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marches, to prevent any transfer of troops to Belgium, and lastly | military historians have asserted to be the foreseen result of the to seek an occasion for giving battle, for cutting off his convoys initial plan.

and for seizing his magazines." So much for the The method of " living on the country " had failed lamentably Jourdan's movement

The method of achieving it is defined as in the Ardennes, and Jourdan, though he had spoken of changing purpose. on Llégo. follows.

“ General Hatry, in order to attain the object his line of supply from Arlon to Carignan, then to Mézières and of these instructions, will have with him the minimum so on as his march progressed, was still actually living from hand of wagons. He is to live at the expense of the enemy as much to mouth on the convoys that arrived intermittently from his as possible, and to send back into the interior of the Republic original base. When he sought to take what he needed from the whatever may be useful to it; he will maintain his communica- towns on the Meuse, he infringed on the preserves of the Army tions with Longwy, report every movement to me, and when of the Ardennes. The advance, therefore, came for the moment necessary to the Committee of Public Safety and to the minister to a standstill, while Beaulieu, solicitous for the safety of Charleroi of war, maintain order and discipline, and firmly oppose every-in which fortress he had a magazine-called up the outlying sort of pillage." How the last of these instructions was to be troops left behind on the Moselle to rejoin him by way of Bastogne. reconciled with the rest, Hatry was not informed. In fact, it At the same moment (29th) Jourdan received new orders from was ignored. “I am far from believing," wrote the representa- Paris--(a) to take Dinant and Charleroi and to clear the country tive on mission Gillet,“ that we ought to adopt the principles between the Meuse and the Sambre, and (b) to attack Namur, of philanthropy with which we began the war.

either by assault or by regular siege In the latter case the bulk At the moment when, on these terms, Jourdan's advance was of the forces were to form a covering army beyond the place, resumed, the general situation east of the Scheldt was as follows: to demonstrate towards Nivelles, Louvain and Liége, and to The Allies' centre under Coburg had captured Landrecies, and serve at need as a support to the right flank of the Ardennes now (May 4) lay around that place, about 65,000 strong, while Army From these orders and from the action of the enemy the left under Kaunitz (27,000) was somewhat north of Maubeuge, the campaign at last took a definite shape. with detachments south of the Sambre as far as the Meuse. When the Army of the Moselle passed over to the left bank Beyond these again were the detachment of Beaulieu (8000) of the Meuse, it was greeted by the distant roar of guns towards near Arlon, and another, 9000 strong, around Trier. On the side Charleroi and by news that the Army of the Ardennes,

Charterel. of the French, the Army of the Moselle (41,000 effectives) was which had already twice been defeated by Kaunitz, in cordon between Saargemünd and Longwy, the Army of the was for the third time deeply and unsuccessfully engaged beyond Ardennes (22,000) between Beaumont and Givet; of the Army the Sambre. The resumption of the march again complicated of the North, the right wing (38,000) in the area Beaumont- the supply question, and it was only slowly that the army Maubeuge and the centre (24,000) about Guisc. In the aggregate advanced towards Charleroi, sweeping the country before it the allied field armies numbered 139,000 men, those of the and extending its right towards Namur. But at last on the 3rd French 203,000. Tactically the disproportion was sufficient to of June the concentration of parts of three armies on the Sambre give the latter the victory, if, strategically, it could be made was effected. Jourdan took command of the united force (Army effective at a given time and place. But the French had mobility of the Sambre and Meuse) with a strong hand, the 40,000 newas a reraedy for over-extension, and though their close massing comers inspired fresh courage in the beaten Ardennes troops, and on the extreme flanks left no more than equal forces opposite in the sudden dominating enthusiasm of the moment pillaging Coburg in the centre, the latter felt unable either to go forward and straggling almost ceased. Troops that had secured bread or to close to one flank when on his right the storm was brewing shared it with less fortunate comrades, and even the Liégois at Menin and Tournai, and on his left Kaunitz reported the peasantry made free gifts of supplies. “We must believe,” says gathering of important masses of the French around Beaumont. the French general staff of to-day, " that the idea symbolized

