Italian interest will be fully safeguarded. Moreover, to separate the city of Fiume from the buffer State could not fail to lead to a protest against the very establishment of such a buffer State which, under such conditions, would be inhabited almost exclusively by Jugo-Slavs.

With respect to the new Italian proposal for the annexation to Italy of the long narrow strip of coast from Fianona to the gate of the city of Fiume there are difficulties of a practical nature. The reason for which the Italian Government have made this demand is stated to be a purely sentimental one, namely, the desire that the city of Fiume should not be separated from Italy by any intervening foreign country. No doubt such a sentimental reason may be of great importance in the eyes of the Italian Government, but it would appear to rest on a misapprehension of the real position of Fiume. The creation of the buffer State, which is to be completely independent of Jugo-Slavia, was, among other reasons, precisely intended to safeguard the position of Fiume; and the free State, of which Fiume must, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, form an essential part, is already in direct contact with the Kingdom of Italy not only by sea, but by a long land frontier of approximately 100 miles. Full effect, therefore, is already given to the sentimental considerations to which the Italian Government attach so much value. In fact, the new Italian plan would not achieve this object so well, as in practice it is to be feared that it would be quite unworkable. The Italian

Government do not propose to interfere with the railway connecting Fiume with the north, which they admit is to remain within the Free State. This railway runs for a considerable distance along the coast, and the Italian proposal amounts, so far as this region is concerned, to cutting off from the Free State, and incorporating with Italy, the line of sandy and barren beach intervening between the railway and the sea. Whilst the injury to the Free State, which would in this eccentric way be entirely cut off from its only seaboard, is obvious and unmeasurable, it is not easy to understand what would be the benefit to Italy, unless it be considered a benefit to her that the Free State should be so crippled. Nor does it seem necessary to dwell on the extraordinary complexities that would arise as regards Customs control, coastguard services, and cognate matters in a territory of such unusual configuration. The plan appears to run counter to every known consideration of geography, economics, and territorial convenience, and it may perhaps be assumed that if these considerations were overlooked by the Italian Government, this was due to their having connected it in their mind with the question of annexing to

Italy all that remains of the Jugo-Slav portion of the peninsula of Istria.

This question of further annexation of Jugo-Slav territory is raised quite unambiguously both by the demand for the whole of Istria and by the proposal to annex the island of Lagosta. In neither case do even considerations of strategy arise. For the strategical command of the whole Adriatic is already completely assured to Italy by the possession of Trieste, Pola, the islands facing Fiume, Pelagosa, and Valona. Additional security is afforded by the proposed demilitarisation of the whole Free State of Fiume, together with a large zone lying to the north of it, and of the small portion of Istria remaining to the Free State of Fiume.

Economic considerations being equally excluded, there remains nothing but a desire for further territory. Now the territories coveted are admittedly inhabited by Jugo-Slavs; they contain practically no Italian elements. This being so, it is necessary to refer to the way in which President Wilson, with the cordial approval of Great Britain and France, has met every successive Italian demand for the absorption in Italy of territories inhabited by peoples not Italian, and not in favour of being so absorbed. On this point the following passage may be quoted from a telegram addressed to Signor Tittoni by the Secretary of State at Washington on the 12th November:

"Your Excellency cannot fail to recognise that the attitude of the American Government throughout the negotiations has been one of sincere sympathy for Italy and of an earnest desire to meet her demands. Italy claimed a frontier on the Brenner Pass, and the demand was granted in order to assure to Italy the greatest possible protection on her northern front, although it involved annexing to Italy a considerable region populated by alien inhabitants. Italy demanded further a strong geographic eastern frontier, and this likewise was granted in order to assure her abundant protection, although it involved incorporation within Italian boundaries of further territory populated by alien inhabitants. Italy demanded the redemption of her brothers under foreign sovereignty, and every effort was made to meet this wish even in certain cases where by so doing much greater numbers of foreign races were brought within Italian sovereignty. Italy demanded complete naval control of the Adriatic, and this was granted by according her the three keys of the AdriaticPola, Valona, and a central island base. When all this failed to satisfy Italian claims, there was added concession to concession at Sexten Valley, at Tarvis, at Albona, in the Lussin Islands, in the terms of the Fiume Free State and elsewhere. In our desire to deal generously, even more than generously,

we yielded to Italy's demands for an Italian mandate over Albania, always hoping to meet from Italy's statesmen a generous response to our efforts at conciliation."

