our independence. Here, therefore, is an end to all our liberties, as far as relates to the conduct and measures of the ministry of the day. To disapprove being a mark of disloy alty and disaffection, there is nothing left to us but to approve; and, let it be observed, that, as in principle, so in the practice, this doctrine applies to persons in parliament as well as to those without. Blessed state of freedom! Precious fruit of our "invaluable "constitution!". Irresistible stimulus to exertion, to fight and to shed one's blood! Heart-cheering signal for an on-set: “death, "or the privilege of applauding Pitt !"If ever there was a time, when every thing, whereby men may be alienated from the government (by which I mean King and parliament and the courts of justice) should be carefully abstained from;, if ever there was a time, when the people should see and hear nothing to make them doubt of the reality of their liberties, and when the experience of every hour should more and more confirm them in that attachment to these liberties, which alone will, when the day of trial comes, encourage them to act in a manner directly opposite to that of the people of Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia; it ever there was such a time, that time now is. What, therefore, are we to think of those, whose constant endeavour it is, or, at least, whose efforts constantly tend, to make us believe, that, in reality, we have no liberties at all? That what we enjoy, we enjoy by mere sufferance from the minister? That, to disapprove of his measures is, to be taken for proof of enmity to our country? That, to have discredited falsehoods, nay, direct lies, issued from the offices in Downing Street, is, even after those lies are detected, to be considered as conclusive evidence of our exulting at the disasters, which those lies were intended to keep from our knowledge? And, finally, that, to crush us, to put us out of all political, and nearly out of all physical, existence, requires only that the minister say the word?Pop'e of England! (for to you I now speak) Do you approve of the measures of Mr. Pitt? He has had the management of your affairs for twenty years; he has always been the absolute master of his measures; and, do you, I day, approve of them? Do you approve of a series of nares, in peace and in war, by which your country has been reduced to its present state? And, are you haters of your country? Are you, in addition to all your burdens and your mortifications, to be told that you are traitors? Are you, indeed, because you wish, as you naturally must, for such a change of councillors as would be 1 likely to produce a change of councils, to incur the imputation of enmity to your country and your King?-In England, when the hour of conflict shall come, and come, in all human probability, it speedily will, there will not be found, supposing all hearts united, one man too many. For those, therefore, who would divide them, who would mark out as traitors all those who cannot keep silence and who will not applaud the measures of the minister, who reject all support of the country not given conjointly with a support of Mr. Pitt, what appellation can be too harsh, what punishment too severe? To accuse their opponents of a want of loyalty and patriotism is ever the last resource of a baffled ministry; and, sometimes it may succeed; but, in the times that are approaching it will not; for, the course of events, which, forthe last seven years, has been steadily making on towards the point which it has now nearly reached, will be turned aside neither by court-intrigne, by rhetorical dexterity, nor by popular clamour. No tricks like those of the pensioned patriots, who, because the people of Middlesex elected Sir Francis Burdett, cried aloud against the revival of Jacobinism, and called for the speedy resuscitation of the Society against Republicans and Levellers, will now be of any avail, though of that Society it should be proposed to put the tithe-hating and pension-loving Mr. Huskis son at the head. We are, the mere hirelings excepted, all of one mind; thanks to Napoleon, in assuming the purple, we are, as to forms of government, all of one opinion, and that is, that, after all, our own is the best. To preserve it, and with it our liberties, as handed down to us by our fathers, we are ready to make every sacrifice that men can make conducive to such an end. But, shall we not be allowed to inquire, whether those sacrifices are likely to be of any avail? Shall we not be permitted to ask, in what hands our resources are to be placed? Shalt we be forbidden to examine into the pretensions of those, and of that minister in particular, in whose behalf the hirelings of the press prefer an exclusive claim to the directing of those means, by which alone we can be saved Ought we not to wish for, and have we not a right to expect, that, now, at any rate, our affairs should be committed to men of great statesmanlike talents? And, supposing us to possess this right, shall we now, with the London Mayor, think Mr. Pitt "the man on whom all eyes are fixed, as the last "barrier between Europe and slavery;" or, shall we, following the dictates of dear bought experience, be convinced, that, in, his whole life, having wanted nothing in the way of opportunity, he has never given one single proof of possessing such talents, in any matters whether domestic or foreign? whe they are numerous enough; but, st 'l, read ficult mes than were ever before known. Dicult times! He, indeed, has lately said so; and has thrown the blame upon Providence, who, says he, "has cost our "lot in times of peril." But, to say nothing, just yet, of the great convenience of a come-off like this, which of us cannot bring, from his speeches, proofs of his having, twice a year, at least, during the first eighteen years of his administration, declared the country to be in a prouder situation than she ever before stood; and, of his having dealt his sarcasms about upon all those, who expressed their fears for the