Thus the initiative passed over to the French, but they missed by the Tricolour, around which marched ever these sansculottes, their opportunity, as Coburg had missed bis in 1793. Pichegru's shoeless and hungry, unchained a mysterious force that preceded right was ordered to march on Mons, and his left to master the our columns and aided the achievement of military success.' navigation of the Scheldt so as to reduce the Allies to wagon- Friction, however, arose between Jourdan and the generals drawn supplies—the latter an objective dear to the 18th-century of the Ardennes Army, to whom the representatives thought general; while Jourdan's task, as we know, was to conquer the it well to give a separate mission. This detachment of 18,000 Liége or Namur country without unduly stripping the cordon on men was followed by another, of 16,000, to keep touch with the Saar and the Moselle. Jourdan's orders and original purpose Maubeuge. Deducting another 6000 for the siege of Charleroi, were to get Beaulieu out of his way by the usual strategical when this should be made, the covering army destined to fight tricks, and to march through the Ardennes as rapidly as possible, the Imperialists dwindled to 55,000 out of 96,000 effectives. living on what supplies he could pick up from the enemy or the Even now, we sce, the objective was not primarily the enemy's inhabitants. But he had scarcely started when Beaulieu made army. The Republican leaders desired to strike out beyond his existence felt by attacking a French post at Bouillon. There- the Sambre, and as a preliminary to capture Charleroi. They upon Jourdan made the active enemy, instead of Namur, his would not, however, risk the loss of their connexion with Maubeuge first object

before attaining the new foothold. The movement of the operative portion of the Army of the Meanwhile, Tourcoing and Tournai had at last convinced Moselle began on the 21st of May from Longwy through Arlon Coburg that Pichegru was his most threatening opponent, and towards Neufchâteau. Irregular fighting, sometimes with the he had therefore, though with many misgivings, decided to Austrians, sometimes with the bitterly hostile inhabitants, move towards his right, leaving the prince of Orange with not marked its progress. Beaulieu was nowhere forced into a battle. more than 45,000 men on the side of Maubeuge-CharleroiBut fortune was on Jourdan's side. The Austrians were a de Namur. tachment of Coburg's army, not an independent force, and when Jourdan crossed the Sambre on the 12th of June, practically threatened they retired towards Ciney, drawing Jourdan after unopposed. Charleroi was rapidly invested and the covering them in the very direction in which he desired to go. On the army extended in a semicircular position. For the fourth 28th the French, after a vain detour made in the hope of forcing time the Allies counter-attacked successfully, and after a severe Beaulicu to fight—" les esclaves n'osent pas se mesurer avec struggle the French had to abandon their positions and their des hommes libres," wrote Jourdan in disgust, ---reached Ciney, siege works and to recross the Sambre (June 16). But the army and there heard that the enemy had fallen back to a strongly was not beaten. On the contrary, it was only desirous of having entrenched position on the east bank of the Meuse near Namur. its revenge for a stroke of ill-fortune, due, the soldiers said, to Jourdan was preparing to attack them there, when considerations of quite anoi her kind intervened to change his direction, and departments as supply areas, Jourdan's being of course far away in

* Each of the fifteen armies on foot had been allotted certain thereby to produce the drama of Charleroi and Fleurus—which Lorraine.


the fog and to the want of ammunition. The fierce threats of | impression was made on the defenders, chiefly because the brook St Just (who had joined the army) to faire tomber les lèles west of Mellet was a serious obstacle to the rigid order of the if more energy were not shown were unnecessary, and within Allies and had to be bridged before their guns could be got over. two days the army was advancing again. On the 18th Jourdan's | Kaunitz's column and Championnet's division met on the battlecolumns recrossed the river and extended around Charleroi | field of 1690. The French were gradually driven in from the in the same positions as before. This time, having in view the outlying villages to their main position between Heppignies and weariness of his troops and their heavy losses on the 16th, the Wangenies. Here the Allies, well led and taking every advantage priace of Orange allowed the siege to proceed. His reasons for of ground and momentary chances, had the best of it. They so doing furnish an excellent illustration of the different ideas pressed the French hard, necessitated the intervention of such and capacities of a professional army and a “nation in arms.” small reserves as Jourdan had available, and only gave way to the “ The Imperial troops," wrote General Alvintzi," are very defenders' counterstroke at the moment they received Coburg's fatigued. We have fought nine times since the 10th of May, orders for a general retreat. we have bivouacked constantly, and made forced marches. On the allied left wing the fighting was closer and more severe Further, we are short of officers.” All this, it need hardly be than at any point. Beaulieu on the extreme left advanced upon pointed out, applied equally to the French.

