CHAP. XI. 1813. up from Mayence, was ordered to join him with Arrighi, which was in all 25,000 more. With the remainder of the army, consisting of the Guards and cuirassiers with the corps of Macdonald and Souham, he proceeded by Meissen and Wurtzen to join Ney's army, consisting of the remains of the corps of Bertrand, Oudinot, and Reynier, to whose support he had already pushed on Marmont from Meissen to Eilenberg. This united force formed a mass of 140,000 combatants, occupying a central position, and holding all the fortified passages over the Elbe; and as the united armies of the Prince Royal and Blucher, though equal in numerical amount, were very much scattered, and the fidelity of the former was more than doubtful, there was the fairest prospect of striking a decisive blow, driving the Allies over the lower Elbe beyond Berlin, and then returning by the right bank to 434; Thiers, Dresden, from whence he would debouch on the rear of 500. the Grand Army as it was threatening Leipsic and his 1 Fain, ii. 366, 367; Odel. ii. 207-211; Jom. iv. xvi. 489 6. advance against Blucher. * communications.1 In pursuance of this design, Napoleon, during the 9th Napoleon's and 10th, when his forces were converging towards Düben, issued orders for the temporary evacuation of the right bank of the Elbe, adding, "To carry off all the cattle, burn the woods, and destroy the fruit-trees." The rapidity with which the movement was conducted, however, prevented the literal execution of this barbarous Napoleon's instructions to Murat, who commanded the army of observation towards Chemnitz, were in these terms, and fully explained his views : "I have raised the siege of Wittenberg, and separated the corps of Sacken from those of Langeron and D'York. Augereau this evening will be at Lützen or Leipsic, and Arrighi has orders to join him; the two united will bring you a reinforcement of at least 30,000 men. One of two things will happen. Either I shall attack the enemy to-morrow and beat him, or if he retires, I shall burn the bridges over the Elbe. Then you must do what you can to maintain Leipsic in order to give me time to beat the Army of Silesia; but if you are compelled to abandon Leipsic, you must direct your course towards the Mulde. The bridges of Düben and Eisenberg are guarded. My intention is to move over to the right bank of the Elbe and manœuvre between Magdeburg and Dresden, debouching by one of my four fortified places on that river to surprise the enemy." - NAPOLEON to MURAT, October 10, 1813; JOMINI, iv. 435, 436. XI. 1813. order, and the swift approach of the light troops of the CHAP. Allies threw back the numerous swarms of stragglers whom the French left behind them. The losses sustained, however, by fatigue and desertion, especially among the German troops, were very severe, amounting, during the movement to Düben, to fully 20,000 men. Dresden was speedily invested, and above 12,000 men in the last stages of sickness and misery shut up in its hospitals, besides 30,000 good soldiers to defend the fortifications. Napoleon, having now united with Ney and Marmont, found himself at the head of 140,000 men, with whom he pressed vigorously forward in the hope of interposing between Bernadotte, who lay at Zörbig, and Blucher, who was marching across from the Elbe to join him, at right angles to the line pursued by the French Emperor. The French, pressing from Eilenberg, down both banks of the Mulde towards Düben, came right on the flank of the columns of the Silesian Army engaged in their cross march. At the approach of forces so great, Blucher hastily evacu- Oct. 10. ated Düben, which was immediately occupied by their advanced-guard, and succeeded, with the corps of Langeron and D'York, by a forced march, in reaching Zörbig late in the evening, where he formed a junction with Bernadotte. So near, however, was Napoleon's design of succeeding, that Sacken, on the evening of the same day, 1 Jom. iv. following on the traces of Blucher with his corps, ap- 436; Bout. proached Düben, when fully occupied by the French Fain, ii.369; troops, and only escaped by making a rapid circuit by 253-257. the village of Sokana.1 97, 98; Plotho, ii. site armies other. Although the advance of Napoleon between the two 7. armies, however, was not attended with the whole ad- The oppovantages which he anticipated, yet it brought the Allies mutually into very great danger, and fully demonstrated the pass each justice of the military principles on which it had been projected. On the day succeeding their junction, Blucher and Bernadotte had a conference; but although there was a constrained courtesy on both sides, yet there CHAP. XI. 1813. Oct. 11. was no cordiality, and little appearance of reciprocal confidence. The ardent, impetuous disposition of the Prussian field-marshal could not sympathise with the cautious, interested circumspection of the Prince Royal, whom the approach of the French Emperor had filled with consternation. It was evident from this meeting that little was to be hoped from joint operations conducted by independent commanders, actuated by such opposite feelings and motives of action.