This is expensive make-believe, and nothing else; and no wonder many députés are of opinion that at this time of the day the republic is really sacrificing too much to the mere pleasure of jouer au marin.

Growing dissatisfaction also is expressed with the shipbuilding policy. Outside of the narrow-minded maniacs of la jeune école, everyone now realizes the folly of losing the benefit of the £8,000,000 already invested in the hulls, armor, and motors of the half-completed Normandie, Flandre, Gascoyne, and Languedoc, especially since the lack of firmness and authority at the head makes it clear that some time will elapse before the cruiser program is taken in hand. The fifth unit of the quadrupleturret series, the Béarn, has just been launched at La Seyne, weighing 14,400 tons, and having been built up to the main armor deck. It is to be used as a tank, and the republic will boast of the possession of the most expensive fuel receptacle in the world. The British Ansons, the construction of which was given up, had not quite reached so advanced a stage, and it is fair to say that no other power, outside of France, would lightly discard powerful super-dreadnoughts of the Flandre and Normandie class, with over 14,000 tons of materials worked into them on the plea that something better may be forthcoming in some five or six years hence.-The Naval and Military Record, Apr. 28, 1920.

FRENCH NAVAL ACTIVITY.-Pending the Parliamentary debate that will decide the fate of the half-completed battleship program and of the naval policy of the republic, Minister Landry is making the utmost of the substantial credits placed at his disposal to safeguard the future, and in every manner pave the way for the plus grande marine française de demain, and no wonder. France has been saved by the sea power of Great Britain, and from all sides timely warnings come to her that in the future, still more than in the past, she will need to rely on the sea for her prosperity and security, for the preservation of both her situation in Europe and of her colonial empire. Of this necessity the Paris Chambers, that are being kept fully alive to the trend of European events, are getting every day more convinced. It is well realized, in the light of circumstantial reports made by well-posted agents in Germany, that the naval eclipse of the Imperial Republic of Bocheland is to be only temporary. "Where there is a will, there is a way." Now, the one capital point the war has taught the Huns is that there can be no hope of revanche for them, and of Deutschland über alles save in songs, without some degree of supremacy in the air and at sea, and it is no longer a secret that, while improving their supercannon designs and aerial craft, their experts are perseveringly and methodically making headway with the preparation of the naval armament of to-morrow, and it is believed that the enormous capabilities of Boche yards and inland factories, added to help from Russia and from neutrals, would enable them to put to sea in a very few years highly-efficient piratical flotillas, without mentioning the battle fleet they have been allowed to keep, no doubt modest enough on paper, but that will serve to foster the naval spirit and undiminished maritime ambitions of Mittel Europa. Such possibilities France can, no more than England, afford to ignore. Outmatched by Bocheland in the matter of population and numerical army strength, her only asset of victory in the case of a single-handed conflict would be the command of the sea and the advantage of safe communications with her colonies. And, of course, German represents for France the principal danger to be guarded against, as she is the only power in a position eventually to threaten the national existence of our republic.

Similarly, Italy is likely to reveal herself as a formidable rival in the no distant future. The war, by giving her the uncontested mastery of the Adriatic, has caused her to inherit the naval possibilities of the defunct Dual Monarchy, and made of Trieste and also of Genoa the chief ports of Central Europe. This coming economic prosperity will confer upon the peninsula the only asset which she lacked to attain naval greatness.

So, when is considered the go-ahead spirit of new Italy, it is safe to say that France will require to throw into the fray the whole of her assets and energy to win in the opening contest for Mediterranean supremacy.

These considerations, outside of the avowed determination of France to maintain her traditional position as the premier continental power, justify the well-thought-out ensemble of measures which the active Minister of Marine has adopted with a view to bringing nearer the day of our effective renovation. Personnel, bases, dockyards and gun factories, up-todate armament, and all other factors not susceptible of improvization are being carefully looked after and calculated on a liberal basis, so as to remove all obstacles in the way of the realization of a first-class naval program.

