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thing quite distinct from the other courses of instruction. Mr. Li confirmed this.
Mr. Peck said that it was regrettable that the Branches of the Kuomintang (the Provincial Tang-pu) often were so hostile to American educational institutions, and he instanced the trouble caused to the Chi-lu University in Tsinan, Shantung. Mr. Li hastened to assure Mr. Peck that the Kuomintang must not be taken as harboring antiforeign feelings. Mr. Peck remarked that the impression was general among foreigners that the Kuomintang was hostile to foreigners, and he supposed the reason was that so many of the slogans used by the Party were directed against foreigners.
Mr. Li was very cordial in his attitude.
RETENTION OF UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
893.0146/150 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Nanking (Peck)
WASHINGTON, April 24, 1931–6 p. m. 26. For the Minister:
(1) The War Department has raised the question as to retaining further United States Army forces at Tientsin. The War Department advanced the view that the present force is no longer able to perform the primary function under the 1901 Protocol ? or, in the event of serious antiforeign trouble, the secondary function of protecting American lives in the Tientsin area; cited the need for its personnel elsewhere; advanced considerations of economy; and expressed the view that, with the development of the spirit of Chinese nationalism, the continued presence of the American troops conceivably may become a source of friction, while their voluntary withdrawal might have a good effect on the relations between the two countries. This Department has no record of "an official communication from the American Minister at Peking, dated June 3, 1928”, which is quoted by the War Department.
This Department has expressed the view to the War Department that it would not be opportune at present to consider the question; that such consideration should be put off until the extraterritoriality question is settled, and that, in any case, no move should be made unless the other powers most concerned have first been consulted.
*For previous correspondence on the reduction of American armed forces in China, see ibid., 1929, vol. II, pp. 538 ff.
Signed at Peking, September 7, 1901, ibid., 1901, Appendix (Affairs in China),
(2) It occurs to the Department, however, that this Government's willingness in principle to withdraw the American Army force at the first opportune moment possibly might prove useful to you at your discretion at some point in the extraterritoriality conversations.
(3) An expression by you of your views on both these points would be welcome to the Department.
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
NANKING, April 27, 1931–11 a. m.
[Received April 27–7:45 a. m.] Your 26, April 24, 6 p. m.
(1) I am in agreement with the War Department that the time will arrive soon when the question of voluntarily withdrawing United States Army forces at Tientsin should be given consideration.
(2) I emphatically believe the present not to be an opportune moment for consideration of this question and that the other powers should be consulted before we take action.
(3) It would be a tactical error, in my opinion, to indicate during the extraterritoriality discussions our readiness in principle to withdraw the Army force. As indicated by the Department's 27, April 25, noon," Tientsin will become a factor of importance in the course of these negotiations, and it is the intention of the British Government, as expressed to me by the British Minister in China, to insist upon reserving both Shanghai and Tientsin from Chinese jurisdiction. I am sincerely convinced that our extraterritorial negotiations should continue and, if an agreement is happily reached, that we should let a period of time elapse to permit determination as to how faithfully and well the Chinese are carrying out the terms of said agreement. Then the moment will arrive for the Secretary of State to signalize the agreement's accomplishment by a public statement which would express confidence in China's stabilization and good faith, this to be accompanied by a statement of the prospective withdrawal of the American Army force at Tientsin. Pending such time it would be of no value, I feel, to say anything.
See pp. 716 ff. * Ante, p. 809.
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Hurley)
WASHINGTON, May 20, 1931. MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Your letter of April 9, 1931, requesting that I give consideration to the question of further retention of Army forces in China, is before me. You refer to various factors, in the light of which you explain that, from the viewpoint of the War Department, the removal of our forces at Tientsin is desirable, and you inquire whether I can see my way clear to concurring in the withdrawal of this garrison.
In reply, I have to say that, having for some time had the possibility of such a move under consideration, it has been and is my view that we should take no action in the matter without first consulting with other powers most concerned. When the opportune moment comes, I shall be glad to take the initiative, internationally, if circumstances warrant. The present moment, however, I do not think an opportune one for proposing or taking action in the matter. Until the situation in China has changed somewhat and until certain questions which are under negotiation between us and the Chinese have been disposed of, I think it would be inexpedient for us to make or to initiate this move. The opportune moment may come in the not distant future. In the interval, if the War Department feels it imperatively necessary, I perceive no objection to a gradual and inconspicuous reduction in the number of men in the force at Tientsin. Sincerely yours,
HENRY L. STIMSON
893.0146/157 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern
Affairs (Hamilton) of a Conversation With Major Hayes A. Kroner of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department
[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1931, Referring to telegram No. 372 of June 27, 11 a. m., from Peiping, stating that a press despatch from Washington reported that the number of American forces on duty at Tientsin was to be reduced effective September 1,
Mr. Hamilton had telephoned Major Kroner the substance of the Peiping telegram under reference. After looking into the matter in the War Department, Major Kroner called and stated that reduction of 208 in American troops at Tientsin begins September 1 and will be spread over a period of from six to eight months and that this reduction is a purely administrative matter of the War Department whereby the Fifteenth Infantry will furnish 208 enlisted men as a contribution toward the fifth increment of the United States Army Air Corps increase.
