partment of Mexico. The majority of her inhabitants, for reasons entirely sufficient, organized a revolution, which was carried to ultimate success by the defeat of the Mexican army and the capture of its general, who was also the President of Mexico, at the battle of San Jacinto on the 21st day of April, 1836. Up to that time, according to the weight of historical authority, the territory known as Texas was bounded on the south by the Nueces river, and was contiguous to the state or department of Tamaulipas in Mexico. See discussion of Boundary of Texas, in volume 17, p. 98, of the American Nation, a history, by Dr. Geo. P. Garrison, late professor of history in the University of Texas; also discussion of the same subject by I. J. Cox, page 81 of volume 6, Texas Historical Quarterly; also, Fulmore's Geographical Map of Texas.

In May, 1836, President Burnett and his cabinet, acting for Texas, and Gen. Santa Anna, who was then a prisoner of war, purporting to act for Mexico, signed two treaties, in one of which it was stipulated that the Mexican army should be withdrawn from Texas, and should go. beyond the Rio Grande; and in the other it was stipulated that another treaty should be entered into at a subsequent date for the purpose, among others, of determining the limits of the two governments. Those treaties were subsequently repudiated by Mexico and Santa Anna; but if they were valid they did not determine, but left for future determination, the question of boundary between Texas and Mexico. In State v. Sais, 47 Tex. 309, it was declared by the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Roberts, that:

The portion of Texas situated between the Rio Grande and Nueces rivers south of a line drawn from the northern boundary of Webb county to the mouth of Moros creek on the Nueces river was originally a part of the State of Tamaulipas in Mexico, whose capital was Victoria, some distance west of the Rio Grande. That the section of country was sparsely settled and was used principally for stock ranches; that it had long been subject to frequent depredations from savage Indians. On the 19th of December, 1836, an act of Congress of Texas was passed, defining the boundaries of Texas, in which that territory was included. Notwithstanding that, however, the State of Texas exercised no permanent jurisdiction over it, except along and near the Nueces river, including Corpus Christi on the Gulf, and the State of Tamaulipas exercised jurisdiction on and near the Rio Grande on the eastern side of it, until after the annexation of Texas to the United States, on the 29th of December, 1845, shortly after which armed occupation of the disputed territory was taken by the United States on behalf of Texas, since which time Texas has exercised jurisdiction over it.

Authentic history seems to support the statement there made, and such being the case, the status of the title under consideration seems to be this:

Prior to 1836 the boundary of Texas was the Neuces River, and Texas made no official claim of boundaries that would include any part of Tamaulipas until December 19, 1836, when her Congress declared that her boundaries extended to the Rio Grande River. Prior to that time and on November 9, 1836, the State of Tamaulipas, the government in possession and exercising jurisdiction over the land in question, sold it to those under whom the appellees claim, and on that day received the purchase money. Thereafter, in September, 1841, and before the asserted claim of Texas had been made good by actual occupancy of the United States army on behalf of Texas, the Mexican Government, in confirmation of the sale previously made, issued the formal grant vesting title in the purchasers. Such being the facts, and considering the protocol tɔ the treaty as applying to this case, we are of opinion that, if the title is good in other respects, the courts should not refuse to uphold it because of the treaty stipulation referred to. The sale was made before Texas had officially asserted any claim to the territory which embraces this land; and, while the formal grant was not issued until after that claim. had been asserted by Texas, it was issued while the Mexican Government was in actual possession and exercising actual jurisdiction over the land in question; and in the forum of conscience no reason can be assigned why the title should not be sustained. In other words, the territory in question was not in fact and law any part of the State of Texas until the claim of Texas had been made good by actual possession of the United States army and actual ouster of the possession and jurisdiction of the Mexican Government, which did not occur until after the issuance of the final title. According to the laws and usages of nations, such a claim constitutes a valid title, which is not affected by a mere change of sovereignty. It may be conceded that the legislative department of the government could have enacted a law requiring such titles to be proved up and confirmed within a given time, and prescribed that a íailure to procure such confirmation would render such titles null and void. But the legislature of the State has not seen proper to pursue that course, and the courts have no right to prescribe such penalty.

[Opinion on question as to whether the governor of Tamaulipas had authority to make sale, which the court held should be presumed, omitted as involving question of municipal law.]

This case has been given long and careful consideration, and our conclusion is that the trial court decided it correctly.

FABER V. UNITED STATES.

Supreme Court of the United States.

[May 29, 1911.]

This case raises the question as to whether Cuban imports are entitled te a reduction of twenty per cent upon the rates charged on goods coming from the Philippine Islands, or only twenty per cent upon the regular tariff rates on goods imported from foreign countries.

The Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, lays a duty on cigars of $4.50 per pound and twenty-five per cent ad valorem.

