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post on the line of communication, and on the main defensive On the 29th Quasdanovich attacked Sauret at Salo, drove front less than 30,000 men were disposed at various points him towards Desenzano, and pushed on to Gavardo and thence between La Corona and Legnago (30 m. apart), and at a distance into Brescia. Wurmser expelled Masséna's advanced guard of 15 to 20 m. from Mantua. The strength of such a disposition from La Corona, and captured in succession the Monte Baldo depended on the fighting power and bandiness of the troops, and Rivoli posts. The Brenta column approached Verona with who in each case would be called upon to act as a rearguard to little or no fighting. News of this colump led Napoleon early in gain time. Yet the lie of the country scarcely permitted a closer the day to close up Despinoy, Masséna and Kilmaine at Castel. grouping, unless indeed Bonaparte fell back on the old-time nuovo, and to order Augereau from Legnago to advance on device of a “circumvallation,” and shut himself up, with the Montebello (19 m. east of Verona) against Davidovich's left supplies necessary for the calculated duration of the siege, in an rear. But after these orders had been despatched came the news impregnable ring of earthworks round Mantua. This, however, of Sauret's defeat, and this moment was one of the most anxious, he could not have done even if he had wished, for the wave of in Napoleon's career He could not make up his mind to give up revolt radiating from Milan had made accumulations of food the siege of Mantua, but he hurried Augereau back to the Mincio, impossible, and the lakes above and below the fortress, besides and sent order after order to the officers on the lines of communibeing extremely unhealthy, would have extended the perimeter cation to send all convoys by the Cremona instead of by the of the circumvallation so greatly that the available forces would Brescia road. More, he had the baggage, the treasure and the not suffice to man it. It was not in this, but in the absence of an sick set in motion at once for Marcaria, and wrote to Sérurier

a despatch which included the o Caldiero

words “ perhaps we shall recover

Gombone
QUASDANOVICH

Bonifacio

ourselves ... but I must take serious measures for a retreat." On the 30th he wrote: “The

enemy have broken through our

Accola line in three places . . . Sauret Grada

Bionde

has evacuated Salo and the

enemy has captured Brescia. pastrengo

You see that our communications

with Milan and Verona are cut." MASSÉNA Logo

Albaredo The reports that came to him
Peschiera
Verona

during the morning of the 30th

enabled him to place the main AUCEREAU

body of the enemy opposite

cola Masséna, and this, without in the WURMSER

least alleviating the gravity of the situation, helped to make his course less doubtful. Augereau

was ordered to hold the line of the Molinella, in case Davidovich's attack, the least-known factor, should after all prove to

be serious; Masséna to reconCastellar

Legnago

noitre a road from Peschiera

through Castiglione towards Operations around Mantua 1796-7 Orzinovi, and to stand fast at SÉRURIER

Mantua

Positions of the night of 3-3 August 1796
shows approximately

Castelnuovo opposite Wurmser
Kmen Vater as long as he could. Sauret

and Despinoy were concentrated important central reserve that Bonaparte's disposition is open to at Desenzano with orders on the 31st to clear the main line of criticism, which indeed could impugo the scheme in its entirety, retreat and to recapture Brescia. The Austrian movements were as overtaxing the available resources, more easily than it could merely the continuation of those of the 29th. Quasdanovich attack its details.

wheeled in ards, his right finally resting on Montechiaro and If Bonaparte has occasionally been criticized for his defensive his left on: do. Wurmser drove back Masséna to the west side measures, Wurmser's attack procedure has received almost universal of the Mincio. Davidovich made a slight advance. condemnation, as to the justice of which it may be pointed out! that the object of the expedition was not to win a battle by falling

In the late evening Bonaparte held a council of war at Rover on the disunited French with a well-concentrated army, but to over bella. The proceedings of this council are unknown, but it at power one, any one, of the corps covering the siege, and to press any rate enabled Napoleon to see clearly and to act. straight forward to the relief of Mantua, i.e. to the destruction of Hitherto he had been covering the siege of Mantua with

Relief of Bonaparte's batteries and the levelling of his trench work. The old various detachments, the defeat of any one of which reinforced in the actual case by Beaulieu's late

experiences of French might be fatal to the enterprise. Thus, when he had lost his elan, and as a temporary victory at one point would suffice for the main line of retreat, he could assemble no more than 8000 men purpose in hand, there was every incentive to multiply the points of at Desenzano to win it back. Now, however, he made up his contact. The soundness of Wurmser's plan was proved by the event. mind that the siege could not be continued, and bitter as the years of age, obliterated his achievement by surpassing it, but such decision must have been, it gave him freedom. At this moment as it was a limited use of force for a limited object--the venture of crisis the instincts of the great captain came into play, and undeniably succeeded.

