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in Tirol

he was able to maintain himself and to wait for Dessolles. The | At the same time, dissatisfied with the marching of the Austrian latter, moving up the Valtelline, by now fought his way to the infantry, he sent the following characteristic reproof to their Stelvio pass, but beyond it the defile of Tauffers (S.W. of Glurns) commander: "The march was in the service of the Kaiser. was entrenched by Loudon, who thus occupied a position Fair weather is for my lady's chamber, for dandies, for sluggards. midway between the two French columns, while his irregulars He who dares to cavil against his high duty (der Grosssprecher beset all the passes and ways giving access to the Vintschgau and wider den hohen Dienst) is, as an egoist, instantly to vacate his the lower Engadine. In this situation the French should have command. Whoever is in bad health can stay behind. The been destroyed in detail. But as usual their speed and dash gave so-called reasoners (raisonneurs) do no army any good...." them the advantage in every manœuvre and at every point of One day later, under this unrelenting pressure, the advanced posts of the Allies reached Cremona and the main body the On the 25th Lecourbe and Dessolles attacked Loudon at Oglio. The pace became slower in the following days, as many Nauders in the Engadine and Tauffers in the Vintschgau re-bridges had to be made, and meanwhile Moreau, Schérer's Lecourbe spectively. At Nauders the French passed round successor, prepared with a mere 20,000 men to defend Lodi, the flanks of the defence by scrambling along the high Cassano and Lecco on the Adda. On the 26th the Russian hero Dessoles mountain crests adjacent, while at Tauffers the attacked him all along the line. The moral supremacy had assailants, only 4500 strong, descended into a deep passed over to the Allies. Melas, under Suvárov's stern orders, ravine, debouched unnoticed in the Austrians' rear, and captured flung his battalions regardless of losses against the strong position 6000 men and 16 guns. The Austrian leader with a couple of of Cassano. The story of 1796 repeated itself with the rôles companies made his way through Glurns to Nauders, and there, reversed. The passage was carried, and the French rearguard finding himself headed off by Lecourbe, he took to the mountains. under Sérurier was surrounded and captured by an inferior corps His scorps, like Auffenberg's, was annihilated. of Austrians. The Austrians (the Russians at Lecco were hardly engaged) lost 6000 men, but they took 7000 prisoners, and in all Moreau's little army lost half its numbers and retreated in many disconnected bodies to the Ticino, and thence to Alessandria. Everywhere the Italians turned against the French, mindful of the exactions of their commissaries. The strange Cossack cavalry that western Europe had never yet seen entered Milan on the 29th of April, eleven days after passing the Mincio, and next day the city received with enthusiasm the old field marshal, whose exploits against the Turks had long invested him with a halo of romance and legend. Here, for the moment, his offensive culminated. He desired to pass into Switzerland and to unite his own, the archduke's, Hotze's and Bellegarde's armies in one powerful mass. But the emperor would not permit the execution of this scheme until all the fortresses held by the enemy in Upper Italy should have been captured. In any case, Macdonald's army in southern Italy, cut off from France by the rapidity of Suvárov's onslaught, and now returning with all speed to join Moreau by force or evasion, had still to be dealt with.

This ended the French general offensive. Jourdan had been defeated by the archduke and forced or induced to retire over the Rhine. Masséna was at a standstill before the strong position of Feldkirch, and the Austrians of Hotze were still massed at Bregenz, but the Grisons were revolutionized, two strong bodies of Austrians numbering in all about 20,000 men had been destroyed, and Lecourbe and Dessolles had advanced far into Tirol Apause followed. The Austrians in the mountains needed time to concentrate and to recover from their astonishment. The archduke fell ill, and the Vienna war council forbade his army to advance lest Tirol should be "uncovered," though Bellegarde and Hotze still disposed of numbers equal to those of Masséna and Lecourbe. Masséna succeeded Jourdan in general command on the French side and promptly collected all available forces of both armies in the hilly non-Alpine country between Basel, Zürich and Schaffhausen, thereby directly barring the roads into France (Berne-Neuchâtel-Pontarlier and BaselBesançon) which the Austrians appeared to desire to conquer. The protection of Alsace and the Vosges was left to the fortresses. There was no suggestion, it would appear, that the Rhine between Basel and Schaffhausen was a flank position sufficient of itself to bar Alsace to the enemy.

