revolutionary system, though not that of Buonaparte, what will be thought of those who, with France at their mercy, had left that country entire in point of territory, 1 Lord Lienriched by all the plunder of Italy, Germany, and Flan- verpool to ders, and had provided no additional security for the reagh, rest of Europe, though, in the instance of the Low 1815; Countries, such security is admitted to be indispensably x. 447. necessary?" 1* Lord Castle July 28, Cast. Cor. demands of The difficulty of coming to a final and satisfactory ar- 93. rangement on this subject, and providing, without irre- Enormous coverably alienating France, for the future security of the Allied Europe, was much enhanced by the magnitude of the demands of the Allied Powers, particularly Prussia, Lord Liverpool's opinion was early pronounced in favour of the occupation of the fortresses for a limited number of years rather than dismantling them. "With regard," said he, "to the two alternatives of dismantling the French fortresses, or their occupation for a given number of years by the Allied Powers, there appears to us to be no question which of these propositions is the most advantageous to Europe, and even to France. In the first place, the dismantling the fortresses has rarely ever been completely effected. The works are partially destroyed, and may be repaired for a small part of the expense at which they were originally constructed. In the second place, though dismantling the fortresses on the frontier of France would uncover that country, expose it for a time to iuvasion, an advantage as far as it goes, it would not materially protect neighbouring countries which had no fortresses; and the contest, if it should arise, would depend in that case upon which Power would bring into the field the superior army. Whereas, if the French fortresses were occupied by the Allied Powers till such time as a barrier could be created by the Allies, they would have the advantage of the security of the French frontier till such time as they had been enabled to create one of their In the third place, the occupation of the French frontier by the Allies, to be restored at a given period to the King and his legitimate successors, would be some security for the continuance of his Government; whereas the dismantling the fortresses could not be productive, at least in anything like the same degree, of such an advantage. If, therefore, the principle of security ought to be the rule of our conduct, the option between these alternatives is clear. We do not feel that we should discharge our duty, if we did not urge this opinion with all possible earnestness, and desire you to urge it upon the Allies."-LORD LIVERPOOL to LORD CASTLEREAGH, July 28, 1815; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 446. own. Powers. XIV. 1815. CHAP. Belgium, and Bavaria, who had the greatest injuries to revenge, and dangers to apprehend, both as regards territory to be ceded by France, and indemnities to be paid. by that Power. The latter soon swelled to an enormous amount, which, even supposing they were in some degree exaggerated, gave a frightful idea of the extent to which systematic robbery and spoliation had been carried by the French armies. They amounted to above £1,200,000,000 sterling. The claims of Hamburg alone, a city at that time containing only 80,000 inhabitants, and impoverished to the last degree by the blockade during the war, amounted to £140,000-a sum, from the difference in the value of money, equal to at least £250,000 in British money. So enormous were the demands, and so obvious the inability of France to discharge them, that the Emperor Alexander, who had never forgiven the resistance made to his views on Poland by the Western States, and was very desirous of popularity in France, under the name of mediating between the contending Powers, took the part of the French in a way which at first excited the apprehension of the British Cabinet.* These concurring circumstances caused the negotiation to be protracted much beyond the period originally contemplated, and which was the more unexpected that at its close no less than 800,000 Allied troops were in possession of the * "We are not at all surprised at the different shades of opinion which subsist amongst the Allied Powers as to the measures which it may be proper to adopt respecting the frontier of France. It is quite natural that the Powers bordering on France should look to their own security in some permanent reduction of the territory of that country. It is quite intelligible, likewise, that the Emperor of Russia should be desirous of being considered as a protector of the French nation; but this disposition, on the part of his Imperial Majesty, should be kept within reasonable bounds. He should recollect that those who are near to France, and consequently in the post of danger, have the deepest interest in the issue of the contest. And, though it may be very proper that he should so far act the part of a mediator as to keep down extravagant and unreasonable pretensions, he ought not to sacrifice what may be necessary for the security of his Allies to the pretensions of the French nation, particularly as that nation has never acted upon those principles of permanent territorial integrity with respect to other countries, when the fortune of war has placed the power in its own hands."-LORD LIVERPOOL to Lord CastleREAGH, July 28, 1815; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 445. XIV. 1815. French territory, where they were, with the exception of CHAP. the English, fed and maintained at the expense of the conquered territory, the inhabitants of which were incapable of making any, even the smallest resistance, while its army was almost entirely disbanded. Lord Castlereagh wrote and transmitted to his Cabinet, on the 17th August,* a "I quite concur with the remark contained in your last letter, that the true interests of Great Britain are much more identified with those of Austria and Prussia in the existing crisis, than with those of Russia; but I must at the same time observe, that both these courts require to be narrowly watched at the present moment, with respect to the mode in which they pursue their particular views, in order that we may not be involved in a course of policy in which Great Britain has no principle of common interest with them, but the reverse. The first point is, that I much suspect neither Austria nor Prussia, and certainly none of the smaller Powers, have any sincere desire to bring the present state of things to a speedy termination. So long as they can feed, clothe, and pay their armies at the expense of France, and put English subsidies into their pockets besides, which nothing can deprive them of, previous to 1st April 1816, but the actual conclusion of a treaty with France, you cannot suppose they will be in a great hurry to come to a final settlement, since the war may be said to have closed. . . . The Prussians have not only brought an entire new corps of 40,000 men forward-much to the annoyance of the King of the Netherlands, on whom they have been feeding, by the way-but they have now reinforcements to an equal amount in full march, to fill up all their other corps, making their numbers in France, according to their own returns, 200,000 men, for which they now draw rations. . . . The Prussian minister of finance, Bulow, yesterday told me that he did not calculate the Allied force now in France lower than 900,000 men; and their expense, including forage and waste, at less than 3 livres per man per day, which is about £112,000 a-day, or £36,000,000 a-year, exclusive of pay and clothing, the latter being provided by distinct requisitions, the former by the revenue of the departments occupied. To judge of the effect of the invasion in a financial point of view upon France, to this must be added the final contribution to be demanded, which, from all I hear and observe, is not likely to fall short of 600,000,000 (£24,000,000); and if to this you add the charge of 100,000 men who are to occupy for a number of years the intended position in France, you will probably be of opinion that the pressure is likely to be as heavy, in a pecuniary shape, as the country can be expected quietly to submit to. "With respect to the fortresses proposed to be erected, you reason the justice of throwing upon France the expense of providing those defences, which her position and conduct render indispensable to the security of the neighbouring states. Austria and Prussia state the justice as strongly and preferably in favour of being indemnified for the expenses of the war, and for former contributions levied upon them by France. It is quite clear that France cannot meet all these demands; that the charge upon her must be limited in amount; and that it will be a question amongst the Allies, in appropriating this fund, which pretension is to give way. It is, in truth, a question much more between us and our Allies, in which, as I foresaw before I left England, we should have to contend upon grounds of remote precaution, against the immediate pressure of avarice and poverty. "Much to my surprise, in discussion with Prince Metternich on this sub |