ple are agreed, I think, that it shall not continue to be so. It is not possible in this communication to discuss the causes of the decay of our shipping interests or the differing methods by which it is proposed to restore them. "The statement of a few well-authenticated facts and some general suggestions as to legislation is all that is practicable. That the great steam-ship lines sailing under the flags of England, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, and engaged in foreign commerce, were promoted, and have since been and now are liberally aided by grants of publie money, in one form or another, is generally known. That the American lines of steamships have been abandoned by us to an unequal contest with the aided lines of other nations until they have been withdrawn, or, in the few cases where they are still maintained, are subject to serious disadvantages, is matter of common knowledge. "The present situation is such that travelers and merchandise find Liverpool often a necessary intermediate port between New York and some of the South American capitals. The fact that some of the delegates from South American states to the conference of American nations, now in session at Washington, reached our shores by reversing that line of travel, is very conclusive of the need of such a conference, and very suggestive as to the first and most necessary step in the direction of fuller and more beneficial intercourse with nations that are now our neighbors upon the lines of latitude, but not upon the lines of established commercial intercourse. "I recommend that such appropriations be made for ocean mail service in American steam-ships between our ports and those of Central and South America, China, Japan, and the important islands in both of the great oceans, as will be liberally remunerative for the service rendered, and as will encourage the establishment and in some fair degree equalize the chances of American steam-ship lines in the competitions which they must meet. That the American states lying south of us will cordially co-operate in establishing and maintaining such lines of steam-ships to their principal ports I do not doubt." Secretary Tracy in his annual report of 1889 uses very strong language in favor of something being done, and is very emphatic in his conclusions. He says: "It must be remembered, however, that cruisers have another and equally important function in the attack and defense of commerce. Any stanch vessel with a good coal capacity and the highest rate of speed, armed with a few rapid-firing guns, though built and used principally for commercial purposes, may by certain adaptations in her construction be made readily available for this form of warfare. The fast transatlantic liners, nationalized in foreign countries, but supported and maintained by American trade and American passengers-many of them, even, owned by American citizens-are a powerful factor in the naval forces of the Government whose flag they bear and at whose disposal they must place themselves in time of war. "It is a matter for serious consideration whether steps may not be taken towards the creation of such a fleet of specially adapted steamers of American construction, owned by American merchants, carrying the American flag, and capable, under well-defined conditions, of temporary incorporation in the American Navy. The advantages of such an arrangement, which enlarges the merchant marine and makes it at the same time self-protecting, are overwhelmingly great. The difficulty is that American capital will not be drawn into the enterprise unless it can be sure of specific compensation for the concessions which it makes to the Government, first, in the adaptation of its vessels to the latter's needs, and secondly, in the surrender of a privilege to use them when the exigency arises. "In the absence of such an arrangement the naval policy of the United States can not neglect to take account of the fleets of fast cruisers which foreign states maintain under the guise of passenger and merchant steamers. They constitute an auxiliary navy, aud must be reckoned as a part of the naval force of the governments maintaining them. It is difficult to imagine a more effective commerce destroyer than the steam-ship City of Paris armed with a battery of rapid-firing guns. She can steam over 21 knots an hour and can average 19.9 knots from land to land across the Atlantic. No man-of-war could overtake her; nomerchantman could escape her. A fleet of such cruisers would sweep an enemy's commerce from the ocean. This fact is well understood in Europe, and states that are unprovided with a convertible merchant fleet are preparing to meet the possible emergency by partly-protected cruisers that are substantially as fast as the City of Paris. Of this type the Piemonte is the latest development, and others equally fast are now building." Secretary Whitney also advocated a like course in his report, I think it was his last annual report. He said: "It may not be out of place as a branch of this subject to call attention to one of the incidental consequences of the policy pursued by other countries in this matter of a naval In time of war troop-ships or transports are in great demand. Several