It is now time to turn to events in Italy, where the Coalition intended to put forth its principal efforts. At the beginning of March the French had 80,000 men in Upper Italy and some 35,000 in the heart of the Peninsula, the latter engaged chiefly in supporting newly-founded republics. Of the former, 53,000 formed the field army on the Mincio under Schérer. The Austrians, commanded by Kray, numbered in all 84,000, but detachments reduced this figure to 67,000, of whom, moreover, 15,000 had not yet arrived when operations began. They were to be joined by a Russian contingent under the celebrated Suvárov, who was to command the whole on arrival, and whose extraordinary personality gives the campaign its special interest. Kray himself was a resolute soldier, and when the French, obeying the general order to advance, crossed the Adige, he defeated them in a severely fought battle at Magnano near Verona (March 5), the French losing 4000 killed and wounded and 4500 taken, out of 41,000. The Austrians lost some 3800 killed and wounded and 1 500 prisoners, out of 46,000 engaged. The war, however, was undertaken not to annihilate, but to evict the French, and, probably under orders from Vienna, Kray allowed the beaten enemy to depart.

Savárov.

Suvárov's mobile army, originally 90,000 strong, had now dwindled, by reason of losses and detachments for sieges, to half that number, and serious differences arose between the Vienna government and himself. If he offended the pride of the Austrian army, he was at least respected as a leader who gave it victories, but in Vienna he was regarded as a madman who had to be kept within bounds. But at last, when he was becoming thoroughly exasperated by this treatment, Macdonald came within striking distance and the active campaign recommenced. In the second week of June, Moreau, who had retired into the Apennines about Gavi, advanced with the intention of drawing upon himself troops that would otherwise have been employed against Macdonald. He succeeded, for Suvárov with his usual rapidity collected 40,000 men at Alessandria, only to learn that Macdonald with 35,000 men was coming up on the Parma road. When this news arrived, Macdonald had already engaged an Austrian detachment at Modena and driven it back, and Suvárov found himself between Moreau and Macdonald with barely enough men under his hand to enable him to play the game of "interior lines." But at the crisis the rough energetic warrior who despised "raisonneurs," displayed generalship of the first order, and taking in hand all his scattered detachments, he manoeuvred them in the Napoleonic fashion.

The

Suvárov appeared with 17,000 Russians on the 4th of April. His first step was to set Russian officers to teach the Austrian On the 14th Macdonald was calculated to be between Modena, troops-whose feelings can be imagined-how to Reggio and Carpi, but his destination was uncertain. Would he attack with the bayonet, his next to order the whole continue to hug the Apennines to join Moreau, or army forward. The Allies broke camp on the 17th, 18th and would he strike out northwards against Kray, who 19th of April, and on the 20th, after a forced march of close on with 20,000 men was besieging Mantua? From 30 m., they passed the Chiese. Brescia had a French garrison, but Alessandria it is four marches to Piacenza and nine to Mantua, Suvárov soon cowed it into surrender by threats of a massacre, while from Reggio these places are four and two marches which no one doubted that he would carry into execution. I respectively. Piacenza, therefore, was the crucial point if

Trebbia.

Action of

Charles and Hotze stood, about the 15th of May, at opposite ends of the lake of Constance. The two together numbered about 88,000 men, but both had sent away numerous detachments to the flanks, and the main bodies dwindled to 35,000 for the archduke and 20,000 for Hotze. Masséna, with 45,000 men in all, retired slowly from the Rhine to the Thur. The archduke crossed the Rhine at Stein, Hotze at Balzers, and each then cautiously felt his way towards the other. Their active opponent attempted to take advantage of their separation, and an irregular fight took place in the Thur valley (May 25), but Masséna, finding Hotze close on his right flank, retired without attempting to force a decision. On the 27th, having joined forces, the Austrians dislodged Masséna from his new position on the Töss without difficulty, and this process was repeated from time to time in the next few days, until at last Masséna halted in the position he had prepared for defence at Zürich. He Zürich. had still but 25,000 of his 45,000 men in hand, for he maintained numerous small detachments on his right, behind the Zürcher See and the Wallen See, and on his left towards Basel. These 25,000 occupied an entrenched position 5 m. in length; against which the Austrians, detaching as usual many posts to protect their flanks and rear, deployed only 42,000 men, of whom 8000 were sent on a wide turning movement and Sooo held in reserve 4 m. in rear of the battlefield. Thus the frontal attack was made with forces not much greater than those of the defence and it failed accordingly (June 4). But Masséna, fearing perhaps to strain the loyalty of the Swiss to their French-made constitution by exposing their town to assault and sack, retired on the 5th. He did not fall back far, for his outposts still bordered the Limmat and the Linth, while his main body stood in the valley of the Aar between Baden and Lucerne. The archduke pressed Masséna as little as he had pressed Jourdan after Stokach (though in this case he had less to gain by pursuit), and awaited the arrival of a second Russian army, 30,000 strong, under Korsákov, before resuming the advance, meantime throwing out covering detachments towards Basel, where Masséna had a division. Thus for two months operations, elsewhere than in Italy, were at a standstill, while Masséna drew in reinforcements and organized the fractions of his forces in Alsace as a skeleton army, and the Austrians distributed arms to the peasantry of South Germany.