showed the way to a victory that would more than counterThe Austrians formed three corps, one (Quasdanovich, 18,000 balance the now inevitable failure. Sérurier was ordered to men) marching round the west side of the Lake of Garda on spike the 140 siege guns that had been so welcome a few days Gavardo, Salo and the Brescia road, the second (under Wurmser, before, and, after sending part of his force to Augereau, to about 30,000) moving directly down the Adige, and the third establish himself with the rest at Marcaria on the Cremona road. (Davidovich, 6000) making a détour by the Brenta valley The field forces were to be used on interior lines. On the 31st and heading for Verona by Vicenza.

Sauret, Despinoy, Augereau and Kilmaine advanced westward 1 See C. von B.-K., Geist und Stoff, pp. 449-451.

against Quasdanovich. The first two found the Austrians at

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Salo and Lonato and drove them back, while with Augereau , force imparted to the French. Napoleon himself rode five horses and the cavalry Bonaparte himself made a forced march on

to death in three days, and Augereau's division marched from

Roverbella to Brescia and back to Montechiaro, a total distance of Brescia, never halting night or day till he reached the town and nearly 50 m., in about thirty-six hours. This indeed was the foundarecovered his depots. Meantime Sérurier had retired (night tion of his relative superiority," for every hour saved in the time of July 31), Masséna had gradually drawn in towards Lonato, of marching meant more freedom to destroy one corps before the and Wurmser's advanced guard triumphantly entered the

rest could overwhelm the covering detachments and come to its

assistance. fortress (August 1).

Wurmser's plan for the relief of Mantua, suited to its purpose, The Austrian general now formed the plan of crushing succeeded. But when he made his objective the French field army, Bonaparte between Quasdanovich and his own main body. he had to take his own army as he found it, disposed for an altogether But meantime Quasdanovich had evacuated Brescia under the different purpose., A properly combined attack of convergent threat of Bonaparte's advance and was now fighting a long might indeed have given good results. But the success of such a

columns framed ab initio by a good staff officer, such as Mack, irregular action with Despinoy and Sauret about Gavardo and plan depends principally on the assailant's original possession of the Salo, and Bonaparte, having missed his expected target, had initiative, and not on the chances of his being able to win it over to brought Augereau by another severe march back to Montechiaro his own side when operations, as here, are already in progress. on the Chiese. Masséna was now assembled between Lonato When the time came to improvise such a plan, the initiative had

passed over to Napoleon, and the plan was foredoomed. and Ponte San Marco, and Sérurier was retiring quietly on Marcaria. Wurmser's main body, weakened by the detachment By the end of the second week in August the blockade of sent to Mantua, crossed the Mincio about Valeggio and Goito Mantua had been resumed, without siege guns. But still under on the 2nd, and penetrated as far as Castiglione,whence Masséna's the impression of a great victory gained, Bonaparte was planning rearguard was expelled. But a renewed advance of Quasdano- a long forward stride. He thought that by advancing past vich, ordered by Wurmser, which drove Sauret and Despinoy Mantua directly on Trieste and thence onwards to the Semmering

back on Brescia and Lonato, in the end only placed he could impose a peace on the emperor. The Directory, however,

a strong detachment of the Austrians within striking which had by now focussed its attention on the German camCastig

distance of Masséna, who on the 3rd attacked it, paign, ordered him to pass through Tirol and to co-operate with

front 10 front, and by sheer fighting destroyed it, Moreau, and this plan, Bonaparte, though protesting against an while at the same time Augereau recaptured Castiglione from Alpine venture being made so late in the year, prepared to execute, Wurmser. On the 4th Sauret and Despinoy pressed back drawing in reinforcements and collecting great quantities of Quasdapovich beyond Salo and Gavardo. One of the Austrian supplies in boats on the Adige and Lake Garda. Wurmser was columns, finding itself isolated and unable to retreat with the thought to have posted his main body near Trent, and to have others, turned back to break its way through to Wurmser, and detached one division to Bassano “to cover Trieste.” The French was annihilated by Masséna in the neighbourhood of Lonato. advanced northward on the end, in three disconnected columns On this day Augereau fought his way towards Solferino, and (precisely as Wurmser had done in the reverse direction at the Wurmser, thinking rightly or wrongly that he could not now end of July)-Masséna (13,000) from Rivoli to Ala, Augereau retire to the Mincio without a battle, drew up his whole force, (9000) from Verona by hill roads, keeping on his right rear, close on 30,000 men, in the plain between Solferino and Medole. Vaubois (11,000) round the Lake of Garda by Riva and Tor: The finale may be described in very few words. Bonaparte, bole. Sahuguet's division (8000) remained before Mantua. The convinced that no more was to be feared from Quasdanovich, French divisions successfully combined and drove the enemy and seeing that Wurmser meant to fight, called in Despinoy's before them to Trent. division to the main body and sent orders to Sérurier, then far There, however, they missed their target. Wurmser had already distant on the Cremona road, to march against the left fank of drawn over the bulk of his army (22,000) into the Val Sugana, the Austrians. On the sth the battle of Castiglione was sought. whence, with the Bassano division as his advanced guard, he Closely contested in the first hours of the frontal attack till intended once more to relieve Mantua, while Davidovich with Sérurier's arrival decided the day, it ended in the retreat of the 13,000 (excluding detachments) was to hold Tirol against any Austrians over the Mincio and into Tirol whence they had attempt of Bonaparte to join forces with Moreau. come..