ultimate safety of the country? The first Let sophisters quibble and hypocrites dissemble as they may, still, in politics, as in religion, the tree will be known by its fruit; and, what is the fruit which this tree of twenty years standing has borne us, our taste, though shockingly corrupted, will easily tell. Various are the opinions of men upon several points as to mesures and causes; but, as to effects, we are upon one point, and that the main one, all perfectly agreed; namely, that we are now arrived at the eve of a great crisis; that we are now engaged in a contest for our existence as an independent state; that it is now about to be determined, not whether England shall beat France, or France beat England, but, in the language of Lloyd's, whether Englishmen shall remain as they are, or become the slaves of Frenchmen. To this question, a question never before mooted, from the times of William the Conqueror to the pre-eight years of his sway was a time of peace sent day, we have been brought during the administration of WILLIAM PITT; during the administration of that man, whom the London Mayor, to his throng of listening citizens, described as the last remaining barrier between Europe and slavery. If such 2 question had been put at the beginning of his twenty years administration; if, when, "the perfidious and impious levity of the "multitude" was hailing him as one descended immediately from heaven; if, when he took the reins of a yet powerful kingdom, under every circumstance of advantage, not forgetting that of the decreptitude of France; if, at that time, such a question had been put, what indignation, what disdain, would it not have excited? Let us not be told of his increase of imports and exports; against the gains of the cotton-spinning nobles and those of the nabobs, we could place the more than doubling of the parish paupers. But, we are not to hear of any thing under the name of national prosperity unconnected with our relative situation with regard to France. The first concern of a nation, that, before which all others ought to give way, and, compared with which, sink into nothingness, is, to preserve its independence; and, of course, the first duty of a minister is, so to conduct the affairs of a nation as to enable it to meet its enemies, or, at least, not to suffer it to sink in this respect after it comes into his hands. Answer us not, Loid Castlereagh, with your long list of ships and yolunteer-battalions; we know well, that and of plentiful harvests. Every circumstance favoured him; and, when he, at last, resolved on war, circumstances there were not less so. Every year did he boast of the proud situation of England, which he failed not to compare with the exhausted, the miscrable, the deplorable, the degraded state of France; every year did he promise us, that the enemy was upon the point of ruin and, only two years before he counselled and defended the peace of Amiens, he pledged himself to the country, having just then discovered a new and solid system of finance, that he would never make peace without securing the balance of power in Europe, And, at the end of all those boastings, out he comes with his whinings about Providence! Out Le comes with a canting gypsey-like story about the casting of our lot! So, Captain Bobadil, when, after all his bragging, he is getting up from beneath a cudgeling, exclaims, "I was certainly pla"net-struck;" but, his friend, who has been a witness of the scene, very gravely assures him, that he had been struck with nothing but a stick "It was a stick, indeed, Captain, for I saw it with my own eyes." A similar reply may be made to our hero, who is an officer of higher rank than Bobadil, and who, we know, has studied the art of war with a degree of eager ness, that, at one time, led some folks to fear, that he really would have taken the command, if the French had landed. Prov.ance! No, no! It is "not in stars, but in himself, that he is an underling. The French are but men, and they have been the same ever since England was England; and, if they have employed new means, either in the cabinet or in the field, it was for the minister of England to keep pace with them. If your adversary, who has been accustomed to fight you with a stick, comes armed with a sword, it is for you to get a sword too, and not to run about crying that he does not fight fair; and, more especially not lay the blame upon Providence. At the outset of this war, Mr. Pitt promised, that he would stem the torrent of liquid fire; that he would "repress the am"bition and chastise the insolence" of Buonaparté; and, in less than a year afterwards, he falls out with Providence, notwithstanding the Morning Fost assures us, that we are, and must be," the particular de"light of Providence. What are now become of these boasts ? Has he stemmed the torrent of liquid fire? Has he, even with the aid of Lord Castlereagh and Lord Mulgrave and Mr. Huskisson and Old Rose, repressed the ambition and chastised the insolence of Buonaparté --But, if the times were difficult; allowing for argument sake, that they were difficult; did he listen to these who advised him what course to pur sue? Never. In the late war, he had, as ha: been before observed, a choice between the advice of Mr. Fox and that of Mr. Burke; he chose to follow neither; and he and Lord Melville pursued, without suffering themselves to be interrupted, the course which ended in the peace of Amiens. That he was not sparing either in money or men, we very well know. In fact, he took where and what he chose, the doctrine of the day being, that whatever men had left was so inach saved out of the fire of revolution. Never was there in the world an instance of a minister's having a nation so completely at his nod! And, after all this, does he talk of difficult times ?In the case of the present war upon the continent, the advice he received, the solemn warning he received, is still fresh in our memory. It is pow only six months and fourteen days ago, that Mr. Fox besought the House of