principles of justice and equity which must, and eventually do, govern, that what is just and equitable under the conditions of to-day may be manifestly unjust twenty, fifty, or a hundred years hence, that when usage, no matter how well established, is or becomes unjust, then usage must and eventually does change to conform to justice? In fact, the history of the development of maritime law is but a repetition of illustrations of this fundamental principle; the Hague Convention for the creation of an International Prize Court being a notable recent instance, in that it takes from the courts of the captor the final determination of prize cases, thus changing an established practice the justice of which has been subject to much and increasing criticism.

As to the desirableness of the International Prize Court, opinions may differ, but if the court is to be established the necessity for a clear definition of the law and the principles which the court is to apply in the determination of the cases brought before it, is obvious. This was the purpose of the London Conference, that the Declaration of London, no matter to what extent it may run counter to individual opinion, was the best solution attainable of the difficult question before the conference, can hardly be doubted.

In closing this comment, its writer ventures the opinion that to the majority of those who have followed closely the discussions of the London Conference of 1908 and the Hague Conference of 1907, "Britain and Sea Law" will be a convincing argument in favor of the Declaration of London, however contrary this may be to the intention of its author. JOHN P. MErrell.

The Panama Canal. By Harmodio Arias. London: P. S. King and Son. 1911. xiv, 188 pp.

In a subtitle this small volume accurately describes itself as "a study in international law and diplomacy." Part I, entitled "The United States and the interoceanic canal," presents in its first four chapters a useful account of the long diplomatic history which is now culminating in the building of the canal by the United States. The fifth chapter of that part deals with the Monroe Doctrine, and indicates, as do other passages, that the author considers that doctrine an occasional instrument for aggrandizement. Part II, dealing with "The juridical position of the Panama Canal," after explaining the indefiniteness of the word neutralization," and demonstrating that in some sense the canal is certainly "neutral". as, indeed, all the treaties dealing with the matter

say

reaches the opinion, in the fifth chapter, that the United States, in accordance with the general principles as to neutralization, has a right to construct and maintain fortifications for the purpose of defending the canal from destruction or attack. This opinion is worked out with great clearness, thus:

* * *

The state, person, or thing neutralized is entitled to enjoy the benefit of peace, but, on the other hand, is burdened with the corresponding obligation of not taking part in a war. It is clear that the non-belligerent idea is the essential characteristic of the nation. But, obviously enough, the right of self-defense is reserved. Law can not discourage self-help, for then the law-abiding members of the community would be at the entire mercy of wrongdoers. Neutralization, then, can not take away the right of self-defense. It is well known that Belgium and Switzerland are permanently neutralized, and that nevertheless they are ready to defend their integrity by well-organized armies. The presence of regular armies in Belgium and Switzerland should not be taken to mean that they are to be made use of for offensive purposes. Undoubtedly arms may be instruments of attack or of protection, but the former alternative ought not to be the first to be taken into consideration when there is an international agreement that forbids offensive measures. Now, passing from the question of the presence of armies in a neutralized region to that of fortifications, one would feel bound to assert that the analogy is real, and that the logical consequences that can be drawn from it are well based, and, therefore, convincing. Belligerent organizations, such as armies, are, indeed, more likely to be used for offensive purposes than fortifications, for the simple reason that the former are capable of movement while the latter are fixed, and, therefore, can not come into action unless they happen to be in the scene of battle. International law allows the existence of war implements and armies in neutralized regions. Prima facie the presence of military elements in a place would seem to be incompatible with its non-belligerent character, but a little consideration on the conception of self-defense necessarily shows that no contradiction or inconsistency occurs.

It is easy, of course, to say that, whatever the general theory of neutralization may be, the United States has by treaty the express authority for fortifying; but it is interesting, nevertheless, to have this idea demonstrated, that neutralization and fortification are harmonious. Happily, the author's opinion as to this matter is shown to be brought to pass by queries and not by prejudice; for throughout the volume there are occasional twists of phrase indicating that the twists of mind are not unreasonably favorable to the United States. For the benefit of any reader who wishes to conduct investigations for himself, the volume gives an adequate bibliography and reprints the important treaties.

EUGENE WAMBAUGH.

A Manual of International Law; for the use of Naval Officers. By Rear Admiral C. H. Stockton, U. S. N. Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1911. 313 pp.

The manual before us represents the experience gained in the practice of international law by its author during a long and especially useful career as an officer of the United States Navy; a career which may be said to have culminated in his fortunate incumbency of the office of Superintendent of the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island. There is no place, certainly in the United States, where instruction in international law is carried on with such systematic thoroughness, or where better or more practical results are obtained, and this is due, in great part, to the intelligent and well-directed endeavors to that end. which were put forth by Admiral Stockton, and by Professors Snow and Wilson who cooperated with him in the establishment of the school upon its present basis. A notion of the extent and character of the work done at the War College may be obtained from the annual volumes of its Proceedings a work of standard and permanent value.

