At the United Nations in New York, here in Washington, the South American League, it is essential and necessary that they strike a pose for their Latin brothers. But, believe me, they will not break down and cry, none of them. None of them. And I hold no brief for many of the governments to whom I have spoken in the last 25 years, believe me, about fait accompli.

Our position must be very careful, so that out of an abundance of caution, and trying to do good, we don't do bad as well. We should insist that the people must speak for themselves, the people must be free, the people must create their own governments, and so on and so on, about now. This is the subject that I would like to discuss with you, because you are for the authority, but not in this resolution. That is no cause for alarm here.

Mr. BINGHAM. But when you say that these people with whom you have spoken indicate they have to make certain noises in opposition, doesn't that suggest to you that they make those noises because the public in the Latin American countries feels very aggrieved about the continuing position of the United States in the Panama Canal Zone? Mr. FLOOD. No, oh, no.

Mr. BINGHAM. It does to me, frankly.

Mr. FLOOD. Well, it doesn't to me, frankly.

Mr. BINGHAM. What did you mean, then, that they had to make certain noises about?

Mr. FLOOD. It means they must make certain noises because they are aware that their people are aggrieved about certain things. But in Brazil, in Argentina, in Peru, in Paraguay, the last thing in the world that they are thinking of is the Panama Canal. They couldn't care less.

Mr. BINGHAM. I am puzzled by your statement-and perhaps you went into this before-that the surrender by the United States of the Canal Zone and Canal would inevitably result in a Communist takeover of Panama, as occurred in Cuba, which would include the canal itself.

Mr. FLOOD. We developed this at some length before you were here. Mr. BINGHAM. Well, then, I am sorry. I don't want to pursue it, if it has been covered.

Mr. FLOOD. Well, perhaps

Mr. BINGHAM. No, I don't want to duplicate anything.

Mr. FLOOD. I understand. We can go over it.

Mr. FASCELL. We are going to have to go to the floor of the House and vote.

Are there any other questions?

If not, I want to thank you, Mr. Flood. We appreciate your coming here, making your statement, answering all of our questions, and helping this subcommittee in its study of the question of the security of the Caribbean and the Panama Canal.

Mr. FLOOD. Thank you. I am glad you permitted me or asked me to come. And I urge that I be invited again, because, frankly, I smell something in the offing.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, the record of the hearings will remain open for the acceptance of additional statements from our colleagues in the House.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.)

(The following statement was subsequently received:)

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE DURWARD G. HALL ON THE PANAMA CANAL

Mr. Chairman, it appears that this Nation has become "obsessed" with the idea of giving up control of the Panama Canal. It is my considered judgment that such action, if accomplished would contribute greatly toward smoothing the roadbed over which the juggernaught of international communism would travel.

We have given away the island Iwo Jima and plan same for Okinawa-our hard won and most strategic base in the Pacific.

We have given away Wheelus Air Force Base, undoubtably its tarmac will soon become a favored resting place for aircraft bearing the hammer and sickle. Now comes the news that the President has appointed Mr. Daniel W. Hofgren, a man whose credentials as a negotiator are at best suspect, to be a special representative of the United States for the Interoceanic Canal Negotiations, with the rank of ambassador.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is time that the Congress makes it perfectly clear that this Nation has no need for a negotiator. The Congress should make perfectly clear, once and for all: We are there, we intend to remain there, and, in the language of today, the sovereignty of and Panama Canal itself—is unnegotiable. It's time we made crystal clear that this involves U.S. territory, and hence is a constitution prerogative of the House and entire Congress.

I have joined with my colleagues from Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Ohio in introducing legislation that would arm the President with the sentiment of the House of Representatives and that of the American people in any future negotiations with the Government of Panama over the status of the Canal Zone.

It is essential that this be done so that a re-occurrence of the abortive proposed 1967 treaty does not come back to haunt us. As many may remember this proposed 1967 treaty contained provisions that ceded additional rights of the Canal Zone to Panama, gave Panama joint administration, increased our annual payments to Panama, raised tolls, and forced the United States to share its defense and police powers with Panama. When the text of this treaty was published there was a hue and cry throughout the United States opposing its provisions. At that time about 150 Members of Congress introduced or co-sponsored resolutions expressing the sense of the House that it was the desire of the American people that the United States maintain its sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Canal Zone. The same language exists in the resolution we are introducing today. Public indignation ran so high that the 1967 draft treaty was never sent to the other body for ratification. I ask that those hearings be made a part of this hearing record!

