born of foreigners in France may acquire French citizenship on the condition that at the time they reach their majority they are domiciled in France. It follows that during their minority they are subject to expulsion; a conclusion which has been definitely affirmed by the French courts. The nationality of such child is held to be that of the parents until majority is reached, and, as aliens, they are subject to the operation of the act. Nor are foreigners who have taken up their domicile in France and by domicile is meant a permanent abode acquired by the formal application for the permission of the government to establish it as required by the laws of France for that reason exempt from the operation of the law of 1849. The author points out, however, that persons who have obtained this permission and who have acted upon the privilege extended by the government are in a better position as regards their right to remain than strangers who have failed to do so. That this was the view taken by the legislator appears from the provision of law specially adopted for the exigency. It is therein provided that the order of expulsion issued against a foreigner who has acquired domiciliary rights in the manner provided by law shall be of no effect if within two months after its issuance the state has not revoked the permission granted to a foreigner to formally acquire his domicile in France. It is unnecessary to add that the citizens of France, with few exceptions, are not subject to the operation of the exclusion law.

In passing to the consideration of what constitute justifiable causes of expulsion, the writer points out that since it must be admitted that foreigners who have been convicted of an offense may well be deemed to be a menace to the public safety of the state, a single conviction constitutes a cause of expulsion of which the government may take cognizance and act accordingly.

Besides the demands of the peace and public security of the state, and as another general ground justifying the exercise of the right, is the existence of a grave political necessity based on political reasons. As examples of the right of expulsion exercised on this ground, the author cites or quotes in part many well-known cases of interest to the student of this branch of the law. As acknowledged justifiable causes of expulsion under this head he gives the publication of anarchistic views, the condonation of assassination, espionage, intrigues and plots against the state, a tendency to resist the laws of the state, anti-militarism, and insult offered to the national flag.

He denies, however, that international law recognizes that foreigners

may with justice be expelled from a country because the number of manual laborers exceeds the demands of capital.

Advocating, as the author does, the existence of the right of states to expel alien friends in time of peace, it follows that he refers with approval to the general view of publicists that international law recognizes equally the right of any state to cause the departure of enemy subjects from its limits in time of war. He points out that this is one of the natural results of the existence of war between two states, but that the declaration of war does not ipso facto bring about the expulsion en masse of enemy subjects; and that even in time of war it is the duty of the state to exercise this right with caution and to give all reasonable opportunity for relieving its territory with the least harm to themselves.

The expulsion of foreigners being by nature an administrative measure, it naturally devolves upon administrative officers to take necessary steps for putting it into effect, and the writer unqualifiedly takes the view that the issuance of an order of expulsion is not within the jurisdiction of judicial officers. Being a national police measure, it lies with the administration to direct its operation, and the courts have no right to direct the expulsion of a foreigner in addition to imposing upon him the penalty which the law prescribes for the crime of which he has been convicted.

The author goes into interesting and instructive detail regarding the procedure incident to the exercise of the right. As the first step, the preliminary investigation looking toward the expulsion of a given alien, corresponding to the investigation by the proper inspection officer under our immigration law on which to base the warrant of arrest issued by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor; and as the second, following the order of expulsion, corresponding to the deportation warrant known to our law, which with us, however, is the third instead of the second step in the proceedings, the latter being with us the issuance by the Secretary of the warrant of arrest, which is the basis of the administrative hearing. Under the law of France the final stage is the notification to the interested party that the order of expulsion has been issued. No necessity exists, of course, under our own law for such notification, in view of the fact that the party is himself entitled to a hearing, has full knowledge of the governmental action taken, and his deportation is the act of the government itself.

On the continent, on the other hand, the actual expulsion is not, as a rule, carried out by administrative officers, except on failure of the

alien to obey the behests of the executive officer who has issued the order. As M. Martini points out, the necessity of individual notification of collective expulsion does not exist in time of war.

As our courts have so often held, the detention of an alien pending his deportation cannot be considered imprisonment for crime, but simply as a legitimate means to be employed by government in insuring the departure from this country of foreigners who belonged to a class the members of which are, for public reasons sufficient to the state, not considered competent to remain. The right of administrative detention, although, even as the author points out, the object of severe criticism, is fully sustained in this work; but he does not hesitate to affirm that the power should not be abused.

The legal effects of the decree of expulsion have been considered at length by the author. They necessarily include, he says, a prohibition against the alien's return.

