mind your background and experience, I would appreciate your personal opinion. General MATHER. I think we should go a long way and consider very, very carefully before we do anything that would rupture the relationships with Brazil or any of these big countries. I don't know what you mean by how far. I would go a long way. I think it is so important to our national security that we should be prepared to, somehow or other, live with the excesses of which many of them are accused. [Security deletion.] Mr. FASCELL. What are the U.S. national security factors, General, which underlie that statement, and make it as important as you say it is? In your judgment, what are the underlying factors? Would they include, for example, the possibility of a Communist takeover in Brazil? General MATHER. Exactly. I can't conceive of another Cuba. Mr. FASCELL. The $64 question there is, what happens when a completely new set of circumstances comes into play? For example, in Chile, if an election were held and the Communists actually took over power? Or on a small island in the Caribbean, if through indigenous efforts, agitators, or otherwise, there was a Communist takeover? I don't see, and I am not asking you to comment on this, how the United States could have a direct military response to that event. General MATHER. I don't either, Mr. Chairman. I just hope that doesn't happen. As you know, our record of recovery of countries that have gone down the drain is practically nil. We haven't gotten any of them back once they have gone. This is what we have got to stop. Mr. FASCELL. What you are saying here is, that we, as a government, ought to take every action we can which would prevent such an occurrence. Particularly since we are limited in our capability to react? General MATHER. Yes, sir. EXAMPLE OF CUBA Mr. GROSS. Let's get back to Cuba. We spent a lot of money in Cuba. We did just about everything for Cuba that we have for a lot of other Caribbean, Latin American, South American countries. What happened? Where did the breakdown come in Cuba? Mr. FASCELL. I am glad you asked that question. I would like to venture an opinion on the record and then hear what the general has to say. First of all, we decided as a government to get rid of Mr. Batista, cut off his aid, and picked a leader who was in the mountains-and he was the wrong leader. Mr. GROSS. That to me, though, is an oversimplification. We go into these countries, give them military help, buy their coffee, pay premium prices for that and other products. But what assurance do we have that, as with Cuba, it is not going to fall apart in our faces? General MATHER. The only way I can answer that, sir, is that we have not lost any more to date. There has only been one Cuba. That was a rich learning experience. Mr. GROSS. Of course, the other side of that coin is the people may live perhaps better than they did before, but still in bondage. The Russians are living better than they did under the czars, but they are still enslaved. I do not think there is any simple answer to that. I do not think a military dictatorship or any other kind of a dictatorship and it has to be military to be sustained-is the real answer. Mr. FASCELL. I do not think either one of us was suggesting that. I think the general can speak for himself. But I certainly was not. Mr. GROSS. I do not mean to attribute a position to either of you gentlemen, not at all. Mr. FASCELL. I will agree with you, however, that there is no simple answer. Mr. Roybal, do you have any further questions? Mr. ROYBAL. No. Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Gross? Mr. GROSS. No. Thank you. Mr. FASCELL. Gentlemen, thank you very much; you have made a very, very important, and useful contribution. General LEBER. We appreciate being here, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FASCELL. The meeting is adjourned. (Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.) CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN MONDAY, JULY 13, 1970 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C. The Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs met in executive session at 10 a.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. FASCELL. The Subcommittee will please come to order. We meet this morning to continue our hearings on Cuba and the Caribbean. We are happy to welcome two distinguished witnesses, the Honorable G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs; and Admiral E. P. Holmes, Commander in Chief, Atlantic. We have invited you gentlemen to discuss with us the security situation in the Caribbean as it relates to your respective responsibilities. During our earlier hearings, we heard testimony about the recent intrusions of Soviet naval and air power into the Caribbean. The visits of Soviet naval combatants, including a nuclear-powered submarine; Soviet air reconnaissance flights over the area; and Marshal Greshko's visit to Havana, as well as certain other developments, suggest that the Soviet Union is moving on several fronts to establish its military presence in this Hemisphere. This concerns us greatly. We have seen what happened in the Mediterranean and what is happening in the Indian Ocean. In both areas the Soviets have challenged our naval power. They have complicated our task of advancing our foreign policy objectives in those regions. Soviet military intrusion into the Caribbean introduces a new factor into our foreign policy equation. For the first time Soviet missilecapable units are moving around in an area which is geographically close to our national boundaries and in which we and many other countries have important interests. Not the least of these is the Panama Canal. Last week some observers suggested that the United States greatly underestimated Soviet intentions with respect to the Middle East. The inference was that the United States did not expect the Soviets to station their military pilots in Egypt, and that when that happened the Middle East crisis worsened. I hope that we do not underestimate the Soviet intentions in the Caribbean. I believe it is imperative that we take a very close look at the situation now and how it may be affected by the presence of Soviet naval power or other military power. That is what we are interested in, gentlemen. We are anxious to hear from you in that context. Mr. Secretary. (A