Velaine and the French positions in the woods to the south in Charleroi, garrisoned by less than 3000 men, was intimidated several small groups of all arms. Here were the divisions of the into surrender (25th) when the third parallel was barely estab- Army of the Ardennes, markedly inferior in discipline and lished. Thus the object of the first operations was achieved. endurance to the rest, and only too mindsul of their four previous As to the next neither Jourdan nor the representatives seem to

For six hours, more or less, they resisted the oncoming have had anything further in view than the capture of more Allies, but then, in spite of the example and the despairing fortresses. But within twenty-four hours events had decided appeals of their young general Marceau, thcy broke and fied, for them.

leaving Beaulieu free to combine with the archduke Charles, Coburg had quickly abandoned his intention of closing on who carried Fleurus after obstinate fighting, and then pressed on his right wing, and (after the usual difficulties with his Allies towards Campinaire. Beaulieu took command of all the allied on that side) had withdrawn 12,000 Austrians from the centre forces on this side about noon, and from then to 5 P.M. launched of his cordon opposite Pichegru, and made forced marches to a series of terrible attacks on the French (Lefebvre's division, join the prince of Orange. On the 24th of June he had collected part of the general reserve, and the remnant of Marceau's troops) 52,000 men at various points round Charleroi, and on the 25th above Campinaire and Lambusart. The disciplined resolution he set out to relieve the litile fortress. But he was in complete of the imperial battalions, and the enthusiasm of the French ignorance of the state of affairs at Charleroi. Signal guns were Revolutionaries, were each at their height. The Austrians came fired, but the woods drowned even the roar of the siege batteries, on time after time over ground that was practically destitute of and at last a party under Lieutenant Radetzky made its way cover. Villages, farms and fields of corn caught fire. The French through the covering army and discovered that the place had grew more and more excited—“No retreat to-day!” they called failea. The party was destroyed on its return, but Radetzky out to their leaders, and finally, clamouring to be led against the was reserved for greater things. He managed, though twice enemy, they had their wish. Lefebvre seized the psychological wounded, to rejoin Coburg with his bad news in the midst of moment when the fourth attack of the Allies had failed, and the battle of Fleurus.

(though he did not know it) the order to retreat had come from On the 26th Jourdan's army (now some 73,000 strong) was still Coburg. The losses of the unit that delivered it were small, posted in a semicircle of entrenched posts, 20 m. in extent, for the charge exactly responded to the moral conditions of the round the captured town, pending the removal of the now un moment, but the proportion of killed to wounded (55 to 81) is necessary pontoon bridge at Marchiennes and the selection of good evidence of the intensity of the momentary conflict. a shorter line of defence.

So ended the battle. Coburg had by now learned definitely Coburg was still more widely extended. Inferior in numbers that Charleroi had surrendered, and while the issue of the battle as he was, he proposed to attack on an equal front, and thus gave was still doubtful-for though the prince of Orange was beaten,

himself, for the attack of an entrenched position, Beaulieu was in the full tide of success-he gave (towards 3 P.M.) Fleurus.

an order of battle of three men to every two yards of the order for a general retreat. This was delivered to the various front, all reserves included. The Allies were to attack in five commanders between 4 and 5, and these, having their men in columns, the prince of Orange from the west and north-west band even in the heat of the engagement, were able to break off towards Trazegnies and Monceau wood, Quasdanovich from the the battle without undue confusion. The French were far too north on Gosselies, Kaunitz from the north-east, the archduke exhausted to pursue them (they had lost twice as many men Charles from the east through Fleurus, and finally Beaulieu as the Allies), and their leader had practically no formed body towards Lambusart. The scheme was worked out in such minute at hand to follow up the victory, thanks to the extraordinary detail and with so entire a disregard of the chance of unforeseen dissemination of the army. incidents, that once he had given the executive command to move, Tourcoing, Tournay and Fleurus represent the maximum result the Austrian general could do no more. If every detail worked achievable under the earlier Revolutionary system of making war, out as planned, victory would be his; if accidents happened and show the men and the leaders at the highest point of combined he could do nothing to redress them, and unless these righted steadiness and enthusiasm they ever reached-that is, as a " Şans

army. Fleurus was also the last great victory of the themselves (which was improbable in the case of the stiffly French, in point of time, prior to the advent of Napoleon, and may organized old armies) he could only send round the order to break therefore be considered as illustrating the general conditions of off the action and retreat.

warfare at one of the most important points in its development. In these circumstances the battle of Fleurus is the sum rather