Mr. Chairman, it is now over two years later. Much has transpired. A military junta is now ruling Panama. A new administration has taken over the reins here in Washington. On the other hand, much has remained the same. Castro is still preaching and exporting revolution in Latin America. American property is still being ex-appropriated "south of the border." Many people both here and abroad call for the surrender of American bases and rights throughout the world. The Panamanian Government is aware of this and is now willing to make another attempt to negotiate a new treaty. They know that they have nothing to lose, and everything to gain. They no doubt feel that if they obtain concessions from us as they did in the negotiations for the 1967 treaty, they can obtain them again in any new round of negotiations.

I am also confident that the citizenry of this country know and comprehend the strategic importance of the Canal Zone. As a Member of the House Committee on Armed Services I was particularly concerned about the possible effect of the 1967 treaty on both the subjects of national security and hemispheric defense. The importance of the Canal Zone as a bastion on our "southern flank" cannot be overrated. Without our control of the Canal Zone the possibility of a potentially hostile regime in Panama denying access of the transferring of our naval forces from ocean to ocean ever grows. The loss of this access could destroy a link in our defense chain and could produce a disaster. It is particularly inappropriate in this time of contingency expectancy around the world.

Mr. Speaker, intertwined with the aspect of national security, is the equally important area of hemisphere defense. The Canal Zone under our control and

jurisdiction serves as an outpost thwarting the perverted ambitions of Castro, Moscow and Peking. Our presence serves as a constant reminder of our determination to stop subversion in Latin America. I ask, would Panamanian control of the canal serve a like purpose? I think the answer is obvious.

Besides military considerations, the commercial considerations must also be examined. A Communist or hostile government could completely close the canal to United States shipping. Over sixty-five percent of all United States shipping passing through the canal annually either originates or terminates in United States ports. The added shipping costs, as well as the curtailment of shipping would be astronomical in the event this facility was denied our use.

Besides paying the price for increased shipping costs, the United States taxpayer could possibly be forced to surrender his aggregate investment of over $5,000,000,000 which would constitute the biggest single "give-away" in recorded history. I cannot envision the American people wishing to write off this huge public asset, without some reasonable and tangible compensation in return. Let's at least put the question to them!

Mr. Chairman, I am happy to inform you that many Members of the House of Representatives are in total agreement with the statement I have made here today, and I remind you that no other branch of the Government has the feel or the knowledge of the electorate as does the membership of the House.

It is imperative that all who are concerned do everything in their power now, to prevent the surrender of our right to the control of the Panama Canal. We cannot sit idly by and watch the Panama Canal become another Suez.

APPENDIX

PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS DONE AT NEW YORK, January 31, 1967, AND TEXT OF CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES DONE AT GENEVA, JULY 28, 1951

MULTILATERAL PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES

Done at New York January 31, 1967;

Accession advised by the Senate of the United States of America, subject to certain reservations, October 4, 1968;

Accession approved by the President of the United States of America, subject to said reservations, October 15, 1968;

Accession of the United States of America deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the said reservations, November 1, 1968;

Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America November 6, 1968; Entered into force with respect to the United States of America November 1, 1968. And text of convention relating to the status of refugees

Done at Geneva July 28, 1951.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees was opened for accession at New York on January 31, 1967, the certified text of which in the English, French, Chinese, Russian, and Spanish languages is word for word as follows:

PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES

The States Parties to the present Protocol,

Considering that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) covers only those persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951,

Considering that new refugee situations have arisen since the Convention was adopted and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the scope of the Convention,

Considering that it is desirable that equal status should be enjoyed by all refugees covered by the definition in the Convention irrespective of the dateline 1 January 1951,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

GENERAL PROVISION

1. The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined.

2. For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term "refugee" shall, except as regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the definition of article 1 of the Convention as if the words "As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and ." and the words ". as a result of such events", in article 1A (2) were omitted.

3. The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without any geographic limitation, save that existing declarations made by States already

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