order, by reason of the small distance separating these countries from the coasts of Italy;" that "all enterprises on the part of Italians, in the aforesaid regions, constantly encounter a systematic opposition of the most obstinate and unwarranted kind."

In regard to the first grievance, no foundation is laid for the claim of Italy to pass upon the economic or social status of the provinces, and the small distance between them and Italy seems a slender basis upon which to rest the right of intervention, unless international law permits a neighbor to suggest without proving the existence of a nuisance and then to abate it at its will and pleasure. The assertion of a vital interest in the provinces is a general statement of a kind to appeal to the public at large, serves as a warning to the Powers that the dispute is not arbitrable and to discount in advance good offices and mediation.

Passing to the special charge, namely, Turkey's opposition to "all enterprises on the part of the Italians," it should also be said that this specification is over-general. It may be that Turkey was opposed to the increase of Italian influence in the provinces, and the present action of Italy justifies the Porte's fears, if the charge were really true. Then again it may well be that some of the Italian projects were of a kind not to be granted without seriously affecting Turkish sovereignty. In the absence of a specific enumeration of them, one cannot venture a positive opinion. The truth of the matter seems to be, as Sir Thomas clearly intimates, that Italy looked upon Tripoli as marked out for Italian acquisition and that the Italian Government took advantage of the Moroccan situation to pluck the fruit that Italian statesmen and politicians had watched with watering mouths. The tree was shaken, the plum fell and the taste is apparently sweet. The world at large is shocked at the whole performance on the part of a Power that has made the arbitration of international differences a cardinal policy as far as others are concerned. There is a touch of the Adam in all of us, we always insist that others arbitrate; when our own interests are involved, arbitration is seen to have limitations and to be dangerous or inapplicable.

The annexation of Tripoli is a fait accompli, to use an expression dear to the diplomatic world, and cannot be undone. Compensation may be offered Turkey, and Sir Thomas shows how the question could be submitted to mediation; the annexation recognized and an indemnity, not less than five million pounds sterling, be assessed by the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague (pp. vi-viii). In municipal law the property would be returned to the owner; in international law, the status

quo created by the irresistible aggressor is recognized, and an indemnity, that may or may not amount to a fair purchase price, is forced upon the unwilling vendor.

In the practice of nations, it is still a misfortune, if not actually an indictable crime, to be physically weak.

Sir Thomas writes in fulness of knowledge and with an open mind, willing to believe that there may be some future justification for Italy's conduct, but seeing none sufficient at present. The additional chapter on Moslem feeling (pp. 101-108) shows how unjustifiable attacks on Turkey may easily produce the worst of all human calamities: a religious or holy war. The monograph is a consolation to those who believe that the municipal standard of honorable conduct should be applied to international relations.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

L'Arte della Pace. By Michele Asmundo. Catania: L. & S. Scuderi. 1912. pp. 255. L. 4.

The "Art of Peace," in the terminology adopted or invented by Mr. Asmundo, represents diplomacy, and the greater part of this little book consists of a summary sketch of the progress of diplomacy as a counterpoise of war in the relations of European states, from its origin in Italian politics of the middle ages to the present date. As a concise, clear and flowing narrative, it is admirable, and would be tolerably well adapted to serve as a primer covering general international relations during the period mentioned, in one of the encyclopædic series put out by various publishing houses. In this respect, the only criticism to be made arises from the very quality of conciseness commended, which sometimes suggests inaccuracy or incompleteness, where it is really a question of language or of theory undeveloped for lack of space.

It is from a wider point of view, however, that this part of Mr. Asmundo's work is open to remark, and the criticism suggested is this, that it is questionable whether he has, in his narrative, preserved sufficient relief to bring out clearly the real object and meaning of the book. It must be confessed that we have something of a sense of losing the thread and of flitting down through the centuries among wars, conferences, treaties and new wars, in all of which the art of peace, as a determining factor, has but little chance of being remembered.

It is to the earlier pages that we must turn to find what the author

would regard as his contribution to science and theory. It consists in a presentment of the facts of political life as a balancing of forces.

The ultmate basis of the argument is found in the principle of the Malhusian law of the disproportionate increase of population and of means of subsistence. The productive surface of the earth is limited in extent, the possible multiplication of population is unlimited: it is war which reëstablishes the relation between population and means of subsistence, not, be it observed, by the simple and straightforward elimination of the surplus population, but "by compelling men to limit their increase so as to adapt themselves to the means of subsistence."

War, we are told, results in conquest, conquest produces the state, and property within the state. "The earth is distributed amongst men who, compelled to live in the section of territory assigned to them, feel first of all the necessity of limiting their multiplication - hence the family."

