made. He replied that the charge of Japanese machine-gunning of the Panay having been made, the Japanese Government must first ascertain the facts. He confirmed that an officer of the General Staff had left for Shanghai to investigate. 394.115 Panay/371 GREW The Navy Department to the Department of State [WASHINGTON, undated.] [Received December 20, 1937.] The following information has been received from the Commanderin-Chief Asiatic Fleet under date of 19 December, 1937, and was sent to the Commander Yangtze Patrol to inform our Ambassador to China: According to a report given to Beatty of United Press by Horigu Chinese Domei agency Shanghai it is claimed that naval aviators were ordered by the army to bomb all ships on the river between Wuhu and Nanking. This report was given in confidence but was not verified. It is further claimed that the naval commander protested against this order but the order was carried out after being repeated by army officials. The navy is now trying to make the army publicly admit that they issued the bombing orders, but so far the army has refused to do so because of the opposition of the younger officers to such admission. Admiral Hasegawa called today and made the following statements: (1) that planes were acting under army orders. (2) that, though previously denied, one of the aviators had admitted that he fired machine gun. (3) because of the fact that communications with the advanced forces were poor, he has had much trouble getting reports from the army officials. The Japanese naval air force used eight hundred planes in making fifty bombing attacks on Nanking according to Reuter Tokyo. During all of these bombings gunboats of Great Britain and the United States were there and after that number of bombings must have been familiar to Japanese aviators from the air. This makes recognition of Panay as American gunboat most probable by bombers, who nevertheless proceeded to carry out orders received from the army. Among the Japanese bombers who attacked the Panay were two officers who undoubtedly had a part in the bombings at Nanking. One is a Lieut. Comdr. and the other a Lieutenant. 394.115 Panay/158: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State HANKOW, December 20, 1937-9 a. m. [Received December 20-6 a. m.] 89. Following note addressed to Minister of Foreign Affairs 91 today: 91 Wang Chung-hui. "I have just been informed by Mr. Atcheson of the generous and effective services rendered to him and to the other survivors of the Panay by the Magistrate of Hohsien, Mr. Wang Tien Chih, and the Magistrate of Hanshan, Mr. Kiu Jui Chung, during the time that they were at Hohsien and Hanshan. These officers spared no effort in providing the Panay survivors with quarters for their wounded and all with food, stretcher carriers, boats, etc. Mr. Atcheson has asked me to convey to these officers through you his gratitude and the gratitude of the whole party for their assistance and kindly help. I desire to join Mr. Atcheson in this expression of gratitude and to state that I am informing my Government of the helpful attitude of these officers of the Chinese Government. I avail myself, etc." JOHNSON 394.115 Panay/331 The Navy Department to the Department of State [WASHINGTON, undated.] [Received December 20, 1937.] The following information was received from the Commander-inChief Asiatic Fleet under date of 20 December, 1937: There will be a news article in the New York Times today about activities of Colonel Hashimoto and discipline in the Japanese Army. Information contained in this article was furnished to correspondent Abend by Matsui 92 who sent the information to Abend in a special plane. Matsui personally requested that the facts be published. As no Japan paper would ever dare print such matters of the Army, Matsui is hoping that the information contained in the article will be wired to Tokyo after it is published in America. The article indicates that an unusual condition exists in the Japanese Army. The foregoing probably indicates disregard by the younger officers of the Army of any Tokyo Government agreement in regard to the Panay incident. It is thought that the sinking of the Panay will lead to a break between the Navy and Army due to the fact that though Navy planes did the bombing and Navy took the blame they were carrying out Army orders and therefore the Army is responsible for the destruction of the gunboat. 394.115 Panay/164: Telegram The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State SHANGHAI, December 20, 1937-8 p. m. [Received December 20-7:50 p. m.] 1194. Consul General Okazaki on special detail at Shanghai where he serves principally as liaison with the Japanese military called on 92 Gen. Iwane Matsui, Japanese Army Commander in Chief in Central China. me this afternoon with a Japanese military staff officer with whom he had just arrived from Nanking and sought to impress upon me that the Japanese Army bore no ill will toward the Americans and did not deliberately attack any American ships or citizens. He could give me no satisfactory explanation, however, of the reported boarding and machine-gunning of the Panay by an army surface craft nor did his detailed report of poor communications explain why the Japanese military authorities, knowing that the American steamers had been bombed and sunk failed to send information immediately to Shanghai. 