the events we have seen; and, as far as they have been effected, there can be no doubt but it has been the will of the Almighty that they should come to pass. He certainly "rides in the whirlwind, and directs the storm;" but this does not in the smallest degree lessen the duty of every power resisting, to the uttermost, the attacks that are made upon their liberty and independence. No country has so much reason, as this hap py one, to be jealous, in the extreme, of so dreadful a neighbour, and whose peculiar vengeance is whetted against it. It is our manifest duty to hope that the providence of God will be in our favour, and enable us to resist a torrent that has overwhelmed every thing clse, and left this island the last refuge of liberty, property, and religion. It is the duty of every subject of this realm to exert whatever power, influence, or talent, he may possess, in the service of the public, at the most fearful moment Europe has seen for many ages. He that can grasp a weapon, should wield one; and, he that can only reflect on the means of resistance, should well consider them, and give his thoughts to those whose stations may make them useful. I wish I could say that all can pray; but, all that know what prayer is, should pray fervently for their King, their country, their altars. their liberty, and the safety of theirfandies. Well would it be with us were his means of safety more reTied on and bater practised. But thanks to the gracions percy of the Supreme Ruler of Events, truc Christians do abound in this kingdom; and they finish no inconsiderable reasonts hope that we shall still be preserved. Of all the political evils that can befal a nation, that of foreign conquest is, beyond conparison, the worst; and of all the classes of a state to whom this misery comes, to none is it so ruinous as to the landed interest. Merchants, manufacturers, monied men, and professions, can convey their property and their skill to other countries; but those who depend on land lose ail if they fly, and are ruined if they stay. In the present state of things between France and England, a conquest would transfer the soil of the kingdom to French landlords: Buonaparté would portion it out gradually with more than Norman rapacity; and the farmers would be the slaves, the villains, of the new possessors. The consequences of such a revolution cannot be foreseen with too clear an eye, nor make too deep an impression on every heart. Whatever meas sures of prevention are adopted, should be obeyed and promoted with an unsleeping vigilance; for the evil of final defeat would be such as this country never yet experienced. --In reflecting upon the result of all the wars that have taken place since the French revolution, the fact most prominent is, the miserable insufficiency of a regular army to defend a country: not one in Europe has trusted to it, that has not been ruined. [Hear! hear! Mr. Windham !] The expense of supporting an army in a marching state, and actually ready for a campaign is so great, that one or two hundred thousand men swallow up the public revenue of twenty millions of people; and if this army is defeated, a kingdom is conquered. Five millions capable of bearing arms, are as so many sheep driven to slaughter: if it be the will of the victor they lick the dust.—--There wants no military knowledge to enable us to see that there must be something radically rotten in such a species of defence. [Hear! hear! ye advocates for standing armies!]If it be said that the attack is by a regular army, I reply, that it must be so; it is of necessity. No general can march a whole people out of their country; but the question is, whether a whole people cannot be brought to act at home.--But the regular troops, of the necessity of which in this country we have heard so much in parlia ment, have little more dependence placed in them, in the hour of need, than if they were armed peasantry. The Emperor of Germany laid down his neck to be trodden on, while the Archduke Charles was at the head of ninety thousand men, and the Archduke Ferdinand had forty or fifty thousand more. He had more troops in the field than fought for him at Austerlitz. And, if the King of Prussia, with two hundred and fiftythousand men, were, at the head of eighty or ninety thousand, to be defeated, there is not a man in this country but would say, There is an end of Prussia! What, then, is the efficiency of that defence which is annihi lated by a single battle? But, whatever our reasoning may be, the fact remains great and glaring: Europe has trusted her defence to troops of the line, and Europe is conquered. Forty millions of men, TEN MILLIONS OF whom are able to bear arms, are now trampled on, as if they were sheep and pigs, by two hundred thousand Frenchmen!-Are we to trust the tremendous adventure of the lives, liberty, and property, of this country, on the same broken reed that has deceived every neighbour we have upon fearth? In conversation on the late events, it has rarely been omitted to notice the treachery or imbecility of some of those who served the Emperor. The remark is nearly related to the dependence placed on a standing army. The enrolled that coul: serve, where are substitutes to be found? Population returned by the Act of the 41st of the King. .No. 1. Kent Sussex 307,624 159,311 466,935 Fighting men 116,733 No. 2. Surrey 269.043 Hants 219,056 458,699 Fighting men 122,177 No. 3. Whatever the evil might have been, the whole amount was the loss of an army; a loss great enough, without doubt; but the defence of a country rests on a foundation of straw, if the loss of an army is the loss of a kingdom. The men able to bear arms in England alone would form five-and-twenty armies, each of one hundred thousand men. The same proportion would have given the Emperor fifty armies equally numerous. He rested his hope on two, and kept eight-andforty in the state of cattle and sheep: like cattle and sheep they are now eaten up.