Despite the vehement criticisms of the partisans of economy, no reduction is to be made in the personnel of officers de vaisseau, that was strengthened during the war by the addition of 330 capitaines de corvette and 200 aspirants and enseignes, nor will any diminution be made in the expenses devoted to the training of the 2200 active officers. The plea is that officers cannot be improvized, and that the cruiser and super-battlecruiser squadrons of a few years hence must have trained crews ready to man them. The vital question of quality is not being overlooked: first, candidates to the Ecole Navale will have to satisfy hard physical tests and to be athletes, which is an innovation; and, second, bookish attainments and professional knowledge will have to be of a higher order than before, the war having shown the danger of improvized and untrained officers. Similarly, only the best class of seamen is to be kept in the service, and every effort is being made to add to the comfort of life on board, kinema appliances being part of the equipment of all craft of over 80 tons, and commanders receiving special allowances (some 2s. per man per week) intended for the well-being and entertainment of crews, either at sea or on shore. The lot of Mathurin has vastly improved since the Black Sea rebellion, and the number is steadily increasing of would-be recruits, which the navy is not in a position to welcome at the present moment for financial reasons.

Fleet bases that have been improved in some respects during the war are receiving further improvements with a view to enabling them to accommodate ships up to 300 meters length. Havre, St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, and Marseilles are all being considerably enlarged, and being fitted as auxiliary bases. New constructional facilities are being provided; the easy and quick transportation of Lorraine steel to the powerful Brittany arsenals is to be assured a few months hence, whilst constructional experiments with new types of hulls, of armor, of defensive devices, and guns are proceeding at Lorient, Ruelle, and Toulon. With the collaboration of Air Minister Flandin, the Toulon-Bizerta route, with a repairing base in Corsica, is being organized with trained pilots and reliable machines, and further developments are awaited that will place firmly in French hands the air command of the Western Mediterranean.

Whilst the French Navy may claim to have achieved some degree of superiority over all comers in the ballistic line, it lacks practical experience in the construction of modern cruisers, a sort of asset that is so overwhelmingly on the British side. Gallic constructors are second to none in theoretical attainments, no doubt, but the history of French naval architecture amply demonstrates that practice is necessary to give full value to paper calculations. Hence the importance of the studies and comparative experiments to be made in the war prizes Kolberg and Novara, through which Paris experts will gain some of the experience acquired by the German and Austrian constructional departments, especially as it has been decided to prepare, in addition to the 5200-ton éclaireur of the Leygues program, an alternative design reproducing some of the points admired in the British Hawkins and in the projected ocean scouts of America. Studies are also being made of fast seaplane-carrier designs, the porte-avions of the Bapaume class now attached to the Charlier battle fleet having proved

too small and too slow for aviation duties. At the same time, only short seaplanes, suitable for scouting and fire control, are to be carried on board. Heavy bombardment and long-range scouting machines will have Corsica and Bizerta as headquarters and train for their eventual duties in cooperation with the dreadnought squadron and flotillas. Moreover, the Paris Admiralty is closely watching the development of ultra-rapid hydroglisseurs, now being tested in the Middle Sea, that promise to be fair weather scouts of exceptional worth.-The Naval and Military Record, May 5, 1920.

GREAT BRITAIN

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN NAVIES.-There is a general consensus of opinion in this country that it would be ridiculous to attempt a rivalry with the United States in warship building. Whether time will alter this view has yet to be seen, but it is made plain by the absence of a program this year that it represents the official policy. On the other side of the Atlantic, a member of the House of Representatives has just been explaining to his countrymen what the exact situation with regard to the AngloAmerican Fleets will be when vessels now in hand are completed. The situation has not hitherto been explained clearly in America, and it is just as well that it should be realized on both sides of the Atlantic. The figures given by Mr. Britten are very fair, and will bear the test of examination, but in his deductions therefrom he assumes that we shall not put in hand any new ships between now and 1923, and also that the Americans will complete all their new ships in a period which they have not always attained in the past, and which will be increasingly difficult to keep to in the future. It has been said more than once in The Army and Navy Gazette that it is no business of ours if America wants to have a supreme navy. Each nation must decide for itself what degree of protection it will provide, and a power with a long seaboard on two oceans has a correspondingly greater need for ships. But just as we do not question America's right to add to her navy, so we cannot for a moment admit her right to question what we may decide to be essential for us, to whom seapower is more vital than to anybody, and Mr. Britten's remark quoted below about our bonded indebtedness-incurred as much in protecting Americans from tyrannical aggression as ourselves-is neither generous nor just. In order that the facts he has brought together may be better appreciated, it is as well to summarize them herewith:

During 1916 to 1918 the United States has made tremendous strides in battleship authorizations, with the result that 1923 will see the American Navy the predominant naval power of the world, and capable of defeating the navies of any three nations combined, excepting Great Britain.