Thus Austria was preparing to hazard a second (as in the Thus the new way had failed to keep back Wurmser, and the event she hazarded a third and a fourth) highly trained and old had failed to crush Napoleon. Each was the result of its own expensive professional army in the struggle for the preservation conditions. In former wars a commander threatened as Napoleon of a fortress, and we must conclude that there were weighty was, would have fallen back at once to the Adda, abandoning the

reasons which actuated so notoriously cautious a body as the siege in such good time that he would have been able to bring off his siege artillery: Instead of this Bonaparte hesitated long enough Council of War in making this unconditional venture. While to lose it, which, according to accepted canons was a waste, and held Mantua stood, Napoleon, for all his energy and sanguineness, his ground, which was, by the same rules, sheer madness. But could not press forward into Friuli and Carniola, and immunity Revolutionary discipline was not firm enough to stand a retreat. Once it turned back, the army would have streamed away to Milan

from a Republican visitation was above all else important for and perhaps to the Alps (cf. 1799), and the only alternative to com

the Vienna statesmen, governing as they did more or less displete dissolution therefore was fighting.

contented and heterogeneous populations that had not felt the As to the manner of this fighting, even the principle of "relative pressure of war for a century and more. The Austrians, so far superiority" failed him so long as he was endeavouring to cover as is known, desired no more than to hold their own. They no the siege and again when his chief care was to protect his new line of retreze and to clear his old. In this period, viz. up to his return longer possessed the superiority of moral that

guarantees victory from Brescia on the 2nd of August, the only "mass," he collected to one side when both are materially equal. There was therefore delivered a blow in the air, while the covering detachments had to nothing to be gained, commensurate with the risk involved, by fight bard for bare existence. . Once released from its trammels, fighting a battle in the open field. In Italien siegt nicht die the Napoleonic principle had fair play: He stood between Wurmser Kavallerie was an old saying in the Austrian army, and therefore frushed, thanks to local superiority and the resolute leading of the Austrians could not hope to win a victory of the first magMasséna, but at Castiglione Wurmser actually outnumbered his nitude. The only practicable alternative was to strengthen opponent till the last of Napoleon's precautionary dispositions had Mantua as opportunities offered themselves, and to prolong been given up. and Sérurier brought back from the "alternative line of retreat " to the battlefield. The moral is, again, that it was not the

the passive resistance as much as possible. Napoleon's own mere lact of being on interior lines that gave Napoleon the victory, practice in providing for secondary theatres of war was to but his " tact," his fine appreciation of the chances in his favour, economize forces and to delay a decision, and the fault of the measured in terms of time, space, attacking force and containing Austrians, viewed from a purely military standpoint, was that power. All these factors were greatly influenced by the ground. which they squandered, instead of economizing, their forces to gain the brilliant Austrian cavalry of its power to act. But of far time. If we neglect pure theory, and regard strategy as the greater importance was the mobility that Napoleon's personal | handmaiden of statesmanship—which fundamentally it is—we cannot condemn the Vienna authorities unless it be first proved I would at this stage bave reached Bassano, and finally to send that they grossly exaggerated the possible results of Bonaparte's back a large force through the Val Sugana to attack Davidovich. threatened irruption. And if their capacity for judging the This plan practically failed. political situation be admitted, it naturally follows that their Instead of advancing, Vaubois was driven steadily backward. object was to preserve Mantua al all costs—wbich object Wurmser, By the 6th, Davidovich had fought his way almost to Roveredo, though invariably defeated in action, did in fact accomplish. and Alvintzi had reached Bassano and was there

Caldiera When Masséna entered Trent on the morning of the 5th of successfully repelling the attacks of Masséna and September, Napoleon became aware that the force in his front Augereau. That night Napoleon drew back to Vicenza. On

was a mere detachment, and news soon came in that the 7th Davidovich drove in Vaubois to Corona and Rivoli, Bassano.