--I say nothing of our navy, the glorious and never to be too much commended defence of this kingdom, for an evident reason. four hundred thousand volunteers, (on paper at least) and the fortifications I have seen in Essex, prove that our government is convinced that an invasion is possible: if so, the possibility should be guarded against.In the battles of Buonaparté, I believe he has invariably fought with [against] inferior Dumbers; and this accounts for his having won so many victories, by turning the ranks of his adversaries. This circumstance shews that the command of numbers is a matter of immense consequence. Here it is absolutely our own fault and presumption, if we do not oppose him with very superior numbers in every cagagement that could take place. He ought not to land any army without having three upon it, as soon as might be; one in front, and one hanging on each of his wings. With troops of the line this may be impossible to effect; but not so with a general levy.There is one observation which ought to be very obvious; exactly in proportion to the talents, skill, and experience in command, of those who are to lead an invading army, will he the necessity of supplying an inferiority in those respects, by numbers, preparation, intrenchments, or some counterbalance; the idea of a lost battle or two deciding the fate of the kingdom, is the last that is to be admitted for a single moment. And the same remark is applicable to the system of keeping troops in bar-not be practicable. To call men from Nor racks or quarters till the moment they are wanted. To have armies collected in camps, and exercised in large bodies, previous to actual service, appears to be an advantage which is lost in the contrary plan.-The idea which I would most humbly propose før consideration is, to pass an act for a general militia of all men able to bear arms, that is to say, one-fourth of the gross population of the kingdom, and to arm them immediately with pikes; to admit no exemptions but the most absolutely necessary ones, and not adinit of a substitute: when all are No. 4. Essex This is sufficient to explain the idea. Each maritime district should have another behind it to call out as a reserve. Were the kingdom thus armed, and for such a purpose, as soon as the counties in the vicinity of the invasion were called into the field, all the rest would be alert, in exercise every evening without pay, and ready to obey the call expected by themselves.-In the General Defence Bill the enrolment was by classes, respecting single men, and married with children; and there were reasons for it: but in the measure now proposed, this would thumberland to Kent, because they are single, would never do: they must be called out by counties, in the immediate vicinity of the one invaded. In regard to the expense of such a measure, the system should be executed in the cheapest manner possible. Two millions of men exercised one day in a month, and allowed one shilling per diem each, would amount to no Inore than 1 1,200,000 per annum. The officers should: receive no more pay for such days of exercise than the men; a circumstance which would render the measure more popular than making the common distinction. In regard, to dress, regimentals, &c. if it can be contended that the use is equal to the expense, it may be indulged; but this can hardly be urged and when the number of men to be raised is so great, and the duration of the war in every respect so threatening, which makes every species of economy so necessary, to reduce the expense as low as possible, would be a point of essential consequence. It is strength of body, and vigour of arm, that do execution in a close battle, and not the dress of a soldier. Every occasion that can pre"sent itself of using the bayonet, will be eagerly and spiritedly siezed on; it is the weapon of true courage, and most peculiarly fitted for the nervous arm of a Briton." Circular paper, signed H. M. Gor don, Lieutenant Colonel, and Assistant Adjutant General. The remark is as applicable to the pike as to the bayonet. Dressing 2,000,000 of men at 301. each, 3,000,000ĭ. besides officers, &c. It would be an idle ex nse. But for the first month of exercising it might be thought necessary to have this militia trained for one hour every evening, or twenty-four times in the month, in companies of 100 men, which would be assembled in a few minutes; for this, if each received 3 pence, it would amount to 25,000 1. per diem, and for 21 days 600,0001. ;' after that, once a week might suffice. Two millions of pikes would cost, at 6d. each 600,0001. The difference of expense between musquets and pikes is considerable. Musquet 11. 12s. accoutrements 10s. 6d. 21. 2s. 6d. Pike 6d. Difference 11. 16s. 6d. which, for 2,000,000 men, is a difference of 3,650,0001; besides, powder, ball, &c.; and, what is sti'l more, one day's exercise with the pike would equal ten with the musquet. In exercising and disciplining troops, there seems to be some rule of conduct adopted in various countries, which may be a partial cause of such ill success as we have seen remarkable instances of. When I view a volunteer corps of one hundred men on parade, going through their exercise with uncommon precision, I cannot help wishing to know how they would behave when formed into battallions or regiments, and these again into numerous bodies. A day's exercise of 10,000 of these troops, drawn up on rough, broken, or ploughed ground, intersected with numerous hedges, would afford a much clearer idea of what they are fit for, than a month's regular routine without difficulties, and uncombined with other troops. And with generals and commanders the same remark is applicable: those who never were at the head of 5000 men, how can it be known what they would do with 50 100,000 All analogy is against them. It would be extremely beneficial to exercise the pike o bayonet men in large bodies, and once a year in still larger, that they might have an opportunity of learning more than it is possible to learn in small masses only. This would be an easy matter if all fighting men were enrolled and exercised: a short walk would assemble three or four thousand of them at one spot. To many persons of no mean understanding, nothing in modera warfare appears so astonishing as the disuse of the pike in favour of the bayonet, through a long period of time, in which the inefficacy of the fire of musquetry seems to have been gradually established. Of all the battles fought through the last century, nine in ten were gained either