259. X. 1813. to threaten Berlin; there were 20,000 in Bavaria, CHAP. 60,000 in Italy, and 90,000 veterans in garrison on the Oder, the Elbe, and in Dantzic.* In all, he had 550,000 men in arms, of whom, after making every deduction for garrisons, non-effective, and sick, at least 170,000 could be relied on as available, under the Emperor in person, in the centre, and 90,000 under each of his lieutenants opposed to the armies of Blucher and the Crown Prince of Sweden on the flank. The forces of the Coalition were, numerically, at least equal to this immense force, and, indeed, are estimated by M. Thiers at 800,000 men in Italy and Germany, or advancing through Poland from Russia. This statement of the Allied force, however, is 'Thiers, xvi. not drawn by the French historian from any official sources, and is very much exaggerated. It is reduced by the more moderate estimate of Sir George Cathcart, who had access to good sources of information, on the Allied side, to 301,000 between the Rhine and the Oder, while the French active force in the same limits is given at 391,000, as already stated. Wilson, however, shows Cathcart, that this under-estimates the Austrians by about 40,000. Probably we shall not be far wrong if we take the force of each party at the amount stated by the best informed on their own side, as in that way accuracy is most likely to be obtained, and exaggeration is least to be apprehended. Judging by this standard, the fair inference seems to be that, for active operations between the Oder and the Rhine, the French had, in the outset of the campaign, 390,000 men, and the Allies 340,000; but that these numbers would be nearly reversed, and the balance turned the other way, if the contest were considerably prolonged, and the Allies had time to bring * Their exact disposition was as follows:-In Silesia, under Macdonald, opposed to Blucher, 100,000; along the Bohemian frontier, watching the passes, 100,000; reserve under Napoleon near Bautzen, 72,000; under Oudinot, menacing Berlin, 68,000; under Girard, in front of Magdeburg, 12,000; under Davoust at Hamburg, 25,000 French and 10,000 Danes-Total, 387,000.THIERS, xvi. 258. 192, 193. CHAP. X. 1813. all their distant reserves into action. This numerical superiority, already considerable, was seriously enhanced in the outset of hostilities by the concentrated position of the French forces, their command of all the fortresses on the Elbe and the entire passages over that river, and 209, 210; the comparative dispersion of the Allied armies, and 257-259; severance of the Grand Army under Schwartzenberg, in Bohemia, from the two others on the right bank of the Elbe.1 1 Cathcart, Thiers, xvi. Lond. 111, 112. 3. against Blucher at Berlin. Determined, according to his usual custom, to take the Napoleon initiative in hostilities, Napoleon, before the expiry of first moves the armistice, had given orders for the concentration of seven corps-viz., the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 11th -with the Guards and three corps of reserve cavalry, to oppose the Allies in Silesia, where their Grand Army was then placed. As this force amounted to 160,000 infantry, and 30,000 cavalry, with 600 guns, it was much larger than any which the Allies, even with the whole aid of the Austrians, could have brought against him. He had no doubt, therefore, of gaining in the very outset of the campaign a decisive victory over them. But not content with this great object, he directed at the same time an advance against Berlin by the 4th, 7th, and 12th corps, and a corps of cavalry, mustering 70,000 combatants, who were to be supported by Marshal Davoust from Hamburg, bringing up the attacking force to 100,000 men. As the army which the Crown Prince could collect to oppose this invasion did not at first exceed 70,000, he entertained sanguine hopes that the Prussian capital would speedily fall into his hands; an event which would at once gratify his animosity against Bernadotte, satiate his vengeance against Prussia, and strike a blow which would resound throughout Europe.2 110; Cath- But in resolving in this manner on offensive operations, 211; Thiers, at the same time, both in Silesia and Prussia, he committed the same error, which had proved so detrimental to his fortunes in the Peninsula, when he invaded Por 2 Lond. 109, cart, 210, xvi. 257, 259. tugal simultaneously with Andalusia, and fatal in Russia, CHAP. when he advanced to Moscow, leaving the war in Spain X. still unconcluded. 1813. 4. vances of and Blucher Silesia. The cross-march of the Russians and Prussians into Bohemia, of which the French Emperor immediately Mutual adreceived intelligence, made no alterations on these plans. Napoleon On the contrary, it only prompted him the more to carry against each them out, because it left Blucher in Silesia now alto-other in gether detached from the Grand Army, and with a com- Aug. 19. paratively small force alone exposed to his blows. Blucher's orders, intended to favour and prove a diversion to the operations of the Grand Army, were to advance in force against the enemy, and disquiet him at all points— avoiding, however, a general engagement-and immediately falling back when the presence of the Guards and cuirassiers showed that the Emperor was in command in person. Previous to advancing, Napoleon, on the morning of the 19th August, moved in person through the mountains beyond Gabel to the summit of the defile, from