Macdonald continued westward, while, in the other case, nothing | Valley between Disentis and Feldkirch. The archduke's opera. could save Kray but the energetic conduct of Hohenzollern's tions now recommenced. detachment, which was posted near Reggio. This latter, however, was soon forced over the Po, and Ott, advancing from Cremona to join it, found himself sharply pressed in turn. The field marshal had hoped that Ott and Hohenzollern together would be able to win him time to assemble at Parma, where he could bring on a battle whichever way the French took. But on receipt of Ott's report he was convinced that Macdonald had chosen the western route, and ordering Ott to delay the French as long as possible by stubborn rearguard actions and to put a garrison into Piacenza under a general who was to hold out "on peril of his life and honour," he collected what forces were ready to move and hurried towards Piacenza, the rest being left to watch Moreau. He arrived just in time. When after three forced marches the main body (only 26,000 strong) reached Castel San Giovanni, Ott had been driven out of Piacenza, but the two joined forces safely. Both Suvárov and Macdonald spent the 17th in closing up and deploying for battle. The respective forces were Allies 30,000, French 35,000. Suvárov believed the enemy to be only 26,000 strong, and chiefly raw Italian regiments, but his temperament would not have allowed him to stand still even had he known his inferiority. He had already issued one of his peculiar battle-orders, which began with the words, "The hostile army will be taken prisoners" and continued with directions to the Cossacks to spare the surrendered enemy. But Macdonald too was full of energy, and believed still that he could annihilate Ott before the field marshal's arrival. Thus the battle of the Trebbia (June 17-19) was fought by both sides in the spirit of the offensive. It was one of the severest struggles in the Republican wars, and it ended in Macdonald's retreat with a loss of 15,000 men-probably 6000 in the battle and 9000 killed and prisoners when and after the equilibrium was broken-for Suvárov, unlike other generals, had the necessary surplus of energy after all the demands made upon him by a great battle, to order and to direct an effective pursuit. The Allies lost about 7000. Macdonald retreated to Parma and Modena, harassed by the peasantry, and finally recrossed the Apennines and made his way to Genoa. The battle of the Trebbia is one of the most clearly-defined examples in military history of the result of moral force-it was a matter not merely of energetic leading on the battlefield, but far more of educating the troops beforehand to meet the strain, of ingraining in the soldier the determination to win at all costs. "It was not," says Clausewitz, "a case of losing the key of the position, of turning a flank or breaking a centre, of a mistimed cavalry charge or a lost battery.. it is a pure trial of strength and expense of force, and victory is the sinking of the balance, if ever so slightly, in favour of one side. And we mean not merely physical, but even more moral forces."

To return now to the Alpine region, where the French offensive had culminated at the end of March. Their defeated left was behind the Rhine in the northern part of Switzerland, the halfvictorious centre athwart the Rhine between Mayenfeld and Chur, and their wholly victorious right far within Tirol between Glurns, Nauders and Landeck. But neither the centre nor the right could maintain itself. The forward impulse given by Suvárov spread along the whole Austrian front from left to right. Dessolles' column (now under Loison) was forced back to Chiavenna. Bellegarde drove Lecourbe from position to position towards the Rhine during April. There Lecourbe added to the remnant of his expeditionary column the outlying bodies of Masséna's right wing, but even so he had only 8000 men against Bellegarde's 17,000, and he was now exposed to the attack of Hotze's 25,000 as well. The Luziensteig fell to Hotze and Chur to Bellegarde, but the defenders managed to escape from the converging Austrian columns into the valley of the Reuss. Having thus reconquered all the lost ground and forced the French into the interior of Switzerland, Bellegarde and Hotze parted company, the former marching with the greater part of his forces to join Suvárov, the latter moving to his right to reinforce the archduke. Only a chain of posts was left in the Rhine