Major Kroner stated that M. I. D. had not been consulted with reference to the War Department releasing to the press notice of the contemplated reduction in the Army forces at Tientsin.. He expressed regret that the information had been given to the press. His attention was called to this Department's letter of May 20 to the War Department wherein the Secretary of State informed the Secretary of War that “if the War Department feels it imperatively necessary, I perceive no objection to a gradual and inconspicuous reduction in the number of men in the force at Tientsin.” 7
(Note: Mr. Hornbeck also talked with General Moseley 8 on this subject.)
M[AXWELL] M. HAMILTON]
ATTITUDE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON THE EXPORT TO CHINA OF ARMS OR MUNITIONS, INCLUDING MILITARY AIRCRAFT
893.113/1303 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
(Hornbeck) of a Conversation With Mr. Rogers of the Bureau of Aeronautics, Department of Commerce
[WASHINGTON,] June 8, 1931. Mr. Rogers said that he wished to become oriented with regard to the present policy in connection with export of arms to China. In view of developments at Canton, had there been any change! The United Aircraft Company and the Curtiss-Wright Company were bent on some sales to Canton.
Mr. Hornbeck stated that there had been no change in policy. He said that we had had to make some slight readjustments in reference to procedure. The constant principle is that we wish to grant license to export only on consignments the export of which is known to us to be approved and desired by the National (Nanking) Government of China. For Mr. Rogers' confidential information, we have had reason to believe that certain notifications from the Nanking Government are being delayed in the process of communication to us, and we have taken temporarily the position that, where we learn definitely through another acceptable channel that the Nanking Government has given the notification, we will, on presentation of application for license to export, approve.
* This subject was reported to the Minister in China in Department's telegram No. 212, June 29, 1931, 5 p. m., with the added instruction that the Minister might make use at his discretion of parts of the information in discussion with his colleagues.
Maj. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department.
For previous correspondence regarding cancelation of the embargo on ship ment of arms to China, see Foreign Relations, 1929, vol. II, pp. 523 ff.
There followed inquiries by Mr. Rogers with regard to exporting to Hong Kong, Canton, Indo-China, and Yunnanfu. Mr. Hornbeck explained that, for export to Hong Kong or to Indo-China, no license is required, but that we would do what we properly can in cases where we know that the ultimate destination is a point in China, to discourage the transaction in the absence of notification to us that the Nanking Government approves.
Mr. Rogers inquired about export of commercial planes. Mr. Hornbeck said that for these no license is required; he called attention to the press release of June 2, 1930,- especially the list on page 2 thereof. He said that licenses would be useful in order to prevent doubt and possible delay at the port of export, as customs officers would be likely, if they erred, to err on the side of caution and might hold back planes which were of ambiguous construction.
Mr. Rogers said that some of the aircraft companies were inclined to attempt to "get around" our regulations and policy wherever they saw a possible sale in sight. Mr. Hornbeck said that this would indicate short sightedness on their part, inasmuch as encouragement given to civil war in China, while it may mean increase of small sales temporarily, must mean in the long run a retarding of large purchases which might and probably would be made by the Central Government if, relieved of the necessity for fighting for its existence, it could accumulate resources sufficient for the carrying out of a broad gauge program of equipment and construction. Mr. Rogers said that he agreed.
Mr. Hornbeck explained the objection in principle of this Department to transactions involving the necessity for purchase, in fulfillment of contracts to export, of military equipment from American Government Departments. Mr. Rogers said that he considered it highly inadvisable for the Government to be directly associated with trade in arms for export to foreign countries, and that he considered that our attitude with regard to the matter was altogether sound. He said that he would endeavor to discourage that type of transaction. But, he said, the aircraft companies, some at least, care nothing about the Government's policy or other considerations if they see immediate profit in sight.
The view was expressed and concurred in that the Department of Commerce and the Department of State must keep in close touch and work in close cooperation on this matter.
S[TANLEY] K. H[ORNBECK]
* Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930 (no. 36), p. 273.