Wurmser was in the Val Sugana about Primolano and and Alvintzi came within 5 m. of Vicenza. Napoleon watched at Bassano. This move he supposed to be intended to cover carefully for an opportunity to strike out, and on the 8th massed Trieste, being influenced by his own hopes of advancing in that his troops closely around the central point of Verona. On the direction, and underestimating the importance, to the Austrians, 9th, to give himself air, he ordered Masséna to join Vaubois, of preserving Mantua. He therefore informed the Directory and to drive back Davidovich at all costs. But before this order that he could not proceed with the Tirol scheme, and spent one was executed, reports came in to the effect that Davidovich more day in driving Davidovich well away from Trent. Then, had suspended his advance. The rotb and ith were spent by leaving Vaubois to watch him, Napoleon marched Augereau and both sides in relative inaction, the French waiting on events Masséna, with a rapidity he scarcely ever surpassed, into the and opportunities, the Austrians resting after their prolonged Val Sugana. Wurmser's rearguard was attacked and defeated exertions. Then, on the afternoon of the 11th, being informed again and again, and Wurmser himself felt compelled to stand that Alvintzi was approaching, Napoleon decided to attack him. and fight, in the hope of checking the pursuit before going on the 12th the advanced guard of Alvintzi's army was furiously forward into the plains. Half bis army had already reached assailed in the position of Caldiero. But the troops in rear came Montebello on the Verona road, and with the rear balf he posted up rapidly, and by 4 P.M. the French were defeated all along the bimself at Bassano, where on the 8th he was attacked and line and in retreat on Verona. Napoleon's situation was now defeated with heavy losses. Then began a strategic pursuit or indeed precarious. He was on “ interior lines," it is true, but general chase, and in ibis the mobility of the French should he had neither the force nor the space necessary for the delivery bave finished the work so well begun by their tactics.

of rapid radial blows. Alvintzi was in superior numbers, as the But Napoleon directed the pursuers so as to cut off Wurmser battle of Caldiero had proved, and at any moment Davidovich, from Trieste, not from Mantua. Masséna followed up the who had twice Vaubois's force, might advance to the attack of Austrians to Vicenza, while Augereau hurried towards Padua, Rivoli. The reserves had proved insufficient, and Kilmaine and it was not until late on the oth that Bonaparte realized that had to be called up from Mantua, which was thus for the third his opponent was heading for Mantua via Legnago. On the oth time freed from the blockaders. Again the alternatives were Masséna crossed the Adige at Ronco, while Augereau from retreat, in whatever order was possible to Republican armies, Padua reached Montagnana. Sahuguet from Mantua and and beating the nearest enemy at any sacrifice. Napoleon chose Kilmaine from Verona joined forces at Castellaro on the 11th, the latter, though it was not until the evening of the 14th that with orders to interpose between Wurmser and the fortress. he actually issued the fateful order. Wurmser meantime had halted for a day at Legnago, to restore The Austrians, too, had selected the 15th as the date of their order, and had then resumed bis march. It was almost too late, final advance on Verona, Davidovich from the north, Alvintzi for in the evening, after having to push aside the head of Masséna’s via Zevio from the south. But Napoleon was no longer there; column at Cerea, he had only reached Nogara, some miles short of leaving Vaubois to hold Davidovich as best he might, and Castellaro, and close upon his rear was Augereau, who reached posting only 3000 men in Verona, he bad collected the rest of Legnago that night. On the 12tb, eluding Sahuguet by a detour his small army between Albaro and Ronco. His plan seems to to the southward, he reached Mantua, with all the columns of have been to cross the Adige well in rear of the Austrians, to the French, weary as most of them were, in hot pursuit. After march north on to the Verona-Vicenza highway, and there, an attempt to keep the open field, defeated in a general action supplying himself from their convoys, to fight to the last. On on the 15th, the relieving force was merged in the garrison, now the 15th he had written to the Directory, “The weakness and some 28,000 in all. So ended the episode of Bassano, the most the exhaustion of the army causes me to fear the worst. We are brilliant feature of which as usual was the marching power of perhaps on the eve of losing Italy.” In this extremity of danger the French infantry. This time it sufficed to redeem even the troops passed the Adige in three columns near Ronco and strategical misconceptions and misdirections. Between the Albaredo, and marched forward along the dikes, with deep 5th and the i1th, besides fighting three actions, Masséna bad marshes and pools on either hand. If Napoleon's intention was marched 100 m. and Augereau 114.