The sequel of these battles can be told in a few words. The Austrian

government had, it is said, long ago decided to evacuate the Netherthan the product of the various fights that took place between lands, and Coburg retired over the Meuse, practically unpursued, each allied column and the French division that it met. The while the duke of York's forces fell back in good order, though prince of Orange attacked at earliest dawn and gradually drove pursued by Pichegru through Flanders. in the French left wing to Courcelles, Roux and Marchiennes, embarked for home, the rest retired through Holland into Hanoverian but somewhat after noon the French, under the direction for the last phase of the pursuit reflected great glory on Pichegru, for it

territory, leaving the Dutch troops to surrender to the victors. The most part of Kléber, began a series of counterstrokes which

was conducted in midwinter through a country bare of supplies and recovered the lost ground, and about 5, without waiting for densely intersected with dykes and meres. The crowning incident Coburg's instructions, the prince retired north-west ward off was the dramatic capture of the Dutch flect, frozen in at the Texel, the battlefield. The French centre division, under Morlot, made by a handful of hussars who rode over the ice and browbeat the crew's

It was many years a gradual fighting retreat on Gosselies, followed up by the before a prince of Orange ruled again in the United provinces, while Quasdanovich column and part of Kaunitz's force. No serious the Austrian whitecoats never again mounted guard in Brussels.



The Rhine campaign of 1794, waged as before chiefly by the Palatinate, which Clerfayt had conquered in 1795. " If you Prussians, was not of great importance. General v. Möllendorf won a victory at Kaiserslautern on the 23rd of May, but operations there

have reason to believe that you would find some supplies on after became spasmodic, and were soon complicated by Coburg's the Lahn, hasten thither with the greater part of your forces," retreat over the Meuse. With this event the offensive of the Allies wrote the Directory to Jourdan (Army of the Sambre-andagainst the French Revolution came to an inglorious end. Poland Meuse, 72,000) on the 29th of March. He was to move at once, now occupied the thoughts of European statesmen, and Austria began before the Austrians could concentrate, and to pass the Rbine to draw her forces on to the east. England stopped the payment of subsidies, and Prussia made the Peace of Basel on the 5th of April at Düsseldorf, thereby bringing back the centre of the 1795. On the Spanish frontier the French under General Dugommier cnemy over the river. He was, further, to take every

asd (who was killed in the last battle) were successful in almost every advantage of their want of concentration to deliver encounter, and Spain, too, made peace. Only the eternal enemies, blow after blow, and to do his utmost to break them France and Austria, were left face to face on the Rhinc, and elsewhere, of all the Allies, Sardinia alone (see below under Italian Campaigns) up completely. A fortnight later Moreau (Army of the Rhinecontinued the struggle in a hall-hearted fashion.

and-Moselle, 78,000) was ordered to take advantage of Jourdan's The operations of 1795 on the Rhine present no feature of the move, which would draw most of the Austrian forces to the Revolutionary Wars that other and more interesting campaigns Mainz region, to enter the Breisgau and Suabia. “You will command of Clerfayt, one on the upper Rhine, the other south of attack Austria at home, and capture her magazines. You will the Main, while Mainz was held by an army of imperial contingents. enter a new country, the resources of which, properly handled, The French, Jourdan on the lower, Pichegru on the upper Rhine, should suffice for the needs of the Army of the Rhine-andhad as usual superior numbers at their disposal. Jourdan combined

Moselle.” a demonstrative frontal attack on Neuwied with an advance in force via Düsseldorf, reunited his wings beyond the river near Neuwied,

Jourdan, therefore, was to take upon himself the destruction and drove back the Austrians in a series of small engagements to the of the enemy, Morcau the invasion of South Germany. The Main, while Pichegru passed at Mannheim and advanced towards first object of both was to subsist their armies beyond the the Neckar. But ere long both were beaten, Jourdan at Höchst Rhine, the second to defeat the armies and terrorize the populaabandoned. This was followed by the invasion of the Palatinate tions of the empire. Under these instructions the campaign by Clerfayt and the retreat of Jourdan to the Moselle. The position opened. Jourdan crossed at Düsseldorf and reached the Lahn, was further compromised by secret negotiations between Pichegru but the enemy concentrated against him very swiftly and he and the enemy for the restoration of the Bourbons. The meditated had to retire over the river. Still, if he had not been able to treason came to light early in the following year, and the guilty commander disappeared into the obscure ranks of the royalist himself the weight of the Austrian army, and enabled Moreau

“ break them up completely," he had at any rate drawn on secret agents till finally brought to justice in 1804.

to cross at Strassburg without much difficulty. THE CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN GERMANY