At this point it may not be inapt to draw attention to the distinction, which is made clear by an examination of M. Martini's work, existing between the exercise of the right of expulsion by the United States and the various European countries. In the latter jurisdiction conditions calling for the exercise of the right very generally arise with the commission by a foreigner of an act or acts which in greater or less degree threatens the welfare or security, or renders the presence of the offender undesirable for public reasons. In the United States, on the other hand, when a warrant is issued for the deportation of a foreigner, the cause for its issuance is very generally nothing more than the unlawful presence of the alien in the United States a presence not unlawful on account of the commission of any act on his part threatening the public welfare, but because he is afflicted with some disability which constituted a bar to his lawful entry; or because, as under the Chinese Exclusion Acts, he belongs to a class the members of which cannot lawfully enter this country. Up to the passage of the Act of March 26, 1910, amending that of February 20, 1907, the Acts relating to the admission of aliens had not specifically prohibited the return of those who had been excluded or had been deported as being unlawfully here. It is obvious that where the only ground of deporting foreigners is the fact that they have entered unlawfully through the existence of some such disability at the time of entry, which may long since have ceased to exist, it does not include a prohibition against the return of the alien to this country when competent to enter in accordance with its law. But where, as in

the amended Act of 1910, deportation is ordered in the case of aliens found to have committed certain prohibited acts or to have become members of certain prohibited classes after having entered the United States, the warrant ordering their departure might, even in the absence of the special prohibition against their return contained in the act, be deemed to include such prohibition.

The author has devoted considerable space to the question of the right of the courts to pass upon the validity of administrative decrees of expulsion, a subject which has constantly claimed the attention of the courts of this country and concerning which, even after the rendering of the Ju Toy decision by the Supreme Court, judicial opinion is not unanimous.

The question of the admissibility, under our immigration law, of the wives and children of naturalized aliens, has always been an important feature in that branch of our jurisprudence, and of late the Federal courts have reached conflicting opinions on analogous states of fact. Similarly, the courts have differed as to the effect of a marriage entered into between a citizen of the United States and a woman of alien extraction, particularly where it was shown that in all likelihood the marriage, though legally performed, was entered into for the purpose of enabling the woman to enter this country.

Under the title of "Termination of the right of expulsion," M. Martini devotes considerable attention to similar questions arising in connection with the law of France dealing with the general question from the standpoint of expulsion rather than of exclusion. He maintains that the mere fact that a marriage has been contracted by a foreign woman, who has been expelled from France, with a French citizen for the sole purpose of enabling her to return to France, has and can have no effect on the political change of status which, under the French law of citizenship, must result from such a union. The naturalization of the parents brings about the naturalization of their minor children; but not so with children having reached their majority, who, the author shows, as may the wife of a naturalized citizen, obtain the citizenship status under certain conditions.

The book shows excellent preparation in the special branch of law which it covers, as well as an intimate knowledge of the subject-matter, and will undoubtedly prove of special interest to all students of international law and have a peculiar attraction for those who have had occasion to examine into the vexed questions which arise under our laws

regarding the admission and exclusion of aliens. It contains numerous quotations from the foreign laws on the subject, and in the appendix many of these laws are set out in full. While much space is necessarily devoted to the consideration of problems arising in connection with the French law of expulsion, it is nevertheless obvious that the intent of the author is to treat his subject from a comparative standpoint and to show that questions arising in connection with the rights and obligations of governments touching the expulsion of foreigners forms of itself an interesting and important branch of the law of nations. In this he has been successful.

CLEMENT L. Bouvé.

La Bulgarie. Etude d'histoire diplomatique et de Droit international. By Auguste Chaunier. Paris. Rousseau. 1909. 224 pp.

The book of Mr. Auguste Chaunier is a good enough thesis for the doctorate, but nothing more. A search for the discovery of original thought or hitherto unpublished documents goes unrewarded. The book is the result of a skillful and conscientious labor of compilation and vulgarization. The author divides his work into two parts, the first is historical, the other juridical. As for the first we have nothing to criticize. The excellent opuscule of Mr. Bausquet, Histoire du Peuple Bulgare (imp. Chaix, 1909), furnishes reading, attractive and instructive, of a different quality. Mr. A. C. lays greater emphasis, and rightly so, upon contemporary history, upon the reconstruction of the Greater Bulgaria and the reign of King Ferdinand. But even in this historical part, the author is prejudiced from the juridical point of view. He declares that the Bulgarian state was a sovereign state even before its independence, which is a debatable question; he views the annexation. of Rumelia as constituting at first a real, and afterward a personal union, which is incorrect.1

These different points are, of course, taken up again in the second part and developed in the form of a juridical dissertation. In doing so, the author merely reproduces the theories put forth before his advent, particularly in the good thesis of Mr. Sariivanoff La Bulgarie est elle un Etat mi-souverain, which he does not mention, and in the book by Serkis La Roumélie Orientale, which he does not seem to have consulted.

1 See our article upon this question in the JOURNAL, Vol. 5, p. 144 at pp. 151 and