meeting of minds with the British we had to permit some cutting down of statements of principle. As the draft now stands the concluding paragraphs read as follows: "8. This Conference strongly reaffirms the principles of the Nine Power Treaty as being among the basic principles which are essential to world peace and orderly progressive development of national and international life. 9. The Conference believes that a prompt suspension of hostilities in the Far East would be in the best interests not only of China and Japan but of all nations, and that with each day's continuance of the conflict the loss in lives and property is bound to increase and the ultimate solution of the conflict to become more difficult. 10. The Conference therefore strongly urges the Chinese and Japanese Governments to suspend hostilities and resort to peaceful processes. 11. The Conference believes that no possible step to bring about by peaceful processes a settlement of the conflict should be overlooked or be omitted. 12. In order to allow time for the participating governments to exchange views and further explore all peaceful methods by which a settlement of the dispute may be attained consistently with the principles of the Nine Power Treaty and in conformity with the objectives of that Treaty the Conference has taken its decision to suspend for the present its sittings. 13. The Conference will be called together again whenever its Chairman or any two of its members shall have reported that they consider that its deliberations can be advantageously resumed." DAVIS 193.94 Conference/294: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State BRUSSELS, November 24, 1937-midnight. [Received November 24-11:40 p. m.] 52. 1. The Conference recessed this evening after adopting with only Italy abstaining, a single report, the full text of which follows in the next telegram. This will be sent to all governments for their authentic information. 2. I am planning to leave for Paris tomorrow evening and shall probably remain there or in the vicinity until the sailing of the Washington, December 2. DAVIS 'For text of report, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. I, p. 417. 793.94 Conference/296: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State BRUSSELS, November 25, 1937-4 p. m. [Received November 25-3: 10 p. m.] 54. MacDonald before leaving Tuesday on account of his father's funeral pressed me rather strongly to go by London for a day or so. He said the Prime Minister wished very much to have a talk with me before I return to Washington and also that Eden who was unable to return to Brussels because of his health would like to have a final talk. I told him that I would like very much to do so but that there were two difficulties in the way. First, my wife is not at all well; in fact not well enough for me to run the risk of taking her by London. Second, if I should go by London for further consultation just now, particularly with the impending visit of Chautemps and Delbos, I was fearful that there would be so much press speculation that it might possibly have a harmful reaction at home which would not be compensated by the advantages to be gained in further discussions. Yesterday afternoon some of the British press told Pell 10 they understood that the Prime Minister had invited me to see him in London and inquired when I was going. Pell told them he knew nothing about it but that he understood that for personal reasons I was planning to proceed direct for home. A London despatch in the Paris Herald today states that a Downing Street spokesman said that MacDonald had suggested that I return home by London. Last night Cranborne pressed me to go via London. I repeated to him what I had told MacDonald and added that until I returned home and discussed matters fully with the President and you, it was difficult to see what further useful conversations we could carry on except to exchange views more fully as to the manner and the terms under which a possible eventual mediation or conciliation might be offered. This was a subject which we had not been able to explore fully here because of the strain of more pressing work. Cranborne, Cadogan, Hornbeck and I had a tentative exploratory conversation on this subject. The British told me that Craigie had been telegraphing quite a bit of late on the subject of mediation but that they would not have the details of his telegrams until they got back to London. In essence, however, they indicated that the attitude of Japan on this score was less hopeful than a few days ago but they still considered it useful for us to consider this together more fully in order to be prepared if and when something can be done. 10 Robert T. Pell, press officer of the American delegation at the Brussels Conference. I suggested that it might be possible to send Hornbeck for a day or two in London just before sailing to have further conversations with Cadogan without any commitment on this subject. I hope this will satisfy the British. Although my judgment is against visiting England at this time because of possible adverse opinion at home and is certainly against going while the French are there I feel I should point out that an unfortunate impression of unresponsiveness on our part might arise if I refuse under all circumstances to go by London as the British are greatly disappointed that our cooperation here has not assumed a more substantial character. I should be glad, however, to receive your guidance. Hornbeck plans tentatively to go with me to Paris then to The Hague and thence on Tuesday to England where he would visit the Foreign Office informally unless you object. Moffat 11 will stay with me in Paris. DAVIS 793.94 Conference/302: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the BRUSSELS, November 25, 1937-midnight. 