biographical sketch of Secretary Nutter follows:) HON. G. WARREN NUTTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) G. Warren Nutter took office as Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) on March 4, 1969. Born in Topeka, Kansas in 1923, he was educated at the University of Chicago, where he received his A.B. degree in 1944, an A.M. in 1948 and a Ph.D. in 1949. He served in the European Theater during World War II as an enlisted man and later was commissioned as a First Lieutenant in the Army Reserve. His decorations include the Bronze Star, the Combat Infantryman's Badge and three battle stars. Prior to coming to the Defense Department Mr. Nutter was Paul Goodloe McIntire Professor of Economics, Chairman of the Department of Economics, and Director of the Thomas Jefferson Center at the University of Virginia. Before going to the University in 1957, he was on the faculties of Lawrence College and Yale University. During the Korean War. Mr. Nutter served with the Central Intelligence Agency. From 1954 through 1967 he was a member of the research staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research and director of its lengthy Study of Soviet Economic Growth. In the latter capacity, he supervised preparation of several scholarly monographs including his own Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet Union (1962). During four years prior to his present appointment he was active in a number of international conference bringing together economists from the West and Eastern Europe. Together with The Philadelphia Inquirer he received the Gavel Award for distinguished journalism from the American Bar Association in 1968, for his series of articles contrasting the legal, political and social institutions of the United States and the Soviet Union, now published as The Strange World of Ivan Ivanov. He is also the author of four books, two translations of books and contributor of many articles to scholarly journals. His home is in Charlottesville, Va. STATEMENT OF HON. G. WARREN NUTTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS Mr. NUTTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My statement will be a little broader than this specific issue but I will be very pleased to focus on this later in questions and I will have something to say about it. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to be with you this morning to discuss our security posture in the Caribbean. The Caribbean basin has always been of special interest to U.S. security. It is, in effect, our "third border." Although the public focus has been mostly on other areas of the world in recent years. I want to assure the committee that we have been keeping a very careful watch on the situation in the Caribbean. The security threat in the Caribbean can be divided into three elements the internal threat to the security of the Caribbean governments, the threat from Cuba, and the threat stemming from Soviet military activities in the area. I will discuss each of these briefly in turn. INTERNAL SECURITY Active insurgency in the Caribbean area is, in general, under control by the security forces of the local governments, though some countries still require modest U.S. military assistance, primarily training, to develop and maintain adequate security capabilities. [Security deletion.] Although active insurgency is at a very low level, the potential for serious danger remains. Unresolved economic and social problems, the fragility of many of the political institutions, and the presence almost everywhere of Cuban-trained insurgent cadres keep the threat of violence alive. [Security deletion.] "BLACK POWER" MOVEMENT A new challenge in the English-speaking areas has arisen from the so-called Black Power movement. There is increasing awareness among the black extremists in these countries that there are fertile conditions for exploitation. Unsettled social conditions in most of the area offer many openings for extremists to exploit. There are widespread poverty, high levels of unemployment, concentration of wealth in foreign or nonblack hands, and racial tensions, not only between blacks and whites but also between blacks and East Indians and others. [Security deletion.] There is a definite potential for the development of a regional movement, and there are some initiatives in that direction, including a second black power conference that is being planned for later this year. The influence of black radicalism will probably spread. Its ideas have considerable impact, especially on youth. Its main deficiencies seem to be lack of leadership, poor organization, and shortage of funds. Some of the leaders may resort to violence in exploiting periods of unrest or turmoil, and virtually any country is vulnerable to sudden outbreaks. But the recent events in Trinidad may have given the Caribbean people a new awareness of the underlying problems and a sense of urgency toward solving them. THREAT FROM CUBA Cuba presents a potential double threat to United States and Caribbean security-the physical threat to United States or other national territory from strategic weapons which Cuba might obtain, and Castro's support for subversion and insurgency throughout the area. We do not perceive a direct threat to the U.S. mainland at this time. Contrary to numerous recent news reports, we have discovered no evidence that strategic missiles have been reintroduced into Cuba or that Cuba has missiles that could be fired from Cuba and hit our mainland. Cuba has long had defensive missiles, and the Soviets have recently replaced some of them. These defensive missiles include surfaceto-air, air-to-air, and short-range surface-to-surface types. [Security deletion] possibility that cannot be discounted as long as Castro's hostility to the United States persists. Evidence of such a development would immediately be brought to the attention of the highest levels of government. In spite of a repeated lack of success, Castro maintains his basic policy of supporting and encouraging subversion and revolution throughout Latin America. He explicitly reaffirmed this support in his speech of April 22, stating that "Cuba has never nor will it ever deny support to a revolutionary movement" and that "revolutionaries willing to struggle, to fight, to die will always be able to count on |