CHAP.

X.

the first week of October. At length, therefore, and for the first time in the campaign, they had acquired a numerical 1813. superiority over the enemy in the field; they could bring from 290,000 to 300,000 to bear upon them, while they could be opposed only by 208,000.* Benningsen crossed the Elbe on the 25th and reached Töplitz on 2d and 3d October. The Allied troops, also, were in a far more favourable situation. Comfortably hutted or lodged in Prague, Töplitz, and the numerous towns and villages in the Bohemian plain, they were in a very different situation from the French, starving on the barren and frigid summits of the Boehmerwald. Their position enabled them to profit immensely by these advantages. An advance of a few miles from Töplitz towards the foot

* Statement of the Allied forces at the opening of the Leipsic campaign, as compared with what it had been at the opening of the Dresden campaign:—

Thus the Allied force was increased by 30,000, while the French was diminished by 148,000! This was chiefly owning to the astonishing efforts made by Prussia, which much increased the numerical strength of its corps, and the arrival of the Russian reserve, under Benningsen.-CATHCART, 270.

If 25,000 be added to Cathcart's estimate for his under-rating of the Austrian army in Bohemia, it will give the Allies about 350,000 men, of whom 290,000 would be available for operations beyond the Elbe.

X.

1813.

of the mountains was sufficient to bring back the Guards CHAP. and cuirassiers in breathless haste from the centre of Silesia to the summit of the Erzgebirge. Their wants, provided for by the wealth of England, and furnished by the rich agricultural plains in their rear, were amply supplied; rations were regularly served out to the men, and the necessity of providing for their daily wants by foraging and individual plunder, so fatal to military discipline, was unfelt. Above all, the general enthusiasm excited by the interesting cause in which they were engaged, and the glorious successes they had gained, preserved them from mental depression, and sent back such of the sick or 140; Bout. wounded as were not labouring under fatal ailments in 270. an incredibly short space into the ranks of war.'

1 Lond. 139,

88; Cath.

of opera

"The plan of the campaign," says Sir George Cath- 77. cart, "adopted by the Allies, had for its basis a general Allied plan concentration of all their armies on the main communica- tions against Napoleon. tion of Napoleon with France. This was the principle advocated by Moreau and others at the outset of the preceding campaign; and although it implied the abandonment, on the part of the Allies, of the main communication with the Russian territories, yet little was to be apprehended on that account; for the exhausted condition and national hostility of the countries to the east of the Elbe, and the important but precarious stake which Napoleon still held in those to the west, rendered the maintenance of a direct communication with his only proper base, the Rhine, an object of vital importance to him; while the Allies, having adopted the Bohemian frontier for their base, were in a great measure independent of the line of operations through Silesia, which they were about to abandon. To carry this plan into effect, it was agreed that the Army of the North, about 61,000 men, and General Blucher with that of Silesia, about 65,000, should cross the Elbe to the north of Dresden, and, acting in concert, move down upon the Saale at Halle or Merseburg; while the Grand Army, amounting

CHAP.

X.

1813.

*

to 120,000 men, should advance out of Bohemia by its left upon Lützen or Weissenfels. When the three armies. should be united near these points, in rear of the defiles caused by the rivers Pleisse, Elster, and Saale, they would be in complete command and possession of the enemy's communications, and thus united would amount to 246,000 men. Besides these, the troops left to defend the Bohemian passes and observe Dresden amounted to about 60,000 more, otherwise disposable according to circumstances. Thus operations were to commence on all sides with the month of October." "At the same time," says Sir Charles Stewart, "it was presumed that the favourable appearances from the side of Bavaria would shortly put in motion a combined force in the direction of Wurzburg, which 1 Cathcart, would still further threaten the enemy's communications, Lond. 141. and complete his embarrassments in every quarter of

271, 272;

78.

tion of the

Bernadotte,

sion of Sir Charles

Stewart to his headquarters.

Germany."

secure.

