CHAP. proving he deemed success impossible with the troops X. put under his orders, but the Emperor declined to receive 1813. his resignation. * 61. position of Thus, on all sides, the fabric of Napoleon's power in Alarming Germany was crumbling into dust, and it had become the French painfully evident that a decisive change had taken place army. in the relative position of the contending parties. Under the eye of the Emperor, indeed, the Guards and cuirassiers, the élite of the army, combated with their former resolution, and had achieved deeds worthy of their ancient fame, but in every other situation the French troops had been defeated, and with consequences which rendered those defeats doubly disastrous. Thirty thousand prisoners and 250 guns had been taken by the Allies in the last three weeks, and the total losses of the French in that short period amounted to 100,000. This presented a striking contrast to the Russians in the Moscow campaign, who had retreated from the Niemen to Moscow, a distance of 600 miles, without one gun being taken, or one battalion broken, though pursued by 400,000 men. The young conscripts and newly raised regiments had in many cases behaved very badly in the field, and on the first reverse threw away their arms, dispersed, and were seen no more. The troops of the Confederation of the Rhine in particular, though they in * "C'est un devoir pour moi de déclarer à V. A. S. qu'il est impossible de tirer un bon parti des 4o, 7e, et 12e corps d'armée dans l'état actuel de leur organisation. Ces corps sont réunis par le droit, mais ils ne le sont pas par le fait chacun des généraux en chef fait à peu près ce qu'il juge convenable pour sa propre sûreté; les choses en sont au point qu'il m'est très-difficile d'obtenir une situation. Le moral des généraux et en général des officiers est singulièrement ébranlé: commander ainsi n'est commander qu'à demi, et j'aimerais mieux être grenadier. Je vous prie, Monseigneur, d'obtenir de l'Empereur ou que je sois seul général en chef, ayant seulement sous mes ordres des généraux de division d'aile, ou que sa Majesté veuille bien me retirer de cet enfer. Je n'ai pas besoin, je pense, de parler de mon dévouement, je suis prêt à verser tout mon sang, mais je désire que ce soit utilement. Dans l'état actuel, la présence de l'Empereur pourrait seule rétablir l'ensemble, parce que toutes les volontés cédent à son génie, et que les petites vanités disparaissent devant la majesté du trône."-LE PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA au MAJORGÉNÉRAL, Wurtzen, 10 Septembre 1813; THIERS, xvi. 436, note. X. 1813. general fought bravely in battle when their blood was CHAP. up, yet made no secret of the side to which their wishes inclined, and on many occasions not only deserted during the confusion of defeat, but joined the patriot ranks of Germany. The old enthusiasm of the Revolution was worn out; that of the empire was drowned in blood; the ardour of patriotism, the fervour of devotion, had passed over to the other side. In these circumstances, there can be no doubt that wisdom would have prescribed to the Emperor the abandonment of the line of the Elbe, and a retreat, with the main strength of his army still unbroken, to the Rhine. It was there that his real base of operations was to be found; and if 250,000 men had reached that frontier stream, it was difficult to see how they could ever be driven beyond it. But so decisive a step was not only repugnant to the iron soul and lofty aspirations of the Emperor, but it was open in a political point of view to very serious objections. It implied at once a confession of defeat, the abandonment of all the objects for which he was contending in Germany, and the loss of 100,000 veteran soldiers, who were immured in the fortresses on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula. All Europe would join the Allies the moment the French eagles repassed the Rhine; the Confederation of that river, the great bulwark of the empire, would become the advanced post of its enemies; and instead of the forces of Germany being divided, they would be hurled in a united mass against France, now reduced to its own resources.11 Marm. v. Napoleon, however, did not deceive himself, however much he may have tried to deceive others. Immediately after this great defeat, he sent off to the Senate at Paris orders to call out 120,000 men of the conscription of 1810, 1811, and 1812, and one of 160,000 on that of 1815! The whole conscription of 1813 and 1814 was already in the depots. At the same time he wrote a long confidential letter, in cypher secretly, by Maret, to 475-481. Clarke, the Minister at War,2 enjoining him without delay VOL. II. E 254-256. 2 Thiers, xvi. CHAP. 1813. 62. Renewed of Schwart zenberg to put the fortresses on the Rhine in a proper posture of defence.* No sooner were the Allies made aware, from the cessation of the active pursuit of his column, that Napoleon movement with his Guards had set out in a different direction, than they resumed the offensive on the Bohemian frontier. The Russian and Prussian columns returned to all the passes of the mountains which they had traversed; Wittgenstein, with the right wing, reoccupied Nollendorf, against Dresden. Sept. 5. * "Les événements se pressent de telle manière qu'en laissant à S. M. des chances heureuses et brillantes, il est cependant de la prudence d'en prévoir de contraires. Je crois devoir, mon cher Duc, m'en expliquer confidentiellement avec vous. L'armée Russe n'est pas notre ennemi le plus dangereux. Elle a éprouvé de grandes pertes, elle ne s'est pas renforcée, et, à sa cavalerie près, qui est assez nombreuse, elle ne joue qu'un rôle subordonné dans la lutte qui est engagée. Mais la Prusse a fait de grands efforts. Une exaltation portée à un très-haut degré a favorisé le parti qu'a pris le souverain. Ses armées sont considérables, ses généraux, ses officiers, et ses soldats sont trèsanimés. Toutefois la Russie et la Prusse n'auraient offert que de faibles obstacles à nos armées, mais l'accession de l'Autriche a extrêmement compliqué la question. "Notre armée, quelque prix que lui aient coûté les victoires remportées, est encore