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The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war. (Article 1.)

The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral powers without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a notification, which may, however, be given by telegraph. Neutral powers, nevertheless, can not rely on the absence of notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of the existence of a state of war. (Article 2.)

In the absence of a detailed statement as to the grievances asserted by Italy, no opinion is expressed as to the sufficiency of the causes leading to the declaration of war.

Supposing that the contentions of Italy were well founded, it would have a grievance against Turkey. If this grievance were capable of being formulated as a right of which Italy was deprived, the question of the existence or non-existence of the right, its nature and extent, could be submitted to the Permanent Court of The Hague. If, however, the grievance could not assume the form of a claim of right, but falls within the category of cases outside the realm of international law, that is to say, if the claim is based upon a national policy, it is a political question, or, as Italy puts it, "a vital interest," and as such might be the subject of negotiation, not of arbitration. In this view of the matter the action. of Italy would be none the less precipitous and in contravention of the conduct properly expected of a nation which has for years championed the cause of the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

In 1856 Sardinia was a party to the Congress of Paris in which the integrity of Turkey and the doctrine of good offices and mediation in Turkish affairs was announced and accepted. Of more serious significance were the international obligations assumed by Italy when a formal international statute was enacted which it was hoped would begin a new era in the relations of nations. In 1899 Italy participated in the First Hague Peace Conference, and Count Nigra, its first delegate, played an enviable and important role in framing the Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. And again in the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, the influence of Italy was felt in all questions concerning the peaceful settlement of international disputes. An examination of the provisions of the Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes adopted by the First Hague Conference, and revised by the second, will show that in its eagerness to possess itself of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, Italy has unfortunately violated the spirit. if

not the letter, of those sections of the convention dealing with good offices. and arbitration. Thus, the first article of this convention provides:

With a view to obviating, as far as possible, recourse to force in the relations between States, the signatory powers agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences.

In the next article the signatory Powers agree:

In case of serious disagreement or conflict, before an appeal to arms - to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers.

It is as apparent that a disagreement existed as that an armed conflict now exists between Italy and Turkey, and that Italy has not requested either "the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers," but has declined to accept offers of good offices or of mediation at the request of Turkey or of the Powers.

It may be said that the Powers themselves have been remiss in insisting upon good offices and mediation, but the fault of the strangers to the conflict is no justification for Italy to have discarded the wise and just provisions of an international convention to which it is a party, when the opportunity was presented of furnishing to the Powers an example of recourse to peaceable methods of settling the dispute.

The truth of the matter seems to be that in whatever form the controversy had presented itself, Italy would have been unwilling to listen to advice and mediation to submit the case to arbitration, providing it might be reasonably maintained that it was susceptible of arbitration.

The available lands of northern Africa are no longer open to discovery o occupation. In Egypt, Great Britain plays the role of schoolmaster, but the occupation, temporary in its beginning, is likely to prove permanent unless the highway to India should assume less importance in the future than it does in the present. The conquest of Algiers by France, and its incorporation with the Republic, the acquisition of a protectorate in 1881 over Tunis, and the undisguised intention of France to extend its empire to the east and to consolidate it by the acquisition of Morocco, suggested, no doubt, to Italy the advisability of seizing Tripoli and Cyrenaica while they were still in the possession of a Power rightly or wrongly reputed weak. When successful in establishing a protectorate in Morococ, it might have occurred to the ambitious statesmen of the French Republic to extend their sphere of influence from Tunis to Egypt, and the golden opportunity to annex Tripoli and Cyrenaica would have been

lost to Italy, even although their acquisition is now sought at the expense of inconsistency and of the wise and just provisions of an international document.

It would seem that the universal disapproval with which the action of Italy has been regarded is in itself evidence of a growing international opinion based upon a respect of elemental law and justice, and there are not wanting evidences to show that Italian statesmen have betimes qualms of conscience. Thus Italy is represented in the press as willing to pay a goodly number of millions to quiet title to Tripoli and Cyrenaica, which were formally annexed to the kingdom on November 6, 1911. In the United States this suggestion is likely to be attributed to its proper source, for we, as a nation and a people, have endeavored to satisfy the conscience aroused by an unjust war, by a formal purchase of territory which we had already occupied and conquered. By the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo the United States bound itself to pay Mexico the sum of $15,000,000 for the territory acquired by an unjust and unjustifiable war, and there are perhaps some people still living who would be inclined to attribute this payment as due to some other cause than the inestimable value of the land in question to the United States. Pot may well call kettle black.

RUSSIA AND PERSIA.