As the object of these operations was to envelop Dissatisfac- Napoleon by the three armies, and force him back to the Allies with Rhine, and he occupied a central position with 200,000 and conse men between them, they were attended with great hazard, quent mis and required for their successful prosecution the most entire concord and singleness of intention in all the Allied generals. In two, this great requisite was already Of the fidelity and vigour of Blucher, not a doubt could be entertained; the only danger was, that he would be too ardent in the common cause: Schwartzenberg, though more circumspect, was equally to be trusted ; and the presence of the sovereigns at his headquarters was the strongest security for the adoption of united measures. But with respect to Bernadotte, who was at the head of the great Army of the North, and whose cooperation was essential to the success of the joint operations, the case was very different. Grave suspicions had

* According to Wilson, who, from his official position as commissioner with the Austrian headquarters, is perhaps the best authority on the subject, the Allied Grand Army which marched on Leipsic numbered in all 179,000 men. -See WILSON, ii. 166.

СНАР.

X.

1813.

been awakened by his conduct, which the recent successes gained by the army under his command had nowise tended to dispel. Though he had repulsed the enemy at Gross Beeren, and defeated him at Dennewitz, yet on neither of these occasions had the victory been improved as it might have been. On both, the battle had been begun by the Prussian generals without his orders, and gained in effect before his arrival on the field. The system which he had adopted, on the eve of each, of having the Prussians in front, the Russians behind them, and the Swedes a day's march behind the Russians, not only exposed the troops first engaged to great hazard, but rendered the acquisition of decisive success in the end next to impossible. It was owing to these causes that the battle of Gross Beeren had been only a partial success in the centre, that of Dennewitz far less decisive than it might have been rendered. It was well known that in the close of the last of these battles, when the Russians and Swedes, preceded by 150 guns, advanced against the broken French centre, the enemy were thrown into a degree of confusion almost unparalleled in modern warfare, and that if the 9000 noble horse which the Prince Royal had under his orders had been let loose to charge, 10,000 additional prisoners would have been made. The immense advantage of having the centre routed and the two wings separated, had by no means been improved as it might have been; the broken and dispersed army was allowed to retire without molestation to the Elbe, while the victor remained inactive at Jüterbock, only a few miles from Stewart to the field of battle. These facts were well known at Lord Castlereagh, Oct. headquarters, and Sir Charles Stewart disclosed the 1, 1813, discoveries he had made as to his secret relations with i. 438-441; Bout. 68, the French Emperor, when professing the most ardent 69. zeal in the Allied cause.1* The result was that, with the

Sept. 10th.-"Yesterday evening General Stewart arrived. I was most happy to see him and to find that he had not been seduced by Bernadotte,

1 Sir Chas.

MS.; Richter

CHAP.

X.

1813.

79.

plan for the

of the campaign.

entire concurrence of the British Government, it was determined to send Sir Charles Stewart, who had now recovered of his wound, to the headquarters of the Prince Royal, to be a check upon the movements of the latter, and endeavour to bring him into cordial co-operation with the other Allied armies.

The intentions of the French Emperor were thus exNapoleon's plained in the 15th bulletin of the Grand Army: "The Femainder Emperor's intention was to pass the Elbe, to manœuvre upon the right bank, between Dresden and Hamburg, to threaten Potsdam and Berlin, and to assume Magdeburg for the centre of operations, which has been supplied with stores and provisions for that purpose." It is easy to see from this announcement that, notwithstanding all the misfortunes which he had undergone, the mind of the Emperor was by no means brought down to the level of his position; and that the only defensive war which he contemplated was an offensive one, which might strike terror into his enemies, and support the prestige of his name among the nations of Europe. His views, and the reasons on which they were founded, were thus unfolded to St Cyr, at a midnight conference on the 6th October. "I am going to leave Dresden," said he, "and I shall take the remains of Vandamme's and your corps along with me. I shall certainly be soon engaged in a decisive battle. If I am successful, it will be a matter of regret if I have not my whole force at my disposal to profit by it; if I experience a reverse, you will be of more use to me than you could if you were left here. Remaining in Dresden in such an event, you would be lost without resource. Besides, of what use is Dresden now to me? It can no longer be considered as the pivot of my army, which is unable to find subsistence in the whom he describes as a great fanfaron unworthy of trust, and one who desires general peace with France that he may renew the ancient relation with Sweden. Colonel Cooke, who had seen a great deal of him, tells me that he has said that if anything happens to Buonaparte the French people would select him or Moreau as their chief." "- WILSON's Diary, ii. 74.