to reach the dry open ground of S. Bonifacio in rear of the Feldzeugmeister Alvintzi was now appointed to command a Austrians, it was not realized, for the Austrian army, instead of new army of relief. This time the mere distribution of the being at the gates of Verona, was still between Caldiero and troops imposed a concentric advance of separate columns, for S. Bonifacio, heading, as we know, for Zevio. Thus Alvinizi practically the whole of the fresh forces available were in Carniola, was able, easily and swiftly, to wheel to the south. the Military Frontier, &c., while Davidovich was still in Tirol. The battle of Arcola almost defies description. The first day Alvintzi's intention was to assemble his new army (29,000) in passed in a series of resultless encounters between the heads Friuli, and to move on Bassano, which was to be occupied on of the columns as they met on the dikes. In the the 4th of November. Meantime Davidovich (18,000) was to evening Bonaparte withdrew over the Adige, expecting capture Trent, and the two columns were to connect by the Val at every moment to be summoned to Vaubois's aid. But DavidoSugana. All being well, Alvintzi and Davidovich, still separate, vich remained inactive, and on the 16th the French again crossed were then to converge on the Adige between Verona and Legnago. the river. Masséna from Ronco advanced on Porcile, driving Wurmser was to co-operate by vigorous sorties. At this time the Austrians along the causeway thither, but on the side of Napoleon's protective system was as follows: Kilmaine (9000) Arcola, Alvintzi had deployed a considerable part of his forces investing Mantua, Vaubois (10,000) at Trent, and Masséna on the edge of the marshes, within musket shot of the auseway (9000) at Bassano and Treviso, Augereau (9000) and Macquard by which Bonaparte and Augereau had to pass, along the (3000) at Verona and Villafranca constituting, for the first time Austrian front, to reach the bridge of Arcola. In these circumin these operations, important mobile reserves. Hearing of stances the second day's battle was more murderous and no Alvintzi's approach in good time, he meant first to drive back more decisive than the first, and again the French retreated to Davidovich, then with Augereau, Masséna, Macquard and 3000 Ronco. But Davidovich again stood still, and with incredible of Vaubois's force to fall upon Alvintzi, who, he calculated, I obstinacy Bonaparte ordered a third assault for the 17th, using

Ancola.

indeed more tactical expedients than before, but calculating | struggle of the campaign. Once he felt sure of the situation chiefly on the fighting powers of his men and on the exhaustion Napoleon acted promptly. Joubert was ordered to hold on to of the enemy. Masséna again advanced on Porcile, Robert's Rivoli at all costs. Rey was brought up by a forced march to brigade on Arcola, but the rest, under Augereau, were to pass Castelnuovo, where Victor joined him, and ahead of them both the Alpone near its confluence with the Adige, and joining various Masséna was hurried on to Rivoli. Napoleon himself joined small bodies which passed the main stream lower down, to storm Joubert on the night of the 13th. There he saw the watch-fires forward on dry ground to Arcola. The Austrians, however, of the enemy in a semicircle around him, for Alvintzi, thinking themselves advanced from Arcola, overwhelmed Robert's that he had only to deal with one division, had begun a widebrigade on the causeway and almost reached Ronco. This was spread enveloping attack. The horns of this attack were as yet perhaps the crisis of the battle, for Augereau's force was now so far distant that Napoleon, instead of extending on an equal on the other side of the stream, and Masséna, with his back front, only spread out a few regiments to gain an hour or two to the new danger, was approaching Porcile. But the fire of a and to keep the ground for Masséna and Rey, and on the morning deployed regiment stopped the head of the Austrian column; of January 14th, with 10,000 men in hand against 26,000, he Masséna, turning about, cut into its flank on the dike; and fell upon the central columns of the enemy as they advanced Augereau, gathering force, was approaching Arcola from the up the steep broken slopes of the foreground. The fighting was south. The bridge and the village were evacuated soon after- severe, but Bonaparte had the advantage. Masséna arrived at wards, and Masséna and Augereau began to extend in the plain 9 A.m., and a little later the column of Quasdanovich, which had beyond. But the Austrians still sullenly resisted. It was at moved along the Adige and was now attempting to gain a foothold this moment that Bonaparte secured victory by a mere ruse, on the plateau in rear of Joubert, was crushed by the converging but a ruse which would have been unprofitable and ridiculous fire of Joubert's right brigade and by Masséna's guns, their rout had it not been based on his fine sense of the moral conditions. being completed by the charge of a handful of cavalry under Both sides were nearly fought out, and he sent a few trumpeters Lasalle. The right horn of Alvintzi's attack, when at last it to the rear of the Austrian army to sound the charge. They swung in upon Napoleon's rear, was caught between Masséna did so, and in a few minutes the Austrians were streaming back and the advancing troops of Rey and annihilated, and even to S. Bonifacio. This ended the drama of Arcola, which more before this the dispirited Austrians were in full retreat. A last than any other episode of these wars, perhaps of any wars in alarm, caused by the appearance of a French infantry regiment modern history, centres on the personality of the hero. It is in their rear (this had crossed the lake in boats from Salo), comsaid that the French fought without spirit on the first day, and pleted their demoralization, and though less than 2000 had been yet on the second and third Bonaparte had so thoroughly imbued killed and wounded, some 12,000 Austrian prisoners were left them with his own will to conquer that in the end they prevailed in the hands of the victors. Rivoli was indeed a moral triumph. over an enemy nearly twice their own strength.