"Beginning with the North Dakota, Delaware and Utah (leaving out the South Carolina and Michigan because of their light tonnage, although they carry eight big guns), I find that we have 33 battleships and battle cruisers built and building, all of which will be available for service in 1923, while Great Britain has 35 first line ships of the same character, thus giving Great Britain an advantage of two ships, which we immediately offset by greater tonnage, bigger guns, superior muzzle velocity, heavier armor and more modern construction. The American ships have a total tonnage of 1,118,650 tons, against the British 884,100 tons, showing superiority of 234,550 tons, or an advantage of 8,638 tons per ship. In average speed of all vessels we are practically the same, showing a fraction less than 23.7 knots average per ship. In main batteries we have 340 guns to 314 for the British, with an average of 10.3 big guns per ship, to the British 8.97 guns per ship, while our guns will average 141⁄2 inch, against the British 1323 inch, and this would appear to give us a tremendous advantage in weight of steel thrown by one broadside, when we will hurl 548,400 pounds against 452,000 pounds by all British big guns. Our ships will average 16,618 pounds of projectiles against 12,914 pounds for a

British broadside of main guns; thus our ships will throw 3704 pounds more steel than the British, ship for ship, or 28.7 per cent superiority." Comparing the secondary batteries, Mr. Britten says, 'Our navy has the greater advantage. Our 494 guns in this class average 5.4 inch caliber against the British 526 guns with an average of 4.9 inch, showing our guns to average larger in caliber and power, throwing 40,158-pound projectiles, against 32,080 for the British secondary battery, which means that our ships will average 12161⁄2 pounds against 9161⁄2 pounds for the British), or more than 33 per cent to our navy's advantage. Great Britain has 350 destroyers built and building" (continues Mr. Britten), "while we have 322, but ours are larger, faster and more modern, and it is not unreasonable to assume our superiority in destroyers is even greater than in first line battleships and cruisers. In submarines England has 150 built or building, and we have 150 built or building. Great Britain has but one superdreadnought of the Hood type, of 41,200 tons displacement, with a 31-knot speed, carrying eight 15-inch guns; which is in no direction the equal of our Indiana type of superdreadnought of 43,200 tons, 23-knot speed, carrying twelve 16-inch guns.

'During the past twelve months Great Britain has dispered the material of at least one sister ship of the Hood class in the interest of economy, and I maintain that until she can pay interest on her bonded indebtedness. at least to her bonded creditors, she would not be justified in going ahead with a costly competitive battleship program, and particularly so not with us, when she realizes fully that we have no designs upon anything she may have. While the pride of Britain may be hurt by her slide into second place among the naval powers, she certainly cannot hope to successfully compete against us if we are really determined to take the place we are entitled to on the seas as the world's foremost nation, and where American commerce can receive the protection it failed to get prior to our entrance into the World War." In conclusion Mr. Britten declares: "The phrase, 'the freedom of the seas,' will mean just exactly what it says, and our supremacy thereon will never justify the control and regulation of the commerce of all nations merely because we have the power to do so, as Britain has done in the past, much to our disappointment and, at times, humiliation."-The Army and Navy Gazette, May 15, 1920.

SUBMARINES AND FUTURE NAVAL WARFARE.-The submersible commerce destroyer would continue to be of small dimensions, such as might easily carry four 6-inch guns. Concerted attack on trade vessels, in widely separated areas, should be guarded against, and trade vessels must either go under water or else move in convoy. The former method was not very feasible, and the latter would have to be the principal measure of defence.

