CHAP. X. 1813. the part of the enemy, in some quarter, might give him an opportunity of falling in great force on an isolated corps or unguarded point, and reinstating his affairs by a decisive blow. With this view, he ordered the construction, with every precaution for secrecy, of a third bridge at Pirna, in addition to the two already established between the forts of Koenigstein and Lilienstein. The object of this was to enable the Young Guard and part of St Cyr's corps to pass the Elbe suddenly and fall on the left of the enemy opposed to Macdonald, against whom he projected an offensive movement, as the position of the Allies in the plain of Culm appeared too strong, and their force there too great, now that the Austrians had come up, to offer the prospect of attack453-455; ing them to advantage. Napoleon flattered himself that by this means he would succeed in rendering the position on the Elbe and at Dresden so strong, that he might securely pass the winter there.1 Thiers, xvi. Cathcart, 261, 262 Lond. 137, 138. 69. Sharp ac tion on the a retreat. Before carrying this design into execution, however, he resolved to make one reconnaissance more to see French left, whether he could not find an opportunity of striking a followed by blow against the Allies. It took place on the ensuing Sept. 17. day (17th September), and at first promised to bring on a general battle; but no favourable opportunity of engaging with advantage presenting itself, it came to nothing important. Fifteen thousand of the French were directed by the Emperor against the Allied right, while eight thousand moved on in the centre and left, and thirty thousand infantry and cavalry remained in reserve. The French at first met with considerable success. Ziethen, who held the advanced post at the foot of the descent, was dislodged by Mouton Duvernet, and driven back in disorder towards Culm. Encouraged by this, Napoleon moved down to the foot of the descent, deeming that the opportunity of striking a blow had arrived. A thick mist overhung the upper part of the hills, and, spreading down upon the plain, concealed the greater portion of the Allies X. 1813. from the enemy; when on a sudden, as the French CHAP. were advancing on Culm, a loud cannonade burst forth in their front, and a storm of bullets fell on their columns. Napoleon ordered up his horse to attack the batteries, and several charges of cavalry against them took place, but without success; and at length, seeing that the enemy were sufficiently on their guard at all points, he drew back to his old position on the hills with the loss of seven guns and 2000 prisoners. "Their retreat," says Cathcart, "alone saved them from a disaster as great as that of Vandamme; for during the action Meerfeldt and Colloredo with an Austrian corps had, by advancing through the defile of the Elbe round their left, to the dominant heights of Nollendorf, got into their rear, and a panic had seized them, so that the thick fog alone saved the attacking corps from a total rout." This severe check convinced Napoleon that he would derive no advantage from prosecuting offensive operations in Bohemia; and it was against the army of Silesia that he now intended to direct his attacks. Accordingly he withdrew, followed by the Guards and cuirassiers, to Pirna on the 18th, from iv. 121, 173, whence on the 19th he moved to Koenigstein, where he . 170; carefully inspected the bridges, and on the 21st re-entered 460-464. Dresden, accompanied by his Guard.1 * 1 Lond. 138, cart, 263, 139; Cath 264; St Cyr, 174; Vaud. Thiers, xvi. of the 70. this hill campaign. This fatiguing and harassing campaign in the hills, though unaccompanied by any great event, was attended Great losses with a most serious loss to both parties, but far greater French in to the French than their opponents, owing to their position on the cold and inhospitable summits of the mountains. The troops perched on these rude and lofty ridges, without shelter or covering of any kind except their greatcoats, were starving; stretched in bivouacs, "Yesterday I made a reconnaissance to ascertain the force and position of the enemy; and although the debouche of Peterswalde was favourable for artillery, the declivities being gentle, the position of the enemy did not permit me to attack him. I have resolved, therefore, to hold to the system of go and come, and to await my opportunity.”—NAPOLEON to ST CYR, Sept. 18, 1813; ST CYR, iv. 421. X. CHAP. night after night, with no protection against the frosty chills and frigid dews of autumn, felt with peculiar 1813. severity in those elevated regions, the young conscripts rapidly became sick, and were universally and woefully depressed in spirits. The few villages to be met with on the summits were entirely ruined; their roofs and partition-walls, with the whole furniture they contained, had been torn to pieces for firewood; it was with the utmost difficulty, and only by repairing a ruin, that quarters were got for the Emperor himself in the parish manse of Breitenlee. The subsistence of the men was in a still worse condition. Rich as Saxony is in agricultural productions, the fruits of its soil had been entirely exhausted by the enormous multitudes who had recently passed over or been quartered on its surface; the increasing numbers and audacity of the Allied cavalry rendered it next to impossible to get up any regular supplies from the rear; and great as the stores were which the Emperor had provided in the fortresses on the Elbe, it was found almost impossible to get them up to the front where the troops were bivouacked, owing to the deplorable state of the roads, and the exhaustion of the horses from want of forage. The hay and straw was everywhere totally consumed, the stack-yards emptied, the houses burnt or in ruins; while the fields of potatoes in the rural districts, oftentimes turned over in search of food, told to what grievous shifts the troops of all nations which had passed over them had been reduced.