Comons to grant him no money for the purpose of stirring up Austria to war. This warning we must now re-peruse; we must keep it coastantly before us; it is an unerring guide in farming an opinion of the two men. Mr. Fox, observe, had not, as the base hirelings of the press have insinuated, any objection to repressing the ambition of France; he had no objection to a combination of powers upon the continent for that purpose; but, he objected to a premature effort for urging those powers into a war, and that for the reasons which he so distinctly and so prophetically gave. When the House again meets, he has nothing to do but to read his speech of the 21st of June, and then, with the event before them, to leave them to judge between him and the man who has had the presumption to be his rival. He said: 66 After what had passed, it was a "matter of less delicacy to express an opi"nion on hypothesis, as to the purpose for "which the vote was called for; whether "on the hypothesis, that it was to enable us to make terms of peace, or on the hypothesis that it was to engage the powers "of the continent to co-operate with us in "the war. On this head he should state briefly his opinion. It seemed to be the prevailing opinion, that to engage with "Russia alone would make our situation more difficult than at present, unless "Prussia or Austria could be included in "the confederacy of the first of these "powers co-operating there was less hope, "of the latter more, though he thought "fear a more proper term than hope in the "latter case. Without a sure prospect of "efficient co-operation, he should feel most unhappy if he were to suffer this vote to pass without entering his protest against it, without warning this country and Europe against the consequences. No man could tell what would be the issue of war; but when they looked to the past, "he asked, with what rational hope such a 66 war as the late one could be begun, and "with what rational ground of succèss? "Was it intended that, at the present pe"riod of the year, when Austria was unprepared, any operations should be undertaken, or only that every thing should "be prepared to begin the war in the next campaign? If Austria were to move, "and the consequence should be, what "was not improbable, productive of serious "disasters, what would become of our hopes of continental connexions? what of the liberties of Europe? what of the prospect of setting limits to the power "of France, justly and rationally consider"ed already too formidable? Under such "circumstances, and on such information, "it became wise men to consider well be"fore they should grant any money where "the chances were one hundred to one a singly into the war, and, as had been ar"gued the preceding night, for the purpose of rousing the powers of Europe by our example, which we could only exhi"bit in the case of invasion, that pat the 66 66 66 66 question on a different footing. He dis"liked the phrase to rouse Europe, because "the attempt to do so had the effect "of producing a disinclination to co-operate "with us. Every man knew that the charaeter of the British government in Europe was, that it was actuated by selfish motives "in instigating the powers of the continent 66 to war for British interests. He hoped "that this opinion was false; but if we "should attempt to instigate the powers of "the continent to a renewal of hostilities, "whilst they wished to remain at peace, "whether for the purpose of regaining "strength or recruiting their resources, " or for whatever other reason, it would a"lienate the affections of Europe more from us than any inefficiency that could take SC place in the conduct of the war. If Au"stria alone were to embark with us in the "war, she could not use her exertions with exertions. This was a ground for thinking that the result could not be favorable. Austria would be driven to the alternative "of concluding a treaty under the same "circumstances which obliged her to con"clude the treaty of Leoben and Luneville, "and to submit to such terus as France "should dictate; for it was contrary to all "experience and history to suppose, as had "been argued, that being engaged to Rus"sia and England, she would be bound to "hold out to the last. No country could "be obliged by any treaty to hold out to its "destruction and lie down under itsruin. "There was another alternative which "Austia might adopt, which was, to hold out to the end; and might not that con"duct endanger the total extinction of the "second power in Europe? If she chose, "as he thought she would, the former al"ternative, we should then be driven, after "all our efforts and expence, either to make a separate peace, or to carry on a defensive war. He hoped we should not be "reduced to that alternative, and should not "discuss what should be our conduct in such a case. It would be highly indiscreet in us to form an alliance for the purpose of a 66 66 66 might obtain reasonable terms of peace." Upon this Mr. Pitt, with that sort of candour for which he is so famous, observed, that Mr. Fox's observations "seemed to go this length, that all attempts at releasing ourselves from our present situation were improper, because it might happen that our affairs might be made worse. This was a mode of reasoning that would lead "all the powers of the continent to remain "supine under the oppression of France, and never attempt to oppose her schemes "of ambition and aggrandizement. Why? "because in opposing these schemes, they ran a risk of making matters worse. But "were they to wait till the power of France was much more increased, and much 66 more confirmed? till their own resources were much more reduced than they were at present, and till the power of resis tance was gone? This would indeed be exposing themselves to a certainty of having theirs made worse."