If guarantees and safeguards existed to-day keeping our ports open, by all means compare the guarantees you would get under the Declaration of London with those you have to-day and see which are the greater, but at the present moment there are no guarantees whatever, and even if there are none under the Declaration of London, you are no worse off than you are to-day.

Further opposition to the International Prize Court and to the Declaration was made on the ground that both the Hague Convention (No. 7), relative to the conversion of merchant ships into war ships, and the Declaration left unsettled the question whether such conversion might take place on the high seas. It is difficult to see what argument can be drawn from that fact. Without the above convention and the Court the great Powers will undoubtedly exercise a right which they declare they are unwilling to abandon. Far from "legalizing piracy" or "reintroducing privateering" by its failure to forbid conversion on the high seas, Convention No. 7 actually places important restrictions upon the conversion in general of merchant ships into war ships, and England can continue to treat such ships as have been converted on the high seas as she sees fit the decisions of the International Court of Prize, even should it in some way recognize the legality of conversion on the high seas, cannot affect the relations between the belligerents themselves, inasmuch as the question of conversion on the high seas is specifically excepted from Convention No. 7.

Opponents of the Declaration endeavored to arouse public sentiment against the article of the Declaration permitting the destruction of neutral prizes when the observance of the general rule forbidding their destruction would "involve danger to the safety of the warship or to the success of the operations in which she is engaged at the time." Sir Robert Finlay describes the article as "a relapse into the methods of barbarism." Again, it is difficult to see how the Declaration will make matters worse than they now stand. Without the Declaration, Russia, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and Japan will exercise the right they assert, whereas under it there will at least be some restrictions upon its exercise. The restriction (Art. 50) that all persons on board the ship must first be placed in safety before the ship is destroyed would, as Mr. Bray points out in his monograph on the Declaration, make "the presence of another neutral ship to which the crew can be transferred practically a sine qua non."

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It is not contended here that the Declaration of London is an ideal code of naval law in time of war. There are several rules in it which

clearly do not represent an ideal system. It would have been progressive policy to have declared private property of the enemy immune from capture at sea as it now is on land. Food-stuffs shoull have been placed in the free list, and the prevention of commerce in them left to blockade. The destruction of neutral prizes should have been unconditionally forbidden. These last two rules would have prevented the many disputes that will undoubtedly result from the application of the present rules, which from their nature cannot be applied in a precise and rigid manner. But though not an ideal code, the Declaration is a great advance from the present uncertainty in the law, which amounts in fact to an absence of law.

The question of the ratification of the convention creating the International Prize Court, although it was the immediate object of the Naval Prize Bill, was a minor feature in the discussion of it. Criticisms were passed upon the organization of the court, to the effect that English commercial interests, the largest in the world, would be subjected to a court in which England would be represented by only one judge out of fifteen. The argument seems to overlook the fact that if there is no international prize court English commercial interests will be subjected to a belligerent court, from which no appeal can be taken. Theoretically it is possible for England to protest diplomatically against the decision of a belligerent court, but if the protest is unavailing, as it was during the Russo-Japanese war, there is no redress but war, which is hardly an acceptable form of redress when such comparatively small interests are at stake.

On the whole, then, it would seem that Great Britain stands to gain by the Declaration more than she stands to lose; and in addition consideration must be given to the fact that Great Britain, together with the other nations, gains more in having definite rules agreed upon, even at some cost to its theoretical rights, than in leaving the law in its present chaotic state. It is unfortunate that the Declaration had to be subjected to public opinion at such an inopportune time. It would seem reasonable that the rules formulated by the chosen delegates of a nation at an international conference should have a strong claim for acceptance on the part of the people. When nations meet in conference it becomes clear from the start that compromise is the only possible means of securing agreement. Each nation must be ready to surrender what it considers less important for what it considers essential; and at times even essential interests must be limited and circumscribed, if a solution is to be found

which will be satisfactory to all. But the necessity for this resort to compromise is almost entirely overlooked when the rules agreed upon in a conference of delegates are submitted to national parliaments for ratification. The expressions of public opinion regarding the advisability of the adoption by a given nation of an agreement like that of the Declaration of London invariably reflect a narrow national point of view, which has little sympathy with concession as a principle. Moreover, the public opinion of one country, while tending to magnify the concessions which lave been made to others, can seldom realize the importance which other nations attach to the concessions they have made. The statement of M. Renault in his report accompanying the Declaration and explaining its provisions gives expression to the spirit which animated the conference:

The solutions have been extracted from the various views or practices which prevail and represent what may be called the media sententia. They are not always in absolute agreement with the views peculiar to each country, but they shock the essential ideas of none. They must not be examined separately, but as a whole, otherwise there is a risk of the most serious misunderstandings. In fact, if one or more isolated rules are examined either from the belligerent or the neutral point of view, the reader may find that the interests with which he is especially concerned are jeopardized by the adoption of these rules. But they have another side. The work is one of compromise and mutual concessions. Is it, as a whole, a good one?