The Austrians were now commanded by the archduke Charles, The wonder of Europe now transferred itself from the drama who, after all detachments had been made, disposed of some of the French Revolution to the equally absorbing drama of a 56,000 men. At first he employed the bulk of this force against great war on the Rhine. “Every day, for four terrible years,” Jourdan, but on hearing of Moreau's progress he returned to wrote a German pamphleteer early in 1796, “ has surpassed the the Neckar country with 20,000 men, leaving Feldzeugmeister one before it in grandeur and terror, and to-day surpasses all

v. Wartensleben with 36,000 to observe Jourdan. In later in dizzy sublimity.” That a manæuvre on the Lahn should years he admitted himself that his own force was far too sma!! possess an interest to the peoples of Europe surpassing that of to deal with Moreau, who, he probably thought, would retire the Reign of Terror is indeed hardly imaginable, but there was a after a few maneuvres. good reason for the tense expectancy that prevailed everywhere. But by now the two French generals were aiming at something France's policy was no longer defensive. She aimed at invading more than alternate raids and feints. Carnot had set before and "revolutionizing” the monarchies and principalities of old them the ideal of a decisive battle as the great object. Europe, and to this end the campaign of 1796 was to be the great Jourdan was instructed, if the archduke turned on

archdate's and conclusive effort. The “liberation of the oppressed” had Moreau, to follow him up with all speed and to bring

plae, its part in the decision, and the glory of freeing the serf easily him to action. Moreau, too, was not retreating but merged itself in the glory of defeating the serf's masters. But advancing. The two armies, Moreau's and the archduke's, met a still more pressing motive for carrying the war into the enemy's in a straggling and indecisive battle at Malsch on the oth of country was the fact that France and the lands she had overrun July, and soon afterwards Charles learned that Jourdan bad could no longer subsist her armies. The Directory frankly told recrossed the Rhine and was driving Wartensleben before him. its generals, when they complained that their men were starving He thereupon retired both armies from the Rhine valley into the and ragged, that they would find plenty of subsistence beyond interior, hoping that at least the French would detach large the Rhine.

forces to besiege the river fortresses. Disappointed of this, and On her part, Austria, no longer fettered by allied contingents compelled to face a very grave situation, he resorted to an nor by the expenses of a far distant campaign, could put forth expedient which may be described in his own words: “to more strength than on former campaigns, and as war came retire both armies step by step without committing himself nearer home and the citizen saw himself threatened by “re- to a battle, and to seize the first opportunity to unite them so volutionizing" and devastating armies, he ceased to hamper or as to throw himself with superior or at least equal strength on to swindle the troops. Thus the duel took place on the grandest one of the two hostile enemies." This is the ever-recurring idea scale then known in the history of European armies. Apart of “ interior lines.” It was not new, for Frederick the Great bad from the secondary theatre of Italy, the area embraced in the used similar means in similar circumstances, as bad Souham struggle was a vast triangle extending from Düsseldorf to Basel at Tourcoing and even Dampierre at Valenciennes. Nor was it and thence to Ratisbon, and Carnot sketched the outlines in differentiated, as were Napoleon's operations in this same year, accordance with the scale of the picture. He imagined nothing by the deliberate use of a small containing force at one point less than the union of the armies of the Rhine and the Riviera to obtain relative superiority at another. A general of the 13th before the walls of Vienna. Its practicability cannot here be century did not believe in the efficacy of superior numbers-had discussed, but it is worth contrasting the attitude of contem- not Frederick the Great disproved it ?—and for him operations poraries and of later strategical theorists towards it. The on “ interior lines" were simply successive blows at successive former, with their empirical knowledge of war, merely thought targets, the efficacy of the blow in each case being dependent it impracticable with the available means, but the latter have chiefly on his own personal qualities and skill as a general on condemned it root and branch as “an operation on exterior the field of battle. In the present case the point to be observed lines."

is not the expedient, which was dictated by the circumstances, The scheme took shape only gradually. The first advance but the courage of the young general, who, unlike Wartenswas made partly in search of food, partly to disengage the leben and the rest of his generals, unlike, too, Moreau and


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Jourdan themselves, surmounted difficulties instead of lamenting ( away to the east against Wartensleben's front and inner flank, them.

