the scope and obligation of the policy of arbitration adopted in the present arbitration treaty of April 4, 1908, between the two countries, so as to exclude certain exceptions contained in that treaty and to provide means for the peaceful solution of all questions of difference which it shall be found impossible in future to settle by diplomacy, with the following AMENDMENTS. On page 3, line 4, after the word " Tribunal" add a comma. In the same line strike out "may" and insert in lieu thereof "shall." On page 4 strike out the paragraph commencing on line 28 and ending on line 35. Provided, That the Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the said treaty with the understanding, to be made part of such ratification, that the treaty does not authorize the submission to arbitration of any question which affects the admission of aliens into the United States, or the admission of aliens to the educational institutions of the several States, or the territorial integrity of the several States or of the United States, or concerning the question of the alleged indebtedness or monied obligation of any State of the United States, or any question which depends upon or involves the maintenance of the traditional attitude of the United States concerning American questions, commonly described as the Monroe doctrine, or other purely governmental policy. In the editorial comment in the January number of the JOURNAL an impartial summary was given of the provisions of the texts of the treaties, their aims, and purposes, the objections to their ratification contained in the various reports made by the Foreign Relations Committee, and the official interpretation and justification of their terms made by Secretary Knox, who negotiated and signed them on behalf of the United States. In view of the fullness with which these views were set forth in the comment it does not seem necessary to restate the issues or to summarize the debates immediately preceding the ratification. Therefore, the present comment confines itself to noting the changes made in the texts of the treaties and the interpretation of the treaties contained in the resolution of ratification. By general agreement and without the taking of a vote, the text of Article I was slightly amended, as proposed in the majority report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, by placing a comma after the word "tribunal" and substituting "shall" for "may" in the following clause, "or to some other arbitral tribunal, as may [shall] be decided in each case by special agreement." It will be recalled that the majority report proposed to strike from the treaty the third paragraph of Article III investing the Joint High Commission with the power to determine in case of disagreement whether the question in dispute was or was not justiciable under the obligation created by Article I. This clause, which was the subject of much discussion within and without the Senate, was as follows: It is further agreed, however, that in cases in which the parties disagree as to whether or not a difference is subject to arbitration under Article I of this treaty, that question shall be submitted to the Joint High Commission of Inquiry; and if all or all but one of the members of the Commission agree and report that such difference is within the scope of Article I, it shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this treaty. * * Put to a vote the amendment of the majority report was carried, that is to say, was struck out by a vote of 42 to 40. Having thus accepted the two amendments proposed by the majority report, the Senate passed to the consideration of other amendments offered by individual senators. The first article submits to arbitration "all differences hereafter arising * which are justiciable in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law or equity." Senator Culberson proposed to insert after the word "equity" the following phrase "but which shall not embrace any question which affects the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of either of the two contracting parties, nor any question which concerns the interests of third parties." This amendment was rejected by a vote of 45 to 37. Senator Bacon then proposed the following amendment as a proviso to the first clause of Article I: Provided, That this agreement of arbitration does not authorize the submission to arbitration of any question which affects the admission of aliens into the United States, or the admission of aliens to the educational institutions of the several States, or the territorial integrity of the several States or of the United States, or concerning the question of the alleged indebtedness or moneyed obligation of any State of the United States or any question which depends upon or involves the maintenance of the traditional attitude of the United States concerning American questions, commonly described as the Monroe doctrine, or other purely governmental policy. The vote on this stood 41 to 41 and the Vice-President declared it lost. It will be noted, however, that Senator Bacon's amendment reappears in its entirety as the official interpretation in the resolution of ratification, and the first part of it dealing with admission of aliens to the United States or to educational institutions was immediately adopted upon motion of Senator Chamberlain by a vote of 41 to 38 as a proviso at the end of the first clause of Article I. There were no further amendments offered and the treaty as modified was reported to the Senate. Senator Lodge thereupon proposed a resolution of ratification which took note of the action of the Senate, including Senator Chamberlain's proviso. Senator Bacon moved as a substitute for this proviso his former amendment of Article I which had been defeated by the casting vote of the Vice-President, and now changed to the form of a proviso to the resolution of ratification. This time he was more successful as the substitute was carried by a vote of 46 to 36 and as adopted it became the official interpretation of the Senate. The resolution as amended was then agreed to by a vote of 76 to 3 and the French treaty was without objection advised and consented to upon like conditions. Included in the resolution of ratification the substitute has practically the force of an amendment of the treaty for it was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Doe v. Braden (16 Howard 635, 656), that where one of the parties to a treaty, at the time of its ratification annexes a written declaration explaining ambiguous language in the instrument or adding a new and distinct stipulation, and