cerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto, as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course." "1

Extended quotation from the diary of J. Q. Adams has been made, because it is believed that nowhere else is so well shown the Monroe Doctrine in its process of formation. Here are exhibited from day to day the hopes, the fears, and the wishes of the men who were called to act for the nation in the emergency which had arisen; and we are able to discern therein the motives which actuated them in their final decision.

Although the principles of this Doctrine had originated at an earlier period, and had been of slow growth, yet they were now, for the first time, distinctly formulated and officially set forth by the executive department of the government. And here it will be readily seen that the secretary of state, Mr. Adams, exercised a considerable influence in giving final shape to the declaration of those principles.

While taking a stand against the interference of the Allies in South America, independent of England, the message goes further, and skilfully draws the line between the two hemispheres, thus excluding England-our would-be ally-as well as the continental powers from new colonization on the western continents.

In the light of present knowledge, one can hardly subscribe

1 Statesman's Manual, I., 452, 460; State Papers, V. Foreign Affairs, 245-50.

to Mr. Sumner's assertion, that "The Monroe Doctrine proceeded from Canning," and that "he was its inventor, promoter, and champion, at least so far as it bears against European intervention in American affairs." And again, "at last, after much discussion in the cabinet at Washington, President Monroe, accepting the lead of Mr. Canning, and with the counsel of John Quincy Adams, put forth this famous doctrine." 1

And Canning said, in 1826, in explaining the reason why he did not prevent the occupation of Spain by France, "I looked another way. I sought for compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it should not be Spain 'with the Indies.' I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." 2

The historical truth would seem to be, that Canning not only had little, if any, influence in the formation of the Monroe Doctrine, but that he had as little in "calling the new world into existence." We have seen how the Munroe Doctrine originated; as to the independence of South America and Mexico, what are the facts? As late as the autumn of 1823, Mr. Canning was willing to see the Spanish-Americans restored to the dominion of Spain, if this could be done by the efforts of Spain herself. But this he knew was impossible; the colonies had been, with one or two exceptions, practically independent for many years. The United States had acknowledged their independence and had established diplomatic intercourse with them. The English government waited more than two years before adopting a like policy. And then the final step was taken, or at least hastened by a jealousy of the United States. It was feared that they would acquire an authority and a commercial advantage by reason of their intimate relations with the Spanish-Americans. Lord Liverpool wrote to Wellington, December 8, 1824, "If we allow these new states to con

1 Prophetic voices concerning America, pp. 157, 158.

2 Canning's Speech, 12th December, 1826.

8 The 2d of July, 1824, the English government came to a determination to recognize Buenos Ayres. The decision in respect to Mexico and Columbia was taken in the following December.

solidate their system and their policy with the United States of America, it will in a few years prove fatal to our greatness, if not endanger our safety." 1

There is no desire to underrate the importance of Canning's part in thwarting the designs of the "Holy Alliance;" but that was a European, rather than an American triumph. He freed England from her entanglement with the European Alliance, and discredited its policy in Europe; but to do this he sought and obtained the indirect aid of the United States. It is not at all certain that Canning could have prevented the independence of the Spanish-American states, without, at least, having taken an active part against them.

The opposition in parliament gave full credit to Mr. Monroe's message. Brougham said:

"The question with regard to South America is now disposed of, or nearly so; for an event has recently happened, than which no event has ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude, over all the freemen of Europe; that event which is decisive on the subject, is the language held with respect to Spanish America, in the speech or message of the President of the United States to the congress." 2

"When the message arrived in London," says Rush, "the whole document excited great attention. Spanish-American securities rose in the stock market, and the safety of the new states from all European coercion was considered as no longer doubtful." And, in fact, they were safe from molestation by the European Alliance, and all became eventually independent states.

In his next annual message, Dec. 7, 1824, President Monroe again referred to Spanish-American affairs in much the same tone as in his previous messages. "It is impossible," he said, "for the European governments to interfere in their concerns, especially in those alluded to which are vital, without affecting us; indeed, the motive which might induce such interference in the present state of the war between the parties, if a war it may be called, would appear to be equally applicable to us. It is gratifying to know that some of the powers with whom we 1 Life of Lord Liverpool, III., 305. 2 Stapleton, Pol. Life of Canning, II.

enjoy very friendly intercourse, and to whom these views have been communicated, have appeared to acquiesce in them."

On the 20th of January, 1824, Clay had moved the following resolution in the House of Representatives :

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the people of these states would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible intervention by the allied Powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the continent of America which have proclaimed and established for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly recognized by the United States."

No action was taken upon this resolution; and the attempt to give a permanent character to the Monroe Doctrine through the action of Congress failed. It would appear that Congress, considering the danger past, did not approve of adopting a general policy of this kind in the absence of specific cause.

THE PANAMA CONGRESS, 1826.

A common danger and a common cause led the governments of the Spanish-American republics to draw closer to one another; and to unite in leagues for the purpose of resisting the hostile power of Spain, or of the European allies, in case it should be directed against them. Colombia, at the instance of Bolivar, took the lead in negotiating treaties of defensive alliance with the other Spanish-American states. That between Colombia and Chili bears the date of October 21, 1822; its object may be inferred from the following stipulations: "The Republic of Colombia and the State of Chili are united, bound and confederated, in peace and war, to maintain with their influence, and forces, by sea and land, as far as circumstances permit, their independence of the Spanish nation, and of any other foreign domination whatsoever, and to secure, after that is recognised, their mutual prosperity, etc." Again, the two states "contract a league of close alliance and firm and constant friendship for the common defense, for the security of their independence and liberty,-obliging themselves to succor each

other, and to repel, in common, every attack or invasion which may in any manner threaten their existence." After making various more explicit stipulations, and providing for a joint assembly of the representatives of the two states, Article 13 continues: "Both parties oblige themselves to interpose their good offices with the governments of the other states of America, formerly Spanish, to enter into this compact of union, league, and confederation."

ARTICLE 14. "As soon as this great and important object has been attained, a general assembly of the American states shall be convened, composed of their plenipotentiaries, with the charge of cementing, in the most solid and stable manner, the intimate relations which ought to exist between all and every one of them, and which may serve as a council in the great conflicts, as a rallying-point in the common dangers, as a faithful interpreter of their public treaties when difficulties occur, and as an umpire and conciliator in their disputes and differences."

It is stipulated by Article 16, that the national sovereignty of the individual states shall in nowise be impaired by the establishment of the league.

Treaties of alliance of similar import were contracted by Colombia with Peru, July 6, 1822; with Guatemala, March, 15, 1825; with Mexico, October, 31 1823; with Buenos Ayres, June 10, 1823. In these last-named treaties, there is the further suggestion of Panama as a convenient place of meeting for the proposed congress.

The object not only of these special treaties, but also of the proposed general alliance is here made plain. It is to present a united front to the hostile forces of Spain in the war still continuing in some of the South American states, or to those of the European alliance, or any other state which might interfere in the war in favor of Spain.

The stipulations in these treaties referring to a general congress make no mention of the United States; it is the "former" or "ci-devant" Spanish provinces of America. The origin of the idea of inviting the United States does not definitely appear. Mr. Theodore Lyman 1 states that the scheme was suggested as

1 Diplomacy of the United States, II., 467.