and on the 14th he boldly suggested the idea that decided the On the other side, Carnot, of course, foresaw this possibility. campaign. If your Royal Highness will or can advance 12,000 He warned the generals not to allow the enemy to use his men against Jourdan's rear, he is lost. We could not have a forces sometimes against one, sometimes against the other, as better opportunity.” When this message arrived at headhe did in the last campaign," and ordered them to go forward quarters the archduke had already issued orders to the same respectively into Franconia and into the country of the upper effect. Licutenant Field Marshal Count Latour, with 30,000 Neckar, with a view to seeking out and defeating the enemy's men, was to keep Moreau occupied-another expedient of the army. But the plan of operations soon grew bolder. Jourdan moment, due to the very close pressure of Moreau's advance, was informed on the 21st of July that if he reached the Regnitz and the failure of the attempt to put him out of action at without mecting the enemy, or if his arrival there forced the Neresheim. The small remainder of the army, with a few latter to retire rapidly to the Danube, he was not to hesitate to detachments gathered en route, in all about 27,000 men, began advance to Ratisbon and even to Passau is the disorganization 10 recross the Danube on the 14th, and slowly advanced north of the enemy admitted it, but in these contingencies he was to on a broad front, its leader being now sure that at some point detach a force into Bohemia to levy contributions. “We pre- on his line he would encounter the French, whether they were sume that the enemy is too weak to offer a successful resistance heading for Ratisbon or Amberg. Meanwhile, the Directory had, and will have united his forces on the Danube; we hope that still acting on the theory of the archduke's weakness, ordered our two armies will act in unison to rout him completely. Each Moreau to combine the operations with those of Bonaparte in is, in any case, strong enough to attack by itself, and nothing Italian Tirol, and Jourdan to turn both flanks of his immediate is so pernicious as slowness in war." Evidently the fear that opponent, and thus to prevent his joining the archduke, as well the two Austrian armies would unite against one of their as- as his retreat into Bohemia. And curiously enough it was this sailants had now given place to something like disdain.

latter, and not Moreau's move, which suggested to the archduke This was due in all probability to the rapidity with which that his chance had come. The chance was, in fact, one dear to Moreau was driving the archduke before him. After a brief the 18th century general, catching his opponent in the act of stand on the Neckar at Cannstadt, the Austrians, only 25,000 executing a manæuvre. So far from "exterior lines " being strong, fell back to the Rauhe Alb, where they halted again, fatal to Jourdan, it was not until the French general began to to cover their magazines at Ulm and Günzburg, towards the end operate against Wartensleben's inner flank that the archduke's of July. Wartensleben was similarly falling back before Jourdan, opportunity came. though the latter, starting considerably later than Moreau, had The decisive events of the campaign can be described very not advanced so far. The details of the successive positions briefly, the ideas that directed them having been made clear. occupied by Wartensleben need not be stated; all that concerns The long thin line of the archduke wrapped itself round the general development of the campaign is the fact that the Jourdan's right flank near Amberg, while Wartensleben Amberg hitherto independent leader of the “Lower Rhine Army fought him in front. The battle (August 24) was a Würzburg. resented the loss of his freedom of action, and besides lamenta- series of engagements between the various columns that tions opposed a dull passive resistance to all but the most formal met; it was a repetition in fact of Fleurus, without the intensity orders of the prince. Many weeks passed before this was over- of fighting spirit that redeems that battle from dulness. Success come suficiently for his leader even to arrange for the contem- followed, not upon bravery or even tactics, but upon the preplated combination, and in these weeks the archduke was being existing strategical conditions. At the end of the day the French driven back day by day, and the German principalities were retired, and next morning the archduke began another wide falling away one by one as the French advanced and preached extension to his left, hoping to head them off. This consumed the revolutionary formula. In such circumstances as these - several days. In the course of it Jourdan attempted to take the general facts, if not the causes, were patent enough — it was advantage of his opponent's dissemination to regain the direct natural that the confident Paris strategisis should think chiefly road to Würzburg, but the attempt was defeated by an almost of the profits of their enterprise and ignore the fears of the generals fortuitous combination of forces at the threatened point. More at the front. But the latter were justified in one important effective, indeed, than this indirect pursuit was the very active respect; their operating armies had seriously diminished in hostility of the peasantry, who had suffered in Jourdan's advance numbers, Jourdan disposing of not more than 45,000 and Moreau and retaliated so effectually during his retreat that the army of about 50,000. The archduke had now, owing to the arrival became thoroughly demoralized, both by want of food and by of a few detachments from the Black Forest and elsewhere, about the strain of incessant sniping. Defeated again at Würzburg on 34,000 men, Wartensleben almost exactly the same, and the the 3rd of September, Jourdan continued his retreat to the Lahn, former, for some reason which has never been fully explained and finally withdrew the shattered army over the Rhine, partly but has its justification in psychological factors, suddenly turned by Düsseldorf, partly by Neuwied. In the last engagement Neresheim.

and sought a long, severe and straggling battle above on the Labn the young and brilliant Marceau was mortally

Neresheim (August 11). This did not, however, give wounded. Far away in Bavaria, Moreau had meantime been him much respite, and on the 12th and 13th he retired over the driving Latour from one line of resistance to another.