European Governments make an annual contribution, based on tonnage, to companies constructing new vessels. The consideration to the government is a counter-agreement, permitting the government to take such a vessel for a transport in time of war upon terms named in the agreement. The government officials are also consulted as to her mode of construction, and she goes on to the naval-reserve list. These payments are incidentally in the nature of a subsidy to the ship-owner, and this, with the liberal payments for government transportation of mails, etc., keeps a large fleet of merchantmen afloat as a reserve ready for a time of war. Without ships and trained seamen there can be no naval reserve. reserve. "A notable illustration of the generosity and courage with which England pushes her shipping interest is seen in the manner in which she is at this moment dealing with the trade of the North Pacific. It has been thus far principally under the American flag and contributory to San Francisco and the United States. The British Government and Canada together are proposing for the establishment of a line of first-class steamers from Vancouver to Japan. The subsidy is likely to be $300,000 annually-£45,000 from England and £15,000 from Canada. There will also be contributed from the naval-reserve fund probably $5 per ton annually for each ship constructed for the route, which will increase the sum probably $125,000. Under such competition it is quite easy to conjecture what will become of the American flag and our resources in the way of a naval reserve in the North Pacific." Secretary Whitney of course puts it largely upon the ground that these should be auxiliaries to the Navy. So does Secretary Tracy. Admiral Porter makes a very able argument in the same general direction. Now, the naval architects had a meeting a short time ago, in March-March 26, 27, and 28-in England. The first paper read was by William W. H. White, director of naval construction, and he used this language in reference to the merchant steamers: "Referring to merchant steamers and war cruisers, it was remarked that passenger steamers of the first rank greatly exceed, in displacement as well as length, even the largest cruisers yet constructed (Her Majesty's ships Blake and Blenheim). On this account it is unreasonable to expect that any regularly-built war cruisers yet contemplated can catch vessels like the City of Paris, or Teutonic, or Umbria at sea. It has been proposed that war cruisers should be built equaling these "greyhounds" in speed and coal endurance, but surpassing them in armament and protection. To do this must involve still greater displacement and cost; and one may well hesitate in embarking on such a course so long as we possess not merely a vast superiority in swift merchant steamers available as auxiliaries to the regular fleet, but also larger war cruisers than are to be found in foreign navies." Mr. President, I hope that these bills will both be sent over to the other House, having received favorable action in the Senate. I feel myself a profound interest in this matter of reviving the American marine, as all Senators know, and have labored without weariness in that direction ever since I have been in Congress. I intended when I took possession of the floor to occupy it some fifteen minutes. I ask the pardon of the Senators for having occupied it the length of time I have, trespassing so long upon their patience." ESTIMATES FOR NAVIGATION BOUNTIES. On July 8 Senator Frye made a second speech in reply to points made in the debate, and furnished an estimate of yearly payments to steamers under the two bills then being discussed. This will be referred to later. He also had read the following estimates for navigation bounties, prepared by the Bureau of Navigation at the instance of the chairman of the Committee on Marine and Fisheries in the House: Mr. FRYE. I was saying that Mr. Bates made a statement before the committee touching these same things, and his statement there does not apply to the bill here, because a limitation of 500 tons has been put in since he made his statement, and two or three other limitations contained in the bill have been put in. He has revised that statement and I have it here, addressed to the chairman of the House Committee on Marine and Fisheries, in which he goes into the matter at length very carefully, and so that Senators may have an intelligent idea of what this bill is likely to cost if it becomes a law I ask leave to present this statement of the Commissioner of Navigation and have it printed in the Record. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair hears no objection. The statement referred to is as follows: "ESTIMATES FOR NAVIGATION BOUNTIES. "TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF NAVIGATION. "May 21, 1890. "SIR: As it may be expected that persons unacquainted with the state of our marine, both in home and foreign trade, may have an idea that the payment of bounties to vessel trading abroad would call for great sums of money for the first and the following years of the life of the bill, at your request I have revised the method of my first estimate and made a closer approximation of annual payments; have also made a calculation of what the amount would be the first year, if all our salt-water vessels of the size, class, and grade named in the bill could find business in the foreign trade, as of course they could not do. "REVIEW OF FORMER ESTIMATES-THE TONNAGE. "For want of time to examine books of classification, my former estimate of tonnage qualified for bounty-earning was based upon the ages of vessels, and is somewhat in excess. In the present investigation the Shipmasters' Record, of New York, has been consulted, and a closer approximation made. The facts discovered concerning the condition of our marine will surprise even the best informed. Of the sail-vessels above 500 tons, in both our foreign and domestic trade, whose measurement foots up to 901,244 tons, there are only 500,876 tons that are classed in the Record A1 and A. In other words, only 55.5 per cent. of either of the fleets, foreign or domestic, are qualified for bounty-earning. In my statement, page 257 of the Report of Hearings, the sail tonnage computed as equivalent to permanently employed was 543,696 tons. 380,745 tons. amount I estimated 70 per cent. was A 2 or r higher, namely, Of this "The change in the bill of class limit from A 1 to A 14, and the decrease from 70 to 55.5 per cent. of fleet tallying therewith, will lower the amount of sail tonnage from 422,938 to 301,751 tons for the qualified fleet last year in the foreign trade. As a year will have elapsed from the date of these statistics to the probable time of passing the bill, deduction should be made for one year's losses from the perils of navigation (3.63 per cent.), and for lapsing from class (6.37 per cent.), together 10 per cent., making the amount of tonnage to start with next year (1891) 271,576 tons. To this should be added about half the tonnage that will be built during the year. In 1889 the amount built of sail above 500 tons was 21,335 tons (or 2.36 per cent. only of the salt-water sail of 901,244. In the same year the losses of registered tonnage amounted to 3.63 per cent.). If we allow for doubling in 1891 the tonnage built in 1889, and add half of it to 271,576, we shall have 292,911 tons as amount of sail for bounty-earning in the first year of the operation of the bill. "With regard to the steamers, my first estimate fixed upon 151,316 tons, which was cut down by one year's losses (estimated at 10 per cent.) to 136,285 tons. It is found on consulting the Record that the whole tonnage of screw-steamers above 500 tons classed A 1, thirteen years and upward, sums up to 156,606 tons. As the whole amount of steam last year registered and assumed to be in the foreign trade was 194,471 tons, it would appear that 80 per cent. of our steamers in the foreign trade are qualified by size and class for bounty-earning. Taking the new figure of 156,606 tons and deducting 3 per cent. for one year's losses from the perils of navigation and 5 per cent, for lapsing from class, making together 8 per cent., we have 144,078 tons to start with in the first year. To this should be added about one-third of the tonnage that will be built during the year. In 1889 the amount built of steam tonnage above 500 tons was 17,952 tons. This will give a result of 150,062 tons as amount for bounty-earning in the first year. "THE MILEAGE THAT MAY BE MADE. "In the first estimate it was assumed that the sailing vessels would probably navigate an average distance of 18,000, and steamers of 42,000 miles annually; but the changes in the bill limiting the bounty in any voyage to 7,000 miles, although many voyages will be double this distance, and confining the payments to voyages made direct to or from a foreign country, will have the effect of reducing this estimate largely in the case of sailing vessels and to some extent in the case of steamers. The following examples of actual navigation will illustrate the operation of the bill as reported to the House: "Ship I. F. Chapman, New York to San Francisco, thence to Liverpool, and return to New York, in thirteen and one-half months, would sail 31,000 miles, but make in bounty mileage only 10,010, "Ship L. Schepp, New York to Yokohoma, thence to Manilla, and return to New York, in fifteen months, would sail 36,000 miles, but make in paying distance only 14,000 miles. "Ship Santa Clara, New York to Melbourne, thence to Newcastle, New South Wales, thence to Manilla and return to New York, in seventeen and one-half months, would sail 36,000 miles, but make in mileage measurement only 14,000 miles. "Ship Daniel Barnes, New York to Melbourne, thence to Newcastle, New South Wales, thence to Honolulu, thence to Hong Kong, and return to New York, in sixteen months, would sail 39,000 miles, but make in bounty mileage only 14,000 miles. "The average bounty mileage of these ships would be only 10,060 miles a year. It also appears from actual transatlantic voyages that 18,000 miles annual mileage is too much for them, though all the distance made be allowed. The following examples illustrate this point: "Bark H. L. Routh, 1,023 tons, New Orleans to Lisbon, and thence to New York, five and one-third months, distance 7,300 miles. "Ship City of Montreal, 1,116 tons, New York to Rotterdam and back, five months, distance 6,400 miles. "Ship M. Nottebohm, 