CHAP. XIV. 1815. detailed and most able account of the state of the negotiations, and the reasons adduced on both sides, which throws an important light on the difficulties with which he was surrounded, and the views which in the end swayed the British Government. At length, after a long delay, and no small difficulty, the heads of an arrange ject, I received not only a concurrence, but a considerable degree of support from the Russian minister; and he has since told me that the Emperor will agree to my proposition of appropriating one-third of the whole contribution to fortifications, which, considering the remote interest Russia has in this arrangement, is a very liberal proceeding on his Imperial Majesty's part. . . . The more I wish the alternative, the more I am impressed with the wisdom of what the Duke of Wellington states upon this subject in his letter to me, when he says he deems the possession of a certain number of French fortresses for an extended period of time, in itself preferable to the actual cession of the same places; and for this obvious reason, that the one is compatible with French connection, the other leads to unite all Frenchmen against us, or rather against the Power that shall be found in possession of their spoils; and as the King of the Netherlands would probably be the first to be attacked, we have more reason to weigh well the course to be pursued. "When I state that the temporary occupation is not incompatible with preserving a useful influence in France, I do it from knowing that the King and his ministers do not wish to see France without foreign troops; that they admit the Allies cannot leave their troops in France, without the security of a certain number of their fortresses. My belief and hope is, if the arrangement is made with some attention to the feelings and interests of the country, that the King, his Government, and the loyal party in France, will ally themselves with you; and that thus sustained, the King will be able gradually to establish his authority, which, if accomplished, is valuable beyond all other securities we can acquire. If he fails, we shall not have to reproach ourselves with having precipitated his fall, and we shall have full time to take our precautions. If, on the contrary, we push things now to an extremity, we leave the King no resource in the eyes of his own people but to disavow us; and once committed against us in sentiment, he will be obliged soon either to lead the nation into war himself, or possibly be set aside to make way for some more bold and enterprising competitor. The whole of this view of the question turns upon a conviction that the King's cause in France is far from hopeless, if well conducted, and that the European alliance can be made powerfully instrumental to his support, if our securities are framed in such a manner as not to be ultimately hostile to France, after she shall have given protracted proofs of having ceased to be a revolutionary state. "I have no doubt, that in the prevailing temper, in England as well as in Germany, the Cabinet ought to instruct the Duke of Wellington not to look to secure a fortified place the more or the less, which seldom tells much in the contest of nations, but to confer with the other Powers how we can best reduce the power of France, and most effectually disqualify her from making again the attempt to assail Europe. I have no doubt the middle line would be most popular, and that in extorting the permanent cession of one or two fortresses of great name, our labours would carry with them an eclat which is not likely to attend them according to the course we recommend. But it is not our business to collect trophies, but to try if we can bring back the world to peace ment were come to between him and Prince Nesselrode, which formed the basis of the treaty which followed, and was signed on 20th November.* XIV. 1815. 94. Nov. 20. Lord Liverpool was exceedingly anxious that in addition to the fortresses designed by the Duke of Welling- Terms on ton for temporary occupation, Strasburg and Lille should which peace is at length be demolished † and the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin concluded. secretly insisted that Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, and French Flanders, should be ceded to Austria and Prussia, and form part of the Germany Confederacy. It was ful habits. I do not believe this to be compatible with any attempt now materially and permanently to affect the territorial character of France, as settled by the Peace of Paris. Neither do I think it a clear case (if we can, by imposing a strait waistcoat upon that Power for a number of years, restore her to ordinary habits, and weighing the extraordinary growth of other states in latter times, and especially of Russia) that France, even with her existing dimensions, may not be found a useful, rather than a dangerous member of the European system. You have now all the materials before you; you know the Duke of Wellington's sentiments and my own; and if you wish us to alter the view we have taken of the question, or have to make any change in the instructions given me on leaving England, there is no time to be lost."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD LIVERPOOL, August 17, 1815; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 485-491. * This agreement was in the following terms: "1. Occupation des places désignées par le Duc de Wellington pour cinq années. "2. Cession de Landau, comme enclave de l'Allemagne. "3. Cession à la Suisse, ou démolition de Huningue. "4. Restitution au Roi de Sardaigne de la partie de la Savoye réunie à la France par la paix de Paris, contre la cession de sa part, pour la rectification des frontières de Genève. "5. Restitution des districts détachés des Pays Bas par la paix de Paris. "6. Contribution équivalente à une année de revenu de la France, savoir, six cent millions de francs. "7. Comprendre dans cette contribution les cinquante millions exigés actuellement, et le montant des objets d'équippement qui ont été fournis. "8. Employer le tiers de cette contribution à la construction de quelques points fortifiés en Belgique et dans le midi de l'Allemagne. "9. La contribution sera payable dans trois ans.”—Memorandum by PRINCE NESSELRODE, August 24, 1815; Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 498. +"You will understand me as not bringing forward the dismantling of Lille and Strasburg as a sine qua non, but as wishing it to be urged with all the weight which we feel is due to it; and, considering how very short our propositions fall of the Austrian and Prussian projets, I cannot but entertain a confident hope that, when the French Government are aware, as they must be, of the extent of sacrifice which would have been demanded from them, if it had not been for the moderation of Great Britain and Russia, they will not feel it possible to make any serious resistance to a concession of this nature."