On reDanube. At this date Wartensleben was about Amberg, almost ceiving the news of Jourdan's reverses, however, he made a rapid as far away from the other army as he had been on the Rhine, and successful retreat to Strassburg, evading the prince's army, owing to the necessity of retreating round instead of through the which had ascended the Rhine valley to head him ofi, in the nick principality of Bayreuth, which was a Prussian possession and of time. could therefore make its neutrality respected.

This celebrated campaign is pre-eminently strategical in its Hitherto Charles had intended to unite his armies on the character, in that the positions and movements anterior to the Danube against Moreau. His later choice of Jourdan's army as battle preordained its issue. It raised the reputation of the archthe objective of his combination grew out of circumstances and duke Charles to the highest point, and deservedly, for he wrested in particular out of the brilliant reconnaissance work of a cavalry victory from the most desperate circumstances by the skilful brigadier of the Lower Rhine Army, Nauendorff. This general's and resolute employment of his one advantage. But this was reports-- he was working in the country south and south-east only possible because Moreau and Jourdan were content to accept of Nürnberg, Wartensleben being at Amberg - indicated first an strategical failure without seeking to redress the balance by hard advance of Jourdan's army írom Forchheim through Nürnberg fighting. The great question of this campaign is, why did to the soulk, and induced the archduke, on the 12th, to begin a Moreau and Jourdan fail against inferior numbers, when in Italy concentration of his own army towards Ingolstadt. This was a Bonaparte with a similar army against a similar opponent won purely defensive measure, but Nauendorff reported on the 13th victory after victory against cqual and superior forces? The and 14th that the main columns of the French were swinging I answer will not be supplied by any theory of “exterior ans? interior lines.” It lies far deeper. So far as it is possible to celebrated maxim: “The principles of war are the same as those summarize it in one phrase, it lies in the fact that though the of a siege. Fire must be concentrated on one point, and as soon Disectory meant this campaign to be the final word on the as the breach is made, the equilibrium is broken and the rest is Revolutionary War, for the nation at large this final word had nothing.” In the domain of tactics he was and remains the been said at Fleurus. The troops were still the nation; they no principal exponent of the art of breaking the equilibrium, and longer fought for a cause and for bare existence, and Moreau and already he imagined the solution of problems of policy and Jourdan were too closely allied in ideas and sympathies with the strategy on the same lines. “ Austria is the great enemy; misplaced citizen soldiers they commanded to be able to dominate Austria crushed, Germany, Spain, Italy fall of themselves. We their collective will. In default of a cause, however, soldiers must not disperse, but concentrate our attack." Napoleon will fight for a man, and this brings us by a natural sequence of argued that Austria could be effectively wounded by an ofiensive ideas to the war in Italy.

against Piedmont, and even more effectively by an ulterior

advance from Italian soil into Germany. In pursuance of the THE WAR IN ITALY 1793-97

single aim he asked for the appointment of a single commanderHitherto we have ignored the operations on the Italian in-chief to hold sway from Bayonne to the Lake of Geneva, and frontier, partly because they were of minor importance and for the rejection of all schemes for “revolutionizing” Italy till partly because the conditions out of which Napoleon's first after the defeat of the arch-enemy. campaign arose can be best considered in connexion with that Operations, however, did not after all take either of these forms. campaign itself, from which indeed the previous operations The younger Robespierre perished with his brother in the coup derive such light as they possess. It has been mentioned that d'étal of oth Thermidor, the advance was suspended, and in 1792 the French overran Savoy and Nice. In 1793 the Bonaparte, amongst other leading spirits of the Army of Italy, Sardinian army and a small auxiliary corps of Austrians waged was arrested and imprisoned. Profiting by this moment, Austria a desultory mountain warfare against the Army of the Alps increased her auxiliary corps. An Austrian general took command about Briançon and the Army of Italy on the Var. That furious of the whole of the allied forces, and pronounced a threat from offensive on the part of the French, which signalized the year 1793 the region of Cairo (where the Austrians took their place on the elsewhere, was made impossible here by the counter-revolution left wing of the combined army) towards the Riviera. The in the cities of the Midi.