2. Okazaki returned later this evening to say that another military officer, Chief of the American Section of the War Office, had just returned from Nanking and vicinity and reports that a Japanese Army surface boat contacted the Standard Oil steamers on the right bank of the river and attempted by signal flags to warn off the Japanese bombing planes but were unsuccessful and several members of the army unit were wounded by bomb fragments, that men of this unit rendered assistance to the Americans, that the surface boat later visited the Panay but found her sinking rapidly and could find no one aboard, that this boat did not machine-gun the Panay, but that another army surface boat in the vicinity machine-gunned a Chinese boat which was following the American ships and this Chinese boat was captured and is now at Nanking. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo, Hankow and Peiping. GAUSS 394.115 Panay/163: Telegram The Commander in Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Leahy)93 [SHANGHAI,] December 20, 1937-10:56 p. m. [Received December 20-9:02 p. m.] 0120. At press conference by General Harada, Japanese Military Attaché, he said that Japanese boat which bombed Panay at 1100, 12 December gave warning that the vessel was in dangerous zone, that Panay fired at Japanese troops on shore with main battery, and that the army boat which boarded the Panay before she sank did not machine-gun the vessel before boarding. These statements are entirely contrary to all evidence given by survivors to Court of Inquiry. 93 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Navy Department. 394.115 Panay/172: Telegram The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State ROME, December 21, 1937-5 p. m. [Received December 21-2:40 p. m.] 528. My telegram 527, December 21, 1 p. m." I find that in an earlier despatch describing the death of Sandri which was printed in the Corriere Della Sera of December 18, and which has just been brought to my attention Barzini reported as follows: "The boats were returning to the ship to get medicines and distilled water when boats full of troops which had been lying wait on the other bank during the bombardment approached the Panay which was slowly disappearing under water and opened fire with machine guns on the deserted vessel." PHILLIPS 394.115 Panay/170: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, December 22, 1937-11 a. m. [Received December 22-5 a. m.] 668. 1. The Foreign Office informs me that the Vice Minister of the Navy, Admiral Yamamoto, desires to call on me tomorrow to inform me of the results of Japanese investigations into the circumstances of the attack on the Panay. He is to be accompanied by Yoshizawa, of the Foreign Office, Lieutenant Commander Taniguchi, who has brought information from Navy Headquarters at Shanghai, and probably Lieutenant Colonel Nishi (see our 655, December 18, 3 p. m.), who is flying back today from Nanking. The Vice Minister has requested that the Counselor and the Naval Attaché of this Embassy also be present at the meeting. 2. It would be helpful to us if we could have by tomorrow morning pertinent portions of the report of findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry. 3. I am repeating this telegram to the Commander in Chief and am requesting him, if he is in a position to supply me with the desired portions of the naval report, to radio Washington urgently as soon as he has communicated it to me. Repeated to Shanghai for urgent communication to the Commander in Chief. "Not printed. GREW 394.115 Panay/170: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) WASHINGTON, December 22, 1937-4 p. m. 368. Your 668, December 22, 11 a. m. 96 1. Department has not yet received report of findings. We have, however, reports and accounts by various survivors, both officers and civilians, which are in accord regarding important facts although showing some discrepancies in regard to minor and unessential details. None of these casts doubt in any way on the statement of essential facts made in the first sentence of the second paragraph of the note which you delivered under instruction of Department's 342, December 13, 8 p. m.,95 and all of them support and confirm the view supplementarily expressed in Department's 350, December 16, 1 p. m.96 2. It is evident that the Japanese authorities in the course of their investigation have discovered that the essential facts are as this Government has stated them; that they have encountered great diversity of testimony by their own people with regard to certain details; that they have been distracted from the main issues by a controversy over the question whether Japanese Army surface craft did or did not machine-gun the Panay; and that they are having contention among themselves, in view especially of that controversy, over the question of action which they should take by way of punishment and by way of giving assurances. But, this Government's statement of what it requests and expects was made and will stand without regard to the question of the machine-gunning; it was based on the essential facts. Before either they or we had the later details, the Japanese Government had admitted fault and had promised appropriate action. 3. We have already what to us is conclusive evidence that before the attacks were ended some of the bombing planes should have known that they were bombing American vessels; that at least one and probably two Japanese Army launches approached the Panay and engaged in some firing; that personnel from at least one such launch boarded the Panay after its abandonment; and that planes machinegunned survivors. We believe that, notwithstanding conflicting testimony and contentions by their own people, the Japanese authorities must be fully aware of these facts. 4. We have proceeded on the principle of not entering into controversy with the Japanese Government over the details. Such controversy would tend merely to obscure the main issues, with regard to which the substantial facts are clear and undisputed. Among these facts are: our ships were on the river by right; Japanese military authorities knew that they were there and knew their approximate |