1

While the state of affairs in Persia is still too unsettled for it to be possible to predict the outcome, it is well to point out what the situation means for the independence and sovereignty of Persia. On August 18/31, 1907, a convention was signed between Great Britain and Russia 1 the general object of which was "to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their states on the continent of Asia." In that treaty the two Powers while engaging" to respect the integrity and independence of Persia" state that "for geographical and economic reasons" they have "a special interest in the maintenance of peace and good order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining or in the neighborhood of " their frontiers, and that they are "desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the abovementioned provinces of Persia." They thereupon agree in Articles 1, 2, and 3, to limit the spheres of their respective interests in Persia to the

1 Printed in SUPPLEMENT, 1:398.

Persian provinces adjoining their respective frontiers, thus dividing Persia into three spheres of interest: a British sphere, a Russian sphere,. and a neutral sphere. Within their respective spheres each party is to be free from competition in seeking economic concessions from the PersianGovernment. Article 4 provides that the revenues from the Persian customs shall be devoted as previously, certain of them to the amortization and interest of the loans concluded by Persia with the Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse (a bank controlled by Russians and connected with the Russian State Bank), and certain others to the service of the loans concluded by Persia with the Imperial Bank of Persia, a British bank incorporated in Great Britain by a royal charter of Septem-. ber 2, 1889. Article 5 contemplates the possible necessity of either government establishing control over the sources of revenue mentioned in Article 4" in the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse and with the Imperial Bank of Persia."

The treaty does not in express terms constitute an attack upon the sovereignty of Persia. It is true that a nation possessing a clear consciousness of its sovereign rights would resent such an arbitrary treatment of it economic interests and especially the suggestion of possible interference on the part of foreign governments in the administration of its revenues. As regards the former point, it is no infringement of state sovereignty for two foreign Powers to agree to respect each others monopoly of economic concessions, though the state might well be alarmed that an economic partition would in due time be stretched into a political partition. The provisions of Article 5 are, however, more significant. How far were the British and Russian Governments concerned in the loans made by the banks controlled by their respective countrymen? The loan made by the British bank in 1892 was guaranteed by the customs of Fars and the Persian Gulf ports. The loan made by the Russian bank in 1900 was guaranteed by all the Persian customs with the exception of those assigned as the guarantee of the loan made by the British bank. These guarantees gave the Russian and British Governments the right to interfere diplomatically in favor of the rights of their subjects; they did not give those governments the right to take control on their own initiative of the Persian customs. But Persia was in too disturbed a condition in 1907 either to observe the subtle meaning of the terms of the Anglo-Russian agreement or to enter a protest against them.

The present crisis has the treaty of 1907 for its starting point. The economic interests of Russian subjects and corporations have become the political interests of the Russian Government. The conclusion is inevitable from the pretexts offered by the Russian Government for its action.

On June 13th, Mr. Shuster, an American citizen, assumed charge of the treasury and revenues of Persia. In the statement issued in reply to Russian criticisms, Mr. Shuster says that when he entered upon his duties he found banking deficits amounting to over £100,000, together with an unknown sum outstanding in checks, drafts, etc. These deficits have now been paid, in spite of heavy expenses entailed by the civil war, and there is now a balance of £160,000 in the Persian treasury. What are the charges of the Russian Government against Mr. Shuster?

The law of June 13th invested Mr. Shuster as Treasurer-General with the control of all revenues and the sole power to sign checks on government funds. Mr. Shuster thereupon gave notice that all customs payments should pass through his hands. This action aroused a protest from M. Mornard, a Belgian, who held the office of Director General of Customs, and who had previously drawn checks on the customs funds. In this protest he was supported by the Belgian Legation at Teheran, which announced that it would not permit the Belgian employees of the customs service to serve under Mr. Shuster. The Russian Minister went further and declared that he would introduce Russians into the customs service rather than submit to having Mr. Shuster in control. The two legations even denied the power of the Mejliss (National Council) to pass the law of June 13th. Mr. Shuster satisfied any possible ground of complaint by giving notice to the Imperial Bank and the Banque d'Escompte that no disbursements would be made from the customs receipts until all liens upon them had been paid. M. Mornard was prevailed upon to comply with the law and conceded the justice of the Treasurer-General's demand; but the Russian Minister nevertheless continued to resist Mr. Shuster's authority.

Mr. Shuster's efforts to levy taxes upon the Persian grandees, who as Russian protégés, had hitherto evaded the Persian tax laws, met with steady opposition on the part of Russia. When, however, Mr. Shuster began to appoint Englishmen, familiar with the Persian language, to posts in northern Persia (a measure which he was perfectly justified in taking, though it might have been a more tactful policy had he appointed officers of another nationality) Russia came forward with a veto upon the appointments.

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