French, still dependent on Genoa for supplies, had to take the In 1794, when this had been crushed, the intention of the French offensive at once to save themselves from starvation, and the government was to take the offensive against the Austro- result was the expedition of Dego, planned chiefly by Napoleon, Sardinians. The first operation was to be the capture of Oneglia. who had been released from prison and was at headquarters, The concentration of large forces in the lower Rhone valley had though unemployed. The movement began on the 17th of naturally infringed upon the areas told off for the provisioning of September; and although the Austrian general Colloredo the Armies of the Alps (Kellermann) and of Italy (Dumerbion); repulsed an attack at Dego (Sept. 21) he retreated to Acqui, indeed, the sullen population could hardly be induced to feed the and the incipicnt offensive of the Allies ended abruptly. troops suppressing the revolt, still less the distant frontier The first months of the winter of 1794-1795 were spent in armies. Thus the only source of supply was the Riviera of re-equipping the troops, who stood in sore need after their rapid Genoa: “Our connexion with this district is imperilled by the movements in the mountains. For the future operations, the corsairs of Oneglia (a Sardinian town) owing to the cessation of enforced condensation of the army on its right wing with the our operations afloat. The army is living from hand to mouth,” | object of protecting its line of supply to Genoa and the dangers of wrote the younger Robespierre in September 1793. Vessels its cramped situation on the Riviera suggested a plan roughly bearing supplies from Genoa could not avoid the corsairs by resembling one already recommended by Napoleon, who had taking the open sea, for there the British ficet was supreme. since the affair of Dego become convinced that the way into Carnot therefore ordered the Army of Italy to capture Oneglia, Italy was through the Apennines and not the Alps. The essence and 21,000 men (the rest of the 67,000 effectives were held back of this was to anticipate the enemy by a very early and rapid for coast defence) began operations in April. The French left advance from Vado towards Carcare by the Ceva road, the only moved against the enemy's positions on the main road over the good road of which the French disposed and which they signifiCol di Tenda, the centre towards Ponte di Nava, and the right cantly called the chemin de canon.

along the Riviera. All met with success, thanks to The plan, however, came to nothing; the Committee, which Saorgio

Masséna's bold handling of the centre column. Not now changed its personnel at fixed intervals, was in consequence only was Oneglià captured, but also the Col di Tenda. Napoleon wavering and non-committal, troops were withdrawn

Schérer Bonaparte served in these affairs on the headquarter staff. for a projected invasion of Corsica, and in November Meantime the Army of the Alps had possessed itself of the Little 1794 Dumerbion was replaced by Schérer, who St Bernard and Mont Cenis, and the Republicans were now assembled only 17,000 of his 54,000 effectives for field masters of several routes into Piedmont (May). But the Alpine operations, and selected as his line of advance the Col di Tendaroads merely led to fortresses, and both Carnot and Bonaparte- Coni road. Schérer, besides being hostile to any suggestion Napoleon had by now captivated the younger Robespierre and emanating from Napoleon, was impressed with the apparent become the leading spirit in Dumerbion's army-considered danger to his right wing concentrated in the narrow Riviera, that the Army of the Alps should be weakened to the profit of which it was at this stage impossible to avert by a sudden and the Army of Italy, and that the time had come to disregard the early assumption of the offensive. After a brief tenure Schérer feeble neutrality of Genoa, and to advance over the Col di Tenda. was transferred to the Spanish frontier, but Kellermann, who now

Napoleon's first suggestion for a rapid condensation of the received command of the Army of Italy in addition to his own, French cordon, and an irresistible blow on the centre of the Allies took the same view as his predecessor—the view of the ordinary

by Tenda-Coni,' came to nothing owing to the waste general. But not even the Schérer plan was put into execution, Napoleon in 1794.

of time in negotiations between the generals and the for spring had scarcely arrived when the prospect of renewed

distant Committee, and meanwhile new factors came revolts in the south of France practically paralysed the army. into play. The capture of the pass of Argentera by the right wing This encouraged the enemy to deliver the blow that had so long of the Army of the Alps suggested that the main esfort should be been feared. The combined forces, under Devins,-the Sar. made against the barrier fortress of Demonte, but here again dinians, the Austrian auxiliary corps and the newly arrived Napoleon proposed a concentration of effort on the primary and Austrian main army,-advanced together and forced the French economy of force in the secondary objective. About the same right wing to evacuate Vado and the Genoese littoral. But at time, in a memoir on the war in general, he laid down his most this juncture the conclusion of peace with Spain released the

Liguria was not at this period thought of, even by Napoleon, Pyrenees armies, and Schérer returned to the Army of Italy at the as anything more than a supply arca.

head of reinforcements. He was faced with a difficult situation,

and Keller

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