We confidently hope that those who study it seriously will answer that it is. The Declaration puts uniformity and certainty in the place of the diversity and obscurity from which international relations have too long suffered. The Conference has tried to reconcile in an equitable and practical way the rights of belligerents with those of neutral commerce; it consists of Powers whose conditions, from the political, economic, and geographical points of view, vary considerably. There is therefore reason to suppose that the rules on which these Powers have agreed take sufficient account of the different interests involved, and hence may be accepted without objection by all others.

It is as yet too soon to predict whether the House of Commons will attempt to use its power of overruling the veto of the House of Lords. Considering that the bill passed by a majority of only forty-seven it does not seem likely that the Government will attempt to pass it until the present state of public opinion has changed. It is to be hoped that in due time English public opinion will realize that in repudiating the International Prize Court, with the Declaraton of London as its code, a step backward has been taken. The International Court of Prize stands as the first truly international court in the history of the world. It gives promise, if adopted, of gradually accustoming the world to a code of law

truly international in character, and in addition it offers a means of familiarizing the nations with the idea of a court of arbitral justice, which it was sought to create at the Second Hague Conference, but which could not be carried into effect for lack of agreement as to the method of constituting its membership.

THE PASSPORT QUESTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.

The Jewish question, or so-called "passport question," with Russia arises out of the fact that the Russian Government, for certain historical reasons based on economic and political considerations, reserves the right to exclude from entry into Russia all alien Jews. For this purpose the point of religious faith has been adopted as the readiest test or shibboleth of race. Very many exceptions are made to the rule of exclusion, so that in practice very few persons of Jewish race or religion who have legitimate business in Russia are excluded. These rules and exceptions are applied alike to all nationalities other than Russian.

The Jewish question is to be carefully distinguished from the questions arising from the unlawful emigration and naturalization in other countries of Russian subjects. Russia is one of those countries which not only denies the right of expatriation, and therefore regards as invalid the naturalization which any of her subjects may secure in foreign countries, but imposes severe penalties therefor. It is more usual in practice, however, for the Russian consuls simply to refuse the necessary visé to the passports of naturalized Americans who were formerly subjects of Russia.

The Jewish question is also to be distinguished from that arising out of Russia's refusal to waive the claim of military service in the case of her subjects who have emigrated.

The legal elements involved in the present question arise out of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded between the United States and Russia in 1832. Article I of that treaty reads as follows:

There shall be between the territories of the high contracting parties, a reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation. The inhabitants of their respective States, shall, mutally have liberty to enter the ports, places, and rivers of the territories of each party, wherever foreign commerce is permitted. They shall be at liberty to sojourn and reside in all parts whatsoever of said territories, in order to attend to their affairs, and they shall enjoy, to that effect, the same security and protection as natives of the country wherein they reside, on condition of their submitting to the laws and ordinances there prevailing, and particularly to the regulations in force concerning commerce.

For thirty years it has been contended by certain elements of opinion in this country that the exercise or assertion by the Russian Government of a right to exclude from Russian territory any American citizen on the ground that he professes the Jewish faith is inconsistent with the spirit of the Treaty of 1832.

The agitation of the question in the United States has been particularly active during the past year. On February 10th last, Mr. Herbert Parsons, of New York, introduced in the House of Representatives a joint resolution calling upon the President to denounce the Treaty of 1832 on the ground that Russia had violated that treaty by subjecting American citizens to a discrimination based upon religious belief. Five other resolutions in identical terms were also introduced in the House. On April 6th Mr. Sulzer, of New York, introduced a resolution substantially similar to the Parsons resolution, but referring not to "religious belief" alone, but to race or religion." Senator Culberson had meanwhile introduced a resolution, "that it is the sense of the Senate that the Treaty of 1832 with Russia be abrogated." No action on any of these resolutions was taken by either House of Congress during the special session. Upon the reassembling of Congress on December 4th last, Mr. Sulzer again introduced his resolution for the termination of the treaty. This resolution passed the House by a vote of 301 to 1 (87 members not voting) on December 13th. The text of the resolution reads as follows:

RESOLVED, etc., That the people of the United States assert as a fundamental principal that the rights of its citizens shall not be impaired at home or abroad because of race or religion; that the Government of the United States concludes its treaties for the equal protection of all classes of its citizens, without regard to race or religion; that the Government of the United States will not be a party to any treaty which discriminates, or which by one of the parties thereto is so construed as to discriminate, between American citizens on the ground of race or religion; that the Government of Russia has violated the treaty between the United States and Russia, concluded at St. Petersburg, December 18, 1832, refusing to honor American passports duly issued to American citizens, on account of race and religion; that in the judgment of the Congress the said treaty, for the reasons aforesaid, ought to be terminated at the earliest possible time; that for the aforesaid reasons the said treaty is hereby declared to be terminated and of no further force and effect from the expiration of one year after the date of notification to the Government of Russia of the terms of this resolution, and that to this end the President is hereby charged with the duty of communicating such notice to the Government of Russia.