the beginning of the war it had sought the good offices of the Powers with a view to inducing Italy, in the name of the general peace and out of respect for the treaties guaranteeing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to desist from the conflict. The reply next calls attention to the fact that the bond between Tripoli and the Empire, as manifested by the tenacity with which that province had resisted the Italian invasion, was so close that the demand upon the Turkish Government to amputate Tripoli was equivalent to a proposition of suicide. This bond between the province and the Empire was one not dependent upon the predominance of any one party in Turkey. If Turkey were to abandon a province so strongly attached to the mother country, the act would cause an upheaval throughout the whole Ottoman Empire, which would endanger not only the domestic peace of the Empire, but would complicate the international situation to an even greater degree. "The result of such an act would thus be diametrically opposed to the object sought by the friendly Powers, that is to say, the maintenance of the general peace." In this state of affairs the Turkish Government is forced to declare that it could not enter into negotiations unless they were to have "as a basis and point of departure, the effective and integral maintenance of the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, the formal renunciation by Italy of the annexation of the Ottoman Provinces of Tripoli and Benghazi, and the prior agreement on the part of Italy to withdraw her troops."

Inasmuch as there is a clear and definite issue between the belligerents and neither of them is prepared to consider any compromise on the vital point at stake, it is difficult to see what could be accomplished at present by an international conference, if it were to be called. In fact it appears from semi-official sources that the idea of an international conference is acceptable to neither Italy nor Turkey. There seems to be a general agreement among European diplomats that the program of such a conference would have to be strictly limited to the issue concerning Tripoli; but so long as neither party is willing to yield on the fundamental proposition of sovereignty over Tripoli, the labors of the conference would. be doomed to failure in advance. With the decisions of the Congress of Berlin before her as a precedent, Turkey could not hope to gain by an international conference unless she were at her last gasp, which is clearly not the case so long as Turkey can control domestic revolt within the Empire. If the great Powers of Europe have hitherto refrained from dividing among themselves the Turkish possessions in Europe, their

unselfishness has been due, the Porte may be inclined to think, not to consideration for Turkey, but to the difficulty of deciding upon a partition satisfactory to all the claimants. On the other hand, the Porte has only European dissension to thank if the traditional Turkish misrule in her European provinces and the persecutions to which the Christian population of the vilayets has been from time to time subjected, have not long since cost her the loss of those territories. International law, it is true, does not recognize the rights of an individual apart from his citizenship in a given state, hence under strict law a state may subject a certain portion of its own subjects to greater burdens than it puts upon others, without being accountable before the nations; but if these burdens reach the point of persecution, and especially if they are attended by physical violence, so as to outrage the feelings of the citizens of other states, who are bound to the sufferers by ties of race or religion, it may well be a question whether foreign nations may not intervene in the interest of their own domestic peace.

WILLIAM T. STEAD, 1849-1912

Among the victims of the Titanic disaster of April 14, 1912, was William T. Stead, and the JOURNAL cannot allow this issue to go to press without a brief statement of his services to the cause of international peace. Mr. Stead's activities as a journalist and as a man interested in all good causes are too well known to require comment, but his services in connection with the First and Second Hague Conferences, unofficial though they were, are not his least title to remembrance. He attended the First Conference in 1899, secured adequate notices of its work in the journals and published in French a well-known account entitled The Conference at the Hague. In 1907 he attended unofficially the Second Hague Conference and, as in 1899, secured notices in the press, which went far to counteract the imperfect and often hostile accounts which appeared in the newspapers generally. He prepared and published in French, at his own expense, a volume entitled Le Parlement de l'Humanité, a sort of "Who's Who" of the Conference, with portraits of the delegates, and during the entire course of the Conference he issued in French, at his own expense, a daily journal entitled the Courier de la Conférence, which was, and still remains, the best daily account of the proceedings of the Conference, as well as of the hopes and aspirations of

its members. These various works were but a fraction of his literary activity. They are, however, sufficient in themselves to give him an honored place in the hearts of all who believe in the Hague Conferences and see in them the instrumentality of creating an international law, which will regulate, according to the principles of justice, the foreign relations of nations.