by artillery, by the rapid and skilful movement of divisions, by turning or flanking, or by the bayonet it hardly appears that any general was indebted for his success to the fire of inusquetry. Marshal Saxe, in his Reveries, holds itin utter contempt.. Had the last war continued (says Count Saxe) some time longer, the close fight "would certainly have become the common method of engaging; for the insig"niucancy of small arms began to be diṣeo"vered, which make more noise than they do-execution, and which must always gr "casion the defeat of those who depend too "much upon them. I have seen even whole "vollies without killing four mes; and "shall appeal to the experience of all man"kind, if any single disch was ever so "violent, as to disable an enemy from advancing afterwards to take ample revenge, by pouring in his fire, and at the same in 66 as much in favour of the pike as it is against musquet firing." My opinion,' says Saxe again," in regard to the importance of pikes is supported by the general concurrence of men of reflection and experience; "and the only reasons to be assigned for the "disuse of it, are such as have also occasion"ed the abolition of many other excellent "customs of the ancients, by which I mean neglect and indolence" If firing, which is the only apparent motive for preferring the musquet to the pike, be thus inefficacious, and if the pike be su perior to the bayonet, as nobody can doubt, what possible reason can be produced for arming all our troops with musquets, at the expence of 2 or 3 guineas, instead of with pikes, at that of 6 shillings? But with 200,000 of soldiers this would be insanity. -A measure very requisite before the land ing of an invading army, would be, to pass an act of parliament, declaring it to be high treason to receive a flag of truce, or any proposition whatever, from any person mongst the hostile troops. Who can read the details of the late campaign without seeing the immense mischief which resulted from these insidious and most ruinous regociations? But whatever may be the result of comparing weapons, the case of a general levy seems to preclude any mode of arming except with pikes: the expence and the tune necessary to discipline troops armed with musquets, must render pikes essential to the plan, at least for the greater part of the forces thus levied. And if the vast importance of having such numbers in the field as may enable our generals not only to out flank, but absolutely to surround the foe, be well considered, it will surely appear, that to have army behind army, so posted as to be called readily into action, ought speedily to decide the result of the contest.-If it be supposed that a French army landed on our coast, it is difficult to conceive that the campaign would be of any long duration.. Defended by a regular army, two battles, perhaps one, would decide the fate of London; for the vicinity of the coast, approached either from Boulogne or Holland, is such to that capital, that the struggle must be a very short one. But with as many armies of pikemen as you please to call out, nothing would prevent the action being unintermit 'would prove a very bad snare, and finish with our being out-generaled; but if the issue be put on close fighting, he must gain his advantages, whatever they were, at a very dear price, so that his victories might prove his ruin.-How many men, when they read a proposition of this sort, will be sure to cry out, "all this is very wild." If wildness be an entire departure from that system which has hitherto been depended on for the defence of Europe, I hope it is exceeding wild: it cannot in this respect be too wild. Troops of the line have lost Europe; in the name of common sense let us not trust to them alone. -If it was within the verge of possibility to bring into the field five or ten armies of troops of the line, it might be very well to rely upon them; but we have not 100,000 such, if the debates in parliament are to be relied on; that is, we have a sufficient number for one battle.-Lose it--and the kingdom is gone.But the great principle for which I contend does not depend on the arms, or on the description of troops to be raised: let every man be armed and exercised; if with musquets, well; if not, with pikes. Permit not the nation to be in a state of Austrian imbecility; a regular army defeated, and the foot of the conqueror on the neck of the nation.-The fortification system has been so much ridiculed, that it is not likely to be effected to the extent that might be of real consequence; but to plain men it should seem, that if such intrenchments as have been thrown up for some miles near Chelmsford are considered as an important defence, (and that they are so considered is evident, or they would not have been made), such, or more effective ones, on the coast, the artillery bearing directly on the gene of landing, would be much more formidable to an approaching foe. The expense might be very moderate. There are 1760 yards in a mile; a ditch 6 yards deep, and 10 yards wide, and 1760 yards long, at 1s a cubic yard, amounts to 52801. which sum would dig a mile of such intrenchment, and consequently, 100 miles of it would cost only 528,000l. A broad road for the rapid advance of troops and artillery, and kept for that purpose only, should run parallel to the entrenchment; and the expense of this at 1001. per mile, would add only 10,000l. for the 100 miles: double or treble it, the ob ted from the shore to the Thames, with theject as to the expense is small. If a fourgreat advantage of being able absolutely to surround the enemy at every point; and it would not be very good policy to let him close his eyes from the very instant he forced a landing. If three or four of the best generals of France were in the invading army, perhaps any plan of maneuvering and-twenty pounder were mounted at every 6 yards, there would be 293, say 300 in a mile; at 501. each, these would cost 15,000l. or for a 100 miles 1.500.0001. Evident enough it is, that for less than 2,000,0001, sterling a most formidable entrenchment, lined with artillery, might be executed 923] POLITICAL REGISTER.-Arthur Young on National Defence. through the extent of 100 miles; and t [924 Europe were in safety, the spectacle |