the treaty is afterwards ratified by the other party with the declaration attached to it, and the ratifications duly exchanged, the declaration thus annexed is a part of the treaty and as binding and obligatory as if it were inserted in the body of the instrument. It is of course for the President to determine whether or not he considers the action of the Senate as impairing the value of the treaties. Should he be of the opinion that ratifications thereof should be exchanged, and if Great Britain and France are willing to accept the treaties in their present form, ratifications may be exchanged at any time agreed upon and the treaties be proclaimed. The question is one of expediency for the President and the Secretary of State to decide. MEDIATION IN THE TURKO-ITALIAN WAR. The war between Italy and Turkey has for some months past been reduced to a situation which may be compared to a stalemate. Both parties seem able to hold their own, yet neither party is able to push the other any further. Italy is in secure possession of the town of Tripoli and the surrounding country, but she is unable to push further back and conquer the entire territory. Turkey is still in possession of the mountains in southern Tripoli but cannot drive the Italians from Italy has thus far limited the scene of operations to Tripoli the coast. and Cyrenaica. She might strengthen her position and bring Turkey to terms if she carried the war into the Eastern Mediterranean and captured important towns in Europe and Asia Minor, but for the present she is apparently precluded from doing so by a desire not to interfere with neutral commerce in that section. Turkey, on the other hand, might take effective action in ousting the Italians if she were able to send troops by land either to the scene of action or to Italian territory in Europe. This being the situation, it is now an opportune time for the Powers to intervene. Having apparently delayed their good offices to prevent the war from breaking out, the Powers may now take steps to put an end to it when it has become a public nuisance. Mediation at this point will not deprive Italy of any substantial advantages she has gained, and it will enable Turkey to retire gracefully before the decree of a conference of the Powers rather than to submit to dictation from Italy. It is perhaps somewhat less humiliating for a man to be deprived of his property by a higher power exercising a right of "eminent domain" than to be plundered by a single individual. had no ground of war against Turkey. been very real ones, only they were not and definite terms before the war began. has been thrown upon Italy's motives. In the preamble to the bill ratifying the decree of annexation, it is stated that, This does not imply that Italy Italy has always regarded the equilibrium of political influences in the Mediterranean as her vital interest and has constantly held her possession of a free hand economically and politically in Tripoli and Cyrenaica to be essential thereto. Italy had for years striven to attain this end by fair and peaceful means, and would not have had recourse to arms, had any other solution been possible and had all forms of Italian activity in Lybia not met with persistent and systematic opposition from the Ottoman Government. This statement adds no details as to the character of that "systematic opposition" to Italian enterprises in Tripoli which figured as the chief complaint in the ultimatum to Turkey. What is meant by the "possession of a free hand * * * politically" it is difficult to say, but it suggests some sort of a protectorate over Tripoli which Italy asserts to be necessary to the maintenance of an equally vague "equilibrium of political influences in the Mediterranean." The Italian premier in his defense of the annexation bill went a step further and is reported as saying that in Italy, as in all civilized countries, the colonial problem made itself felt as a supreme necessity, and that Italy could never have tolerated the occupation by others of Tripoli, her steadfast goal. The two motives are quite distinct. On the one hand, Italy feels that colonial expansion is a national necessity, and, on the other hand, she fears that the one opportunity open to her may be seized by others. The occupation of Tripoli is thus regarded as analogous to the occupation by the other Powers of the lower portion of the African continent. Italy claims that as Turkey had done nothing to improve the territory it was right that Italy should be allowed to do so. Being prevented from doing so by alleged Turkish opposition to Italian enterprises, Italy enters upon the war, and she is all the more prompt to take this step for fear lest other Powers should anticipate her on a similar civilizing mission. All this seems very plausible, but we are still confronted with the question in the Turkish reply to the ultimatum as to the "nature of the guarantees which Italy would have considered sufficient for the protection of her economic interests in Tripoli. To this question no reply has been given and apparently none can be given. Ancient Rome looms large on the modern horizon and is not Italy heir-at-law of the unoccupied or adjacent provinces of the wondrous Empire? Apart from the opportuneness of mediation at this point of the contest it is highly desirable for the Powers to put an end to the war. Italy cannot afford to continue a war in which she is making so little progress. The situation is one where not to advance is to go back. Taxation continues while the opposing forces are resting on their arms. On the other hand, Turkey is faced with the danger of a revolt in her European provinces. Albania, Macedonia, and Crete could want no better moment for a final effort to shake off the Turkish yoke. Europe on its part can not be indifferent to the prospects of a conflagration in the Balkans. The difficulty is in the absence not of a realization on the part of the Powers of the need of mediation but of an agreement as to the basis of such mediation. Italy has committed herself to the annexation of Tripoli as the sine qua non of a treaty of peace. Turkey refuses to consider the terms. How can the Powers bring pressure upon Italy to modify her demand or upon Turkey to comply with it as it stands? Russia has her own designs for securing a free egress from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Austria is not indifferent to the fate of Albania. Bulgaria, with the backing of a formidable army, can not but sympathize with those of her own race in Macedonia. On the whole, it is very probable that if a European conference should meet to act |