TABLE 2.-CUBAN REFUGEE AIRLIFT ARRIVALS, PERCENT DISTRIBUTION BY OCCUPATION AND YEAR OF

TABLE 3.-CUBAN REFUGEE AIRLIFT ARRIVALS: PERCENT DISTRIBUTION BY AGE AND YEAR OF ARRIVAL

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, what is the last public statement by the Premier of Cuba with respect to his foreign policy intentions? Mr. HURWITCH. The last and most important one, Mr. Chairman, was the statement made on April 22 of this year, on the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth. This was a significant foreign policy statement from a variety of points of view.

It seemed to most observers, including myself, that with this speech Fidel Castro gave up any public semblance of being independent of the Soviet Union. Many of us have felt for a long time that he was really more or less the lackey of Soviet communism. This public admission culminated a movement which started in 1968, when Castro, after some initial resistance, agreed that the Soviet takeover in Czechoslovakia was a warranted activity and one which he endorsed. The attitude of Cuba from that point on has been one of gradual but perceptible accommodation and close relations with the Soviet Union.

With respect to the relationship of Cuba to the hemisphere, it is also equally evident that Castro in his speech had not abandoned his self-imposed role as the "liberator of the masses of the Latin-American peoples." His self-styled importance is one which he still clings to. However, it is also clear that the Soviet Union in the hemisphere

has adopted a policy of, if you like, "legitimacy" in the sense of having established very carefully a series of diplomatic relationships with a number of the countries of the hemisphere. There had been previously a great deal of friction, according to our information, between the Soviets and Fidel Castro as to the best way to bring about communism in the hemisphere.

The April 22 speech in many ways represented an admission, or capitulation if you like, on the part of Fidel Castro that his Russian masters have the upper hand, and while he himself has not abandoned his pretensions for subversion in the Latin American countries it will probably be done in the future on a more selective basis than had been the rather widespread and helter-skelter activities of Cuban subversion in the past.

I think those are the main points of significance of that speech, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. It is fair to say, then, Mr. Secretary, that because the United States considered that a significant statement, our present posture toward Cuba is predicated to a large extent on our analysis of that statement?

Mr. HURWITCH. I would say, Mr. Chairman, that the history of our relations with Cuba, which, as you so correctly referred to in your opening statement, goes back now to more than a decade, that is our relations with Castro Cuba, is one which has a long history and foundation, and while one speech is important I would hesitate to agree that our entire policy or much of our policy today has been greatly influenced by one speech.

As I indicated, our assessment of that speech was in many ways a confirmation of much of our political analysis which had been going on for quite a while.

Mr. FASCELL. It was just a factor, although it might be an important factor, in assessing what U.S. policy was and is, and what Cuba's policy was or is.

Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.

LATIN AMERICA'S POLICY TOWARD CUBA

Mr. FASCELL. Has there been any noticeable change in other LatinAmerican countries' policies toward Cuba since the April 22 speech? I have in mind specifically the initiatives which were made at the Caracas conference of the IA-ECOSOC, by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, and statements which appeared recently at the meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States now being held in Washington and winding up today at noon?

Mr. HURWITCH. Mr. Chairman, our own review of the Cuban situation was hastened as a result of particularly the meeting that took place in Caracas of the IA-ECOSOC in February, which you referred to, and because of some indications that we had received even in January, that some Latin American countries were reportedly reviewing their own policies with regard to Castro Cuba with a view toward seeing whether or not some means of communication or some accommodation with the situation that Cuba represented should not take place.

There were at that time rumors that the United States itself was undertaking not only such a review of policy but had itself deter

mined that the situation in Cuba was such that we ourselves should change our policy.

The results of our review of policy were those I stated to you in my opening remark-we found no real change in Cuba's attitude both from the standpoint of exporting revolution and with respect to its military ties with the Soviet Union.

We communicated through our ambassadors to all the countries of the hemisphere, in rather great detail to the foreign offices concerned, the basis of our review and analysis and the conclusions to which we had come. With, I must say, remarkably few exceptions, and I will expound on my observation about "remarkably" in a moment, the Latin American countries (whose opinion we did not ask as to whether or not they agreed with our position, but stated that this was merely a means of clarifying our position to them) responded with, as I say, near unanimity that they agreed, that they were glad to have this clarification of American policy, and that they themselves agreed with it from the standpoint of their own national self interest.

I say "remarkably" because, as I indicated earlier, there was a number of rumors and pieces of intelligence which were coming into the Department of State which had indicated there was a sort of rending of the fabric of inter-American unanimity with regard to Cuba. I must say I, for one, was personally prepared to receive replies from our ambassadors after speaking with the foreign ministers concerned that there were considerably more tears in the fabric than what indeed proved to be the case.

I would prefer in public session not to go into a specific listing of the countries one way or the other except to indicate that, for example, as you have known, and it is public knowledge, Chile, particularly the Foreign Minister of Chile, Mr. Valdez, has been particularly interested in seeing whether or not some new relationship with Cuba could be achieved.

Trinidad, as you rightly point out, Mr. Chairman, was also interested. The countries in the Caribbean have a special geography and a special history, particularly the newly formed black republic of the Caribbean. They have special histories which must be taken

into account.

