Admiral HOLMES. Yes, sir. Mr. FASCELL. Is that the way it reads? Mr. FASCELL. Further instructions would also have been necessary to go in and evacuate people or to move in closer? Admiral HOLMES. Yes. Mr. FASCELL. In other words, your primary order, then, was to go up to 50 miles and hold until you heard some more? Admiral HOLMES. And be prepared for whatever might happen. Mr. FASCELL. Be prepared for anything. Mr. Fulton. Mr. FULTON. I want to give a compliment on the handling of the Trinidad situation, because it was well and carefully handled, with good judgment by both the military and our U.S. Ambassador, Fife Symington. I thought it was a series of decisions which averted a possible blowup or involvement which could have caused us not only embarrassment, but quite a loss of life. I think between the military and the Ambassador and the State Department, it was worked out well. CONTACT WITH U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS Admiral HOLMES. I might mention one little thing about this. It is a small item, but it has proven to be rather substantial. [Security deletion.] In our relationships with the Ambassadors down there, we talk to each other just to understand each other. This business of being able to [security deletion] I think is rather significant-small. granted, but important. Mr. FASCELL. It is an important capability, I agree. Admiral HOLMES. If we are authorized to do something, whatever it may be, to evacuate or come in, or whatever, he can then [security deletion] keep him apprised of the situation and of the availability of aircraft, helicopters, ships, troops, or whatever is necessary. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, in light of the increasing sensitivity of the problem in this area, politically as well as militarily, are we now working through the OAS, at least preliminarily, to see if we can evolve some kind of a crisis response mechanism? I am thinking primarily of an occasion when the United States may find it unwise for any reason, to respond militarily to a given problem in the Caribbean. It seems to me it would be extremely useful to have some kind of a crisis response mechanism agreed to within the OAS. Mr. NUTTER. I think that is correct, Mr. Chairman. I would hope these matters are being discussed in that forum. Mr. FASCELL. You are saying now you do not know? Mr. NUTTER. I do not know. Mr. FASCELL. I guess we all had better find out Mr. NUTTER. Yes, sir. Mr. FASCELL.-because if we are to do something before the fact, and not be compelled to send in a whole task force, we ought to have this option. At any rate, at your level there has been no action? Mr. NUTTER. There is, of course, constant discussion in that forum of the problems connected with Cuba. There is, I think, a common understanding [security deletion]. As to whether or not they have gotten into possible contingency developments, I really cannot give you information. [Security deletion.] U.S. POLICY REVIEW Mr. FASCELL. Earlier, we received testimony that the State Departnent has just completed a rather extensive review of the whole Cuba policy with other Latin Governments. Was DOD brought in at any point in the course of that review? Mr. NUTTER. I am not familiar with an exercise of that sort that we have gone through with other countries of Latin America. [Security deletion.] Mr. FASCELL. The DOD input would be at that level? CUBAN STRIKE CAPABILITY Mr. KAZEN. Has Cuba any strike capability? Mr. NUTTER. They have MIG aircraft. The missile capability is essentially defensive. They do not have long-range missiles installed on Cuba that we have been able to identify. They do have, of course, MIG aircraft with a range that the admiral could better discuss than I. Mr. KAZEN. I ask this question because we keep hearing about how much aid Russia is giving them. Where are they putting this aid? Admiral HOLMES. Another thing they are furnishing, aside from the MIG aircraft, is the KOMAR missile boats. They have [security deletion] of those which carry their relatively short-range missiles, but it was one of this type of boat that sank the Israeli destroyer in the Mediterranean. They have [security deletion] of these. Mr. FASCELL. When were they first introduced into the Caribbean? How long have they been there? Admiral HOLMES. They have been there 4 or 5 years. I think the last was delivered in 1967. It is a relatively short-range missile, but a capable system has been demonstrated. Mr. KAZEN. What do you mean by relatively short-range? Admiral HOLMES. I think 30 or 35 miles. It is the STYX-type missile, so-called. Mr. KAZEN. How many aircraft, and what type, do they have? Admiral HOLMES. [Security deletion.] Mr. FASCELL. You may supply the exact figure for the record. Is that all right, Mr. Kazen? Mr. KAZEN. Yes. Mr. FASCELL. We would like to have some estimate. (The information requested is retained in the committee's file) Mr. KAZEN. I want to make sure that we know what Castro has. Admiral HOLMES. He has the MIG aircraft. They are relatively short-range. They are defensive aircraft. They have very little strike capability, although, as you know, one flew into the United