War, therefore, is the origin of all civilization: but the idea of war is not to be separated from that of peace. They are in fact inseparable, but one or the other may prevail in human relations, or they may balance each other. In case of a perfect equilibrium, we have justice.

The force of war tends to destroy, the force of peace to preserve; but these two apparently contrary tendencies are inextricably associated. At no time, for example, is the economic value of human life so clearly emphasized as in war; numbers, organization, and mutual dependence then become of the highest importance.

The arms by which the force of peace is above all supported and developed, especially in modern times, are money and credit. The influence of the bourse may tend to peace or war, but it is essentially a power in favor of peace.

At this point, we meet with a curious attempt to represent the conceptions with which the writer is dealing, geometrically and by diagrams. A line running in one direction from a point represents the force of war, a line in the opposite direction, the force of peace. If these forces are precisely equal, a composite force arises which is called justice. The common point where all these forces meet in the diagram is law.

This section is interesting because it reveals plainly the nature of the author's ideas and, in a general way, the kind of value which the book possesses. All this, as to opposing and composite forces, is pure symbolism, just as the whole outline of the origination of property and the family is pure mythology.

That is not to say that it is necessarily without value in presenting a

fresh aspect of the subject; nor is the mythological element at all uncommon in the philosophy of law or politics. Rousseau's "Social Contract," essentially a piece of mythology, has been both fruitful and useful. What is uncommon is rather the simple clearness of style and language that make this element evident beyond question under a historical disguise.

The remainder of the book is occupied by the historical summary above referred to, and we can only repeat the criticism already indicated, that it would seem as if the ideas set forth, the economic forces making for peace and war, and often for peace even in the midst of war, the occasional equilibrium of the two forces in a state of justice and the causes which lead to a readjustment of the balance, while they may all no doubt be illustrated from the narrative, are often apt to be lost from view in its even flow.

As to the conceptions presented, much might be said. But, when we are told, as in the last few pages, that war is a law of nature, the originator of civilization and the condition of life, and we are solemnly warned against thinking of disarmament or universal peace, it suggests a treatise directed against lightning-rods on the ground that electricity is one of the most beneficent forces in nature, or against the construction of levees and breakwaters, on the ground that floods have in the past been a potent means of fertilization, besides furthering the progress of the world, from time to time, since the days of Noah, by removing large numbers of superfluous people from the face of the earth.

JAMES BARCLAY.

International Law. By L. Oppenheim. Vol. 1, Peace. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1912.

Professor Oppenheim needs no introduction to American readers. The first edition of his work, published in 1905-1906, has been a familiar manual of reference not only for students, for whom the author says that the work is particularly intended, but for advanced scholars and professors as well. The author admits that upon the publication of the first edition of the work he had received warnings that a comprehensive treatise in two volumes would never be read by young students. If the event has proved those warnings unfounded, we think it largely due to the fact that in the discussion of even the most complicated problems of international law the author has succeeded in giving the proper

historical setting to each question, with the result that the principle involved is more easily discernible.

Chapters I and II of the first volume deal with the foundation of international law and with the development and science of international law; and they are perhaps the most valuable chapters of this volume. The author's discussion of the legal force of international law is a careful and logical piece of argument, and is especially useful to the student for the distinction which it makes between the theoretical and practical aspects of the question. If Austin's definition of law be correct, then indeed what is called international law cannot be said to be law; but Austin has yet to prove that his narrow conception of law is the only one which may legitimately bear the title of law. But putting definitions aside (and with them the theories whose validity depends upon them) we find an actually existing body of rules which in practice are recognized as law, and which, though violated at times, as are the rules of municipal law, are in general enforced both by the moral sanction of public opinion. and by the physical sanction of self-help, assisted occasionally by the intervention of sympathizing states.

Professor Oppenheim is a positivist, that is, he finds the source of international law in custom and treaties, which express the implicit and explicit consent of nations. We do not think it fair however to infer that the author is indifferent as to the moral forces underlying the actual practices of nations and directing the conduct of nations along more humane and just lines. In fact, in speaking of the work of Grotius, Professor Oppenheim pays a proper tribute to the influence exerted by the law of nature upon the development of modern international law.

The final chapter of the volume, which deals with important groups of treaties, will be especially valuable to students. The section of Commercial Treaties is new, and it is followed by a section describing Unions Concerning Common Non-Political Interests. This last section, dealing as it does with matters which lie outside the range of governmental policy and upon which it is easier, therefore, for nations to come to an agreement, illustrates in a striking way the rapid growth in recent years of a mutual recognition by nations of the many interests which they have in common, and offers no small promise of the probability in the future of similar agreements in which states will yield on minor questions of national policy in favor of a greater gain to the family of nations as a whole.

CHARLES G. FENWICK.