APPROVAL OF THE DECLARATION OF LONDON BY THE UNITED STATES

SENATE ON APRIL 24, 1912

3

It will be recalled that the Second Hague Peace Conference adopted a convention for the establishment of an International Prize Court, but that certain of its provisions were objected to by certain of the signatory countries, which nevertheless approved the idea and the convention as a whole. The United States considered unacceptable those provisions which authorized and required an appeal in prize cases from the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to the International Court of Prize to be established at the Hague. For this reason an alternative procedure was proposed by this government, which, while allowing a direct appeal from courts of last resort, would nevertheless permit certain countries to submit to the Hague court the questions involved rather than the judgment itself of the national court of last resort. An additional protocol to this effect was drawn up and signed by representatives of the various governments at The Hague on September 19, 1910, and the additional protocol has since been approved by all the signatories to the convention. On February 15, 1911, the Senate of the United States advised and consented to the ratification of the original convention as modified by the additional protocol, so that, as far as the United States is concerned, the objection to the establishment of the International Prize Court has been removed.

In the next place, a difficulty arose as to the law to be applied by the International Prize Court. Article VII provides that, if the question in issue has been regulated by a treaty between the countries in litigation, the provisions of this treaty should be binding upon the court. The meaning of the treaty would undoubtedly be subject to interpretation, but the law would exist in a tangible shape which the court was to interpret and apply. This provision is clear and has given rise to no controversy.

3 Articles III and VI of the original Prize Court Convention.

The second paragraph of Article VII, however, has been the subject of heated discussion, for it provides that "in the absence of such (treaty) provisions, the court shall apply the rules of international law. If no generally recognized rule exists, the court shall give judgment in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity." In the discussion of the convention, Russia and Japan objected that the law in such matters was not settled and that an agreement upon the law to be applied should precede the establishment and operation of the court. The British delegation proposed the provisions, but the Government of Great Britain objected to them and declared that, unless an agreement should be reached upon the law to be applied by the court in certain branches of prize law, Great Britain would be unable to ratify the convention. It, therefore, suggested an international conference of naval Powers to meet at London. The Powers consulted accepted the proposal and a naval conference, composed of representatives from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, and Russia, met at London on December 2, 1908, adopted the socalled Declaration of London, and adjourned on February 26, 1909.4

It is not the purpose of the present comment to examine the provisions of the Declaration of London or to determine in how far they met the objections, which had been raised to Article VII of the Prize Court Convention. Opinion is divided on this question, but it is generally agreed that the declaration marks a decided advance and that, even although some of its provisions are properly open to criticism, the declaration is an acceptable compromise and a clear statement of hitherto conflicting views. The British Government accepted the declaration and signed the Prize Court Convention, but, as it had made the acceptance of the declaration a prerequisite to the ratification of the Prize Court Convention, it is evident that, so far as Great Britain is concerned, the fate of the Prize Court hangs upon the declaration. The Prize Court Convention and the declaration necessitated changes in its municipal law, and a prize bill was introduced and passed in the House of Commons to bring municipal law into accord with the international agreements. The House of Lords rejected on December 15, 1911, the prize bill. Hence, so far as Great Britain is concerned, it can not at present cooperate in the establishment of the Prize Court. The British Government, however, has stated its intention to reintroduce the bill, and, if the opposition of the House of Lords can not be overcome, to take 4 For the text of the Declaration, see Supplement, Vol. 3, p. 179.

advantage of the revised procedure, which enables a bill which has three times passed the House of Commons, to become a law without the assent of the upper chamber. It is to be hoped that the bill will eventually be passed and that Great Britain will be enabled to co-operate in the establishment of the great and beneficent International Court of Prize.

As previously stated, the acceptance of the additional protocol removed the one serious objection which the United States had made to the Prize Court Convention. The Declaration of London, which refers to the convention and supplies the law to be administered in certain cases by the court under Article III of the convention, was submitted to the Senate in April, 1909. No action was taken at this time, because it was deemed inexpedient to approve it before the Prize Court Convention was modified so as to remove objections. It was also deemed advisable to await the action of Great Britain. It would have been proper to consider at one and the same time the Prize Court Convention, the additional protocol and the declaration, because they related to one and the same subject. The Senate, however, acted favorably upon the convention and the additional protocol without considering the declaration. However, on April 24, 1912, the declaration was taken up by the Senate, and advised and consented to. Therefore, as far as the United States is concerned, the President is in the fortunate position to deposit ratifications of the convention and the additional protocol, whenever a date is fixed by The Netherlands Government, and the President is also enabled to deposit ratifications of the Declaration of London in accordance with its provisions, whenever he may care to take such action.

It is a source of congratulation to those who believe that conflicts of a judicial nature may be settled peaceably and satisfactorily by international courts of justice, to learn that the United States has, by the approval of these various instruments, given concrete expression to its belief in the peaceful settlement of international disputes, which has been a cardinal principle of the United States since its independent existence as a member of the society of nations.

THE EIGHTEENTH LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION

The Eighteenth Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, held at Mohonk Lake, N. Y., May 15th-17th, was, like its predecessors, representative of many callings and nationalities, there being