In the end, under pressure from Paris, it was Masséna who resumed active movements. Towards the middle of August, Lecourbe, who formed a loose right wing of the French army in the Reuss valley, was reinforced to a strength of 25,000 men, and pounced upon the extended left wing of the enemy, which had stretched itself, to keep pace with Suvárov, as far westward as the St Gothard. The movement began on the 14th, and in two days the Austrians were driven back from the St Gothard and the Furka to the line of the Linth, with the loss of 8000 men and many guns. At the same time an attempt to take advantage of Masséna's momentary weakness by forcing the Aar at Döttingen near its mouth failed completely (August 16-17). Only 200 men guarded the point of passage, but the Austrian engineers had neglected to make a proper examination of the river, and unlike the French, the Austrian generals had no authority to waste their expensive battalions in forcing the passage in boats. No one regarded this war as a struggle for existence, and no one but Suvárov possessed the iron strength of character to send thousands of men to death for the realization of a diplomatic success-for ordinary men, the object of the Coalition was to upset the treaty of Campo Formio. This was the end of the archduke's campaign in Switzerland. Though he would have preferred to continue it, the Vienna government desired him to return to Germany. An Anglo-Russian expedition was about to land in Holland,' and the French were assembling fresh forces on the Rhine, and, with the double object of preventing an invasion of

1 For this expedition, which was repulsed by Brune in the battle of Castricum, see Fortescue's Hist. of the British Army, vol. iv., and Sachot's Brune en Hollande.

South Germany and of inducing the French to augment their |
forces in Alsace at the expense of those in Holland, the archduke
left affairs in Switzerland to Hotze and Korsákov, and marched
away with 35,000 men to join the detachment of Sztarray
(20,000) that he had placed in the Black Forest before entering
Switzerland. His new campaign never rose above the level of a
war of posts and of manœuvres about Mannheim and Philipps-
burg. In the latter stage of it Lecourbe commanded the French
and obtained a slight advantage.

upward to the centre of the S-and to force his way through the
French cordon to Zürich, and if events, so far as concerned his
own corps, belied his optimism, they at any rate justified his
choice of the shortest route. For, aware of the danger gathering
in his rear, Masséna gathered up all his forces within reach
towards his centre, leaving Lecourbe to defend the St Gothard
and the Reuss valley and Soult on the Linth. On the 24th he
forced the passage of the Limmat at Dietikon. On the
25th, in the second battle of Zürich, he completely
routed Korsákov, who lost 8000 killed and wounded,
large numbers of prisoners and 100 guns. All along the line the
Allies fell back, one corps after another, at the moment when
Suvárov was approaching the foot of the St Gothard.

Battle of
Zürich.

