GEN. TAYLOR S DESPATCHES. 43 of the 8th inst., accidentally shot himself with a pistol on the following day, and expired before night. It has been quite impossible as yet to furnish detailed reports of our engagements with the enemy, or even accurate returns of the killed and wounded. Our loss is not far from 3 officers and 40 men killed, and 13 officers and 100 men wounded; while that of the enemy has in all probability exceeded 300 killed; more than 200 have been buried by us on the two fields of battle. I have exchanged a sufficient number of prisoners to recover the command of Captain Thornton. The wounded prisoners have been sent to Matamoras-the wounded officers on their parole. General La Vega and a few other officers have been sent to New Orleans, having declined a parole, and will be reported to Maj. Gen. Gaines. I am not conversant with the usages of war in such cases, and beg that such provision may be made for these prisoners as may be authorized by law. Our own prisoners have been treated with great kindness by the Mexican officers. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, The RESULT of these battles, however, was fatal. The Mexican republic lost all power, either present or future, of retaining one foot of that vast territorial empire which they once held east of the Rio Grande. The conquerors were tempted, in the flush of victory, to carry their arms beyond that melancholy river;-to seek for glory in conquests; -to find the gratification of dominion in foreign lands;-to indulge the rapacious lust of power;-to leave fields fertile in blessings for others fertile only in blood ;—and finally, to make it uncertain whether even the best of Republics can resist the universal tendency of man to build up Empires-by the destruction of Justice. CHAPTER III. Action of Congress.-Declaration of the President.-Legislation.-General Scott's Views of the War.-His Comments on the Plan of Campaign. -His Correspondence with Secretary Marcy.-The Grounds for his Opinions. Is ordered to remain at Washington. THE news of the capture of Captain Thornton's party was received with great surprise by the nation, and the government. Notwithstanding all the acts of the United States and Mexico, both diplomatic and legislative, during the previous four years, had tended to this and no other result; and notwithstanding General Taylor had been ordered to the Rio Grande with four thousand regular troops, yet neither people nor President seem to have realized that war was actually near at hand. They appear to have relied upon some invisible Providence to prevent a catastrophe, which to a reasonable mind, and especially to one imbued with the spirit of a statesman, seemed inevitable.1 The intelligence of hostilities on the Rio Grande, was therefore received with astonishment, and for a time occasioned a powerful excitement. Congress was then in session, and the President immediately sent in an extraordinary Message. In this, he declared that the 1 Mr. Clay declared in the canvass of 1844, that the annexation of Texas was equivalent to a war with Mexico, and that war must follow President's Message, dated the 11th of May, 1846. PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. 45 Mexican government had "at last invaded our territory, and shed the blood of our fellow-citizens on our own soil." In the same Message, and in the paragraph immediately following, he stated that Mr. Slidell was sent to Mexico with full powers to adjust all the questions in dispute between the two governments, "both the questions of the Texas boundary, and of indemnification to our citizens." The boundary in dispute was the western boundary of Texas only, and hence this was a clear admission, that the territory adjacent was in dispute, and was not our soil, till the question of boundary was settled. Congress, however, with less than two days' deliberation, adopted the declaration of the President, and declared that, "by the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that government and the United States." At the same time, that body authorized the President to accept the services of fifty thousand volunteers, and placed ten millions of dollars at his disposal. The intention was to put an end to the war, by a vigorous effort and decisive victories. The President declared that in his opinion, "the immediate appearance in arms of a large and overpowering force," would be the best means of producing peace.1 Just two days before this declaration, the decisive battle of Resaca de la Palma had been fought, and the army of Arista pursued beyond the Rio Grande. We are now to see what plans the government had formed for the further prosecution of the war. The term most commonly used to express this idea was "to conquer a peace." The original authorship of this phrase appears to belong to the poet Coleridge. See Cottle's Reminiscences. At this time, General Scott, as commander of the army, was stationed at Washington, engaged in arranging and superintending the various staff duties of the army. He would be naturally consulted on the plans to be formed, and the means to execute them. This was the case. Immediately after the act of Congress of the 13th of May was passed, he was invited to call upon the President, who in that interview informed him that it was his determination to assign him the command of the army in Mexco.1 From that moment, he was busily engaged in the necessary arrangements to carry into effect the views and instructions of the President. He was employed fourteen hours a day in all those various duties which pertain to the movements, supplies, equipage, direction, and objects of the army. No one can imagine the magnitude of these labors, their responsibility or importance, who does not reflect, that the geography, climate, military armament, means of supply, in fine, the whole detail of the physical and social condition of Mexico, were almost utterly unknown in the United States, and that information on these topics had to be obtained by inquiry and study, before even a general of the army could make prudent military arrangements. The Rio Grande was assumed by the government, as the base line of military operations from the beginning. Yet this river was itself not less than seven hundred miles from the Mississippi river, separated by lands so unproductive, and so sparsely populated, as to be incapable of supporting either man or beast on the extended scale required by the operations of war. The 1 Marcy's Letter to the President, published in the Public Documents of 1846. WAR RECOGNISED BY CONGRESS. 47 Mississippi then became the true and real base of supply and movement, and New Orleans the great depot for provisions and armament. From this point, General Scott had to calculate the march and support of an army whose field embraced Texas and California, the Rocky Mountains and the Sierra Madre; the cold regions of eternal snow, and those sunburnt climes where snow was never known! To prepare the clothing and guard the health of troops who were to visit regions on the one side swept over by the frosty air of health, and on the other filled with the pestilence which walketh in darkness! To make these plans and arrangements required skill, sagacity, labor, and experience. The duties, services, and knowledge acquired in his previous life, amply qualified General Scott for this duty; and that he performed it well, is now universally acknowledged by the people and the government. Congress had declared that "war existed" on the 13th of May. The armies were then in conflict on the Rio Grande, and it was known that the American force was much inferior in number, while their base of supply was seven hundred miles distant. Not a moment was to be lost. The plan of the campaign must be instantly formed; the volunteers must be hurried into the field; and what was another and yet greater difficulty, an army larger than the American Republic had yet raised at one time, must be supplied in the course of a few weeks, with the armament, equipment, provisions, and means of transportation necessary to maintain that army actively in the field. This was the task which now devolved on the executive officers of the government, and especially upon those of the military department. The plan of the campaign in Mexico for the year 1846, |