The manual is primarily intended for the use of naval officers, as is indicated by its title. The book is not quite equally divided between peace and war; a comparatively full presentation of the former being necessary in the discussion of the subjects of territory, including boundaries, insurgency in its relation to belligerency, jurisdiction on the high seas and nationality, all of which are of the first importance to officers. of the Navy. In the portion devoted to war, belligerency, neutrality, maritime capture, blockade, contraband, the right of search and unneutral service are all of them thoroughly and lucidly discussed in the light of the most recent authorities. The old rules of maritime capture, which have recently been made the subject of conventional amendment, are brought fully up to date; the most recent of these, the Convention. of London of 1907, is treated in great detail and at sufficient length. This is as it should be, for that convention, if generally and fully adopted and followed, is calculated to bring about very material changes in the practice of maritime warfare.

It was an earlier American author, the late Major General Halleck, whose work on international law was required to be carried on board every public armed vessel in the British Navy. It is fortunate, indeed, that Admiral Stockton's excellent work on the same subject is to occupy a similar place in the Navy of the United States. For that purpose a better selection could not possibly have been made.

GEO. B. DAVIS.

Boundaries. A Contribution to the Study of American International Law. By Hugo D. Barbagelata. Paris. 1911.

[Translation.*]

Until recent years no study of what may be called, strictly speaking, "American international law," had been attempted. The expression, it is true, was in use. But it was taken in quite a different sense from that which is at the present day given it. By it we understand, indeed. at the present time, among other subjects which need not occupy us here. the international problems and situations peculiar to the new continent.1

This study of American International Law, in the sense now given it, tends from day to day to draw greater attention to it. The monograph of Mr. Barbagelata on "Boundaries," written as a thesis for a diploma in the School of Political Science, is a proof of this.

The subject chosen is a very interesting one: it has dominated, in fact, the entire foreign policy of all the states of the new world during the course of the nineteenth century. What rules have been observed in the delimitation of their boundaries? Have they merely had recourse to the ordinary rules of international law, or have they, on the contrary, sought for and followed a special rule, more in harmony with the principles peculiar to America? Such is the question which the new world. has had to solve.

The states of Latin America, being all of them, with the exception of Brazil, former colonies of the same mother-country, and having proclaimed their independence at about the same period, and at the same time having set themselves up as separate nations, the problem of the delimitation of their respective boundaries became a peculiarly delicate one. If the states of America on becoming independent broke off entirely their past relations with Spain, they nevertheless preserved the former administrative divisions. The latter, from having up to that time marked the several provinces of the colonial empire of Spain, thereafter served to define the territory of the new states. This adaptation was brought about without conflict, and with the consent, if not expressed, at least tacit, of the states, except in certain boundary regions of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.

*

At the time of their independence, these states were in perfect accord

By Mr. Chas. G. Fenwick, of Washington, D. C.

1 See Alvarez, Le Droit International Américain, Paris, 1910, p. 10 and following.

on the point of making their administrative divisions national boundaries, and they agreed whether expressly by treaty, or tacitly, to adopt in fact a rule of delimitation absolutely unknown to international law, but perfectly logical and answering to the necessities of the situation. This rule is called the Uti Possidetis of 1810.

This very simple rule has been at the same time the source of difficulties between the states, as is evident when we remember that the former administrative divisions were almost always lacking in definiteness. The result is that boundary questions may be classed among the most important points of American international law. Let us see how Mr. Barbagelata regards these questions of uti possidetis.

After a rapid examination of the cases in which the rule of uti possidetis has not been applied, the author concludes that it is "a principle of little practical value, and embarrassing rather than useful in the solution of the countless boundary questions which arise so frequently between the various states of Latin America." [Page 3.] This opinion indicates, in our opinion, a confusion with regard to two very different matters. A distinction must be made, indeed, between the rule according to which the delimitation is made, and the more or less practical import which may be attributed to it. As regards the rule itself, there is no room for doubt. Diplomatic history goes to show that, with certain exceptions which do not destroy the rule, the rule of uti possidetis has, indeed, been the basis chosen for the carrying out of these delimitations. It is hardly in place here to enumerate the various cases in which the rule has been proclaimed or followed. On the contrary, it is important to note the cases in which the principle appears to have been abandoned, and these are precisely the cases which Mr. Barbagelata has made use of to support his position that the rule is indefinite. Thus the author cites. in support of his assertion the agreement of confederation signed at the Congress of Lima in 1847, and in which, after having proclaimed the rule of uti possidetis as a principle of delimitation, Article 7 goes on to provide that

in order to determine the said delimitations in cases where they are not fixed in a natural or definite way, they (the Confederate Republics) agree that when the case shall arise the governments of the republics concerned will appoint delegates who shall meet together, and after exploring as far as possible the territory in dispute, will determine the boundary lines of the two republics by taking the watersheds, channels of rivers and other natural lines.

But this last restriction, far from being in our opinion a derogation from the rule, only goes to confirm it, for, as can be gathered from a