Suvárov's last exploit in Italy coincided in time, but in no other respect, with the skirmish at Döttingen. Returning swiftly from the battlefield of the Trebbia, he began to drive back Moreau to the Riviera. At this point Joubert succeeded to the command on the French side, and against the advice of his generals, gave On the 21st the field marshal's headquarters were at Bellinzona, battle Equally against the advice of his own subordinates, the where he made the final preparations. Expecting to be four days field marshal accepted it, and won his last great victory at Novi en route before he could reach the nearest friendly Suvárov la on the 13th of August, Joubert being killed. This was followed magazine, he took his trains with him, which inevitably the Alps. by another rapid march against a new French" Army of the Alps" augmented the difficulties of the expedition. On the (Championnet) which had entered Italy by way of the Mont 24th Airolo was taken, but when the far greater task of Cenis. But immediately after this he left all further operations in storming the pass itself presented itself before them, even the Italy to Melas with 60,000 men and himself with the Russians and stolid Russians were terrified, and only the passionate protests an Austrian corps marched away, via Varese, for the St Gothard of the old man, who reproached his "children" with deserting to combine operations against Masséna with Hotze and Korsákov their father in his extremity, induced them to face the danger It was with a heavy heart that he left the scene of his battles, in At last after twelve hours' fighting, the summit was reached which the force of his personality had carried the old-fashioned The same evening Suvárov pushed on to Hospenthal, while a "linear" armies for the last time to complete victory In the flanking column from Disentis made its way towards Amsteg early summer he had himself suggested, eagerly and almost over the Crispalt. Lecourbe was threatened in rear and pressed angrily, the concentration of his own and the archduke's armies in front, and his engineers, to hold off the Disentis column, had in Switzerland with a view, not to conquering that country, but broken the Devil's Bridge. Discovering this, he left the road, to forcing Jourdan and Masséna into a grand decisive battle. threw his guns into the river and made his way by fords and But, as we have seen, the Vienna government would not release water-meadows to Göschenen, where by a furious attack he bim until the last Italian fortress had been reoccupied, and cleared the Disentis troops off his line of retreat. His rearguard when finally he received the order that a little while before he had meantime held the ruined Devil's Bridge. This point and the so ardently desired, it was too late. The archduke had already tunnel leading to it, called the Urner Loch, the Russians attempted left Switzerland, and he was committed to a resultless warfare in to force, with the most terrible losses, battalion after battalion the high mountains, with an army which was a mere detachment crowding into the tunnel and pushing the foremost ranks into and in the hope of co-operating with two other detach- the chasm left by the broken bridge. But at last a ford was Savárov ordered to ments far away on the other side of Switzerland. As discovered and the bridge, cleared by a turning movement, Switzer for the reasons which led to the issue of such an order, was repaired. More broken bridges lay beyond, but at last land it can only be said that the bad feeling known to exist Suvárov joined the Disentis column near Göschenen. When between the Austrians and Russians induced England to recom- Altdorf was reached, however, Suvárov found not only Lecourbe mend, as the first essential of further operations, the separate in a threatening position, but an entire absence of boats on the concentration of the troops of each nationality under their own Lake of the Four Cantons. It was impossible (in those days the generals. Still stranger was the reason which induced the tsar to Axenstrasse did not exist) to take an army along the precipitous give his consent. It was alleged that the Russians would be eastern shore, and thus passing through one trial after another, bealthier in Switzerland than the men of the southern plains! each more severe than the last, the Russians, men and horses From such premises as these the Allied diplomats evolved a new and pack animals in an interminable single file, ventured on the plan of campaign, by which the Anglo-Russians under the duke of path leading over the Kinzig pass into the Muotta Thal. The York were to reconquer Holland and Belgium, the Archduke passage lasted three days, the leading troops losing men and Charles to operate on the Middle Rhine, Suvárov in Switzerland horses over the precipices, the rearguard from the fire of the and Melas in Piedmont-a plan destitute of every merit but that enemy, now in pursuit. And at last, on arrival in the Muotta of simplicity Thal, the field marshal received definite information that Korsákov's army was no longer in existence. Yet even so it was long before he could make up his mind to retreat, and the pursuers gathered on all sides. Fighting, sometimes severe, and never altogether ceasing, went on day after day as the Allied column, now reduced to 15,000 men, struggled on over one pass after another, but at last it reached Ilanz on the Vorder Rhine (October 8). The Archduke Charles meanwhile had, on hearing of the disaster of Zürich, brought over a corps from the Neckar, and for some time negotiations were made for a fresh combined operation against Masséna. But these came to nothing, for the archduke and Suvárov could not agree, either as to their own relations or as to the plan to be pursued. Practically, Suvárov's retreat from Altdorf to Ilanz closed the campaign. It was his last active service, and formed a gloomy but grand climax to the career of the greatest soldier who ever wore the Russian uniform.

It is often said that it is the duty of a commander to resign rather than undertake an operation which he believes to be faulty. So however, Suvárov did not understand it. In the simplicity of his loyalty to the formal order of his sovereign he prepared to carry out his instructions to the letter. Masséna's command (77,000 men) was distributed, at the beginning of September, Long an enormous S, from the Simplon, through the St Gothard and Glarus, and along the Linth, the Züricher See and the Limmat to Basel Opposite the lower point of this S, Suvárov (18,000) was about to advance. Hotze's corps (25,000 Austrians), extending from Utznach by Chur to Disentis, formed a thin line roughly parallel to the lower curve of the S, Korsákov's Russians (10,000) were opposite the centre at Zürich, while Nauendorff with a small Austrian corps at Waldshut faced the extreme upper point. Thus the only completely safe way in which Suvárov could reach the Zürich region was by skirting the lower curve of the S, under protection of Hotze. But this detour would be long and painful, and the ardent old man preferred to cross the mountains once for all at the St Gothard, and to follow the valley of the Reuss to Altdorf and Schwyz-i.e. to strike vertically