The Act of March 8, 1902, to raise revenue for the Philippine Islands, provides that there shall be levied, collected and paid upon all articles coming into the United States from the Philippine Archipelago the rates of duty which are required to be collected and paid upon like articles imported from foreign countries; provided "that upon all articles the growth and product of the Philippine Archipelago coming into the United States from the Philipine Archipelago there shall be levied, collected and paid only seventy-five per centum of the rates of duty aforesaid. * All duties and taxes collected in the United States on articles coming from the Philippine Archipelago shall not be covered into the general fund of the Treasury of the United States, but shall be held as a separate fund and paid into the Treasury of the Philippine Islands to be used and expended for the government and benefit of said islands." (32 Stat. 54; 5 Fed. Stat. Ann. 716.)

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The Commercial Convention with Cuba, proclaimed December 17, 1903 (33 Stat. 2136), declares, in Article 2, "that during the term of this convention all merchandise being the product of the soil or industry of the Republic of Cuba imported into the United States shall be admitted at a reduction of twenty per centum of the rates of duty thereon, as provided by the tariff act of the United States, approved July 24, 1897, or as may be provided by any tariff law of the United States subsequently enacted."

Article 8 provides that "the rates of duty herein granted by the United States to the Republic of Cuba are and shall continue during the term of this convention preferential in respect to all like imports from other countries, and, in return for said preferential rates of duty granted to the Republic of Cuba by the United States, it is agreed that the concession herein granted on the part of the said Republic of Cuba to the products of the United States shall likewise be, and shall continue, during

the term of this convention, preferential in respect to all like imports from other countries."

In April, 1906, the convention and statutes above referred to being of force, the plaintiffs imported cigars and alcohol into the United States from Cuba. He contended that under the convention he could only be required to pay a duty twenty per cent less than that collected on tobacco coming into the United States from Philippine Islands which paid seventy-five per cent of the regular rate under the Tariff Act of July, 1897. He also claimed that he should not be required to pay twenty per cent less than the regular tariff on alcohol, but twenty per cent less than special rates allowed on importations of alcohol from France, Germany, Italy and Portugal.

His claim being disallowed he paid, under protest, a duty of twenty per cent less than the tariff rate on cigars and alcohol. On a hearing by the Board of Appraisers his protest was overruled. That judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court (157 Fed. 140) and the case was brought here.

Mr. Justice LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

Article 2 of the Convention with Cuba provides that the products of that island shall be admitted into the United States at a reduction of twenty per cent of the rates of duty in the tariff of 1897, or tariff laws subsequently enacted. There is much force in the suggestion that the reduction is limited to the rates of duty in general tariff acts, and does not apply to special rates under special argeements with other countries. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190. This point, however, we purposely leave open and limit our consideration to the principal question discussed in the brief, whether the Philippine Islands are "another country" within the meaning of the 8th article of the Cuban treaty, providing that the rates therein granted shall continue "preferential in respect to all like imports from other countries."

This treaty was signed and proclaimed several years after it had been. decided, in the Insular cases, that Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands were not foreign countries, but territory of the United States, subject to such laws as Congress might enact for their political and fiscal management. In 1901 this court, in Fourteen Diamond Rings v. The United States, 183 U. S. 177, said that "the theory that a country remains foreign in respect to the tariff laws, until Congress has acted by embracing

it within the Customs Union, presupposes that the country may be domestic for one purpose and foreign for another." That case and DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1; United States v. Heinzen, 206 U. S. 370; Dooley v. United States, 183 U. S. 151, show that, notwithstanding their geographical remoteness, the Philippines are not a foreign country, and, if so, not "another country" within the meaning of the Cuban treaty.

There have been statutes in which the language indicated an intent to make a distinction between a country and its colonies. But in the absence of some qualifying phrase "the word country in the revenue laws of the United States has always been construed to embrace all the possessions of a foreign state, however widely separated, which are subject to the same supreme executive and legislative control." Stairs v. Peaslee, 18 How. 521, 526. If, therefore, in our revenue laws, a colony is treated as a part of the country to which it belongs, the Philippine Islands must be treated as a part of this nation and not as another country. It must be presumed that the words "other country" in the Cuban treaty were used according to their known and established interpretation, Ibid, and did not refer to charges on shipments from territory belonging to the United States. That they were not so regarded appears from the language of the Act of March 8, 1902, which studiously avoids using the words "imports," and enacts that upon articles "coming into the United States from the Philippine Archipelago," there shall be levied only seventy-five per cent of the rates of duty imposed on like articles imported from foreign countries. These duties, when collected, are not covered into the Treasury of the United States, but are to be used and expended solely for the use and government of the Philippine Islands.

But it is argued that even if the United States understood that the Philippine Islands to be a part of this country, Cuba could not be expected to understand that the words "other countries" did not include the Philippines if a duty was in fact charged on goods coming from those islands.

But the 8th article refers to "imports" - the correlative of " exports." This necessarily related to shipments from a country which was foreign to the United States. Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U. S. 600; Patapsco Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 353. The provision that the rates granted to Cuba shall continue "preferential in respect to all like imports from other countries," do not relate to charges on shipments between places under the same flag, but to duties laid on shipments — on