whence he had an extensive view over the Bohemian plains. He then assembled all the curés and most intelligent persons of the district, and, after his usual fashion, overwhelmed them with questions as to the directions of the march of the Allied forces, the amount of their troops, and the whole particulars of their advance. Having satisfied himself, from the answers to these questions, that they were moving on Prague, and that several days must elapse before they could recross the mountains to the northward and threaten his communications with the Rhine, he halted and turned back into Silesia. He thought, and with reason, that he had time to strike a decisive blow against Blucher, now abandoned to his own resources, before the Allied Grand Army could possibly ii. 239, 240. descend from the Boehmerwald into the Saxon plains.' Meanwhile, Blucher, in conformity with his orders, was vigorously pressing the French corps opposed to him in Silesia. Ney at this time had the command of the forces Thiers, xvi. Odel. i. 239 262, 263; 241; Fain, X. 1813. Ney in Silesia CHAP. left in that quarter; and he had under him, besides his own corps, those of Lauriston, Macdonald, and Marmont, a force estimated by Napoleon at 100,000 men. NotwithstandRetreat of ing the magnitude of this force, which was considerably greater than that of Blucher to which it was opposed, such was the vivacity of the Prussian general's attack that the French gave way before him at all points. Ney fell back on the night of the 17th from Liegnitz; next day the lin, 10, 11; Katzbach was passed at all points; and Blucher conThiers, xvi. tinued to press upon the French with such vigour that by the 20th Ney had been compelled to evacuate Buntzlau, and fall back at all points behind the Bober.1 before Fain, ii. 214; 266, 267; Odel. i. 241. 6. crosses over him. Aug. 21, This vigorous irruption of Blucher had the effect of Napoleon at once withdrawing the attention of the Emperor from and repulses the operations of the Allies in Bohemia. He no sooner received advices of the forward movement of the Prussian general, than he stopped his advance upon Gabel into Bohemia, and, turning to the east with his Guards and reserves, was soon upon the Bober, which he passed on a bridge of pontoons. This formidable reinforcement, and still more the prestige and energy of the chief who led it, changed the state of affairs. The Allies were now in presence of Napoleon at the head of 160,000 men ; and although, including the reserves in the rear, Blucher had nearly 100,000 men under his command, this was by no means adequate to resisting the assault of such a mass led by such a chief. Blucher's orders, too, were, on the first appearance of the Guards and cuirassiers in the enemy's ranks, to suspend his advance and fall back. No sooner was he apprised, by the increased vigour of the enemy's resistance, and the appearance of the well-known plumes and helmets of the Guards, that he was in presence of the Emperor in person, than he gave orders to retire at all points towards Jauer. The retrograde movement, however, was not effected without serious loss. Encouraged by the powerful reinforcement they had received, and the presence of their chief, the French generals and X. 1813. soldiers resumed the offensive with the utmost vigour. CHAP. Lauriston and Macdonald, followed by the Emperor in person, with the Guards and cuirassiers, debouched from Lowenberg on the right, while Ney and Marmont crossed at Buntzlau on the left. Maison, with the leading division of Lauriston's corps, threw back D'York, notwithstanding a vigorous resistance, and pressed vehemently on Blucher. The Prussian general, in consequence, fell back behind the Haynau, a little stream between the Bober and the Katzbach; but he sustained a loss of 3000 men in Aug. 22. his retreat. The pursuit was continued through the whole of the following day with increased vigour; and the Allies, 266, 267 after having opposed a stout resistance, were driven over Odel. i. 241; the Katzbach, with the loss, in all, since hostilities were 11; Fain, ii. 244-247; renewed, of 6000 men, while the French were not weak- Lond. 110. ened by more than two-thirds of the number.1 1 Thiers, xvi. Bout. 10, 7, of the Allies and against While these operations were going forward on the right bank of the Elbe in Silesia, movements of a still more Operations important and decisive character were commencing on the in Bohemin, part of the Grand Allied Army in Bohemia. Following Dresden. up the plan of operations concerted at Trachenberg, this army received orders to cross the Erzgebirge range, and descend in several columns on the main road to Dresden, directly in the rear of the French position. This movement began on the 21st, the very day when Napoleon, on the Aug. 21. other bank of the Elbe, was commencing his vigorous onset on Blucher, and the prescribed order of march was as follows Beginning on the right, the corps of Wittgenstein and Kleist were to pass the defile of Nollendorf and Peterswalde, and follow the high-road from Töplitz to Dresden. This road ran near the intrenched camp at Pirna, so famous in the wars of the Great Frederick, and close to the fort of Koenigstein, both of which required to be observed. The second column, with which were the Russian headquarters under Barclay de Tolly, was to march by the defile of Altenberg and Barenstein. A third, composed entirely of Austrians, with whom were |