MARENGO AND HOHENLINDEN

The disasters of 1799 sealed the fate of the Directory, and placed Bonaparte, who returned from Egypt with the prestige of a recent victory, in his natural place as civil and military

head of France. In the course of the campaign the field strength | Genoa Between them Switzerland, secured by the victory of of the French had been gradually augmented, and in spite of Zürich, offered a starting-point for a turning movement on losses now numbered 227,000 at the front. These were divided either side-this year the advantage of the flank position was into the Army of Batavia, Brune (25,000), the Army of the recognized and acted upon. The Army of Reserve was assembling Rhine, Moreau (146,000), the Army of Italy, Masséna (56,000), around Dijon, within 200 m. of either theatre of war The and, in addition, there were some 100,000 in garrisons and depots general plan was that the Army of Reserve should march through in France. Switzerland to close on the right wing of the Army of the Rhine. Most of these field armies were in a miserable condition owing Thus supported to whatever degree might prove to be necessary, to the losses and fatigues of the last campaign. The treasury Moreau was to force the passage of the Rhine about Schaffhausen, was empty and credit exhausted, and worse still-for spirit and to push back the Austrians rapidly beyond the Lech, and then, enthusiasm, as in 1794, would have remedied material de- if they took the offensive in turn, to hold them in check for ficiencies-the conscripts obtained under Jourdan's law of 1798 ten or twelve days. During this period of guaranteed freedom (see CONSCRIPTION) came to their regiments most unwillingly the decisive movement was to be made. The Army of Reserve, Most of them, indeed, deserted on the way to join the colours. augmented by one large corps of the Army of the Rhine, was to A large draft sent to the Army of Italy arrived with 310 men descend by the Splügen (alternatively by the St Gothard and instead of 10,250, and after a few such experiences, the First even by Tirol) into the plains of Lombardy. Magazines were Consul decided that the untrained men were to be assembled in to be established at Zürich and Lucerne (not at Chur, lest the the fortresses of the interior and afterwards sent to the active plan should become obvious from the beginning), and all likely battalions in numerous small drafts, which they could more routes reconnoitred in advance. The Army of Italy was at first easily assimilate. Besides accomplishing the immense task of reorganizing existing forces, he created new ones, including the Consular Guard, and carried out at this moment of crisis two such far-reaching reforms as the replacement of the civilian drivers of the artillery by soldiers, and of the hired teams by horses belonging to the state, and the permanent grouping of divisions in army corps.

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As early as the 25th of January 1800 the First Consul provided for the assembly of all available forces in the interior in an Blan "Army of Reserve" He reserved to himself the The Army of Reserve. Command of this army, which gradually came into being as the pacification of Vendée and the return of some of Brune's troops from Holland set free the necessary nucleus troops. The conscription law was stringently reenforced, and impassioned calls were made for volunteers (the latter, be it said, did not produce five hundred useful men). The district of Dijon, partly as being central with respect to the Rhine and Italian Armies, partly as being convenient for supply purposes, was selected as the zone of assembly. Chabran's division was formed from some depleted corps of the Army of Italy and from the depots of those in Egypt. Chambarlhac's, chiefly of young soldiers, lost 5% of its numbers on the way to Dijon from desertion-a loss which appeared slight and even satisfactory after the wholesale débandade of the winter months. Lechi's Italian legion was.newly formed from Italian refugees. Boudet's division was originally assembled from some of the southern garrison towns, but the units composing it were frequently changed up to the beginning of May. The cavalry was deficient in saddles, and many of its units were new formations. The Consular Guard of course was a corps d'élite, and this and two and a half infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade coming from the veteran "Army of the West " formed the teal backbone of the army. Most of the newer units were not even armed till they had left Dijon for the front.

Such was the first constitution of the Army of Reserve. We can scarcely imagine one which required more accurate and detailed staff work to assemble it-correspondence with the district commanders, with the adjutant-generals of the various armies, and orders to the civil authorities on the lines of march, to the troops themselves and to the arsenals and magazines. No one but Napoleon, even aided by a Berthier, could have achieved so great a task in six weeks, and the great captain, himself doing the work that nowadays is apportioned amongst a crowd of administrative staff officers, still found time to administer France's affairs at home and abroad, and to think out a general plan of campaign that embraced Moreau's, Masséna's and his own armies.

The Army of the Rhine, by far the strongest and best equipped, lay on the upper Rhine. The small and worn-out Army of Italy was watching the Alps and the Apennines from Mont Blanc to He afterwards appointed Berthier to command the Army of Reserve, but himself accompanied it and directed it, using Berthier as chief of staff.

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to maintain a strict defensive, then to occupy the Austrians until the entry of the Reserve Army into Italy was assured, and finally to manoeuvre to join it.