After the ordeal of Arcola, the victory of the French was a foreThe climax was reached just in time, for on the 17th Vaubois gone conclusion at each point of contact. Napoleon hesitated, was completely defeated at Rivoli and withdrew to Peschiera, or rather refrained from striking, so long as his information was leaving the Verona and Mantua roads completely open to incomplete, but he knew now from experience that his covering Davidovich. But on the 19th Napoleon turned upon him, and detachment, if well led, could not only hold its own without combining the forces of Vaubois, Masséna and Augereau against assistance until it had gained the necessary information, but him, drove him back to Trent. Meantime Alvintzi returned could still give the rest of the army time to act upon it. Then, from Vicenza San Bonifacio and Caldiero (November 21st), when the cent of gravity had been ascertained, the French and Bonaparte at once stopped the pursuit of Davidovich. On divisions hurried thither, caught the enemy in the act of manæuthe return of the French main body to Verona, Alvintzi finally vring and broke them up. And if that confidence in success withdrew, Wurmser, who had emerged from Mantua on the 23rd, which made all this possible needs a special illustration, it may was driven in again, and this epilogue of the great struggle be found in Napolcon's sending Murat's regiment over the lake came to a feeble end because neither side was now capable of to place a mere two thousand bayonets across the line of prolonging the crisis.

retreat of a whole army. Alvintzi's mancuvre was faulty Alvintzi renewed his advance in January 1797 with all the neither strategically in the first instance nor tactically as forces that could be assembled for a last attempt to save Mantua. regards the project of enveloping Joubert on the 14th. It At this time 8000 men under Sérurier blockaded Mantua. failed because Joubert and his men were better soldiers than his Masséna (9000) was at Verona, Joubert (Vaubois's successor) own, and because a French division could move twice as fast as at Rivoli with 10,000, Augereau at Legnago with 9000. In an Austrian, and from these two factors a new form of war was reserve were Rey's division (4000) between Brescia and Monte-evolved, the essence of which was that, for a given time and in chiaro, and Victor's brigade at Goito and Castelnuovo. On the a given area, a small force of the French should engage and other side, Alvintzi had 9000 men under Provera at Padua, hold a much larger force of the enemy. 6000 under Bayalič at Bassano, and he himself with 28,000 men stood in the Tirol about Trent. This time he intended to make Provera, still advancingon Mantua, joined hands there withWurmser,

The remaining operations can be very briefly summarized. his principal effort on the Rivoli side. Provera was to capture and for a time held Sérurier at a disadvantage. But hcaring of this, Legnago on the 9th of January, and Bayalič Verona on the 12th, Napoleon sent back Masséna from the field of Rivoli, and that general, *bile the main army was to deliver its blow against the Rivoli with Augereau and Sérurier, not only forced Wurmser to retire again

On position on the 13th.

into the fortress, but compelled Provera to lay down his arms.

the 2nd of February 1797, after a long and honourable defence, The first marches of this scheme were duly carried out, and Mantua, and with it what was left of Wurmser's army, surrendered. several days elapsed before Napoleon was able to discern the The campaign of 1797, which ended the war of the First Coalition,

direction of the real attack. Augereau fell back, was the brilliant sequel of these hard-won victories. Austria had

skirmishing a little, as Provera's and Bayalic's advance decided to save Mantua at all costs, and had lost her armies in the developed. On the irth, when the latter was nearing Verona, victories of the archduke. Thus the Republican

