THE HIGH SEA FLEET AT JUTLAND The North Sea mist on 31 May, 1916, concealed the movements of the High Sea Fleet as effectively from the historian as it did from Admiral Jellicoe. The positions of more or less unknown German ships at certain times were known, but it has been necessary in most cases to guess the identity of the ships sighted, their movements from position to position and the motives of their leaders. The German official report was correct, but was so generally worded that the detailed facts could not be deduced from it; the British report did not give much important information of the German movements, because the High Sea Fleet was concealed from the British vessels during some of the most critical phases of the battle by mist and smoke. Admiral Scheer has now given much valuable information in his recent book, "Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War." It is true that he might have been more specific, especially as regards the exact courses steered; it is not even stated whether the few courses given are true or magnetic, but a careful comparison of the text with his sketches leads to the conclusion that they were true. In this account all courses are given as true, the variation of 14° having been subtracted from all British courses. Greenwich mean time is used, two hours being subtracted from all German times. Another important authority is the book entitled "The Two White Nations," by Korvetten-Kapitan Georg von Hase, chief gunnery officer of the battle cruiser Derfflinger, numerous reviews of which have appeared in British articles. This book gives many exact courses steered by the German battle cruisers. Admiral Tirpitz devotes a few pages of his book to the battle. A number of short papers from German sources relating to the action have been published. As the movements of the British forces have been described so many times they will not be repeated here except in so far as to render the narrative intelligible. A naval battle can be most clearly described by the use of sketches; for this reason numerous sketches have been drawn. These must not be considered as track charts of the action, as they are meant only to illustrate the general course of the battle; it is not pretended that the courses of individual units are more than approximately correct, although they have been drawn with care after consulting all available information. As it is considered that the exact facts must be developed before fair and valuable criticism should be attempted, no comments on the handling of the opposing forces are contained in this paper. I. THE MISSION OF THE HIGH SEA FLEET On 18 January, 1916, Vice Admiral Scheer, who had from the outbreak of the war commanded the second, and later the third, battle squadron of the High Sea Fleet, was promoted to commander-in-chief upon the illness of Admiral von Pohl. On 21 March, 1915, Von Tirpitz had written: "The order that battle must be sought à tout prix cannot be issued, but must be locked in the breast of the person concerned." He could have no cause for complaint on this ground after the appointment of Admiral Scheer. The commander-in-chief's object was to make the enemy "feel the gravity of the war." According to his statement, his means for accomplishing this object were the following: 1. U-boat trade war. 2. Mines. 3. Trade war in the North Sea and the Ocean. 4. Aerial warfare. 5. Aggressive action of the High Sea Fleet in the North Sea. "The U-boat and aerial war," he writes, "had started already; the three other factors were to be operated in combination." His first task was to organize the defenses of the German Bight; a large number of seaplanes, outpost vessels, patrol vessels and mine-sweepers were constantly on their stations; these forces were to be supported by the High Sea forces in the event of an enemy attack; for this purpose about half the destroyer flotillas, light cruisers, battle cruisers and battleships were maintained ready for getting under way on 45 minutes notice; there was always one destroyer flotilla at Heligoland ready to get under way immediately; the remainder of the fleet was kept on three hours notice. The first operations of the High Sea Fleet were to be night sorties into the North Sea for a short distance outside the German Bight "to destroy enemy forces stationed there, to hold up suspicious craft and to be in readiness to afford help to airships raiding England." The forces used in these sorties were several destroyer flotillas, led by a light cruiser; they were supported by a scouting division of light cruisers and sometimes by the battle cruiser division. The next operations were to be similar night sorties prolonged until daylight in order to cover a more extended area. In such cases several flotillas of destroyers were to proceed in advance; after them would come a division of light cruisers and one of battle cruisers; the entire High Sea Fleet was to follow in support. Such operations were designed to reach the Skagerrak and the approaches to the channel. It was such a sortie that caused the Battle of Jutland. "Finally," writes Admiral Scheer, " other important enterprises were planned, such as the bombardment of coastal towns, to exercise a still greater pressure on the enemy and induce him to take counter-measures which would afford us an opportunity to engage a part or all of his fleet in battle under conditions favorable to ourselves." Such an operation was the attempted raid against Sunderland on 19 August, 1916, two and a half months after the Battle of Jutland. In all the operations of the High Sea Fleet the naval corps in Belgium was to furnish U-boats, which were to be stationed off the English coast while the High Sea Fleet was at sea. |