-Upon this the benches at his back rang with hear! hear! Dearly as the nation has heretofore paid for the cheering from that quarter, this last cheering will be, by far, the dearest ! Mr. Fox replied, "that, as far as he was informed of the state of Europe, Le believed, that, if Austria should "be allured to engage in a war with France, "she would expose herself to the most ex 66 66 66 treme peril, to a danger far beyond any " chance of advantage.” He had never said, nor did his words convey any such implication, that we never were to attempt any thing for fear of rendering our situation worse by the attempt. He never said, that we ought to risk nothing. But he said, that in urging Austria into the war, we were risking too much; and this opinion was founded upon reasons that he gave. To risk, even greatly to risk, may, in some cases, be the height of prudence; but, it is for the wise man to determine when to risk; and, it now appears, that as Mr. Fox said, the risk was all on one side.---With this parliamentary debare before them, for Mr, Pitt's partizans to tell us, that his measures were well-planned, that he acted for the best, that to hope for success was rational, is impudence not to be borne. If you see a man upon the verge of a precipice, if you tell him that another step will bring him to the bottom, if he takes the step and falls, has any one the assurance to tell you that he was as right as you? That he ought not to have believed you, and that he is not to be blamed for his obstinacy? If, indeed, you see a measure about to be adopted, and say nothing about it till the event be known, you have no right to find fault with it afterwards; but, here the measure was objected to; it was protested against, and the reasons, whereon that protest was founded, were given. What is it that distinguishes wise men from fools? What but those powers of the mind which enable them to perceive that which fools cannot perceive? And, when they are at issue upon a matter of opinion, what is to decide, but the event. Besides, when the partizans of the minister tell us, that their conclusions, that is to say, the conclusions of Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville, were as probable as the conclusions of Mr. Fox, and of us who thought with him upon the subject of the present, or, rather, the late, coalition; when they talk of these conclusions, they, as is their invariable custom, overlook the premises. If, as they asserted, there had been 180,000 Russians, actually upon their march in the month of September, and if there had been an army of 300,000 Austrians, well disciplined and appointed, in the field at that tinie; if the Elector of Bavaria had joined his troops to those of Austria; if the kingdom of Hungary had poured into the hands of the Emperor more money and had raised him more men than he knew what to do with; and, finally, if Prussia had, in the month of September, or October, joined the coalition with her army of 500,000 men; if all this had been true, then, indeed, the conclusions of Mr. Pitt and the hirelings would have been not only as probable as oars, bat much more probable than ours. But, they were false, the premises were all false; our opponents built upon sand, upon a shadow, and the consequence has been that which, in such case, necessarily must be. It is not as to concl; sions that we have differed from them; it is upon points of fact that, in every stage of the war, we have been at variance. Mr. Pitt assumed, that the powers, with whom he was about to coalesce stood in need of nothing but British gold to exable them to face Napoleon, and to turn the tide of his fortune: Mr. Fox denied th's: he said they stood in need of more, an! that, if they accepted of that gold, particularly before they were well prepared, they would fail, and that then our situation, to say nothing of the loss of our money, would be infinitely worse than it was before. In every stage of the war, have the hirelings assumed certain premises: they have promulgated, as truths not to be questioned, a certain set of correspondent falsehoods. Upon these they have reasoned; from these they have drawn conclusions: and, of course, these conclusions have been false. It is not of incorrect reasoning that we ac cuse them; it is not of an error of judgment; but, of wiltul falsehood, of criminal falsehood, of falsehood promulgated for the purposes of deception, of lies of the most mischievous tendency. They now tell their deluded hearers, that "if the means were "not proportionate to the object to be accomplished, it is more matter of sorrow "than of blame." But, they told us, and they abused us for doubting their assertions, that the means were fully proportionate to the object. They told us, that Napoleon was taken by surprize; that the Austrians had got the start of him; that the Russian armies were following each other through the Austrian deminions; and, finally, that this wonderful promptitude was entirely to be ascribed to the all-commanding genius of "Mr. Pitt." Far, they say now, from blaming the minister for endeavouring to bring about "a coalition capable of setting 66 bounds to the ambition of Buonaparte, we regard it as a highly meritorious in "stance of his exertions for the preserva "tion of this country and the general deli"verance." But, they were told, that this coalition was not capable of doing it; they were told that its materials were crude, its foundation unstable, and that the time and manner of it were not calulated to produce success. They were told so, and with what calunnies have they repaid their admonishers! What term, expressive of ignorance, of wilfulness, of baseness and of treachery have they not applied to all those who endeavoured, though in vain, tỏ guard the deluded people against their d ceptions! "To us," say they, "it ap pears that the moment was come,” and they quote the words of Demosthenes, after the battle of Charonen, so fatal to the li berties of Greece. "I could not foresee, "that the event would have been as it has “turned out, but if any divine revelation "had presented it to me in all its horrors, "I would, I ought, still to have acted as "I have done." Wi Mr. Pitt avail himself of this hint? Will he make a declara |