attempt, a loss which was not compensated by the strategic

“ visitation

of Alvinlzi's leading troops appeared in front of the Rivoli position. Carinthia and Carniola was one swift march-politically glorious, On the 12th Bayalić with a weak force (he had sent reinforce- if dangerous from a purely, military standpoint-of Napoleon's ments to Alvintzi by the Val Pantena) made an unsuccessful army to the Semmering. The archduke, who was called thither

from Germany, could do no more than fight a few rearguard actions, attack on Verona, Provera, farther south, remaining inactive. and make threats against Napoleon's rear, which the latter, with his On the 13th Napoleon, still in doubt, launched Masséna's division usual" tact," ignored. On the Rhine, as in 1795 and 1796, the armies against Bayalič, who was driven back to San Bonifacio; but of the Sambre-and-Meuse (Hoche) and the Rhine-and-Moselle at the same time definite news came from Joubert that Alvintzi's (Moreau) were opposed by the armies of the Lower Rhine (Werneck) main army was in front of La Corona. From this point begins Strassburg and fought a series of minor actions.

and of the Upper Rhine (Latour). Moreau crossed the river near

Hoche, like his the decisive, though by no means the most intense or dramatic, 1 predecessors, crossed at Düsseldorf and Neuwied and fought his

Rival

Stokach.

way to the Lahn, where for the last time in the history of these wars, meet the storm. Four armies, numbering only 160,000, were there was an irregular widespread battle. But Hoche, in this his

set on foot, in Holland (Brune, 24,000); on the Upper Rhine last campaign, displayed the brilliant energy of his first, and delivered the " series of incessant blows " that Carnot had urged upon Jourdan (Jourdan, 46,000); in Switzerland, which had been militarily the year before. Werneck was driven with ever-increasing losses occupied in 1798 (Masséna, 30,000); and in upper Italy (Schérer, from the lower Lahn to Wetzlar and Giessen. Thence, pressed 60,000). In addition there was Championnet's army, now hard by the French left wing under Championnet, he retired on the commanded by Macdonald, in southern Italy. All these forces Nidda, only to find that Hoche's right had swung completely round

· him. Nothing but the news of the armistice of Leoben the Directory ordered, in January and February 1799, to assume Leobeo.

saved him from envelopment and surrender. This the offensive. general armistice was signed by Bonaparte, on his own authority Jourdan, in the Constance and Schaffhausen region, had only and to the intense chagrin of the Directory and of Hoche, on the

40,000 men against the archduke Charles's 80,000, and was soon 18th of April, and was the basis of the peace of Campo Formio.

brought to a standstill and driven back on Stokach. NAPOLEON IN EGYPT

The archduke had won these preliminary successes Within the scope of this article, yet far more important from its with seven-eighths of his army acting as one concentrated mass. political and personal than from its general military interest, comes the expedition of Napoleon to Egypt and its sequel (see also ÉGYPT: But as he had only encountered a portion of Jourdan's army, be History; NAPOLEON, &c.). A very brief summary must here suffice. became uneasy as to his flanks, checked his bold advance, and Napoleon left Toulon on the 19th of May 1798, at the same time as ordered a reconnaissance in force. This practically extended his army (40,000 strong in 400 transports) embarked secretly at his army while Jourdan was closing his, and thus the French Malta en route, the armada reached the coast of Egypt on the ist of began the battle of Stokach (March 25) in superior numbers, and July. The republicans stormed Alexandria on the 2nd. Between it was not until late in the day that the archduke brought up Embabeh and Gizeh, on the left bank of the Nile, 60,000 Mamelukes sufficient strength (60,000) to win a victory. This was a battle were defeated and scattered on the 21st (battle of the Pyramids), of the “strategic" type, a widespread straggling combat in the French for the most part marching and fighting in the chequer which each side took fifteen hours to inflict a loss of 12% of infantry squares that afterwards became the classical formation for desert warlare. While his lieutenants pursued the more important on the other, and which ended in Jourdan accepting defeat and groups of the enemy, Napoleon entered Cairo in triumph, and pro- drawing off, unpursued by the magnificent Austrian cavalry, ceeded to organize Egypt as Nelson, though too late to head off the expedition, had annihilated though these counted five times as many sabres as the French. the squadron of Admiral Brueys. This blow severed the army of the bold and active Masséna. The forces of both sides in the

The French secondary army in Switzerland was in the hands But to eject the French already in Égypt, military invasion of that Alpine region were, from a military point of view, mere flank country was necessary; The first attempts at this were made in guards to the main armies on the Rhine and the Adige. But September by the Turks as overlords of Egypt. Napoleon-aster unrest, amounting to civil war, among the Swiss and Grison suppressing

a revolt in Cairo- marched into Syria to meet them, peoples tempted both governments to give these dank guards whom he could afford neither to feed, to release, nor to guard, were considerable strength.' shot by his order). But he was brought to a standstill (March 17-May The Austrians in the Vorarlberg and Grisons were under 20) before the half-defensible fortifications of Acre, held by a Turkish Hotze, who had 13,000 men at Bregenz, and 7000 commanded 19.v.). In May, though meantime a Turkish relieving army had been by Auffenberg around Chur, with, between them,