To the considerations thus urged by Mr. Lansing, the three representatives desire to add another argument. In doing so they trust the Italian Government will not credit them with any desire to give advice on questions of Italian high policy, on which the Italian Government will rightly claim to be the best judge. But an appeal to an historical argument may be permitted to the representatives of three countries to whom the liberation of Italian territories from foreign domination has been a matter of unwavering concern and sympathy through generations of noble and often terrible struggles. Modern Italy won the place in the hearts of all liberty-loving peoples, which she has never since lost, by the pure spirit of her patriotism which set before her people the generous aim of uniting under the Italian flag those extensive provinces formerly within the ancient Italian boundaries which were and have remained essentially Italian territories in virtue of their compact Italian population. The sympathies of the world have accompanied Italy's advance to the outer borders of Italia irredenta in pursuit of the sacred principle of the self-determination of the peoples. principle is now invoked by other nations. Not invariably is it possible, owing to the complicated interaction of racial, geographical, economic, and strategical factors, to do complete justice to the ethnic principle. Small isolated communities surrounded and outnumbered by populations of different race cannot, in most cases, be attached to the territory of their own nation from which they are effectively separated, but the broad principle remains that it is neither just nor expedient to annex, as the spoils of war, territories inhabited by an alien race, anxious and able to maintain a separate national State.

This

From this point of view the inclusion in Italy of purely Jugo-Slav territories where neither security nor geographical nor economic considerations compel annexation, is not in itself a commendable policy. It would be bound to create within the Italian borders a compact body of irredentism exactly analogous in kind to that which justified the demand of Italia irredenta for union with the Italian State.

The three representatives venture with all deference to express the opinion that, in declining to agree to the incorporation of more Jugo-Slav territory, they are acting in the highest interest of the Italian nation itself.

The three representatives would make an earnest appeal to the Italian Government to seize the present most favourable of opportunities for arriving at a friendly agreement with

them for the immediate conclusion and permanent guarantee of a definite settlement on lines which they venture to think fully realise all the legitimate national aspirations of Italy and fully safeguard her pre-eminent position in the Adriatic. A settlement based on the foundations which Italy, in conjunction with her Allies, could thereby lay would serve as a means of reconciling interests at present divergent and of offering Italy an opportunity for rendering more cordial and solid her relations with the new nations who are her neighbours and to whom she could furnish such valuable assistance and economic support as her resources and experience entitle her to offer.

The spirit of moderation which has characterised the recent attitude of the Italian Government leads the three representatives to hope that this appeal from Italy's American, British, and French Allies will not pass unheeded, and that the Italian Government will, by assuring definite agreement with their Allies, place on firm foundations the great moral and material triumphs to which Italy's efforts and sacrifices throughout the war have so justly entitled her. G. CLEMENCEAU. FRANK POLK.

Paris, December 9, 1919.

EYRE A. CROWE.

Memorandum.

THE United States, British, and French Governments desire to recognise the independence of the Albanian State. They consider that the State of Albania will require, to the extent indicated in paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,* the administrative advice and assistance of one of the great Powers. For this task Italy, by her geographical situation and economic capacity, is primarily indicated.

66

The United States, British, and French Governments. are anxious, therefore, to entrust to Italy a mandate over the State of Albania under the conditions implied in the Covenant of the League of Nations. They consider that these conditions could form the basis of Italy's acceptance of this mandate, and should be embodied in a Convention to be concluded between the Italian Government and the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The headings of such a Convention would be the following:

1. Albania is recognised as an independent State within the frontiers indicated in the body of the covering memorandum.

* Page 491.

Nothing in these stipulations shall, however, prevent the Albanian State from negotiating with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State such regional rectifications as may be in accord with local ethnographic and economic requirements.

2. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government shall have the right to construct and operate railways through Northern Albania north of parallel 41° 15', and otherwise to enjoy full privileges of international transport across Northern Albania.

3. The right to control the development of the Boyana River shall be vested in the Council of the League of Nations with power to delegate the work to either Italy or the SerbCroat-Slovene State under proper restrictions. It is assumed for this purpose that Montenegro will form part of the SerbCroat-Slovene State.

4. A Commission shall forthwith be established consisting of a representative of the Italian Government, a representative of the League of Nations, and a representative of the Albanian State, who shall be designated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, for the purpose of elaborating (a) the terms of the mandate to be entrusted to Italy over Albania, and (b) the organic law of the future State of Albania. This Commission shall terminate its labours within five months from the signature of this Convention and will address a report thereon with the necessary recommendations to the Council of the League of Nations. The final decision as to the terms of the mandate and the organic law shall be made by the Council of the League acting by a majority vote.

5. The Commission foreshadowed in the above paragraph shall base its deliberations not only on the considerations above outlined but also on the following principles:

(a.) The freedom of conscience and the free and outward exercise of all forms of worship, the complete liberty in education and linguistic matters of all the inhabitants of the State of Albania.

(b.) The organisation, in so far as may be compatible with the traditions of the country and the exercise of efficient administration, of legislative and administrative bodies representing all sections of the population.

(c.) Prevention of the exploitation of the country or its colonisation in a manner liable to militate against the interests of the native inhabitants. Under this heading would be included any recommendations which the Commission might make as to improvements in the existing system of land tenure.

(d.) The eventual creation of a local gendarmerie, the senior officers of which may be nationals of the mandatory Power. The mandatory Power shall have the right, for a period of two years from the date on which the mandate is [CXIII] 3 G