* These extremities of want and suffering rapidly produced their usual effects in utterly disorganising the troops. In vain the Emperor issued the most severe decrees, one in particular, that every tenth marauder should be shot, and recommended to every application for food that a similar * "Not a vestige of forage was to be got for the horses. The frontier villages were all in ruins. All the houses not built of stone were torn to pieces for the fires of the bivouacs. The earth in the fields, which had been ten times turned over, was again and again turned over for the few potatoes which had escaped the eye of former plunder."-Témoin Oculaire, ODELEBEN, ii. 278. CHAP. X. 1813. chastisement should be bestowed on the commissary.* These sanguinary orders were wholly ineffectual in arresting the disorders. Stern necessity compelled the soldiers to leave their colours and wander through the fields in quest of food to assuage the pangs of hunger. The distribution of meat rations had entirely ceased; those of bread were reduced to a half; and nearly the whole army, with the exception of the Guards and cuirassiers, were obliged to forage for their own subsistence. The losses which this accumulation of evils brought on the army were incalculable; in a week they exceeded what would have been sustained in the most disastrous battle. Allies too were suffering from these causes, for troops were bivouacked at night; but not by any means, in such a proportion as the French, for they were rich plain, not on barren hills, and they received ample 140; Thiers, supplies of provisions of all sorts from the fertile fields of 464. Bohemia and Silesia in their rear.1 1 Tém. Ocul. The ii. 196, 197; their 269; St Cyr, Odel. i. 268, iv. 176-179; Cathcart, in a 261, 262; Lond. 139, xvi. 463, cesses of the troops in the During the operations of the Grand Armies on the 71. mountain chain which separates Bohemia from Saxony, Great suc the hostile circle which environed the French army was Allied light daily becoming more contracted, and the losses they sus-French rear. tained from the Cossacks and partisan corps in the rear more serious. On the 14th September Thielman took Weissenfels on the line between Dresden and France, and made 1300 men prisoners. A few days after, the Austrian colonel, Mensdorf, took a French courier with Sept. 17. despatches and letters, 5000 in number, between Dresden and Leipsic, which gave the most dismal accounts of the "The recent movements of the Grand Army had entirely exhausted the last resources of the country; and the soldiers having no longer the excitement of combat to distract their misery, felt it the more keenly. To all verbal communications on this head the answer of the Emperor always was— 'Cause the commissary to be shot, and you will want for nothing.' To the written applications the answer always given was, to apply for decorations — these being more easy to supply than bread. At this moment (20th September) the Emperor issued a decree by which the town of Pirna, then at the lowest point of misery, and its inhabitants starving, should supply 6000 rations of bread a-day."-ST CYR, iv. 178. CHAP. X. 66 condition of the army, and the amount of the losses they had sustained in the late battles. They recounted," 1813. says Sir Charles Stewart, "that of the whole corps engaged under Marshal Ney, only 16,000 had escaped with him, and 10,000 with Oudinot; all the rest had dispersed and sought refuge in Torgau and Wittenberg. Reinforcements to the amount of 15,000 men had arrived at Erfurth, but very infirm troops. It was also stated in these letters that the Young Guard, and especially its artillery, had suffered extremely in the battle of Dresden; that Generals Vachot and Leibu were killed, and Generals Dentail, Zios, Boisildien, Maison, Wern, and Aubert, severely wounded. The whole army is represented as 1 Sir Chas, discouraged, and suffering extremely from fatigue and Stewart to want of provisions. General Blucher's last accounts are reagh, Sept. from Bautzen, with his advanced posts within a German mile of Dresden and his light troops are in communication with those of the Prince Royal."1 Lord Castle 21, 1813, MS. 72. treaties con land, Russia, Sept. 8, 9. The severe wound which Sir Charles Stewart received Fresh at the battle of Culm, already mentioned, confined him cluded be much against his will at Töplitz for some weeks after; but tween Eng he made good use of his time during this period of comand Prussia. pulsory cessation of active operations in the field, in the part which he took in conjunction with his able coadjutor, Lord Cathcart, in the diplomatic communications of the period, which were attended with the most important consequences. Lord Castlereagh was indefatigable in his endeavours to take advantage of the general concord and enthusiasm which the late successes in war had produced, to draw still closer the bonds of union between the Allied Powers. In these efforts he was strongly and ably supported both by Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart, who had seen too clearly how nearly the Coalition had been dissolved by the disaster at Dresden, not to be aware of the paramount importance of profiting by the present auspicious moment to improve its relations. By their united exertions, aided by Metternich and Hardenberg, |