Masséna in severely beaten in the battle of Mount Tabor (April 16, 1799), 5000 men at Feldkirch and a post of 1000 in the strong Napoleon gave up his enterprise, and returned to Egypt, where he position of the Luziensteig near Mayenfeld. Masséna's lead. won a last victory in annihilating at Aboukir, with 6000 of his own available force was about 20,000, and he used almost men, a Turkish army 18,000 strong that had landed there (July 25, the whole of it against Aufienberg. The Rhine was crossed 1799). With this crowning tactical success to set against the Syrian reverses, he handed over the command to Kléber and returned to by his principal column near Mayenfeld, and the Luziensteiz France (August 22) to ride the storm in a new coup d'étal, the " 18th stormed (March 6), while a second column from the Zürich side Brumaire." Kléber, attacked by the English and Turks, concluded descended upon Disentis and captured its defenders. In three the convention of El Arish (January 27, 1800), whereby he secured days, thanks to Masséna's energy and the ardent attacking spirit free transport for the army back to France. But this convention was disavowed by the British government, and Kléber prepared to

of his men, Aufsenberg's division was broken up, Oudinot hold his

ground. On the 20th of March 1800 he thoroughly defeated meanwhile holding of Hotze by a hard-fought combat at the Turkish army at Heliopolis and recovered Cairo, and French Feldkirch (March 7). But a second attack on Feldkirch made influence was once more in the ascendant in Egypt, when its director was murdered by a fanatic on the 14th of June, the day of Marengo: advance of his left wing came to a standstill.

on the 23rd by Masséna with 15,000 men was repulsed and the Kléber's successor, the incompetent Menou, fell an easy victim to ine British expeditionary force under Sir Ralph Abercromby in 1801. Behind Aufsenberg and Hotze was Bellegarde in Tirol with The British forced their way ashore at Aboukir on the 8th of March. some 47,000 men. Most of these were stationed north of Inns. On the 21st, Abercromby won a decisive battle, and himself fell in the bruck and Landeck, probably as a sort of strategic reserve to hour of victory, (sce ALEXANDRIA: Battle of 1801). His successor, General Hely Hutchinson, slowly followed up this advantage, and

the archduke. The rest, with the assistance of the Tirolese received the surrender os Cairo in July and of Alexandria in August, themselves, were to ward off irruptions from Italy. Here the the débris of the French army being given free passage back to France French offensive was entrusted to two columns, one from Meantime a mixed force of British and native troops from India, Masséna's command under Lecourbe, the other from the Army under Sir David Baird, had landed at Kosseir and marched across the desert to Cairo.

of Italy under Dessolle. Simultaneously with Masséna,

Lecourbe marched from Bellinzona with 10,000 men, by the THE WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION

San Bernadino pass into the Splügen valley, and thence over the In the autumn of 1798, while Napoleon's Egyptian expedition Julier pass into the upper Engadine. A small Austrian force was in progress, and the Directory was endeavouring at home under Major-General Loudon attacked him near Zernetz, but to reduce the importance and the predominance of the army was after three days of rapid manæuvres and bold tactics driven and its leaders, the powers of Europe once more allied themselves, back to Martinsbrück, with considerable losses, especially in not now against the principles of the Republic, but against the prisoners. But ere long the country people flew to arms, and treaty of Campo Formio. Russia, Austria, England, Turkey, | Lecourbe found himself between two fires, the levies occupying Portugal, Naples and the Pope formed the Second Coalition. The Zernetz and Loudon's regulars Martinsbrück. But though he war began with an advance into the Roman States by a worthless had only some 5000 of his original force left, he was not discon: and ill-behaved Neapolitan army (commanded, much against certed, and, by driving back the levies into the high valleys his will, by Mack), which the French troops under Championnet whence they had come, and constantly threatening Loudon, destroyed with ease. Championnet then revolutionized Naples. After this unimportant prelude the curtain rose on a general that the * flank position " held by these forces relatively to the

1 The assumption by later critics (Clausewitz even included) European war. The Directory which now had at its command main armies in Italy and Germany was their raison d'être is unneither numbers nor enthusiasm, prepared as best it could to supported by contemporary evidence,

Switzer

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