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CHAP.

X.

1813.

exhausted country which surrounds it. As little can it be regarded as a grand depot; there remain in it only provisions for a few days: almost all the stores of ammunition and provisions it contains are exhausted, and what little remains must be speedily distributed among the soldiers. There are at Dresden 12,000 sick and wounded; but they will almost all die, as they are the remains of 60,000 who have entered the hospitals there since the campaign commenced. When winter sets in, the Elbe no longer affords a position: being frozen, it can be passed at any point. I am about to take up a new position which is everywhere defensible. I shall throw back my right as far as Erfurth, support my left by Magdeburg, and my centre by the heights forming the left bank of the Saale, which form a natural bulwark, capable at any time of arresting an enemy. Magdeburg will become to me another Dresden: it is a noble fortress, which can be left if necessary to its own resources, without the risk of its being carried, as Dresden might have been during the three days that the Allies were before its suburbs, if they had been commanded by a man of capacity. Dresden can never be made a strong place without destroying the vast suburbs which at present constitute the principal ornament of that beautiful capital. In addition to this, it would require to be re-stored with ammunition and provisions, and it is now impossible to introduce them. In fine, I desire to change my position. Dresden is too near Bohemia; no sooner have I left it, even upon the shortest expedition, than the enemy are before its walls, and I cannot prevent that by threatening their rear. By the more distant position which I propose to take, I shall be in a situation to direct great strokes against them, and compel them to conclude a durable peace." St Cyr expressed, as well he might, his entire concurrence in the masterly views so lucidly expressed, 1 St Cyr, iv. it would have been well for Napoleon if he himself had 186-188. not afterwards deviated from them.'

CHAPTER XI.

BATTLES OF LEIPSIC AND HANAU. OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 1813.

XI.

1813.

1.

First move

Allies.

Oct. 4.

CHAP. THE arrival of Benningsen's reserve, which began on the 1st of October, was the signal for the commencement of great operations. Eight thousand Prussians at the same time arrived at Töplitz, which increased the Russian and ments of the Prussian forces (without Benningsen's) to 75,000 effective men, in addition to the Austrians, who were now fully 60,000 more. Great difficulties, however, were experienced in arranging the direction of the three armies, from the jealousies of the Russian and Prussian generals, who positively refused to take orders from the Austrian commander-in-chief. They had hitherto acted separately, and done tolerably well, when at a distance, and each acting under the orders of his own sovereign; but it was more than doubtful if the same harmony would be preserved if they were brought into immediate and personal collision. It was resolved, therefore, to join the armies Cathcart, of Blucher and the Prince Royal, who would form toi. 147; Bout. gether a mass of nearly 150,000 combatants, and to v. 267-272. leave the united armies of Benningsen and Bohemia to advance on the other side into the plains of Leipsic.1

1 Lond. 142;

372; Plotho,

92; Marm.

2. Brilliant passage of

Blucher was the first in motion, and he executed the part assigned to him with equal vigour and success. the Elbe by Leaving a division opposite Dresden to restrain the incursions of its garrison, he marched on the 1st October with the remainder of his forces, about 65,000 strong,

Blucher.

Oct. 2.

XI.

1813.

towards the Elbe, which he reached on the night of the CHAP. 2d. Having deceived the enemy by a false demonstration by his advanced-guard under Sacken against Meissen as to the real point where the passage was to be attempted, he himself moved the bulk of his forces to the mouth of the Schwarze Elster, where the passage in good earnest was to be effected. Three bridges were thrown across with the utmost rapidity; and so admirable were the arrangements made, that by six next morning half the army was over, not only without opposition, but without the operation having even been discovered. Having effected the passage he attacked Bertrand, who had taken up a position barring the way at Wartenburg, a short distance from the river, with 14,000 men, and, after a hard combat, drove him back with the loss of 600 killed and wounded, and as many prisoners.* Headquarters were next day advanced to Düben. On the same day Bernadotte crossed the Elbe in two columns, the Russians at Ackow, the Swedes at Roslau, so that both armies were in communication on the left bank of the river with each other. On the day following Bulow Oct. 4. and Tauenzein were also crossed over, leaving 14,000 men only under Thumen to continue the blockade of Wittenberg. Ney, who had now only Reynier's weak corps, Chron. i. 12,000 strong, under his immediate command (that of 645, 646 Oudinot having been dissolved after Dennewitz), retreated Fain, ii. before forces so considerable, evacuated Dessau,' and after Lond. 141. summoning Bertrand's corps and Dombrowski's detached