With these exceptions at that time, as I say, there was near unanimity of feeling that the policies which were adopted by the OAS continued to be the correct policies with regard to Cuba.

Mr. FASCELL. Of course, Mexico and Jamaica still recognize Cuba diplomatically.

Mr. HURWITCH. Jamaica maintains relations at the consulor level and Mexico which takes very great pride in its independence almost as a matter of vital national interest, has full diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Mr. FASCELL. So there was no change in the policies of those two countries?

Mr. HURWITCH. No.

U.S. POLICY REVIEW

Mr. FASCELL. None noted in this last review. This last review, which was hemispheric, was completed when-just recently?

Mr. HURWITCH. That was completed in March, March is when we tabulated the result.

Subsequent to that there has been, as you are aware, the unfortunate disaster in Peru where all the countries of the hemisphere came as a family to the assistance of one of its members in trouble. The United States, as you know, has come forward both from a governmental standpoint and the private standpoint to alleviate the suffering of the Peruvian people caused by that disaster.

Cuba also has come to the assistance of the Peruvian people.

The Peruvian Foreign Minister in the OAS meeting you recently referred to and which is still going on did take that occasion to thank publicly all of the members of the "American" family that came to the rescue or to the assistance of one of its suffering members, and he also made a particular point of acknowledging Cuban assistance and spoke of the hope that some dialog or some communication might be established with Cuba.

I would say that it is important to understand that the Latin American people who are such a warm people, who have such a strong feeling of family, of blood if you like, that it is not at all surprising that despite the political events in Cuba that they should continue to feel a great attachment for the Cuban people as people, and that they do seek ways and express hopes that some day it will be possible to reunite the American family and include Cuba.

Let me say that the United States shares that view. We also feel very strongly about the traditions of this hemisphere and about the agreements which have been painstakingly established throughout the decades to bring about a machinery, called the Organization of American States, as well as such basic agreements as the Rio Agreement of 1947 providing for members coming to the defense of another, and about all this fabric of "closeness" which has been woven together over the decades. This spirit is something we would like to see continued and we will lend every effort to assist.

THE OAS AND CUBA

Within the inter-American system, of course, we reserve a place for Cuba, under other political circumstances.

Mr. FASCELL. What you are saying is that as of now Castro has effectively closed the door to that opportunity?

Mr. HURWITCH. I would agree with you, not only "effectively" but publicly. The nicest term he uses is "garbage heap" when he alludes to the OAS, so that the inter-American means of peacefully resolving problems among ourselves, in which the peoples of Latin America and the peoples of the United States participate and admire as means of resolving problems without having to resort to violence, this is the phenomenon we are proud of collectively and this has been, as I say, characterized by Mr. Castro as a "garbage heap." He has no interest in joining.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Whalley?

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I find your statement very, very interesting and very complete. You say you have moved 379,000 refugees into the country. What would be the number of adult working people? It is about onethird or about 125,000 people?

Mr. PALMATIER. I think it would be close to that. It might be slightly in excess of that figure.

COST OF CUBAN REFUGEE PROGRAM

Mr. WHALLEY. Would you have any idea of the entire cost of the program over the 10-year period to the United States?

Mr. PALMATIER. Yes. We will have expended through the end of fiscal year 1970 about $471 million on the Cuban refugee program. Mr. WHALLEY. Over the 10-year period?

Mr. PALMATIER. Yes.

SOVIET AID TO CUBA

Mr. WHALLEY. They used to state that Russia was spending about $1 million a day for the part it was playing in Cuba. Do you think that cost is still there or has Cuba been able to supply sugar to cut that cost? Mr. PALMATIER. I would have to defer to the Department of State. Mr. HURWITCH. The estimate we now have is a figure of $1.4 million per day; therefore, rather than decreasing, the cost to the U.S.S.R. has gone up. I think Castro, and this was in his speech of April 22, alluded to the fact that the grant military assistance that Cuba had received from the Soviet Union totaled, since the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union was established, totaled $1.4 billion. In addition we estimate that Cuba has received $3.2 billion in economic assistance from the Soviet Union.

Mr. WHALLEY. Russia still must feel that it is a good investment just to have a location in the hemisphere and in this part of the world.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CUBAN REFUGEES

You say that 17 percent of the people are not working. Have you had any problem with troublemakers or are they all seemingly good citizens? Have any been returned to Cuba or are you permitted to return them?

Mr. PALMATIER. The overwhelming number of Cuban refugees in the United States, Mr. Congressman, have an excellent record. All of us working with them-we in the Federal Government, those at the State level, and in particular, the church groups helping to get them started in the United States-are constantly amazed at the tremendous desire of the Cubans to become good citizens, to become contributing members of the society as rapidly as they can. For instance, you mentioned the percentage on welfare. I think it is interesting that about 85 percent of those in Miami, who seek and are found on investigation to require welfare are 60 years of age and above, as an example.

Of course, the largest concentration is in Miami, Fla. About half of the Cubans in the United States are there. We are in constant contact with officials there, including the local and Federal law-enforcement agencies. The crime rate among the Cubans is remarkably low. I think there are bad apples in every barrel, but the crime rate of the Cubans in Miami would be an extremely low statistic, for instance.

Mr. WHALLEY. What percentage of the 379,000 refugees would still be in Florida?