1,116 tons, New York to Bordeaux and back, five months, distance 6,200 miles. "Ship Fawn, 1,015 tons, New York to Amsterdam and back, five months, 6,400 miles." "The average bounty mileage of these ships is at the rate of 15,523 annually. If we average the mileage of these ships with that of those above, around the capes, we shall have a result of 12,791 miles. "Adopting 13,000 miles of distance as a probable bounty mileage that will be made by the sailing fleet we shall have 292,911 tons multiplied by 13,000 as the ton-miles, and this product by three-tenths of a mill will be $1,142,352. "As we have now a few steamers running to foreign ports, and between other foreign ports, before returning home, and this sort of navigation is likely to be increased, perhaps largely, and as there is to be no bounty paid on running between foreign ports, my former estimate of 42,000 miles per annum is too large for average steamer mileage. It is believed on review that 35,000 miles for bounty earning would be a fair estimate as the bill now stands. We shall have, therefore, 150,062 tons multiplied by 35,000 as the ton-miles, and this product by three-tenths of a mill will be $1,575,651. "THE TOTAL OF BOUNTIES. "By these statements for sail and steam we have for the total of bounty payments the first year the amount of $2,718,004. If we add to this 10 per cent. for fullness of estimation the sum would scarcely reach a round $3,000,000. "THE UTMOST LIMIT OF BOUNTY EARNINGS. "But, as it may be thought the vessels usually employed in the coasting trade might enter the foreign trade under the allurement of bounty pay, we will now include in our estimate all of the qualified salt-water tonnage of the United States. To do this, as all the qualified steam-tonnage is already included, it will only be necessary to take the entire qualified sail tonnage, found by the 'Record' to be 500,876 tons, and make the reductions and additions which were made to the amount in the foreign trade, 301,751 tons, and the result sought will be found, namely, 472, 124 tons. This is an increase of 62 per cent., and would add $698,929 to $2,718,004, making $3,416,933 the total of bounty payments the first year, supposing it possibl to put into the foreign trade all the shipping qualified under the bill. "PAYMENTS OF FOLLOWING YEARS. "Before we can estimate beyond the first year it will be necessary to examine and learn the class endurance, or life-time, remaining to our vessels now in service, and speculate somewhat on the power of the law to increase the tonnage. The Record of American and Foreign Shipping, of New York, supplies the data for the following tables: Classed in the Record: American sail-vessels-wood. Number of vessels A1: 1886, 559; 1890, 497. Amount of tonnage A1: 1886, 532,822; 1890, 464,631. Classed in the Record-Continued. Falling off in number, four years, 11 per cent. Amount of tonnage All: 1886, 53,561; 1890, 36,245. Number of vessels Al and A1): 1886, 619; 1890, 539. Falling off in tonnage, four years, 14.5 per cent. Average time until the expiration of class: For Al vessels (above 500 tons), 1886, 6.55 years; 1890, 5.46 years. Classed in the Record: American steam-vessels-iron. Number of vessels A1, thirteen to twenty years: 1886, 77; 1890, 94. Increase in tonnage, four years, 16.4 per cent. Average time till expiration tion of class, in years: 1886, 12.35; 1890, 9.22. "From these tables it is plain, for four years past, there has not been building enough by 3.6 per cent. annually to keep up the figures of first-class sail tonnage in both foreign and coasting trades. It also appears that all the sail capacity eligible for bounty earning was 500,876 tons December, 1889. Of this amount 60 per cent. was in the foreign trade and 40 per cent. in the coasting trade. And the total steam capacity was 156,606 tons, all of it reckoned as in the foreign trade. The lapsing of these fleets from class would be as follows: For sail: In four years, all the All vessels, 36,245 tons. In five and one-half years, half the Al vessels, 232,315 tons. In eleven and one-half years, other half the Al vessels, 232,315 tons. "Of the vessels surviving the perils of the sea, the Al, if found worthy, may be continued, or pass down to Al grade; the All may be continued or find place in the lower grades. Vessels meriting these continuations are exceptional in character, and the terms given are short. They may be fairly averaged at one year for the fleet of A1), and at two plus one, equal to three years, for the fleet of Al vessels. Including losses at sea the lapsing from class may be treated as follows: For sail. In five years, all the Al vessels In seven years, half the Al vessels In thirteen years, other half Al vessels In the order of time the falling off would be as follows: In the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth years... In the sixth and seventh years In each of six years following Tons. 36, 245 232, 315 232, 315 Tons. 58, 307 51,058 17,870 "Of the vessels surviving some may be continued. For this an average of two years may be allowed. Including losses at sea the lapsing from class may be taken as follows: In each of first ten years----- In each of seven years following Tons. 12,724 4,894 |