As an instance of the extraordinary and almost inconceivable credulity or inaccuracy of M. Thiers as to numbers, especially of his enemies, in particular actions, though he is scrupulously correct as to the general numbers of the French engaged in a campaign, movements, places, and generals employed, the following account he has given of this combat may be taken. After mentioning the details of this affair, and admitting that the Allies gained the victory, and drove the French, after a long and glorious resistance on their part, from their position, he adds, "Toutefois nous n'eûmes pas plus de 500 hommes hors de combat, tandis que l'ennemi en eut cinq ou six mille!"— THIERS, xvi. 486. Blucher's loss in this affair was under 1000 men. battle, even their most serious defeats, and even in the battle of Leipsic itself, Thiers makes the loss of the Allies greater than that of the French.

In every

1 Die Grosse

Bout. 93,91;

363, 364;

CHAP. division to join his standard, withdrew by Bitterfield towards Leipsic.

XI.

1813.

Advance of

Army into

During these operations on the banks of the Elbe, the 3. Grand Army of Bohemia was emerging from the defiles the Grand of Bohemia into the Saxon plains. The movements are the plains thus described by Sir Charles Stewart: "Prince Maurice of Leipsic. of Lichtenstein was to march with 5000 Austrians on Gera to support Platoff, Thielman, and all the partisan corps, which communicated by a prodigious circle round the ground occupied by the enemy, so as to be in communication with the Prince Royal's army in the north. Klenau, with 25,000, was to move on Chemnitz; Kleist and Wittgenstein's corps, 30,000 strong, were directed on Marienberg; Giulay was moved on Zwickau; the 1st and 2d Austrian corps on Kommotau, and Barclay de Tolly, with the Russian headquarters, to Brux. Benningsen, with the reserve, which was much fatigued by its long march through Germany, remained at Töplitz. The effect of these movements was to bring 100,000 men in the first week of October into the Saxon plains, directly on the enemy's communications, whose movement on the flank was to be continued to Erfurth, where an attack on their magazines was to be attempted. A hundred and thirty thousand under Blucher and Bernadotte were in communication on the left bank of the Elbe, so that the French army, which could not muster more than Stewart to 200,000 combatants, who were daily melting away from reagh, Oct. the effects of fatigue and desertion, was environed on all 9, 1813, sides by superior forces, having their communications and retreat perfectly secure."

1 Sir Chas.

Lord Castle

MS.

4.

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During the ten days when the armies of the Allies were Napoleon's thus contracting the circle by which he was surrounded, Dresden. Napoleon remained inactive at Dresden. His prolonged stay there during so critical a period of his fortunes has been often ascribed to indecision; but this is a mistake. He was watching an opportunity before leaving it, of striking a blow against the first of his adversaries who might

CHAP.

XI.

1813.

commit a false movement. "I will not go out again,” said he to St Cyr, "I will wait." In pursuance of this plan he summoned up Augereau, who lay at Mayence with 15,000 newly raised conscripts, to Leipsic, and concentrated his army on all sides, to be ready for the conflict which was evidently approaching, but without attempting himself any offensive movement. He dissolved Macdonald's army, leaving that marshal with his own corps alone in front of Dresden. He sent Souham's corps, along with that of Marmont and Latour Maubourg's cavalry, to Meissen, a small town on the Elbe below Dresden, where they were at hand either to join himself or to succour Ney in case of a passage by the Allies of the lower course of that river. He withdrew Lauriston into the Saxon capital, and despatched Poniatowski to unite with Lefebvre Desnouette's cavalry, and cover, along with Victor, from the side of Bohemia, the great road from that xvi. 474. place to Leipsic.1

1 Thiers,

5.

plans at this

Napoleon, after he heard of the passage of the Elbe by Blucher and Bernadotte, entirely altered his plan of the Napoleon's campaign, and, instead of adopting the system which he period. himself had so clearly shown to St Cyr to be advantageous, of abandoning Dresden and taking St Cyr along with him to concentrate all his forces for a grand attack on some part of the circle of his enemies, he left that general with 30,000 men there, directing him to hold himself in readiness to retire at the shortest notice, but not to move till enjoined by him; while he himself marched to the northward to join Ney, who was retreating before the Prince Royal. To observe and keep in check the Allied Grand Army, which was fast issuing from the defiles of the Bohemian mountains, and moving by Marienberg and Chemnitz on Leipsic, he left Murat with 50,000 men, composed of the corps of Victor, Lauriston, and Poniatowski, near Freyberg, with orders to maintain his position there as long as possible, and, when he could do so no longer, to retire slowly towards Leipsic. Augereau's corps, coming

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