Moreau, however, owing to want of horses for his pontoon train and also because of the character of the Rhine above Basel, preferred to cross below that place, especially as in Alsace there were considerably greater supply facilities than in a country which had already been fought over and stripped bare With the greatest reluctance Bonaparte let him have his way, and giving up the idea of using the Splügen and the St Gothard, began to turn his attention to the more westerly passes, the St Bernard and the Simplon. It was not merely Moreau's scruples that led to this essential modification in the scheme At the beginning of April the enemy took the offensive against Masséna. On the 8th Melas's right wing dislodged the French from the Mont Cenis, and most of the troops that had then reached Dijon were shifted southward to be ready for emergencies. By the 25th Berthier reported that Masséna was seriously attacked and that he might have to be supported by the shortest route. Bonaparte's resolution was already taken. He waited no longer for Moreau

(who indeed so far from volunteering assistance, actually demanded | in the rest. The problem was to reconcile the necessity for time, it for himself). Convinced from the paucity of news that Masséna's army was closely pressed and probably severed from France, and feeling also that the Austrians were deeply committed to their struggle with the Army of Italy, he told Berthier to march with 40,000 men at once by way of the St Bernard unless otherwise advised. Berthier protested that he had only 25,000 effectives, and the equipment and armament was still far from complete as indeed it remained to the end-but the troops marched, though their very means of existence were precarious from the time of leaving Geneva to the time of reaching Milan, for nothing could extort supplies and money from the sullen Swiss.

Bard.

At the beginning of May the First Consul learned of the serious plight of the Army of Italy. Masséna with his right wing was shut up in Genoa, Suchet with the left wing Napoleon's driven back to the Var Meanwhile Moreau had won plan of a preliminary victory at Stokach, and the Army of campaign. Reserve had begun its movement to Geneva. With these data the plan of campaign took a clear shape at lastMasséna to resist as long as possible, Suchet to resume the offensive, if he could do so, towards Turin; the Army of Reserve to pass the Alps and to debouch into Piedmont by Aosta; the Army of the Rhine to send a strong force into Italy by the St Gothard. The First Consul left Paris on the 6th of May. Berthier went forward to Geneva, and still farther on the route magazines were established at Villeneuve and St-Pierre. Gradually, and with immense efforts, the leading troops of the long column' were passed over the St Bernard, drawing their artillery on sledges, on the 15th and succeeding days. Driving away small posts of the Austrian army, the advance guard entered Aosta on the 16th and Châtillon on the 18th and the alarm was given. Melas, committed as he was to his Riviera campaign, began to look to his right rear, but he was far from suspecting the seriousness of his opponent's purpose. Infinitely more dangerous for the French than the small detachment that Melas opposed to them, or even the actual crossing of the pass, was the unexpected stopping power of the little fort of Bard. The advanced guard of the French appeared before it on the 19th, and after three wasted days the infantry managed to find a difficult mountain by-way and to pass round the obstacle. Ivrea was occupied on the 23rd, and Napoleon hoped to assemble the whole army there by the 27th. But except for a few guns that with infinite precautions were smuggled one by one through the streets of Bard, the whole of the artillery, as well as a detachment (under Chabran) to besiege the fort, had to be left behind. Bard surrendered on the 2nd of June, having delayed the infantry of the French army for four days and the artillery for a fortnight. The military situation in the last week of May, as it presented itself to the First Consul at Ivrea, was this. The Army of Italy under Masséna was closely besieged in Genoa, where provisions were running short, and the population so hostile that the French general placed his field artillery to sweep the streets. But Masséna was no ordinary general, and the First Consul knew that while Masséna lived the garrison would resist to the last extremity. Suchet was defending Nice and the Var by vigorous minor operations. The Army of Reserve, the centre of which had reached at Ivrea the edge of the Italian plains, consisted of four weak army corps under Victor, Duhesme, Lannes and Murat. There were still to be added to this small army of 34,000 effectives, Turreau's division, which had passed over the Mont Cenis and was now in the valley of the Dora Riparia, Moncey's corps of the Army of the Rhine, which had at last been extorted from Moreau and was due to pass the St Gothard before the end of May, Chabran's division left to besiege Bard, and a small force under Béthencourt, which was to cross the Simplon and to descend by Arona (this place proved in the event a second Bard and immobilized Béthencourt until after the decisive battle) Thus it was only the simplest part of Napoleon's task to concentrate half of his army at Ivrea, and he had yet to bring 1 Only one division of the main body used the Little St Bernard.