belle et nombreuse. Mais les généraux et les officiers fatigués de la guerre n'ont plus ce mouvement qui leur avait fait faire de grandes choses. Le théâtre est trop étendu. L'Empereur est vainqueur toutes les fois qu'il est présent; mais il ne peut être partout, et les chefs qui commandent isolément répondent rarement à son attente. Vous savez ce qui est arrivé au Général Vandamme. Le Duc de Tarente a éprouvé des échecs en Silésie, et le Prince de la Moskowa vient d'être battu en marchant sur Berlin. Dans de telles circonstances, mon cher Duc, et avec le génie de l'Empereur, on peut encore tout espérer. Mais il se peut aussi que des chances contraires influent d'une manière fâcheuse sur les affaires. On ne doit pas trop le craindre, mais on doit le regarder comme possible, et ne rien négliger de ce que commande la prudence. Je vous presente ce tableau afin que vous sachiez tout et que vous agissiez en conséquence. "Vous feriez sagement de veiller à ce que les places fussent mises en bon état, et d'y réunir beaucoup d'artillerie, car nous faisons souvent dans ce genre des pertes assez sensibles. Vous devriez vous entendre secrètement avec le directeur général des vivres pour faire dans les places du Rhin des approvisionnements extraordinaires, enfin pour préparer d'avance tout ce qui convient, afin que dans une circonstance extraordinaire S. M. n'éprouvât point de nouveaux embarras, et que vous ne fussiez pas pris au dépourvu. Vous sentez que si je vous écris ainsi, c'est que j'ai bien réfléchi à ce qui se passe sous mes yeux, et que je suis assuré que je ne fais rien en cela que S. M. puisse désapprouver. Un grand succès peut tout changer et remettre les affaires dans la situation prospère où l'immense avantage remporté par S. M. les avait placées. Accusez-moi, s'il vous plait, réception de cette lettre."-LE DUC DE BASSANO (MARET) à M. LE GÉNÉRAL CLARKE, Ministre de la Guerre, 8 Septembre 1813; THIERS, XVI. 441-443. CHAP. X. 1813. on the following day pushed on to Gieshübel, and on the 7th reached Pirna, and his advanced posts appeared in the neighbourhood of Dresden. At the same time Schwartzenberg, with the great body of the Austrians, had crossed the Elbe to Leumeritz, to reorganise his army and watch the defiles leading from Silesia; and information was received that Benningsen, with the Russian reserve, 45,000 strong, was advancing by rapid strides from the Oder, and might be expected on the Elbe by the end of the month. St Cyr and Murat retired before this advance; and the former instantly informed Napoleon. No sooner did the Emperor receive this intelligence than, as already mentioned, he ordered Macdonald to retire to Bautzen, near which Poniatowski was placed, so as to form a link of communication with the Grand Army, while he himself repaired with the Guard in the direction of Pirna. He there in the evening met, and had a long conference with, Marshal St Cyr, undoubtedly one of the ablest generals in Europe, to whom he in confidence admitted "that he had lost a brilliant opportunity of striking a great blow by halting the Young Guard at Pirna when Vandamme was advancing on Culm;" but he still maintained that the reserve of the army should now be directed against Bernadotte Sept. 6, 7, or Blucher, and that the Allies would attempt nothing Cyr, iv. 397, against Dresden during his absence. "The chequer," v. 255, 256; said he to Marmont, "has become very complicated; it 259, 260. is I alone who can disembroil it."1 1 St Cyr to Napoleon, 1813; St 405; Marm. Cathcart, Early on the 63. Nollendorf, and retreat of the Allies. Sept. 8. But Napoleon was soon undeceived. following morning, when he was devising a fresh advance Action at against Berlin, in which he himself with the Guards and cuirassiers were to bear a part, he was startled by the intelligence that Wittgenstein's Russians had made themselves masters of the plateau of Gahring, near Pirna, where they were fortifying themselves with diligence. The position was of the utmost moment, for in a few hours it could be rendered unassailable, and it com CHAP. X. manded the road by Pirna to Dresden. Instantly scanning the danger in its full extent, the Emperor, 1813. though part of the Guard only had come up, moved forward to dislodge the enemy from their vantage-ground with two divisions of infantry and the cuirassiers. But no sooner did Wittgenstein see the well-known uniform in the enemy's ranks, than, faithful to the orders he had received, he abandoned his advanced post and withdrew his men to join Kleist's corps, which occupied the heights of Nollendorf. At the same time Klenau's Austrians, which had advanced towards Chemnitz, withdrew to Marienberg, and the Allied troops at all points retired into the Bohemian valleys. Satisfied with this advantage, 1St Cyr, iv. the Emperor pursued the enemy to the summit of the pass, and at the same time despatched a courier to the King of Saxony at Dresden, with the intelligence that the enemy at all points were expelled from the Saxon territory.1 149, 150; Bout. 73, 74; Vaud. i. 174; Richter, ii. 96, 97. 64. conversation on the art of war. On the evening following this exploit, Napoleon received Napoleon's accounts of the terrible disaster of Dennewitz from Ney's with St Cyr aide-de-camp, who brought him the intelligence. He immediately sent for the officer, questioned him minutely as to the whole particulars of the event, and having done so, he dismissed the officer, and began a conversation with St Cyr, who happened to be present, which lasted till past midnight. "He explained," says St Cyr, "in a manner equally lucid and satisfactory, the causes of the reverse, but without the slightest rancour at Ney or any of the generals engaged. He ascribed the whole to the difficulty of the art of war, which, he said, was far from being generally understood. One day or other,' said he, if I have time, I will write a book upon the subject, in which I will demonstrate its principles, in a manner so precise that they will be within the comprehension of every military man, and enable them to learn the art of war as they learn any other science.' 'It were much to be wished,' replied St Cyr, 'that the experience of such a |