'Speaking generally on submarine warfare, the lecturer thought that the advantages of the submerged ship were not likely, within ten years, to be so great as those enjoyed by the U-boats in 1914-16; and if methods of detection and under-water defence made normal advances, the tactical advantages of the submerged ship over the armed surface ship might in the near future be less than in 1919. Strategically, the advantages of submersion were great, and as constructional difficulties were overcome and it became possible to apply submersion to additional classes of ships without sacrificing other essential qualities, the strategic influence of submersible ships would increase to a corresponding degree. Whilst it would not pay to submerse the battle fighting ship, there were other classes of vessel in which submersion would be advantageous. Cruisers intended for observation work off enemy forts, or for watching enemy fleets, must be of the submarine type. Cruisers employed on screening and scouting duties, working with a fleet, will be of aerial and surface types, in co-operation. The commercial destroyer will be of the submarine type, whilst cruisers employed against these raiders must be of aerial and sub

marine types, working in conjunction. The submersible minelayer would be useful in warfare against powers whose geographical position was such that inshore mine-laying would be profitable. For fleet action purposes the torpedo-carrying submarine will only be of marked use for covering the retreat of a defeated fleet.

"After the discussion of the paper, the Chairman, Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, indicated his agreement with the view that the submersible battleship was impracticable, as, with increasing size, the submarine became correspondingly more vulnerable. He also emphasized the importance of aircraft for reconnaissance and convoy work." (Lieutenant W. S. KingHall, R. N., Lecture before the Royal United Service Institute, April 7, 1920; The Times, Apr. 8, 1920. I column.)-The Technical Review, Apr. 27, 1920.

BRITISH NAVAL STAFF.-The barony conferred upon Sir Rosslyn Wemyss was gazetted by the name, style, and title of Baron Wester Wemyss, of Wemyss, in the County of Fife. On October 16th, replying for the navy at the Cutlers' Feast at Sheffield, Lord Wester Wemyss defended himself and the Admiralty against criticisms in the press. Regarding the Admiralty, he said: There is but one field of naval operations extending over all the world, namely, the sea. Moreover, by that immemorial tradition which obtains in all navies of the world, the naval commander-in-chief with his staff goes into action at the head of his forces. Thus it is impossible for a naval commander-in-chief afloat to be the center whence the strategical direction of naval war radiates. The result is that the Board of Admiralty, located in London, is necessarily the center whence radiate the executive orders as regards operations and movements of ships, and it exercises, as far as the navy is concerned, many of the functions of the military commanderin-chief in the field. These conditions necessitate a large and efficient staff organization. At the commencement of the war this, I am afraid, was lamentably inadequate, and it is only now that, with hard experience to guide us, we have reached a point when it can be truly said that there exists an efficient and admirable naval staff."-Journal of Royal United Institute, February, 1920.

NAVAL PRIZE MONEY DISTRIBUTION.-The commanders-in-chief of the Grand Fleet will each receive a thousand shares, or £2500; other commanders-in-chief, 850 shares, or £2125, if admirals; 750, or £1875, if viceadmirals, and 600, or £1500, if rear admirals. A vice-admiral will receive £1000; a rear admiral, £750; commodores vary from £1500, in the rare case of a commander-in-chief, to £400, with three intermediate graduations; and a captain in command will receive £400, £325, or £250, according to his position on the list of captains. A commander may receive from £150 to £75, a lieutenant about half as much, and so on down to £25 for a midshipman, or chief petty officer, £20 for a naval cadet or petty officer, £12 10S. for an able seaman, £7 10s. for a boy, and lastly, £5 for supernumeraries and the canteen staff.-United Service Gazette, May 6, 1920.

CURRENT TENDENCIES IN NAVAL DESIGN.-Of the many warships now under construction in the United States, the six battleships of the Massachusetts class are, in some respects, the most remarkable. Concerning the new battle cruisers, we may say, without risk of offending American susceptibilities, that they are slightly enlarged copies of H. M. S. Hood. Their bulge protection, however, is complete, instead of only partial, as in the British prototype; they are to steam at 334 knots, as against the Hood's 31 knots; their 16-inch guns fire a projectile of 2100 pounds, compared with the 1920-pound projectile of the Hood's 15-inch weapons; and their secondary armament of sixteen 6-inch quick-firing guns is superior in numbers and weight of fire. But, generally speaking, they present no novel features. It is otherwise with the battleships, which are distinctively