which he wanted to ensure the maximum force being brought over the Alps, with the necessity for haste, in view of the impending fall of Genoa and the probability that once this conquest was achieved, Melas would bring back his 100,000 men into the Milanese to deal with the Army of Reserve. As early as the 14th of May he had informed Moncey that from Ivrea the Army of Reserve would move on Milan. On the 25th of May, in response to Berthier's request for guidance, the First Consul ordered Lannes (advanced guard) to push out on the Turin road, "in order to deceive the enemy and to obtain news of Turreau," and Duhesme's and Murat's corps to proceed along the Milan road. On the 27th, after Lannes had on the 26th defeated an Austrian column near Chivasso, the main body was already advancing on Vercelli.

Very few of Napoleon's acts of generalship have been more criticized than this resolution to march on Milan, which abandoned assemble his scattered forces. The account of his motives Genoa to its fate and gave Melas a week's leisure to The march he dictated at St Helena (Nap. Correspondence, v. 30, to Milan. PP. 375-377), in itself an unconvincing appeal to the rules of strategy as laid down by the theorists-which rules his own practice throughout transcended-gives, when closely examined, some at least of the necessary clues. He says in effect that by advancing directly on Turin he would have "risked a battle against equal forces without an assured line of retreat, Bard being still uncaptured." It is indeed strange to find Napoleon shrinking before equal forces of the enemy, Bard the second time than the first. The only incentive to go even if we admit without comment that it was more difficult to pass towards Turin was the chance of partial victories over the discon nected Austrian corps that would be met in that direction, and this he in the sequel, he could only defend it by saying in effect that he might deliberately set aside. Having done so, for reasons that will appear have been defeated-which was true, but not the Napoleonic principle of war Of the alternatives, one was to hasten to Genoa, this in Napoleon's eyes would have been playing the enemy's game, for they would have concentrated at Alessandria, facing west "in their natural position." It is equally obvious that thus the enemy would have played his game, supposing that this was to relieve Genoa, and the implication is that it was not. The third course, which Napoleon took, and in this memorandum defended, gave his army the enemy's depots at Milan, of which it unquestionably stood in sore need, and the reinforcement of Moncey's 15,000 men from the Rhine, while at the same time Moncey's route offered an assured line of retreat by the Simplon and the St Gothard. He would in fact make for himself there a "natural position" without forfeiting the advantage Once possessed of Milan, Napoleon says, of being in Melas's rear he could have engaged Melas with a light heart and with confidence in the greatest possible results of a victory, whether the Austrians sought to force their way back to the east by the right or the left bank of the Po, and he adds that if the French passed on and concentrated south of the Po there would be no danger to the MilanSt Gothard line of retreat, as this was secured by the rivers Ticino and Sesia. In this last, as we shall see, he is shielding an undeniable mistake, but considering for the moment only the movement to Milan, we are justified in assuming that his object was not the relief of Genoa, but the most thorough defeat of Melas's field army, to which end, putting all sentiment aside, he treated the hard-pressed Masséna as a "containing force" to keep Melas occupied during the strategical deployment of the Army of Reserve. In the beginning he had told Masséna that he would "disengage" him, even if he From the had to go as far east as Trent to find a way into Italy first, then, no direct relief was intended, and when, on hearing bad news from the Riviera, he altered his route to the more westerly passes, it was probably because he felt that Masséna's containing power was almost exhausted, and that the passage and reassembly of the Reserve Army must be brought about in the minimum time and by the shortest way But the object was still the defeat of Melas, and for this, as the Austrians possessed an enormous numerical superiority, the assembly of all forces, including Moncey's, was indispensable. One essential condition of this was that the points of passage used should be out of reach of the enemy The more westerly the passes chosen, the more dangerous was the whole operation-in fact the Mont Cenis column never reached him at alland though his expressed objections to the St Bernard line seem, as we have said, to be written after the event, to disarm his critics, there is no doubt that at the time he disliked it. It was a pis aller forced upon him by Moreau's delay and Masséna's extremity, and from the moment at which he arrived at Milan he did, as a fact. abandon it altogether in favour of the St Gothard. Lastly, so strongly was he impressed with the necessity of completing the deployment of all his forces, that though he found the Austrians on the Turin side much scattered and could justifiably expect a series of rapid

When he made his decision he was unaware that Béthencourt had been held up at Arona.

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