-LORD LIVERPOOL to LORD CASTLEREAGH, August 23, 1815; Cast. Cor. x. 496. XIV. 1815. Nov. 20. CHAP. With no small difficulty that Lord Castlereagh, the Duke of Wellington, and Prince Nesselrode, withstood these demands, and they did so on the ground that such a partition of France would unite every heart and hand in the country against the Government, and render the preservation of peace, the great object of all their efforts, impossible. By their united efforts, the demands of the German Powers were at length overruled, and peace was concluded with France on terms more favourable than, after so dreadful an overthrow, could have been expected. By this treaty the territory of France was reduced to its exact limits in 1790, by which the whole addition left to it by the treaty of 1814 was swept away, except the little territory of the Venaisin, the first conquest of the Revolution. Versoix, with a small adjacent territory, was ceded to the canton of Geneva; but the fortress of Huningen, a standing menace to Switzerland, was to be demolished. The contribution laid on France for the expenses of the war, was fixed at 700,000,000 francs (£28,000,000), in addition to which an army of 150,000 men, under the Duke of Wellington, formed of 30,000 each from Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and the lesser Powers of Germany, was to retain possession, during five years, of the chief frontier fortresses of France, from Condé to Fort Louis, including Valenciennes, Cambray, Quesnoy, Maubeuge, and Landrecy. This great force was to be maintained entirely at the expense of the French Government, which for five years would amount to 250,000,000 francs (£10,000,000), making in all £38,000,000 to be paid by France under this treaty.* By the advice of Lord Castlereagh, and with the entire 1 See Treaty concurrence of the Cabinet, Great Britain surrendered i. 682; and the whole portion of this indemnity accruing to her, 501, 518. amounting to nearly £5,000,000, to aid in forming a barrier against France in the Low Countries.1 in Martens, Schoel, xi. The French Government was to pay 50,000,000 francs a-year for the pay, equipment, &c., of the Allied troops; but it was besides to furnish them in kind with their whole provisions, forage, lodging, and fuel. This would probably amount to as much more.-See SCHOEL, xi. 510. XIV. 95. of Lord reign policy. The treaties of Vienna consummated the foreign policy CHAP. of Lord Castlereagh, and afford a convenient opportunity for a rapid review of their principles and effects. The period 1815. of nearly half a century which has since elapsed, fraught Retrospect as it has been with the most important events, both foreign Castleand domestic, has thrown a broad and steady light on the reagh's fo views of international rights and policy on which it was founded. It was vehemently decried at the time by the Liberal party, both at home and on the Continent-by the first, because it was deemed too favourable to despotic power, and too little encouraging to popular movements and inclinations; and by the last, because it had defeated the great democratic effort of the European states, and established an alliance of the Conservative Powers which threatened for a long period, if not for ever, to restrain its advances. That it had both these effects for a considerable time is indeed certain; but yet neither was intended by him, and neither formed the principal object to which his policy was directed. It was the maintenance of the national independence, to the support of which his early life had been devoted, that during his whole career constituted his main object. He resisted the democratic movement, both at home and abroad, because he saw that the hostility of its leaders always had been, and he foresaw always would be, in the end directed against this country. He inclined to the legitimate monarchies, and succeeded at last, by great exertions, in arraying them in a firm league for mutual protection and the prevention of the desolating effects of separate warfare. He did so, not because he was inclined to arbitrary principles, or desirous of supporting arbitrary governments, but because he foresaw that it was by the democratic Powers that the peace of Europe was likely in future to be disturbed and the independence of Great Britain threatened, and that it was by an alliance with the legitimate monarchies. alone that either could be successfully maintained. The annals of Europe during the twenty years which immediately succeeded the first French Revolution too XIV. 1815. 96. tionary afforded of to England cracy. CHAP. clearly vindicated these opinions. In the outset that event was not merely regarded with no disfavour, but carried with it the warmest and nearly unanimous sympathy of Proof which the British people. To see, and, if they can effect it, the Revolu- render, all other nations as free as themselves, has ever annals been the warmest wish of the English; and, in the outthe dangers set, they invariably regard any nation insurgent against from demo- its government, as their natural allies. So it was with the first French Revolution; so it was with the last. Even Mr Pitt and his Cabinet regarded the first convulsion, in its early stages, with favour; they stood aloof when France was pierced to the heart by the Duke of Brunswick's invasion in 1792, and when nothing was wanting but a declaration of war from England to determine the contest at once in favour of Austria and Prussia. It was with deep regret, " and like," as Lord Malmesbury said, "a conscientious man being forced into a duel," that they were in the succeeding year drawn into the war. But the events which rapidly succeeded soon dispelled this amiable and natural delusion, and revealed the painful truth that every revolutionary state on the Continent is no sooner established than it allies itself, not with England, but with France, if under a revolutionary government, and, instead of forming a support to Great Britain, constitutes a direct addition to the power of its enemies. The Batavian, Cisalpine, Roman, and Parthenopeian Republics were not only conquered and organised, but cordially united their forces with those of France; and when Lord Castlereagh succeeded to the helm, in 1807, he found the whole of Europe, under the banners of revolution, arrayed in a vast league against this country. There are many instances in the history of England of revolutionary powers imploring its aid to establish their independence there is not one of any of them in return ever rendering her any assistance. On the contrary, in the darkest period of the war, when Britain, the last asylum of freedom, was endangered, America, after every cause of complaint had been removed by the repeal of the Orders |