* Meanwhile the movements on both sides in opposite directions-the Allies towards the Saale, the French towards the Elbe-continued, and soon became so pronounced, that it was evident that a serious crisis. was approaching, and that in a few days a decisive battle would be fought, by which the fate of Europe would probably be decided. Both parties had mutually crossed their opponents, and each hoped that, by striking at the enemy's communications, he would draw back his troops and stop his advance. Blucher and Bernadotte, at Zörbig, were between Napoleon and the Rhine, while he at Düben was between them and the Elbe. Each army disregarding its own, lay in great strength upon its opponent's communications. This strange and bold movement continued on both sides without intermission during the whole of the 11th. The Prince Royal and Blucher, leaving Thumen with a small division before Wittenberg, and Tauenzein at Dessau, to guard the bridge there, instead of returning towards the Elbe, continued their advance to the south-west, and established themselves, Benningsen's report of the Crown Prince is consonant with what I have stated; but I learn from another quarter that the Crown Prince has declared he will not cross the Elbe, but look to operations that may secure him Norway. We shall rue ere the winter is over that gentleman's connection. Already he checks Prussian movements by the fear of his views, and thus more than nullifies to the general interests the forces under his command. His stanchest friends here now admit he is a fanfaron and egregious liar.""-WILSON'S Diary, ii. 153. "October 15.-I must not omit to note that the Crown Prince has had a battle-royal with the foreign generals and ministers about his person. He told them that he wanted no counsel, and would have no counsellors; but Blucher will not obey his orders to retreat."-Ibid., ii. 160. CHAP. XI. 1813. the latter at Halle, the former at Bernberg and Rothenburg, directly between Napoleon and the Rhine, and in such a situation that they could easily open a communication with the Grand Army advancing from Chemnitz and Kommotau. Napoleon, on his part, pushed forward Reynier to raise the siege of Wittenberg, Bertrand to destroy Blucher's bridge at Wartenburg, and Ney to Dessau, to get possession of the important bridge there. The former, with the aid of the garrison, speedily drove Thumen from before Wittenberg, and raised the siege of that place; while Tauenzein, in no condition to withstand the greatly superior forces of Ney, abandoned Dessau after breaking down the bridge there, and fell back by Zerbst towards Berlin. Napoleon was highly to St Cyr, elated with these advantages, particularly at seeing the 1813, St road to the Prussian capital open before him; and he Jom. iv.436; wrote to St Cyr that he had raised the siege of Witten- 190; Die berg, driven back the Silesian army, and was about to Grosse cross to the right bank of the Elbe with his whole forces, 555, 556. by which bank he would return to Dresden.1 * 1 Napoleon Oct. 11, Cyr; Vaud. i. Chron. i. duct of Ber which en This advance of the French Emperor towards the 8. Elbe, menacing Berlin, completely paralysed Bernadotte's Timid conoperations, and seriously endangered the army of Silesia. nadotte, Napoleon's plan was on the very point of proving suc- dangers cessful, and a great victory on the Elbe re-establishing Blucher. his affairs. Bernadotte, whose force, as Tauenzein was driven over to the right bank, did not exceed 55,000 men, of course could make no head singly against Napoleon, who had 130,000 in hand. His true policy in these circumstances would have been to have closed up with Blucher; and their united force, of nearly equal strength with the French, would have enabled him to combat them on equal terms, or, at all events, maintain "I have raised the siege of Wittenberg: the army of Silesia is in full retreat by the left bank: to-morrow I will compel it to receive battle, or abandon the bridges of Dessau and Wartenburg. I shall then probably pass over to the right bank; and it is by the right bank I shall return to Dresden." -NAPOLEON to ST CYR, 11th October 1813. VOL. II. G CHAP. XI. 1813. their ground till the Grand Army of Bohemia came up. Instead of this, he detached himself entirely from Blucher, who remained at Halle, and fell back after recrossing the Saale, which he had passed as far as Köthen, towards the Elbe. The effect of this diverging retrograde movement was to expose Blucher, who now stood alone. at Halle, cut off from the Elbe, to the blows of the French Emperor and very great danger. It may easily 1Thiers, xvi. be conceived that this retrograde movement of BernaLond. 161; dotte to Köthen, in presence of Napoleon, while he himVaud. i.197, self remained at Halle on the Saale, in pursuance of the general plan of operations, did not increase the confidence of Blucher in the royal ex-French Marshal.1 * 545-547; Bout. 150; 198; Cath cart, 189. 9. in conse quence, leaves St Cyr at Dresden. The success which in the first instance, however, attended Napoleon, this bold irruption of Napoleon towards the Berlin road and the communications of the armies of Silesia and the North, exercised a great and, as it proved in the end, fatal influence on his fortunes. By restoring his confidence in his star, and inducing the belief that he was on the eve of a decisive triumph, it led him to abandon the wise plan which, as already shown, he had previously formed of sacrificing all lesser objects for this great blow, and abandoning Dresden to accumulate his whole force between Wittenberg and Magdeburg. He never doubted now, that after routing and severing the Prince Royal and Blucher, and capturing Berlin with his left wing, he would return to Dresden in triumph by the right bank. He accordingly entirely changed his plans as to St Cyr, and, deeming it now no longer necessary to abandon Dresden, he sent that General positive orders to suspend the evacuation of that town, and of the camp at Pirna, * "Il semblait que l'une des deux armées du bas Elbe, celle de Bernadotte, avait repassé sur la rive droite de l'Elbe, et que l'autre au contraire, celle de Blucher, était restée sur la rive gauche, avec tendance à remonter vers Leipsic par derrière la Mulde. Les mouvements ordonnés la veille, particulièrement celui de Marmont, répondaient parfaitement à cette indication."-THIERS, Ivi. 514. Part only of Bernadotte's army-viz., Tauenzein's corps-had retreated across the Elbe; the bulk of it had only receded as far as Köthen, a day's march from Halle, where Blucher had his headquarters. |