States not long ago. He has a total naval strength of something on the order of [security deletion] vessels. [Security deletion] of these are the 47-893-70-9 KOMAR missile boats. Then he has some Kronstadt patrol-type boats which used to appear periodically off Havana. Then others are small PCE-type patrol craft. I think he has [security deletion] small amphibious LSM-type craft. Mr. KAZEN. Does he keep them pretty close to shore, or do they wander out in the Caribbean? Admiral HOLMES. They stay pretty close to shore, although some MIG's came out toward Florida within the past 6 months and intercepted a small private plane. As soon as they crossed into the Air Defense identification zone which is operated from southern Florida, they penetrated a little bit and they turned around and went back. It was really not a harassment. They do not get out very far. Mr. KAZEN. Do we know of every flight they make outside of the mainland? Are they under surveillance at all times? Admiral HOLMES. For the most part. If they are at any altitude, we get them from our installations in southern Florida at Key West, under the Joint Air Reconnaissance Control Center which is at Key West-which, incidentally, is an important function that is discharged down there under my command. If they get up at altitude so the radar can pick them up, we get them. It is only 90 miles down to Havana. They do not have to get too high. We are usually informed of any sorties moving around any great distances of any of their naval units. We are pretty well informed of these. Mr. KAZEN. Do we have any radar or detection capability from Guantanamo? Admiral HOLMES. Yes. Mr. KAZEN. Would they know about it before our Florida station? Admiral HOLMES. Yes, they would know about it earlier. FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION Mr. FULTON. I was on active duty as a Navy reservist at Guantanamo, and I was very much interested at the time in Cuba. I also have been over at Roosevelt Roads on another occasion of Reserve duty. The question comes up, how close is the reporting of information that is of intelligence value on the military developments to the U.S. executive department. Through what channels does intelligence have to flow? At the time of the buildup of the Cuban missile crisis, I was one of those who took the House floor from time to time over a period of a few weeks, saying that missiles were going into Cuba before there was any acknowledgement by the executive department. As a matter of fact, I had been down on Navy Reserve duty at the debriefing of our U.S. Navy flyers doing shore patrol. These debriefings specifically covered missiles and U.S.S.R. ships making deliveries in large quantities to Cuba. It was simply amazing that we in Congress then a few weeks later were called into very secret session, and we were told the Executive had just found out that missiles were going into Cuba, when at the level of operations at least of the Navy, that was well known ahead of time. You were saying that it is a quick function of intelligence on military reporting for policymaking decision in the Cuban area. Is that the case? Through what channels does it have to go? In that case, I just could not understand it. I was a good friend of the President when this thing came up. It did not seem possible that he had not known about it, too. Admiral HOLMES. I will tell you how it works as of today. In the case of air activity, we know about this in Key West. Mr. FULTON. To whom do intelligence reports go? Admiral HOLMES. It goes to the Joint Air Reconnaissance Control Center, and immediately goes into my Joint Reconnaissance Center in Norfolk, and goes immediately to the National Military Command Center here in the Pentagon. This is very direct. Then in addition, there are maritime surveillance flights that are out over the ocean, and we keep track of their merchant shipping in and out. Incidentally, this shipping is significant in Havana, for example. As between ships in port and en route, there are usually about two ships in port for one en route. The figures run between 47 in port today to about 4 weeks ago there were 75 in port, with about 35 en route. Today there are 47 in port with about 18 en route. We keep track of these things. This information comes into my headquarters, a place called the indications center, which has direct communications into Washington with this information. It makes logic, I think you would agree, to establish this kind of reporting system. It is essential. Whether it was buffed up and tightened up after that other situation, I cannot say. I know it is one of the things when I took this job I looked at very soon, and followed it very closely. When I get a report in the middle of the night, or whenever, that something has occurred, my first question is, "Does Washington know?" I always get the answer, "Yes." ROUTE OF SOVIET VESSELS Mr. KAZEN. What route do their ships take to go to Havana? Admiral HOLMES. They go through the Florida Straits south of Key West and right straight in. Mr. KAZEN. Where do they come from? Mr. FASCELL. Show us on the map right behind you, will you please, Admiral Holmes? |