56. The British are strongly in favor of a joint Anglo-American offer to mediate between Japan and China. They admit that the time is probably not yet opportune but think it may come in the near future. They also think that as long as Japan is unwilling to make a constructive or reasonably just settlement she would discourage mediation by the two of us and perhaps try to work it around for Germany and Italy to mediate believing that she would thus put the other interested powers in an embarrassing position and be able to effect a settlement more favorable to herself than if other powers were the mediators. I have told the British in substance that I would be glad for us to see the thoughts of our two Governments working along parallel lines as to methods of approach and possible terms of settlement which would be a sine qua non to safely attempting mediation, but that we should then be guided by developments and I would want to confer with Washington before reaching any conclusion or making any tentative commitment. The British evidently feel as we do that Japan will jockey on the question of mediation. The Japanese Ambassador here sent me word that he was confident his country would be glad to have American mediation particularly if we would act through Grew. He told the British that he was sure that his "J. Pierrepont Moffat, Adviser to the American delegation at the Brussels Conference. Government would be favorable to British mediation alone. He told the Italians that he was prepared to recommend to his Government on his responsibility that they accept mediation by the Shanghai Committee. Aldrovandi has in conference approached me several times here and suggested that Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States mediate as members of the Shanghai Committee and said he believed that they could induce Japan to accept this. That is quite possible. On the other hand the British are opposed to this because they feel satisfied that the problem of composing the difference between the members of such a mediating committee would be about as great as that of bringing Japan and China together. We suspect that the strong opinion expressed by the Japanese and reported by Craigie and Grew against joint Anglo-American cooperation was in line with Japanese strategy of trying to keep us apart just as in the preliminary naval negotiations they tried to drive a wedge between us by playing one off against the other. They unquestionably feel that as long as they can keep us from standing together they are safe from outside pressure. I feel that the more the Japanese think that the British and ourselves are cooperating closely and earnestly for a fair and peaceful solution and are not making threats the greater are the chances of success. I realize, however, that it is important to avoid giving any erroneous impression that we are playing the British game or committing ourselves to join in coercive measures. The Chinese are standing off Italian proffers of mediation and probably also German. We suggest that you take no moves and make no commitments on the subject of mediation until we shall have had an opportunity to discuss it with you in Washington. DAVIS 793.94 Conference/296: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt) WASHINGTON, November 26, 1937-6 p. m. 590. Following telegram is for Mr. Davis. If he is still in Brussels, please repeat to him. Personal for Norman Davis. Your 54, November 25, 4 p. m. from Brussels. I am distressed to hear of Mrs. Davis' ill health. I think your answer to MacDonald was wise and that the press speculation aroused by your visit and consultation with Chamberlain and Eden would be harmful here and to you personally. I, therefore, concur in your judgment against going to London. On the other hand, I believe that Hornbeck could usefully make the trip, especially if he answers inquiries by stating that he is visiting London for personal reasons on his way home. HULL 793.94/11412: Telegram The Consul at Geneva (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State GENEVA, December 2, 1937-4 p. m. [Received December 2-1: 10 p. m.] 369. Minister's 41, October 8 [7], 3 p. m.12 Opinion in Geneva is that no meeting of Sino-Japanese Advisory Committee will be called at least before January Council meeting. Secretariat officials feel that League did its part adopting the Committee's resolution condemning Japan and the Chinese think no useful purpose would be served by referring the matter back to the Committee when the Brussels Conference itself was unable to take more direct action. Hoo indicates that the present Chinese plan is to endeavor to obtain any possible aid from individual governments as a result of either joint all [or?] individual agreement and in the meantime to wait upon events. BUCKNELL 793.94 Conference/347 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) 13 PARIS, December 2, 1937. Ambassador Koo called at 10:30 by appointment, which Mr. Hornbeck had previously arranged, to see me at the Hotel Bristol. Koo said he came to say goodbye and to leave with me two memoranda 14 which he had told Mr. Hornbeck he would prepare. The first contained unofficial confidential suggestions as to possible basis for a settlement between Japan and China. The second was a list of requirements to enable China to continue to defend herself. Dr. Koo doubted if the militarists in Japan were yet prepared to agree to any kind of settlement which would be fair and reasonable, and said that his chief concern was to keep up the morale of China, which could best be done by securing the means with which to defend herself. He nevertheless thought that there was a possible chance that Japan would now accept mediation if proposed by the United States and Great Britain, and that those two powers might be able to exercize enough influence to bring hostilities to an end and induce Japan to agree to a settlement which China could afford to accept. He felt that the United States could save the situation if it would act quickly and energetically, and that otherwise the alternatives which faced 12 Not printed. "Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chairman of the American delegation in his covering letter of December 16. 14 Not found in Department files. |